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Religion, Cognition and Author-Function:
Dyer, Southwell, Lodge and As You Like It.
Abstract.
The thesis incorporates the view that allegory as a mode of communication is 
impossible. Accordingly, religious meanings of Elizabethan literary texts usually 
read as “secular” works are registered herein without recourse to positing an 
allegorical level of meaning in those texts. In order to arrive at relatively secure 
readings, texts have been selected which have explicit interrelationships (for 
example, texts which are parodies or adaptations of earlier texts). Registering the 
tenor of the later texts’ departures allows contemporary production of meaning 
from the earlier works to be traced. The aim, however, is not merely to show that 
Elizabethan “secular” texts are far more religious than tends to be supposed; the 
thesis seeks to demonstrate the extent to which theories of cognition were 
inseparable in the period from doctrinal issues. Early modems not only thought 
and read religiously, religious concepts informed their cognitive theories (and 
vice versa).
The thesis culminates in a reading of As You Like It, arguing that the play 
employs facultative rhetoric (as derived from scholastic faculty psychology) in 
order to present human appetence as co-efficient in salvation. In doing so, the 
play downgrades the role of the intellectual faculty. The notion of 
author/dramatist as governing intellect is thereby brought into question. 
Accordingly, the thesis also traces the development of attitudes towards author- 
function in its study-texts, demonstrating the extent to which a given text’s 
cognitive model and its rhetorical stance towards crucial doctrinal issues (relating 
to human participation in salvation) affect its deployment of, and attitude 
towards, author-function.
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Note Regarding Sources.
Quotations from pre-modem primary sources retain original spellings with the 
following exceptions: where such sources use “i” for “j ”, I have used “j ” for the 
reader’s convenience due to the high number of quotations including names such 
as “Iohn” and “Iaques” (this does not apply to Latin texts and the poems in the 
appendix); where “w ” is used for “w” I have used “w”, and where long “f  ’ is 
used for “s”, I have used “s”. Spellings and punctuation in modem sources have 
been adapted to British conventions.
References to classical texts and, where appropriate, medieval texts are 
normatized.
All titles have been normatized: initial letters of all words in titles, except 
prepositions, intra-clausal connectors and articles, are capitalized.
Introduction.
Religion, maintains Frederic Jameson, is “the master-code of pre-capitalist 
society”.1 One must be careful, however, not to infer from Jameson’s use of the 
word “code” that “pre-capitalist” discourse should be decoded into modem 
capitalist discourse in order to find out what pre-capitalist subjects were “really” 
saying.2 As Debora Shuger remarks, religion is “not simply politics in disguise”. 
Rather, in the Renaissance, “[rjeligion supplies the primary language of analysis. 
It is the cultural matrix for explorations of virtually every topic”.3 In a manner 
consistent with Shuger’s assessment, this thesis will argue that Shakespeare’s As 
You Like It addresses religious issues which.were of major importance both at its 
moment of probable composition (1598-9) and first production (1599), and in the 
longue duree of late-medieval/early modem Christianity.4
Some modem readers might consider Elizabethan religious topics to be of 
little relevance to present-day concerns. However, since the historicist study of 
texts such as As You Like It is regarded as a legitimate means of developing 
greater understanding of present cultural formations, it follows that those texts 
are to be read in relation to their cultural moment (regardless of one’s incapacity 
to fully recreate that moment). Therefore, while the religious dimension of such
1 Fredric Jameson, “Religion and Ideology: a Political Reading o f  Paradise Lost,” p. 39, in 
Francis Barker et al, eds. Literature, Politics and Theory (London: Routledge, 1986), pp. 35-56.
2 Vincent B. Leitch et al, eds. The Norton Anthology o f  Theory and Criticism  (New York & 
London: Norton, 2001), p. 1933. My point is not materially affected if  one regards early modem  
societies as nascent-capitalist or semi-capitalist rather than “pre-capitalist”.
3 Debora Kuller Shuger, Habits o f  Thought in the English Renaissance: Religion, Politics and the 
Dominant Culture (Toronto, Buffalo & London: University o f Toronto Press, 1997), p. 6.
4 For dating o f  AYLI, see: Juliet Dusinberre, “Introduction,” pp. 37-46, in Dusinberre, ed. AYLI 
(London: Thomson Learning [Arden3], 2006), pp. 1-142; “Pancakes and a Date fox AYLI,” SQ,
54 (2003), pp. 371-405.
“secular” texts as Shakespeare’s plays remains inadequately historicized (and 
apprehended), modem analyses of those texts will suffer from unnecessary 
transhistorical distortion.
This circumstance is not the only argument I would make for the modem 
relevance of my thesis. I will also maintain that As You Like It engages with 
issues relating to theories of cognition. As Jameson and Shuger’s comments 
indicate, that engagement cannot be separated from the text’s religious discourse. 
Nor, on the other hand, can it be regarded as either the ground or a side-effect of 
that discourse. Rather, registration of the interfusedness of early modem concern 
with doctrinal and cognitive issues offers a means of diagnosing the cultural 
relativity of modem cognitive habits which, of all habits, are the most likely to be 
considered “natural”. By assessing the relations between doctrinal positions and 
cognitive theories in the early modem period, that is, one gains a vantage point 
from which to observe the belief-positions informing modem cognitive habitus.
The present thesis, however, is a literary study. The foregoing remarks are 
offered to indicate the potential contemporary relevance of my findings. The 
thesis itself aims to demonstrate that As You Like It is informed by 
intellectual/theological problems which came to prominence following the 
nominalist challenge to (and within) scholasticism in the 14th century. Charles 
Trinkaus has recorded aspects of that challenge, noting, for example, how 
Ockhamists insisted that “only a freely elected, spontaneous act that was not 
guided by natural necessity could be considered moral”.5 The performance of 
even such a motiveless moral act, however, could have no actual bearing on the 
human agent’s salvific destiny. Thus, regardless of whether one had access to the 
sacraments, or received them in an appropriate spiritual state, and regardless of 
any ecclesiastical advisor’s opinion or operative efficacy, the human agent could 
not wilfully obtain grace. In other words, one could do nothing to affect the 
predestined outcome. This doctrine of divine election—which, of course, was
5 Charles Trinkaus, ‘In Our Image and Likeness Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist 
Thought, 2 volumes (London: Constable, 1970), 1.71. See also: “The Problem o f  Free Will in the 
Renaissance and the Reformation,” pp. 54-5, Journal o f  the History o f  Ideas 10 (1949), pp. 51- 
62.
taken up by later church reformers—arguably informs Orlando’s complaint in the 
opening scene of As You Like It. The rest of the play, moreover, can be read as 
interrogative of the Ockhamist position and its Lutheran/Elizabethan reception. 
For instance, Orlando’s eventual loving sacrifice—his “decision” to rescue his 
former enemy (his brother Oliver) from a predatory lioness—is not only (quite 
pointedly) “not guided by natural necessity”, but also (I argue) the ostensibly co­
efficient means by which the hero converts passion to grace.
The religious interpretation of Shakespeare’s works is a valid historicist 
endeavour in and of itself. Nevertheless, it is my view that to segregate the 
religious from a larger philosophical framework is to participate in modem 
binary formulations which segregate the sacred from the “secular” and (if often 
unconsciously) the religious from the intellectual. The latter binary formulations 
are consistent with modem hegemonic secularism. The present thesis, therefore, 
has not only to contend with the historical complexities of its matter, but also 
needs to work hard to demonstrate its relevance in a resistant contemporary 
milieu. The resistance I have in mind is by no means confined to the “world 
outside the academy”. Fellow academics, on being told that the focus of my 
thesis is As You Like It, have expressed (polite) surprise that one play could 
provide enough matter for such a project—or, rather, it promptly turns out, that a 
comedy should do so. “If it were Hamlet or King Lear...” the conversation 
proceeds, “I could understand it.” One can expect to find serious intellectual 
issues explored in tragedies, it seems, because their mood is more “like ours” in 
their darkness, their apparent cynicism and scepticism. Comedies, however, are 
apt to be regarded as commercial fluff (as though Hamlet was not written for 
money!), offering escapism, diversion from political troubles, and facile 
endorsement of conservative social institutions such as marriage.
The link between a bias against comedy as vehicle for “serious” thought 
and binary thinking may seem obscure to the reader. However, it has a long 
pedigree. As Shuger records, there was widespread recognition, during the 
Renaissance, of the specifically rhetorical power of the Bible, not excluding 
those portions of it written in “plain style”. Indeed, a link was held to obtain
between the solemn/sublime and the plain.6 Nonetheless, in theoretical works of 
the period which discuss rhetoric in isolation from theology, “the plain style ... 
remains associated with ... the low, conversational idiom of comedy.” 
Furthermore, as Shuger notes, the incongruity of recommending a “low” style for 
teaching, including religious instruction, goes unaddressed by early modem 
rhetorical scholars.7 The Bible was thus a particularly large elephant in the room 
whenever Renaissance neoclassicists insisted on stylistic decorum (inconsistency 
in this regard can be registered, for example, in Sidney’s Apology for Poetry)? 
The plain style, or “low” comedy, therefore, was (and is) appropriate for 
instructing a socially-diverse audience about religious issues. Moreover, once the 
Bible—the example of mixed style par excellence—is adopted as a rhetorical 
role model, nothing prevents a comedy from alternating between “low”, 
“medium” and “high” styles to suit the matter at hand. Thus, alongside 
Touchstone’s recollections of Jane Smile and her cow’s dugs (2.4.43-50), one 
finds in As Yon Like It Rosalind and Celia exchanging philosophical sallies in 
prose about fortune and nature (1.2.31-55), Orlando’s Neoplatonic poems 
(3.2.85-92, 122-51) and Oliver recounting Orlando’s epic struggle with a lioness 
in blank Spenserian verse (4.3.97-119, 126-31, 139-55).9 In other words, As You 
Like It can be placed in the same genre as the Bible, being a defiantly non- 
classical, hybrid poetic work offering doctrinal/moral instruction to audiences 
with a diverse range of appetites.10
The modem resistance to registering religious meaning in comedy is a 
function of an insistence on segregating the sacred and the secular. This
6 Debora K. Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric: the Christian Grand Style in the English Renaissance 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1988), p. 143.
7 Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric, p. 144.
8 A historical text must show Socrates dying a criminal’s death whereas true poetry would not, 
Sidney argues there. Yet this is precisely how Scripture represents Christ’s death, and Sidney 
maintains that Scripture belongs to the highest type o f  poesy: Geoffrey Shepherd, ed. An Apology 
fo r  Poetry, by Sir Philip Sidney (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1973), pp. 111-2.
9 Quotations o f  A YLI are from Nick de Somoygi, ed. A YLI: The First Folio o f 1623 and a 
Parallel Modern Edition (London: Nick Hem, 2003). Line references to the 2006 Arden3 edition 
are provided for the reader’s convenience.
10 For Elizabethan theatre as vehicle o f  religious instruction, see: Jeffrey Knapp, Shakespeare’s  
Tribe: Church, Nation and Theatre in Renaissance England (Chicago & London: Chicago UP, 
2002), p. 118 and passim.
insistence is itself informed by a “sceptical” Cartesian (per)version of 
empiricism. “Whatever I have up to now accepted as most true,” says Descartes 
in the first of his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), “I have acquired either 
from the senses or through the senses. But from time to time I have found that the 
senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have 
deceived us even once”.11 Descartes goes on to register the absurdity of this 
stance from a “common sense” position, only, however, as a prelude to bringing 
that common-sensical position itself into question en route to his famous 
conclusion. Jacques Derrida, in “Cogito and the History of Madness”, occupies— 
in customary deconstructionist fashion—Descartes’ position from within, in 
order to arrive at a new understanding of its meaning.12 Consequently, a central 
tenet of poststructuralism holds that, as one’s subjective experience of 
phenomena has no secure basis, empiricism can function only as a registration of 
diverse sets of conventions, not as an epistemology. A particular presupposition 
of the Derridean-poststructuralist position often goes unremarked: it takes for 
granted that the human subject is the (only) potential basis for (human) cognition 
(this basis failing, no other is presumed to exist). Derridean post-structuralism 
thus remains allied (albeit negatively) to a dualist mind-body split which has long 
since been exploded by advances in neurobiology and other related disciplines.13
It is interesting, therefore, to note that many late-medieval and early 
modem (pre-Cartesian) scholars would not have accepted Derrida’s subjectivist 
premise. Granted that one never knows when one’s apprehension of reality is in 
accord with that reality, one does not know either (in that same subjectivist 
sense) when accurate apprehension may in fact have occurred/be occurring.
Thus, the modem position is “sceptical” (not sceptical) because it assumes, in a 
naively positivist vein, that all of its apprehensions are as good as false.
Influential late-medieval theorists of cognition, such as the 14th-century
11 Bernard Williams, ed. Meditations on First Philosophy with Selections from  the Objections and  
Replies, by Rene Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986), p. 12.
12 Jacques Derrida, “Cogito and the History o f Madness,” in Writing and Difference (London & 
New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 36-76.
13 See, for example: Antonio Damasio, Descartes ’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain 
(London: Vintage, 2006); Michel Serres, The Five Senses: A Philosophy o f  Mingled Bodies (I) 
(London & New York: Continuum, 2008).
Franciscan theologian Peter Aureol, maintained on the contrary that the presence 
of error provided the epistemological basis for the cognition of reality 
(apprehensions err therefore something is).14
Christianity is thoroughly bound up with theories of cognition because 
individual agency (and a fortiori human agency in regard to acts of cognition) is 
the very question it raises. As Robert E. Stillman has observed, “arguments about 
the freedom or bondage of the will provoked many of the most divisive 
theological debates of the [16th] century”.15 Jesuit theologians, like other 
Catholic—and Protestant—theorists (and like scholastics in previous centuries), 
developed elaborate positions on this issue. Furthermore, as missionaries to 
Protestant states, the Jesuits made use of popular art-forms in order to 
communicate their complex position on free will. Accordingly, it will be argued 
(in Chapter 4) that Thomas Lodge’s prose and poetry pastoral romance 
Rosalynde (first published 1590)—Shakespeare’s immediate source for As You 
Like It—functioned as a popularization of Jesuit theology. As You Like It, it will 
be suggested in turn, performs an Anglican borrowing of Rosalynde's Jesuit 
feathers.16 Shakespeare’s play, moreover, does not replicate the humanism of 
Lodge’s romance; that is, the play (I suggest) interrogates the humanist tendency 
to equate selfhood with the intellect. In a manner that may strike the reader as 
incongruously medieval (but note the 1 l th-century provenance of the names 
Shakespeare gives to his fraternal agonists: Orlando and Oliver)17—and also thus 
recalling Spenser’s antiquarian practice in The Faerie Queene—As You Like It 
presents human agency as facultative process.18
14 Dallas G. Denery II, Seeing and Being Seen in the Later Medieval World: Optics, Theology and  
Religions Life (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005), pp. 118-9.
15 Robert E. Stillman, Philip Sidney and the Poetics o f  Renaissance Cosmopolitanism  (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2008), p. 132.
16 The anachronistic term “Anglican” is used for rhetorical convenience.
17 Anne Owens, “AYLI, or, the Anatomy o f  Melancholy,” p. 18, Q/W /E/R/T/Yl (1997), pp. 15-26.
18 For analysis o f  the Neoplatonic provenance o f  Spenser’s facultative rhetoric, see: Alastair 
Fowler, “Emanations o f  Glory: Neoplatonic Order in Spenser’s Faerie Queen,” in Judith M. 
Kennedy & James A. Reither, eds. A Theatre fo r  Spenserians (Toronto & Buffalo: University o f  
Toronto Press, 1973), pp. 53-82. Fowler suggests that an alternative influence on Spenser’s 
facultative rhetoric may have been “the medieval tradition, going back to SS Augustine and 
Bonaventura, that traced a trinitarian pattern in operations o f the human mind”: p. 67. On Spenser
Why would Shakespeare (or Spenser) draw upon such musty 
scholastic/Aristotelian concepts? Had the Reformation (if not Augustine) not 
swept all that away? “Augustinian humanism,” William J. Bouwsma remarks, 
“saw man not as a system of objectively distinguishable, discrete faculties 
reflecting ontological distinctions ... but as a[n] ... organic unity”.19 It is worth 
pausing over Bouwsma’s formulation. It implies, of course, that, before 
Augustine, scholars did see “man ... as a system of objectively distinguishable, 
discrete faculties reflecting ontological distinctions”. That is, those benighted 
scholars did not understand that words were only words, philosophical models 
only heuristic devices; they really did—en masse—conceive of the psychological 
faculties they described as occupying physical spaces in the head. This could be 
argued (with difficulty in the case of Aristotle, I would suggest),20 but it renders 
one a hostage to historical fortune. That is, one will be obliged at every turn to 
insist that whenever a later champion of rationalism uses an abstract (or a 
metaphorical) term, s/he is only doing so “rhetorically”. Bouwsma’s humanists 
(poststructuralists avant la lettre) know better than to assume that there is any 
necessary correspondence between the language one uses and actual reality.
Thus, one here encounters the opposing nominalist extreme: there are “real” 
ideas in one’s head which, unfortunately, one simply cannot put into words, and 
so one has to make do with the clumsy labels left by one’s predecessors. 
Bouwsma strides confidently into this swampland: “Despite their underlying 
belief in the integral unity o f the personality,” he writes, “the Augustinian
21humanists accepted and argued in terms of the old vocabulary of the faculties”.
In other words, Bouwsma knows what the nominalists are really saying even if
and Shakespeare’s medievalism, see: Maureen Quilligan, The Language o f  Allegory: Defining the 
Genre (London: Cornell UP, 1979), p. 288.
19 William J. Bouwsma, “The Two Faces o f Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in 
Renaissance Thought,” p. 36, in Heiko A. Oberman & Thomas A. Brady, Jr., eds, Itinerarinm  
Italicum: the Profile o f  the Italian Renaissance in the M irror o f  Its European Transformations 
(Leiden: Brill, 1975), pp. 3-60.
20 See, for example: Joel Kaye, Economy and Nature in the 14th Century: Money, Market 
Exchange and the Emergence o f  Scientific Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998), p. 49 
(“Aristotle’s conceptual world was shifting and fully relational, with ... determinations changing 
as the point o f reference changed”).
21 Bouwsma, “Two Faces,” p. 37 (emphases added).
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they did not know back then how to say it. However, the scholars whom 
Bouwsma states had an “underlying belief in the integral unity of the 
personality” did not actually possess a word for the modem concept of 
“personality”.22 It is difficult to see how a person can have an “underlying belief’ 
in something of which they have no concept. Bouwsma’s transhistoricism thus 
reminds one to avoid reading back an idea of the self as “organic unity” onto 
early modem texts. Hence, instead of saying “Why would Shakespeare trade in 
faculty psychology when, being clever, he knew he was an unified organic 
individual, like us?”, I prefer to say (in anticipation of my reading of As You Like 
It): “Shakespeare appears to have made use of a facultative model of cognition in 
order to address religious issues before a diversified audience; this implies that 
the notion of the self as a unified whole was by no means universally accepted, 
and that a facultative model obtained as a social, rhetorically-produced, 
contingent reality”.23
Certainly, Augustine is an important figure for the present discussion in 
that he placed his personal experience, as described in the Confessions, at the 
core of his theology. On the other hand, Augustine famously complained 
(following Romans 7:15) that what he willed to do and what he found himself 
actually doing were often two different things24—can a “unity” be so radically 
divided? Colin Morris has noted that “intention” was given little attention by 
Christian theologians and philosophers prior to the 12th century (despite the 
importance accorded to intention by the New Law: “But I say unto you, that 
whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath already committed adultery
22 John F. Benton, “Consciousness o f Self and Perceptions o f  Individuality,” p. 284, in Robert F. 
Benson & Giles Constable, eds. Renaissance and Renewal in the 12th Century (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1982), pp. 263-95.
23 For another reading o f  AYLI as concerned with the reliability o f cognition, see: Maurice A. 
Hunt, Shakespeare’s AYLI: Late Elizabethan Culture and Literary Representation (New York & 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 54ff. Hunt sees the play as “a hinge in a grand 
cultural shift o f responsibility from humankind to language for lapses in communication and 
meaning”: p. 55. Evidently certain that such “lapses” always do and must occur, Hunt does not 
engage with the notion o f cognition as productive (as opposed to representational) process.
24 Henry Chadwick, ed. Confessions, by Augustine o f Hippo (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992), VIII. 10- 
11, 20-22 .
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with her in his heart” [Matthew 5:28])25 and that Augustine himself neglected the 
question of motive.26 Faced with this lacuna, Bouwsma moves forward in time to 
the Protestant appropriation of Augustine. Melanchthon’s respect for Augustine 
(in contrast to his contempt for other Church Fathers), says Bouwsma, explains 
the German reformer’s “indifference to the value of distinguishing the various
97faculties of the human personality”. There appears to be, moreover, a link 
between Melanchthon’s rejection of faculty psychology and his (admittedly 
ambivalent) anti-intellectualism. This is an important point as it relates directly to 
education (a major concern of the reformers, given the Lutheran-Tyndalian 
emphasis upon individual reading of Scripture). In the Loci Communes (1521), 
Melanchthon states: “in describenda homini natura non habemus opus 
multiplicibus philosophorum partitimibus”.28 Psychological faculties, in being so 
heuristically expendable, thus have much in common with their externalized 
collegiate namesakes, the latter being evidence of academic over-specialization. 
The early Melanchthon thus implies that only one discipline (Christian theology, 
presumably) is required for—indeed, worthy of—Christian education (not a 
Christian’s religious education, but the education of a Christian political subject). 
Not just the Aristotelian cognitive faculties, it appears, but fancy theory per se is 
out. Christians do not need abstruse disciplines and schools of thought because 
they prefer to read the plain and simple meaning of the only text worth reading: 
Scripture. Admittedly, Melanchthon modified his position in subsequent editions 
of the Loci Communes (though Bouwsma’s account itself does not observe this 
complicating circumstance).29 Nonetheless, one may infer that a “common sense” 
resistance to faculty psychology is consistent with an Ockham’s Razor approach
25 All Biblical quotations are from the Rheims-Douay Holy Bible; Translatedfrom the Latin 
Vulgate.
26 Colin Morris, The Discovery o f  the Individual, 1050-1200 (Toronto: University o f Toronto 
Press, 1987), pp. 73-6.
27 Bouwsma, “Two Faces,” p. 36.
28 Philip Melanchthon, “Loci Commvnes Rervm Theologicarum, sev Hypotypoeses 
Theologicasef p. 86, in Henry Ernest Bindseil, ed. Corpus Reformatorum, Volume 26 
(Brunsvigae: C. A. Schwetschke, 1854), pp. 59-228. “[W]e surely do not need the many divisions 
o f  philosophy to describe the nature o f man”: Philip Melanchthon, “Loci Communes Theologici,” 
p. 23 (emphasis added), in Wilhelm Pauck, ed. The Library o f  Christian Classics. Volume 19: 
Melanchthon and Bucer (London: SCM, 1969), pp. 1-152
29 Stillman, Sidney, pp. 148-50.
to theorization and education.
Melanchthon continues: “sed paucis in duo partimur hominem”
(indicating some strain in Bouwsma’s “organic unity”). “Est enim in eo vis 
cognoscendi, est et vis qua vel persequitur, vel refugit, quae cognovit.”31 The 
body, presumably, participates in the “faculty by which [man] either follows or 
flees ... things”. The exposition continues: “Vis cognoscendi est, qua sentimus, 
aut intelligimus, ratiocinamur, alia cum aliis comparamus, aliud ex alio 
colligimus”.32 If the senses are connected in some way to the cognitive faculty, 
then one might expect sensation to belong to it also. Are the senses and sensation 
distinct from the body? Melanchthon does not want to go into this: “Non puto 
magnopere referre, hoc loco separare sensus ab intellectu, quern vocant, et 
adpetitum sensuum, ab adpetitu superiore”.33 Interestingly, Melanchthon here 
retraces the limits of Thomistic speculation. For example, regarding Aquinas’ 
statement that “[a] 11 love of incorporeal or spiritual objects is an act of will rather 
than affectus”, Shuger notes that “Thomas ... does not make it very clear whether 
this intellective appetite is subjectively experienced as emotion”.34 A major 
problem for Aquinas, one suspects, is that the ultimate source of his facultative 
theory is Aristotle who, in a manner unacceptable to Christian orthodoxy in its 
(Neo)Platonic reception, made “the heart the basis of sensation and motion, as 
well as the source of life”.35 One also begins to suspect that Melanchthon’s 
project consists, to a notable extent, of a retention of (and reliance upon) 
scholastic terms as rhetorical devices, simultaneous with a rejection of their
30 Melanchthon, “Loci Commvnes,” p. 86. “We divide man into only two parts”: Melanchthon,
“Loci Communes,” p. 23.
31 Melanchthon, “Loci Commvnes,” p. 86. “[A] cognitive faculty, and ... a faculty by which he 
either follows or flees the things he has come to know”: Melanchthon, “Loci Communes,” p. 23.
32 Melanchthon, “Loci Commvnes,” pp. 86-7. “The cognitive faculty is that by which we discern 
through the senses, understand, think, compare, and deduce”: Melanchthon, “Loci Communes,” p. 
23.
33 Melanchthon, “Loci Commvnes,” p. 87. “I do not think it greatly matters at this point to 
separate the feelings from what is called the intellect, and the appetite o f the feelings from the 
higher appetite”: Melanchthon, “Loci Communes,” p. 23.
34 Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric, p. 217.n. Compare: Henry Beveridge, ed. Institutes o f  the Christian 
Religion, by John Calvin (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2008), 1.15.7.
35 E. Ruth Harvey, The Inward Wits: Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance (London: Warburg Institute, 1975), p. 22.
ontological validity.36 In other words, Melanchthon does not abolish facultative 
rhetoric, he restores (and insists upon) awareness of its metaphoricity. What 
Aquinas gained by (ostensibly?) assuming his terms corresponded to reality was 
an ability to use them as building blocks, leading to new insights. The 
disadvantage of this approach is that terms become mistaken for realities (by the 
philosopher’s followers). Melanchthon, on the other hand, employs terms as 
metaphors, useful for the communication of ideas.37 The danger here is that, in 
denying that language has any actual correspondence to reality, one is committed 
to wielding terms within a finite rhetorical system. In this sense, rhetoric is 
inherently conservative: statements work rhetorically because they appeal to 
people’s pre-established tastes (appreciation of this fact is perhaps signalled by 
the title “As You Like It”). Consequently, precisely where Aquinas left matters 
obscure, Melanchthon appears unable or unwilling to venture new insights. He 
can, however, turn back to Scripture, in order to escape what he regards as a 
maze of scholastic blind alleys.
Melanchthon continues: “Vis e qua adfectus oriuntur, est qua aut 
aversamur, aut persequimur cognita, hanc vim alias voluntatem, alias adfectum, 
alias appetitum nominant.”38 As the repetition of “alias” indicates, Melanchthon 
is impatient with the variety of opinions—with the confusion of the will and the 
appetite. “Intemi affectus,” Melanchthon insists, “non sunt in potestate nostra ... 
non posse voluntatem sua sponte ponere amorem, odium, aut similes adfectus, 
sed adfectus adfectu vincitur”.39 The latter clause should be noted, as again it 
seems descriptive of a closed system; it also anticipates the Elizabethan project to
36 For the humanists’ use o f  scholastic traditions “usually without acknowledgement”, see: Walter 
Clyde Curry, Shakespeare’s Philosophical Patterns (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1937), 
pp. 13-15.
Melanchthon defended the pragmatic value o f rhetoric in an epistolary exchange with Pico 
della Mirandola. See: Steven Ozment, The Age o f  Reform, 1250-1550: an Intellectual and  
Religious History o f  Late M edieval and Reformation Europe (New Haven & London: Yale UP, 
1980), pp. 313-4.
38 Melanchthon, “Loci Commvnes,” p. 87. “The faculty from which the affections arise is that by 
which we either turn away from or pursue the things known, and this faculty is sometimes called 
‘w ill’ (voluntas), sometimes ‘affection’, and sometimes ‘appetite’”: Melanchthon, “Loci 
Communes,” p. 23.
39 Melanchthon, “Loci Commvnes,” p. 90. “Internal affections are not in our power ... the will ... 
cannot in itself control love, hate, or similar affections, but affection is overcome with affection”: 
Melanchthon, “Loci Communes,” p. 27.
attach subjects’ affections to the queen in lieu of the Virgin Mary. In any case, 
here one reaches the anti-humanist core of the Protestant message, the parting of 
the ways for Erasmus and Luther: the will is not free.40 “Quid enim est voluntas,” 
asks Melanchthon, “si non adfectum fons est? Et cur non pro voluntatis 
vocabularo cordis nomen usurpamus? Siquidem scriptura potissimam hominis 
partem cor vocat.”41As stated, this is not faculty psychology per se; it is 
facultative rhetoric. Nor is it anti-hierarchical, as Shuger suggests (with reference 
to Augustine, not Melanchthon, but the point applies to both).42 Rather, 
Melanchthon rejects the Thomistic hierarchy which follows the Stoics in placing 
intellect in alliance with will at the top of the facultative ladder. Melanchthon 
installs a new hierarchy, or, rather, claims to restore the Apostolic one, according 
to which the heart is “the most powerful part of man”. If there is any doubt on 
this matter, he adds: “Nam cum corda deus judicet, necesse est cor cum suis 
adfectibus summam ac potissimam hominis partem esse.”43
As Bouwsma notes, if Melanchthon’s Lutheran position freed the will from 
reason’s rule, it bound it to the heart. The conclusion was that, since he cannot 
control his affections, “man can only be saved by grace not by knowledge; for 
knowledge can at best reach only the mind, but grace alone can change the 
heart”.44 However, there is an oft-noted problem here. Why preach to people if 
nothing avails? Why observe the commandments? Why write plays to sway 
audiences? Why do anything? Bouwsma’s summary contains a crucial lacuna. 
Not “grace alone can change the heart”—rhetoric also can alter one’s affections, 
can persuade one to attach oneself to a new object, or detach oneself from an
40 Ernst F. Winter, ed. Discourse o f  Free Will, by Desiderius Erasmus and Martin Luther (New  
York: Continuum, 1994). See also: Trinkaus, “Free Will,” pp. 55-60.
41 Melanchthon, “Loci Commvnes,” p. 90. “For what is will, i f  it is not the fount o f  affections? 
And why do we not use the word ‘heart’ instead o f ‘w ill’...?  For the Scriptures call the most 
powerful part o f man the ‘heart’”: Melanchthon, “Loci Communes,” p. 27.
42 Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric, p. 46. Augustine challenges the Platonists’ disparaging o f passion but 
later remarks, “[e]t utique ordine naturali animus anteponitur corpori”: George E. McCracken, ed. 
The City o f  God against the Pagans, by St. Augustine (London & Cambridge, MA: Heinemann & 
Harvard UP, 1957), XIV.23; see also: XIV.5.
43 Melanchthon, “Loci Commvnes,” p. 92. “For since God judges hearts, the heart and its 
affections must be the highest and most powerful part o f man”: Melanchthon, “Loci Communes,” 
p. 29.
44 Bouwsma, “Two Faces,” p. 42.
object to which one had been previously attached. Rhetoric and grace, therefore, 
are the media of conversion. This might be stated more radically: grace equals 
rhetoric. This position is not in Melanchthon, nor any of the Lutherans—because 
it restores freedom to human cognition (if not to the willing and/or feeling 
“subject”).45 Such an understanding of grace, I will argue, is consistent with the 
theological position presented by As You Like It; hence, it will be claimed that the 
play employs facultative rhetoric. Understood non-facultatively, human agency 
cannot be presented as free. In other words, if the self is regarded as the “I” 
marking a unified totality, it cannot be free, for that “I” identifies itself with the 
will, which cannot control the affections, the highest and most powerful part of 
“man”. If, on the other hand, the “I” is destructured metaphorically, then the 
rhetorical means by which human agency operates, not (only) in collaboration 
with grace but as grace (as rhetorical effect), may be presented (and staged).
Regardless of the extent of the influence of Melanchthon’s Loci Communes 
within Elizabethan England,46 prominent use of facultative rhetoric in discussion 
of doctrinal issues occurred much closer in time and space to the moment in 
which As You Like It was written and staged—for example, in the writings of 
Richard Hooker.47 In his principal works, Hooker, of course, was not specifically 
answering (or defending) Luther or Melanchthon, but rather combatting the 
radical reformers who wished to see all forms of ecclesiastical hierarchy 
abolished in Elizabethan England, following the model Calvin imposed in 
Geneva. Like Melanchthon, Hooker “assigns emotion a central role in the act of 
faith”.48 Accordingly, Hooker did not regard faith as something a Christian 
acquires merely by reading Scripture. This was a controversial position in 
Elizabethan England. Hooker’s own curate, the radical reformer Walter Travers,
45 Lacunae and apparent contradictions in Richard Hooker’s writings leave open the possibility o f  
his having entertained such a view; see: Nigel Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology: a 
Study o f  Reason, Will and Grace (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003), pp. 56-61.
46 Stillman notes that “only Erasmus, Cicero and Aristotle were found more frequently [than 
Melanchthon] on [16lh-century] English bookshelves”: Sidney, p. 7.
47 Regarding Hooker’s use o f facultative rhetoric, see: J. Leeds Barroll, Artificial Persons: the 
Formation o f  Character in the Tragedies o f  Shakespeare (Columbia: University o f  South 
Carolina Press, 1974), pp. 35.n, 37.n, 38.n; Curry, Philosophical Patterns, pp. 15-19; Voak, 
Hooker, pp. 12, 25-6, 62-5, 68-9.
48 Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric, p. 197.
wrote in complaint to the Privy Council circa 1585: “Upon ... occasion of this 
doctrine of [Hooker’s], that the assurance of that we believe by the word is not so 
certain as of that we perceive by the sense”.49 In response, Hooker argued that 
Travers’s view exhibited over-confidence in human intellectual powers (the 
radicals had become the new scholastics!). In an adroit rhetorical move, Hooker 
insisted that the “saving truth” of Christian doctrine “is far above the reach of 
human reason”.50 This did not mean, however, that human cognition was 
incapable of degrees of certainty. “I conclude,” asserted Hooker, “that we have 
less certainty of evidence concerning things believed, than concerning sensible or 
naturally perceived [s/c].”51 Comparison of the reliability of different modes of 
cognition thus occupied centre-stage during this high-profile Elizabethan 
doctrinal debate. Admittedly, Hooker’s facultative rhetoric is more implicit here 
than Melanchthon’s. The latter reformer, after all, had had to clear the way by 
explicitly rejecting scholasticism’s criteria of truth (if not its terms). With that 
battle long-won by the 1580s, Hooker has no need to explain why he will not be 
using scholastic terms in a systematic fashion. Nevertheless, as his response to 
the radical reformers shows, along with Melanchthon he rejected the notion of an 
isolated rational selfhood capable of accessing truth by volitional means. After 
all, if securing grace was as straight-forward as that, reading Scripture could be 
described as a “work” by which one became justified.
Where, though—in line with the doctrine of election—Melanchthon 
attributes all belief to grace, Hooker skirts the issue of predestination.52 Hence,
49 Walter Travers, A Svpplication Made to the Privy Covnsel (Oxford: Joseph Barnes, 1612), p. 
13.
50 Richard Hooker, “A Learned Discourse o f Justification, Works, and How the Foundation o f  
Faith Is Overthrown,” p. 46, in Christopher Morris, ed. O f the Laws o f  Ecclesiastical Polity, by 
Richard Hooker, 2 volumes (London: Dent, 1907), 1.14-75. For relevant discussion, see: Nigel 
Atkinson, Richard Hooker and the Authority o f  Scripture, Tradition and Reason: Reformed 
Theologian o f  the Church o f  England? (Vancouver: Regent College, 2005), pp. 76-128; Michael 
Brydon, The Evolving Reputation o f  Richard Hooker: An Examination o f  Responses, 1600-1714 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006).
51 Richard Hooker, “A Learned and Comfortable Sermon on the Certainty and Perpetuity o f  Faith 
in the Elect: Especially o f  the Prophet Habbakuk’s Faith,” p. l.n., in Morris, ed. Ecclesiastical 
Polity, 1.1-13. This view is consistent with Augustine: “animus anteponitur corpori, et tamen ipse 
animus imperat corpori facilius quam sibi”: McCracken, ed. City o f  God, XIV.23. “[T]he soul 
ranks above the body, yet the soul itself finds it easier to rule the body than to rule itself.”
52 Shuger, Habits o f  Thought, p. 75.
one seeks in vain, when reading Hooker, for the overwhelming apprehension of 
human nullity one experiences in reading Luther. This relative tepidity has been 
ascribed to the fact that Hooker was an apologist for an established regime, rather 
than the champion of a new movement, like Foxe. That circumstance also 
suggests why Hooker made greater allowances for the role one’s historical 
moment plays in determining praxis. Under the tyranny of the papacy, radical 
“unorthodox” insights based on individual close reading and the use of 
extravagant polemic were, presumably, necessary. With Elizabeth long- 
established on the throne, less non-conformist and less abrasive discursive 
activities are called for. Reasoned but nonetheless sensually appealing rhetoric is 
appropriate in a well-regulated Christian state, not Pauline lightning bolts and 
vituperation. Moreover, if, as Hooker says, one approaches certainty regarding 
“things believed” by means of the senses, rather than immediately grasping 
“truth” with the intellect, then well-tuned rhetoric has an especially important 
role to play in leading people to accept the “saving truth”.
Hooker’s call for individual defiance to be supplanted by a cementing of 
communal bonds is a crucial difference between the early Lutheran and the late 
Elizabethan situations. In some ways, their firm approval of rhetoric can make 
Hooker and Melanchthon’s positions seem extremely close. Both Lutherans and 
Anglicans, J. S. Pendergast has suggested, sought to use images to lead people 
away or “up” from the sensual world.54 But (setting aside the varieties of 
“Lutheran”) is that true for all Anglicans? Is not Hooker, as spokesman for a 
rather dazzling regime, committed to the view that people could do much worse 
than attach themselves to the visual spectacles of the court and its attendant 
power? How far should the average political subject go in his/her mystical 
career? “The proper use of images,” says Pendergast, “is to deliver people out of 
that ignorance, which possesses people in the Roman captivity”.55 Are 
Elizabethans still “in the Roman captivity”? Obviously, as defender of the
53 Richard Helgerson, Forms o f  Nationhood: the Elizabethan Writing o f  England (Chicago & 
London: University o f Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 269-83.
54 John Pendergast, Religion, Allegory and Literacy in Early Modern England, 1560-1640 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), p. 105.
55 Pendergast, Religion, p. 105.
Church of England, Hooker will not answer yes.
Moreover, as Pendergast himself observes, the distinction between an 
acceptable use of images as means of ascent to the spiritual and an unacceptable 
speculation on images as objects “does not clarify how images manifest Truth, or 
why speculation is such a dangerous thing”.56 It is not that the answer to the latter 
point is far to seek; rather, it was rarely in the interests of reformers seeking to 
win potentates to their cause to spell it out. Summarizing and interpreting 
arguments presented in an English religious treatise published in 1612,57 
Pendergast observes that “speculation” (dwelling intensely on images) was 
regarded by some Protestants as apt to lead “to reliance upon academics and the 
Pope”58—or, in England, subjection to the monarchy and/or its appointed 
doctrinal experts. Evidently, a hierarchical ecclesiastical structure is always 
necessary in a large-scale Christian political community.59 Otherwise, where all 
members are encouraged to engage in “speculation” (upon Scripture as well as 
upon “images”), there is nothing to prevent individual mystics from forgetting 
(or rejecting) their civic duties and floating off into the spiritual stratosphere 
(and/or wandering down into the radical underground).
Does this mean that there is no room for public debate of religious issues in 
a stable Christian political state? Does one end up subject once more to the 
tyranny of papal infallibility, only now disguised as monarchical absolutism? To 
answer this, I will return to that other point which, according to Pendergast, was 
left obscure by the Protestant distinction between acceptable and unacceptable 
uses of images: how do images manifest truth? If reason cannot access truth 
directly, what happens when people cognize images? How does doing that lead 
them towards truth? Here Hooker diverges from the Melanchthonian position. 
Instead of everyone being their own authority when it comes to matters of faith,
56 Pendergast, Religion, p. 105.
57 Edward Skipworth, An Apology fo r  the Holy Supper o f  the Lord against the Corporall 
Presence, Transubstantiation, Masses without Communicants, the Communion vnder One Kinde, 
together with Certaine Analiticall and Orthodoxe Propositions vpon the Lords Svpper (London: 
Nathaniell Butter, 1612); this text is an English translation o f a treatise by the French Protestant, 
Pierre du Moulin.
58 Pendergast, Religion, p. 105.
59 Ernest William Talbert, The Problem o f  Order: Elizabethan Political Commonplaces and an 
Example o f  Shakespeare's Art (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 1962), p. 50.
members of a Christian community must submit to the majoritarian view on all 
important issues. “Variety of judgement and opinions,” Hooker observes, 
“argueth obscurity in those things whereabout they differ. But that which all 
parts receive for truth, that which every one having sifted is by no one denied or 
doubted of, must needs be matter of infallible certainty”.60 As Pendergast 
remarks, “Hooker is suggesting that theologically ... ‘infallible’ opinion can be 
found in popular opinion”.61 The “pope” is the people. In other words, as As You 
Like It has it, when Touchstone and Rosalind reach a discursive impasse: “let the 
Forrest judge” (3.2.119). Insofar as Luther was understood to be asserting “I am 
right because I know I’m right” (as Sir Thomas More complained, with regard to 
the Lutherans),62 Lutheranism had to be rejected by a sane community.
Thus, in Hooker’s texts there are two types of facultative rhetoric—one 
relating to a notional topology of the human soul, the other descriptive of 
cognitive process. Regarding the first type: “Man doth seek a triple perfection[,]” 
Hooker writes, quoting (without attribution) the Nicomachean Ethics, “first a 
sensual”, aimed at necessities and “beauties”, “then an intellectual”, aimed at 
exercising reason, and “lastly a spiritual and divine”.63 Thus, Hooker divides 
“individuals” into three faculties (eschewing Melanchthon’s dualism), each with 
their own claims to perfection. I stress the latter phrase because it challenges the 
hierarchic model posited by Melanchthon, whereby, since God judges the heart, 
the heart should be regarded as paramount. By replacing the Stoic/scholastic 
identification of the “self’ with the individual “mind” with an identification of 
the “self’ with the “heart”, Melanchthon retains a subjectivist model of 
cognition. Cognition for Hooker, however, is always being communally 
performed. Discrete acts of judgement/discernment occurring during that on­
going process (such as, say, the establishment of the Elizabethan religious 
settlement) are to be accepted or rejected (regardless of any individual’s 
subjective opinion) according to the extent to which they are consistent with the
60 Quoted in Pendergast, Religion, p. 107.
61 Pendergast, Religion, p. 107.
62 Sir Thomas More, “Responsio ad  Luther am f  in John M. Headley, ed. The Complete Works o f  
St. Thomas More, volume 5, part 1 (New Haven & London: Yale UP, 1969).
63 Morris, ed. Ecclesiastical Polity, 1.205.
registrations of the communal assembly. Moreover, once those judgements have 
been ratified by an established legal system (itself a product of a contingent 
communal/historical process), it is not the place of individuals to question them 
outside of legitimate venues.
To put the matter another way: if Christ is the self and Christ is the 
community, then it follows that the Christian self is the community. No one 
faculty—not even the heart—is to be identified with the “self’. Thus, Hooker 
sees individual members of the state, each comprised of three faculties, as 
capable of acts of apprehension which contribute to cognition. However, reliable 
discernment occurs only after those members pool their data in a facultative 
assembly. As You Like It, it will be argued in Chapters 7-8, presents this 
facultative system in action. In any case, as may now be seen, discussion of early 
modem doctrinal positions cannot be usefully separated from discussion of early 
modem theories of cognition.
In his affirmative texts,64 Hooker employs abstract terms as metaphors in a 
logical register. In a poetic work (in print or on stage) fictional personce are signs 
and, therefore, metaphors. By means of these metaphors, Shakespeare’s As You 
Like It (I contend) dramatizes doctrinal conceptions consistent with 1590s 
Anglican theology—as formulated in Hooker’s works. As stated above, to stage 
human agency in cognition, one must abandon the notion of a unified selfhood 
directing a will by means of sovereign reason. Accordingly, in a play using 
facultative rhetoric, both the play’s characters and their sundry interactions may 
figure facultative processes.
As You Like It is an especially appropriate guide to navigation of the issues 
raised by Hooker’s departures from Lutheran-Melanchthonian thinking, in that 
Shakespeare’s comedy “answers” Rosalynde, a text written circa 1587 by the 
Catholic Thomas Lodge. As Keir Elam points out, As You Like It is notable in 
that it “is the comedy in which Shakespeare is most consistently and substantially
641 follow Sidney’s observation in An Apology fo r  Poetry that poetic  texts are distinct in that they 
“nothing affirm”: Shepherd, ed. Apology, p. 123.
indebted to a narrative source”.65 That the source in question is an English 
“literary” work—one only a decade older than the Shakespearean text—further 
justifies selection of As You Like It as lodestar for the present thesis. 
Interpretation of the play is thus rendered relatively secure via triangulation (a 
hermeneutic process equivalent to the facultative empiricism recommended by 
Hooker).
However, As You Like It has been selected as the chief study-text for the 
present thesis for a further reason, relating to the third term in the thesis’ title. I 
will argue that As You Like It engages extensively with the question of author- 
function. Specifically, it will be maintained that the melancholy Jaques figures 
the author-function in the body of the text.66
It will be useful to consider here a recent account of late-medieval attitudes 
to the location of authority in literary works. The French medieval literary 
scholar Michel Zink has pointed to the shift in vernacular French fiction in the
t V i13 century away from relying upon fidelity to a previous, authoritative source 
as vouching for the truth of a newly-written text.67 Once an ironic stance is 
adopted towards the evident absurdities of earlier fictions, the claims of a new 
fiction’s authority reside in the author’s subjectivity as represented in the text, 
Zink argues.68 Notwithstanding the importance of the shift Zink describes, it may 
be doubted whether this alteration can perform the “invention of literary 
subjectivity”. After all, if earlier sources are, by the 13th century, being derided as
65 Keir Elam, ‘“As They Did in the Golden World’: Romantic Rapture and Semantic Rupture in 
AYLI,” p. 217, Canadian Review o f  Comparative Literature 18 (1991), pp. 217-32.
66 In using the term “author-function” I am obviously influenced by Michel Foucault’s essay 
“What Is an Author?” (in Paul Rabinow, ed. The Foucault Reader [London: Penguin, 1991], pp. 
101-20). Certainly, I would concur with Foucault’s statement that “in a civilization like our own 
there are a certain number o f discourses that are endowed with the ‘author function’” (p. 107). 
However, in that essay Foucault neglects to account for the agency and/or process involved in the 
“endowing” o f author-function. The present thesis offers a means o f  exploring that question by 
examining the relationship between the poetic faculty (as referred to by Robert Southwell in a 
passage discussed in Chapter 3) and the reification o f same in the person o f  an author. Since 
Foucault pays no heed to facultative rhetoric, this is a point o f  distinction between the two 
approaches. For similar reasons, I have chosen to engage with Michel Zink’s more historicized 
approach to “literary subjectivity” (see below) in lieu o f direct colloquy with Foucault’s essay.
67 Michel Zink, The Invention o f  Literary Subjectivity (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins UP, 
1999), pp. 25-7. See also: Kevin Brownlee, Poetic Identity in Guillaume de Machaut (Madison: 
University o f Wisconsin Press, 1984), pp. 3, 10-11.
68 Zink, Literary Subjectivity, pp. 29-30; Brownlee, Poetic Identity, p. 11.
patently fallacious, then that charge will include the imputation that the earlier 
texts, whether read as spurious inventions or distorted accounts, are likewise the 
products of their authors’ subjective viewpoints. More importantly, any text 
purporting to represent subjectivity implicitly relies upon the notion of a unified 
subject, identifiable with the mental processes of that isolated subject. Models 
predicated on such a notion will tend to regard artworks of all types as “mimetic” 
in the sense of being representational—that is, derivative—of an objective 
“reality” (the relationship to Platonism is evident). Indeed, according to 
Platonism, the human subject itself is a derivative assembly, a distorted reflector 
and reflection of ideal forms—hence, human subjectivity cannot even perform 
itself let alone iterate that performance in literary works. The following axiom 
thus holds: texts operating under the aegis of a rationalistic model of cognition 
cannot perform subjectivity because subjectivity in itself is not capable of 
performance. Thus, all texts actually communicate facultatively, whatever their 
philosophical (or doctrinal) allegiances. (Texts, however, may differ insofar as 
they acknowledge, suppress or challenge this circumstance.) The notion of the 
subjective is not interrogated by the alteration Zink describes.69 However, the 
nature of the author-function is being interrogated in French 13th-century fictions. 
The author-figure in these fictions is no longer presented as a scribe but as an 
ostensible locus of participation in the production of meaning.
The purpose of statements made by the 13th-century (and later) authors 
discussed by Zink, is, according to that scholar, to provide a link between the 
present moment of the text’s reception and the historical narrative it recounts.70 
Thus, by means of this link, what is being told as happening in the past is 
performatively enacted in the present when the text is read. However, whether or 
not the narrative was held to be capable of doing such work would depend on the 
reader's attitude to the work and, more generally, to the act of reading. The 
presence and statements of the authorial “I”, therefore, are intended to indicate to
69 Zink appropriately cites Lacan’s “mirror stage” to illustrate his point— “appropriately” as 
Lacan’s theory relies on a non-productive notion o f identity as a former unity now characterized 
by lack: Literary Subjectivity, p. 33.
70 Zink, Literary Subjectivity, pp. 30-1.
the reader how the text is to be read. The authorial “I” itself does not determine 
how the text (how all texts) is (are) read. To re-state for emphasis: the fictional 
authorial persona stands as a sign indicating that the text as a whole is to be read 
as happening in the present: the moment of reception. Zink’s 13th-century texts, 
therefore, perform a fold of author-function onto the narratives which that 
function ostensibly creates, while itself featuring as a textual element in the texts 
of those narratives. The author-function thus folds on to the text as a whole and 
cannot be considered as present only in statements containing first person 
pronouns. Such statements are rather (and only) conspicuous markers of what the 
text as a whole does. The purpose of the fold, therefore, is not to enable the 
performance of fictional “narrative” in the present but, by framing that narrative 
as potential happening, not inert history, to show that all narrative happens when 
it is read, despite the (strategic) claims of earlier scribes to be narrating historical 
occurrences.
It is worth stressing here, therefore, that one should not confuse author- 
function with the representation o f subjectivity in a text, regardless of whether 
that author-function appears as a narrating “I” or as a distinct heterobiographical 
personage—a character in the fiction with a name different to that of the author 
but who evidently bears some notional relation to the author.71
The relation of these issues to As You Like It may most readily be shown by 
considering relevant aspects of The Countess o f Pembroke’s Arcadia (the “old” 
Arcadia). This version of Sidney’s romance is prefaced with a letter “TO MY 
DEAR LADY AND SISTER THE COUNTESS OF PEMBROKE” signed “Your 
loving brother, Philip Sidney” (3).72 The letter is followed immediately by the 
commencement of the narrative, which, to start with, may seem, to the modem 
reader, to be delivered by an impersonal omniscient narrator. For example, 
introducing Gynecia, but also anticipating her actions in the narrative to follow, 
the narrator says that the “wound” her virtue suffered “fell more to her own
71 Zink, Literary Subjectivity, p. 109.
72 All quotations from The Countess o f  Pem broke’s Arcadia are from Katherine Duncan-Jones, 
ed. The Countess o f  Pem broke’s Arcadia (The O ld Arcadia), by Sir Philip Sidney (Oxford & 
N ew  York: Oxford UP, 1985).
conscience than to the knowledge of the world” (4). Here the narrator occupies a 
place analogous to God’s in having knowledge of the condition of fictional 
beings’ consciences. Before long, however, the narrator uses the first person 
pronoun (“Basilius, I say” [5]) and also employs the modesty topos, saying that 
to describe the former heroic deeds of Pyrocles and Musidorus “is a work for a 
higher style than mine” (10). If the narrator is (a) God, his capacities are radically 
circumscribed. The narrator, moreover, occasionally addresses his presumed 
readers directly, using such terms as “fair ladies” (211)—as Katherine Duncan- 
Jones observes: “we can almost picture the young Sidney sitting as entertainer 
among a cluster of lively young ladies” (his sister’s “coterie”).73 What relation, 
however, does this version of “Philip Sidney” have to his near-namesake, the 
mournful shepherd Philisides, who is included in the narrative itself? Something 
more baroque than the 13th-century practice described by Zink is happening.74 
The narrating “I” of Sidney’s Arcadia folds onto the romance’s narrative but, in 
addition, within that narrative, Philisides narrates further woes, implying further 
conceptual folds. The fact that Philisides is embedded in the narrative (is himself 
an object of the universal narration), however, would indicate that he is in some 
sense disqualified from complete identification with the host-text’s author- 
function. Since he is “available” for narration by a further-seeing author- 
function, Philisides may be regarded as representing the role of fallen sinner (the 
role of lacking-subject lacking its object), with a view, perhaps, to the reader’s 
mortification.
When a text’s nominal author splits into two in such a fashion, the 
enframing author-figure can be regarded, somewhat paradoxically, as both the 
father and son of the heterobiographical personage framed in the narrative—the 
“father” in that, being “older”, he is able to look back upon errors committed by
73 Duncan-Jones, Old Arcadia, p. xiii.
74 E. I. Watkin traces the early appearance o f  baroque sensibility in Italian poetry to Sannazaro’s 
Arcadia, one o f Sidney’s principal pastoral romance models: Catholic Art and Culture 
(Aberdeen: Hollis & Carter, n.d.), p. 100.
the younger character and, in doing so, implicitly reprove them;75 the “son” in 
that he is, in some sense, the empirical product of that younger personage.76 
Moreover, in narrating the text from a position of authority (claiming to perform 
the cognition of fictional beings’ consciences), the begetting-begotten author- 
function implies that he has (modesty topos notwithstanding) overcome the 
cognitive uncertainties of the human condition and become a worthy conduit for 
the text itself.
This very practice, though, leads one to wonder if the current author- 
function has indeed reached full maturity. Might not further experience lead to 
recognition that the “Philip Sidney” narrating this version of the Arcadia is also a 
fallen being prone, at some point, to adopt a new fixed position from which to 
judge his earlier version(s)? The presence of the modesty topos indicates an 
awareness of this quandary on the part of Sidney (and “Sidney”). After all, the 
subsequent composition of a “New” Arcadia shows that further experience did 
lead to the formation of an updated “Philip Sidney”.
Sidney’s pastoral Arcadias are not the objects of study here—their 
proximate sources are diverse and multilingual, which renders them less 
manageable as study-texts for this exploratory thesis. As stated, Shakespeare’s As 
You Like It, by contrast, has a non-controversially identifiable immediate English 
source in Lodge’s Rosalynde. Nonetheless, there is a point of resemblance 
between Shakespeare’s comedy and Sidney’s romance to which I wish to pay 
particular attention. Shakespeare adds the melancholy Jaques to the scenario of 
Lodge’s text. Jaques marks the site of author-function in the play, being, like 
Sidney’s melancholy Philisides, the conventional pastoral author-figure.77
75 It might seem more feasible to describe the narrator as an older brother o f the younger 
character; however, from a subjectivist perspective, in writing the narrative, “Philip Sidney” 
makes Philisides.
76 For Arcadia as the site o f  “Becoming rather than Being,” see: Ruth Nevo, “Existence in 
Arden,” pp. 71-2, in Harold Bloom, ed. William Shakespeare’s A YLI (New York, N ew  Haven & 
Edgemont: Chelsea House: 1988), pp. 63-79.
77 Annabel Patterson, Pastoral and Ideology: Virgil to Valery (Berkeley & Los Angeles: 
University o f California Press, 1987), p. 25. Examples o f  the convention are given in Chapter 8. 
For comparison o f Jaques and Philisides, see: Rosalie Colie, “Perspectives on Pastoral: Romance, 
Comic and Tragic,” p. 58, in Bloom, ed. AYLI, pp. 47-62; Edwin Greenlaw, “Shakespeare’s 
Pastorals,” pp. 132-4, SP 13 (1916), pp. 122-54. For Jaques as author-figure, see: Ted Hughes, 
Shakespeare and the Goddess o f  Complete Being (London: Faber & Faber, 1992), pp. 108-16.
Jaques, of course, is more usually thought of, primarily, as the figure of a 
melancholic. An early passage in Robert Burton’s The Anatomy o f Melancholy 
(1st edition: 1621) indicates that melancholy came to be regarded as a 
characteristic property of the post-Reformation author, whose productions were 
found in “every close-stool and jakes”.78 Such melancholy authors claimed the 
satirist’s (and Lutheran’s) right to pronounce upon the “public good”:
Out o f  an itching hum our that every man hath to sh ow  h im self, desirous o f  fam e and 
honour . . .  ‘though it be to the dow nfall and ruin o f  m any others’ . ..  they that are scarce 
auditors, vix au ditores, m ust be m asters and teachers, before they be capable and fit 
hearers . . .  They com m only pretend public good, b u t . . .  ’tis pride and vanity that eggs  
them  on . . .  B y  w hich  it com es to pass, ‘that not on ly libraries and shops are full o f  our 
putrid papers, but every close-stoo ls and ja k es,’ . . .  ‘W ith us in France,’ saith Scaliger, 
‘every man hath liberty to write, but few  ability . . .  n ow  noble sc ien ces are v ilified  by  
base and illiterate scribblers,’ that either write from vainglory, need, to get m oney, or as 
parasites to flatter and co llogue w ith  som e great m en, they put out bu rr as  . . .  ‘you  shall 
scarce find one, by reading o f  w hom  you  shall be any w hit better, but rather m uch w orse  
. . .  by w hich he [the reader] is rather infected than any w ay perfected.79
Complaints about individuals’ presumptuous willingness to speak had, of 
course, been made before, but the arrival of printing upped the ante, as Burton’s 
language indicates. With the greater availability of printed books, students no 
longer had to “sit at the feet of a ... master”.80 Hence, “they that are scarce 
auditors”, in Burton’s phrase, could soon appear in print themselves as “masters 
and teachers”. The number of the “many others” who would experience “ruin” as 
a consequence of being influenced by the heretical productions of these self- 
proclaimed teachers was likely to be far greater than the number of those 
influenced by their medieval equivalents. Burton specifically refers to the 
commercial aspect of the matter: “not only libraries” but also “shops” are “full of
78 Holbrook Jackson, ed. The Anatomy o f  Melancholy, by Robert Burton (New York: N ew York 
Review Books, 2001), p. 23 (emphasis added).
79 Jackson, ed. Melancholy, pp. 22-3.
80 Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe, 2nd edition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993), p. 35.
our putrid papers”. (Burton urbanely uses the pronoun “our”: as an author 
appearing in print he is part of the problem.) Checks applied by academic and 
scholarly process, one infers, were likely to be obviated by printers whose 
motives included not only the advancement of learning but also the making of a 
financial profit.81 (Likewise, the “base and illiterate scribblers” described by 
Scaliger in Burton’s account write not only “from vainglory” but also to “get 
money”.) The melancholy Jaques’ request for a license to “blow on” whom he 
pleases in his satire (2.7.49) may, therefore, allude to the Lutheran assertion of a 
right to pronounce in public on moral matters. The role of print in distributing 
Luther’s message is well-known; that distribution soon ceased to be under 
Luther’s control: he did not only “blow on” whom he pleased. His statements 
began to blow indiscriminately wherever they were printed, and making money 
was one reason that Lutheran texts were printed.82
Play-texts usually do not have narrators as such, though they often have, as 
their equivalent, choruses and/or chorus-figures.83 The fold performed by 
Arcadia, therefore, cannot be exactly duplicated by a play-text, assuming such a 
duplication was to be sought. However, the baroque performance of fold upon 
fold can be replicated in other ways. That is, Jaques, as author-function, is (if the 
pun may be forgiven) Jaques-pere, the metaphorical father (creator) of his 
namesake Jaques de Boys?4 or Jaques-/?/.?, who spends almost the entire notional 
duration of the play “at schoole” (1.1.5.), that is, at university.85 (Ted Hughes
81 Eisenstein, Printing Revolution, p. 169.
82 Eisenstein, Printing Revolution, pp. 150-2.
83 Elam, “Golden World,” pp. 217-8.n.2. Elam notes that in AYLI, “Le Beau appears to represent 
an internal or introjected version o f Lodge’s narrator” who is “never permitted to fulfil ... [his] 
information-bearing role”: p. 218.n.2. Neil H. Wright points out that Oliver functions as an 
omniscient narrator in reporting Orlando’s battle with the lion: “Oliver’s Tale in AYLI: Orlando 
and the Psalter Lion,” Kentucky Philological Review  23 (2008), pp. 59 -65 .1 refer to an 
unpaginated typescript, the printed article having proved inaccessible. Heather Dubrow sees 
Oliver as “in some senses a rival playwright to Rosalind”: “The Critical Introduction,” p. 34, in 
Dubrow, ed.AYLI, by William Shakespeare (Boston: Wadsworth, 2012), pp. 27-54.
84 For names o f characters from AYLI, I adopt the spellings most frequently used in the First Folio 
text.
85 Dusinberre, ed.AYLI, p. 149.n. The location o f  Jaques de Boys’ “schoole” is a question o f  
interest, albeit Bradleyan. Jaques de Boys’ equivalent in Rosalynde, Femandyne, “lyues a 
Scholler in Paris”, is “one that knewe as manie manners as he could points o f sophistrie” (137)
observes that “the plain meaning of [Jaques] ... to Shakespeare and his 
contemporaries was not only Jakes = privy ... but the fact that it was the first 
syllable of [the dramatist’s] own name”.)86 Jaques de Boys is named in the play’s 
opening speech (1.1.5) and then utterly forgotten until his arrival in the play’s 
final scene (5.4.148.sd). Thus, he performs an enframing function comparable to 
the narrator of the Arcadia. However, as noted, Jaques de Boys is a scholar, or 
reader, not an author. In other words, what is learned (by fictional persons, 
readers and audience-members) by experiencing the play is equivalent to what 
Jaques de Boys learns during the period he spends “at schoole”.
On the other hand, Jaques de Boys is the fictional creation of the play’s 
author (notionally figured by Jaques-pere). Although himself embedded in the 
“narrative” of the play, the mournful Jaques -pere (inverting the relationship of 
Philisides to “Philip Sidney” in Arcadia) marks the folding of the begetting- 
begotten “older” version of the author-function onto the text as a whole—but the 
fold occurs from the middle outwards. Thus, As You Like It literally explodes the 
subjectivist cognitive model performed by the folding techniques of the 
Neoplatonist Arcadia. Similarly, John Powell Ward sees Shakespeare “finally 
getting clear” in As You Like It of the “serene but elongated movement to the 
right” of Sidney’s Arcadia. By “movement to the right”, Ward denotes the 
logical cognitive registration of mechanical causation in a narrative, “within 
which variation of human character, or even spoken presences, could not 
grow.”87 As You Like It's “exploding” of the linear model of identity-formation 
implies that experience (the result of cognition according to a subjectivist model) 
is in fact not the property of a “subject” accruing wisdom and moral authority as 
a result of growing older.88 As Maurice A. Hunt has suggested, “time in As You
and, according to Saladyne “hath no minde but on ARISTOTLE” (17). All quotations from 
Lodge’s texts are from Edmund W. Gosse, ed. The Complete Works o f  Thomas Lodge, 4 volumes 
(London & New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1966, reprinting Hunterian Club, 1883); 
each work o f Lodge’s therein is individually paginated. Rosalynde is in Volume 1.
86 Hughes, Goddess, p. 101.
87 John Powell Ward, Harvester New Critical Introductions to Shakespeare: A YLI (Hemel 
Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), pp. 10-11.
88 Focussing on gender issues and the character o f Rosalind, Barbara J. Bono has also discussed 
AYLI’s critique o f subjectivity: “Mixed Gender, Mixed Genre in Shakespeare’s A YLI,” in Bloom, 
ed. AYLI, pp. 131-48. See also: Catherine Belsey, “Disrupting Sexual Difference: Meaning and
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Like It in a sense never calculated or controlled by the lovers [nor, a fortiori, by 
any of the other personas] appears to run backward from the present age so as to 
recover spiritually key moments”.89 Under such circumstances, cognition cannot 
be regarded as the volitional attitude a subject adopts towards experience. Rather, 
experience is the narrative mode of cognition and mood its lyrical mode (hence 
the humoral emphasis in the treatment of Jaques and other characters in As You 
Like If). From this it follows that the relative “ages” of human faculties are 
functions of mood not time. As You Like I f  s presentation of facultative, non­
linear cognition, therefore, indicates that a sequential notion of time as the 
essential ground of experience is itself a product of idealist presuppositions.
In any case, it has gone unremarked by scholars that Lodge omits the 
conventional authorial figure from his pastoral romance Rosalynde. (The status 
of “Montanus”, who might be taken for such a figure, will be discussed below.) 
Thus, Shakespeare’s addition of Jaques as author-function invites close attention 
as part of the play’s response to Lodge’s text. Indeed, this addition is a site of 
contest between the facultative rhetoric employed by Shakespeare’s text and the 
dualistic tendencies of Lodge’s romance.90
Previous scholars have indeed examined in detail the character of Jaques. 
Most critics, however, have been content to consider Jaques mainly as a type of 
the melancholic (though some have quibbled over whether his melancholy is 
Immorally determined or volitional).91 Such analyses are, of course, relevant to
Gender in the Comedies,” pp. 180-5, in John Drakakis, ed. Alternative Shakespeares (London & 
New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 166-90.
89 Hunt, AYLI, p. 42.
90 For the development o f  classical pastoral out o f  Platonism, see: Richard Cody, The Landscape 
o f  the Mind: Pastoralism and Platonic Theory in Tasso’s Aminta and Shakespeare’s Early 
Comedies (London: Oxford UP, 1969), pp. 6, 10-11. For discussion o f AYLPs anti-idealism, in 
relation to Lodge’s Rosalynde and Spenser’s Faerie Queene Book 2, see: Hunt, AYLI, pp. 14-15. 
Regarding A YLTs synthesis o f idealism and materialism in relation to the concept o f  time, see: 
Jay L. Halio, ‘“No Clock in the Forest’: Time in AYLI,” SEL 2 (1962), pp. 197-207. For a 
discussion o f the Aristotelian dialectic behind “the concept o f time in A YLF, see: Rawdon 
Wilson, “The Way to Arden: Attitudes towards Time in AYLI,” SQ  26 (1975), pp. 16-24 (the 
quoted phrase occurs on p. 17). For refinement o f Halio and Wilson’s analyses, see: Donn Ervin 
Taylor, “‘Try in Time in Despite o f a Fall’: Time and Occasion in AYLI,” TSLL 24 (1982), pp. 
121-36; Maurice A. Hunt, ilKairos and the Ripeness o f  Time in AYLI,” in Hunt, AYLI, pp. 25-50.
91 Judy Z. Kronenfeld, “Shakespeare’s Jaques and the Pastoral Cult o f  Solitude,” TSLL 18 (1976), 
pp. 451-73; Elmer Edgar Stoll, “Shakespeare, Marston and the Malcontent Type,” MP  3 (1906), 
pp. 281-303; Albert H. Tolman, “Shakespeare’s Manipulation o f His Sources in AYLI,” MLN  37
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the present study, not only because of the relation of mood to cognition just
iLoutlined, but also because—as has been shown—by the late 16 century, the 
intellectual faculty’s reliability and relative status had become a matter of 
dispute. Consequently, melancholy will be treated in the present thesis as a 
characteristic mannerism of the intellectual faculty reified as the exclusive site of 
selfhood, not as an emotion.92
Operating within a post-Cartesian paradigm, scholars have tended to 
examine Jaques in isolation from the other characters of the play, in line with the 
modem tendency to approach fictional characters as isolated units analogous to 
“real individuals”.93 According to my argument, however, Jaques as melancholic 
intellectual is a term in the play’s facultative rhetoric. Though Jaques, like one of 
the radical reformers who opposed Hooker, may believe that his salvation 
depends upon his intellectual capacity to accept Christ as saviour, the play’s 
rhetoric suggests that the strength of faith in salvation of all members of a given 
Christian community depends upon the cognitive production of that community 
as a whole. Previous studies have frequently and usefully considered the 
treatment of religious themes in As You Like It (and will be drawn on accordingly 
at appropriate moments). However, the notion that discernment of the availability
(1922), pp. 65-76. For Jaques’ melancholy as volitional pose, see: Robert B. Bennett, “The 
Reform o f a Malcontent: Jaques and the Meaning o f AYLI" pp. 190-3, SSt 9 (1976), pp. 183-204; 
Grace Tiffany, ‘“That Reason Wonder May Diminish’: AYLI, Androgyny and the Theatre Wars,” 
Huntingdon Library Quarterly 57 (1994), pp. 213-39; Oscar James Campbell, “Jaques,” p. 81, 
Harvard Library Bulletin 8 (1935), pp. 71-102; Robert B. Pierce, “The Moral Languages o f  
Rosalynde and AYLI,” p. 171, SP 68 (1971), pp. 167-76; Agnes Latham, ed. A YLI(Walton-on- 
Thames: Thomas Nelson, 1997 [reprint o f  Arden2, 1975]), pp. xlvi-li. For discussion o f  growing 
suspicion as regards the sincerity o f  melancholic attitudes in the 1590s, see: Hunt, A YLI, pp. 68-9. 
Also pertinent is Julia Kristeva’s view that melancholy speakers always only act the role o f  
(pathological) melancholic: Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia (New York: Columbia UP,
1989), pp. 43-4.
92 For the distinction made between “sadness” and “melancholy” in the medieval and early 
modem periods, see: Douglas Trevor, “Sadness in The Faerie Queene,” in Gail Kem Paster et al, 
eds. Reading the Early Modern Passions (Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 
pp. 240-52.
93 See, however, Cynthia Marshall’s essay, “The Doubled Jaques and Constructions o f  Negation 
in ^ 4 YLI,” SQ  49 (1998), pp. 375-92. Marshall relates Jaques’ melancholy to the use o f  language 
as a “trick” to compensate for the split in the subject: pp. 377-9, 382. Ward also objects to 
interpretations that treat Jaques as an individual, arguing that Jaques’ importance is structural: 
AYLI, pp. 25ff. In line with the current reading o f  Jaques as author-function, Ward notes that 
Jaques “dwells lengthily and rather intensely on ... his own right to speak to the world”: p. 26.
See also: Peter G. Phialas, Shakespeare’s Romantic Comedies: the Development o f  Their Form 
and Meaning (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1966), p. 231.
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of salvation is performed by communal means has not been canvassed in 
previous accounts of the play.94
Furthermore, by adding Jaques, As You Like It inserts an antinomian 
marker into Lodge’s scenario in order to demonstrate that the implicit 
“Catholicism” of Lodge’s romance is isomorphic with />os/-Lutheran schismatic 
positions. As may be inferred from this, it will not be argued that Jaques 
represents the play’s author, Shakespeare. It will be recalled that Zink identified 
in 13th-century French fiction a movement from the citation of one’s source as 
locus of authority to the assumption of ironic distance from that source. It will 
also be recalled that this activity became more baroque in the course of the 16th 
century. As You Like It, therefore, I argue, uses Jaques to counter the attempt by 
Lodge to locate authority in his text as a whole.95
Richard Hooker, of course, was authorized to speak on behalf of the 
Elizabethan polity. He had been licensed not to “blow on” whom he pleased but 
to caution those reformers who, insisting upon their right to debate religious 
matters in public as individual Christians— self-authorized believers—refused to
94 For discussion o f religious meanings in AYLI, see: Richard Knowles, “Myth and Type in 
AYLI,” English Literary History 33 (1966), pp. 1-22; Rene E. Fortin, ‘“Tongues in Trees’ in 
AYLI,” in Roy Battenhouse, ed. Shakespeare’s Christian Dimension (Bloomington, Indiana UP, 
1994), pp. 122-6; Wright, “Oliver’s Tale”; Owens, “Melancholy,” pp. 17-21; Alice-Lyle Scoufos, 
“The Paridiso Terrestre and the Testing o f Love in AYLI,” pp. 219-24, SSt 14 (1981), pp. 215-27; 
Russell Fraser, “Shakespeare’s Book o f  Genesis,” Comparative Drama 25 (1991), pp. 121-8; A. 
Stuart Daley, “Where Are the Woods in AYLI7” SQ  34 (1983), pp. 172-80; “The Dispraise o f  the 
Country in AYLI,” SQ  36 (1985), pp. 300-14; “Calling and Commonwealth in AYLI: a Late 
Elizabethan Political Play,” Upstart Crow 14 (1994), pp. 28-46; William Watterson, “AYLI as 
Christian Pastoral,” in Battenhouse, ed. Christian Dimension, pp. 117-22; Paul J. Willis, 
“‘Tongues in Trees’: the Book o f  Nature in AYLI,” Modern Language Studies 18 (1988), pp. 65- 
74; Peter Milward, The Catholicism o f  Shakespeare’s Plays, 2nd edition (London: Saint Austin 
Press, 2000), pp. 9-18; Carol Enos, “Catholic Exiles in Flanders and AYLI; or, What If You Don’t 
Like It at All?” in Richard Dutton et al, eds. Theatre and Religion: Lancastrian Shakespeare 
(Manchester & New York: Manchester UP, 2003), pp. 116-29; Clare Asquith, Shadowplay: the 
Hidden Beliefs and Coded Politics o f  William Shakespeare (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), pp. 
138-45; Henry Sebastian Bowden, The Religion o f  Shakespeare: Chiefly from  the Writings o f  the 
Late Mr. Richard Simpson, M.A. (London: Bums & Oates, 1899), pp. 283-8; Phebe Jensen, 
Religion and Revelry in Shakespeare’s Festive World (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008), pp.
117-48; Hunt, AYLI, pp. 7-76.
95 Dusinberre has also read Jaques as a figure for Lodge, observing that “Shakespeare often 
allows into his dramas a figure who speaks with the voice o f a writer whose work he has 
plundered”: Dusinberre, ed. AYLI, pp. 81-2. R. Warwick Bond considered Jaques to be “simply 
Euphues Redivivus”: Bond, ed. The Complete Works o f  John Lyly, Volume 1 (London:
Clarendon, 1902), p. 167. Since Lodge presented Rosalynde as having been written by Euphues, 
Bond’s reading supports the current argument that Jaques figures the author-function as Lodge.
observe facultative and civic decorum. Thus, given that As You Like It presents a 
doctrinal and political position comparable to Hooker’s, Shakespeare’s own right 
to speak “as author” is brought into question by the play’s rhetoric. Hence, I 
contend that the play adopts an ironic stance with regard to author-function via 
the character of Jaques.
In sum, doctrinal issues have not only a necessary relation to cognitive 
theory in the early modem period, but also to the concept of the Christian self as 
authority. Accordingly, the thesis is concerned with religion, cognition and 
author-function not as distinct concepts but insofar as the three terms are inter­
related.
*
From the foregoing discussion, a reader might suppose that the present thesis 
intends to read the fictional personae of As You Like It as allegories of various 
faculties and/or facultative processes. However, such an assumption would itself 
be grounded upon the reification of a single faculty (whether the 
Stoics’/scholastics’ intellect or the Melanchthonian “heart”) as equivalent to the 
isolated agent. According to this view, all art is (merely) imitative of a real 
(objective) world of individuals, objects and concepts that is “out there”. 
Likewise, Melanchthon employs facultative rhetoric, but denies that scholastic 
terms are necessary for the apprehension of Christian truth. As noted, Hooker’s 
facultative rhetoric differs from Melanchthon’s: Hooker’s rhetoric is not merely 
rhetoric. For Melanchthon, there is a transcendental reality which rhetoric can be 
used to bring Christians in this world closer to apprehending, but that rhetoric 
bears no material relationship to that reality. The question of how any given 
human producer of rhetoric, according to this model, ever came into contact with 
that “reality” in order to either apprehend it themselves or become able to lead 
others towards it is one which expounders of the model tend not to broach (as 
Pendergast noted with reference to images). Why does anyone in Plato’s cave 
ever turn? Protestants, by way of answer, are obliged to call upon the miraculous
intervention of divinely infused grace. In the Hookerian model, no such dilemma 
obtains—no miracles are required—because rhetoric produces social reality. 
Human rhetoric is grace. Reliable discernment occurs by communal facultative 
process. Since, for Hooker, “social” is an equivalent term to “human”, the point 
may be re-stated more radically: rhetoric produces human reality. In short, 
according to this understanding of cognitive agency, the majoritarian 
discernment of meaning in any text produces that text’s (then-current) meaning. 
The text as written material object has a human/social meaning when 
facultatively ratified. Thus, no text can have two meanings at any one time for a 
given audience, or community—not even for an individual reader, once the latter 
is apprehended as a facultative assembly. From the perspective of an 
ontologically valid facultative rhetoric, therefore, allegory as a mode of 
communication is impossible.
Since this denial of the possibility of allegory as mode of communication 
has obvious bearings on the manner in which the interpretations of the thesis’ 
study-texts are presented, Chapter 1 (“The Allegorical Fallacy”) briefly examines 
medieval and early modem formulations of the term “allegory”, suggesting how 
and why the term came to be applied in place of metaphor and figure. Readers 
will no doubt be reassured to hear that I do not expect the entire world to stop 
using the term “allegory” as a result of my argument. Rather, my aim in Chapter 
1 is to demonstrate that the concept of “allegory” as a mode of communication 
relies upon a transcendental notion of a unified, subjective “selfhood” (actually a 
mask for a reified faculty). Failure to register this circumstance has, in my view, 
resulted in hermeneutic distortion with regard to the reading of early modem 
texts.
In Chapters 4 and 6-8, detailed religious readings of Rosalynde and As You 
Like It will be presented. Prior to that, however, it will be necessary to 
demonstrate that religious meanings in seemingly “secular” Elizabethan texts 
were readily apprehended by their contemporary readers. To do this as 
effectively as possible I have chosen to analyse, in Chapters 2-3, two short, 
related texts in their entirety: Sir Edward Dyer’s lyric poem “Hee That His Mirth
Hath Loste” (c. 1571-3?) and the Jesuit Robert Southwell’s parody of that piece.
Dyer’s poem was not selected for analysis simply because it was of 
manageable length. Rather, it was chosen as a highly relevant “ancestor” of the 
Southwell, Lodge and Shakespeare texts. “Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste” was 
one of several Elizabethan “courtly” poems of which Southwell wrote line-for- 
line parodies during his time spent in England as a missionary priest ministering 
to English Catholics. Southwell’s parody of Dyer’s poem is usually read as 
converting a secular poem into a sacred one. However, analysis of the departures 
of Southwell’s parody from its source will seek to show, in Chapter 3 (“Robert 
Southwell’s ‘Phancification’ of Dyer’s ‘Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste’”), that 
Southwell read Dyer’s poem as a religious work in need of doctrinal correction. 
Prior to that, in Chapter 2 (“Sir Edward Dyer’s ‘Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste’: 
Author as Minister”), it will be suggested that contemporary lay copyists of 
Dyer’s poem (members, presumably, of Dyer’s social circle who copied the 
poem into their personal manuscript miscellanies, adapting it in the process) also 
read the lyric as a religious work, as shown by the nature of the changes they 
made in “copying” the text.
As Chapter 2’s title indicates, the poem is relevant to my general thesis in 
other ways. What tends to go unrecalled with regard to Dyer’s lyric is the 
massive impact it had upon Elizabethan culture. Dyer was, within the circle of 
the literate, a well-known writer. For example, Dyer’s lyric is the only English 
poem quoted in Sidney’s Arcadia, where Dyer is identified as “the loveliest 
shepherd” (66).96 Sir John Harington speaks of the poem reverentially in the 
notes to Book 8 of his translation of Orlando Furioso?1 Anne of Denmark asked 
her husband James VI to write her “a Dyer”: a version of—or a poem equivalent 
to—“Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste”.98 A version of Dyer’s poem by Fulke
96 See: Duncan-Jones, ed. O ld Arcadia, p. 372.n.
97 Robert McNulty, ed. Ludovico A riosto’s  Orlando Furioso. Translated into English Heroical 
Verse by Sir John Harington (London: Oxford UP, 1972), pp. 99-100.
98 For James’s version, see: Allan F. Westcott, ed. New Poems ofJames I  o f  England (New York, 
London & Toronto: Columbia UP, 1911), pp. 7-9; for relevant discussion o f  James’s text, see: 
Steven W. May, The Elizabethan Courtier Poets: the Poems and Their Contexts (Columbia & 
London: University o f  Missouri Press, 1991), p. 67; Helena Mennie Shire, Song, Dance and  
Poetry o f  the Coart o f  Scotland under King James VI (London: Cambridge UP, 1969), pp. 221-3;
Greville appeared in print as Sonnet 83 in Caelica (1633), where the punning 
authorial reference '‘''Die e r is transmuted to “Greiv 7//”.100 Ferdinando Stanley, 
Lord Strange, plays the same game in his version of the poem, “Of His Unhappie 
State of Life”:
. . .  this rivall o f  m y such dispise,
W ith m uch desire shall seeke m y nam e to know;
T ell him  m y lines S trange  things m ay w ell su ffice,
For him  to beare, for m e to seeke them  so. (11. 19 -2 2 )101
To pun on one’s own name in this fashion in a lyric was, thus, to avow that one 
was self-consciously or ironically assuming authority upon the model of Dyer’s 
poem. The popularity of “Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste”, therefore, contributed 
to an increasing emphasis upon the relationship of the writer’s identity to a text’s 
ostensible meaning. Hence, when Southwell targeted Dyer’s poem for parody, he 
set his sights upon a cultural monument in order both to achieve maximum 
symbolic impact and to interrogate the claims of Elizabethan poets to speak with 
religious/moral authority.
In the closing stanzas of its longest variants, Dyer’s poem foregrounds its 
concern with author-function. Having made his long complaint about his 
neglected and hopeless condition, the poem’s speaker utters an envoy, addressed 
to his song itself (whereby the status of written text as locus for facultative 
assembly is invoked):
M y songe, i f  anie aske w hose greivous C ase is such,
D y  er  thou letst h is nam e be knowne: h is fo lly  know es to m uch,
Jane Rickard, Authorship and Authority: the Writings ofJam es VI and I  (Manchester & New  
York: Manchester UP, 2007), p. 58.
99 Line 74 in the version o f Dyer’s poem reproduced in Ruth Hughey, ed. The Arundel-Harington 
Manuscript o f  Tudor Poetry, 2 volumes (Columbus: Ohio State UP, 1960), 1.182-4. For the full 
text o f this version, see Appendix 1.1.
100 Line 98 (p. 154) in G. A. Wilkes, ed. The Complete Poems and Plays ofFulke Greville, Lord  
Brooke (1554-1628) in 2 Volumes. Volume 1: Caelica, Mustapha, Alaham (Lewiston, Queenston 
& Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 2008), pp. 150-4.
101 May, Courtier Poets, p. 371.
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But best were thee to hide, and neuer come to light.102
The association of a presumption to speak on religious matters and too-cognizant 
“folly” anticipates the author-figure Jaques’ encounter with a manifest (but also 
absconded) fool in Arden (2.7.12f£), as discussed in Chapter 8.
Dyer’s poem may also bear a particular relationship to Lodge’s Rosalynde. 
In the latter pastoral fiction, the lovelorn shepherd-poet Montanus seems to 
occupy the conventional role of author-surrogate (Paul Alpers, for example, 
considers Montanus to be the romance’s “most poetical lover”);103 however, 
unlike “Jaques” or “Philisides”, the name “Montanus” lacks any evident 
resemblance to that of the romance’s author. There is precedent for the name in 
terms of pastoral convention: “Montanus” participates in Boccaccio’s 4th 
eclogue,104 while the legalistic priest in Guarini’s pastoral play II Pastor Fido is 
called Montano.105 In medieval and Renaissance pastoral works, such names 
tended to be chosen with care.106 Pastoral texts, moreover, had long been held to 
involve the figural discussion of theological and moral issues.107 Hence, one
102 Lines 77-9 o f  the version o f  Dyer’s poem preserved in the Bodleian MS. Ashmole, 781, pp. 
140-2. For the full text o f this version, see Appendix 1.2.
103 Paul Alpers, What is Pastoral? (Chicago & London: University o f Chicago Press, 1996), p.
69.
104 David R. Slavitt, ed. The Latin Eclogues, by Giovanni Boccaccio (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
UP, 2010), pp. 23-32.
105 Walter F. Staton, Jr. & William E. Simeone, eds. A Critical Edition o f  Sir Richard Fanshawe’s 
1647 Translation o f  Giovanni Battista Guarini’s II Pastor Fido (London: Oxford UP, 1964).
106 Helen Cooper, Pastoral: Medieval into Renaissance (Ipswich: D. S. Brewer, 1977), p. 37.
107 Cooper, Pastoral, pp. 26ff. Sidney (Shepherd, ed. Apology, p. 116) and George Puttenham 
(“The Art o f  English Poesy,” pp. 88-9, in Gavin Alexander, ed. Sidney’s The Defence o f  P oesy' 
and Selected Renaissance Literary Criticism  [London: Penguin, 2004], pp. 55-204) remark 
explicitly upon the figural nature o f pastoral poetry. For relevant analyses o f  pastoral figuration, 
see: Cody, Landscape', Louis Adrian Montrose, “O f Gentlemen and Shepherds: the Politics o f  
Pastoral Form,” ELH 50 (1983), pp. 415-59; ‘“Eliza, Queene o f Shepheardes,’ and the Pastoral o f  
Power,” in Kirby Farrell & Kathleen Swaim, eds. The Mysteries o f  Elizabeth: Selections from  
English Literary Renaissance (Amherst & Boston: University o f Massachusetts Press, 2003), pp. 
162-91; William Empson, Some Versions o f  Pastoral (London: Penguin, 1966); Renato Poggioli, 
The Oaten Flute: Essays on Pastoral Poetry and the Pastoral Ideal (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
UP, 1975); Cooper, Pastoral, pp. 36-7, for discussion o f how the eclogue became “an obvious 
medium o f ecclesiastical satire and o f theological instruction”; Karen Nelson, “Pastoral Forms 
and Religious Reform in Spenser and Shakespeare,” pp. 144ff, in J. B. Lethbridge, ed. 
Shakespeare and Spenser: Attractive Opposites (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2008), pp. 143-67; 
Chaudhuri, Renaissance Pastoral', Patterson, Pastoral and Ideology, pp. 1-142; Thomas G. 
Rosenmeyer, The Green Cabinet: Theocritus and the European Pastoral Lyric (London: Bristol
might also seek precedent for the name “Montanus” in Church history, especially 
as the historical Montanus was frequently cited in the period as an early Christian 
heretic.108 Montanus’s principal heresy consisted in claiming to speak on behalf 
of God himself, as though inspired by the Holy Spirit.109 “Montanus” is, thus, a 
suitable name for a presumptuous authorial figure. As Chapter 4 will show, 
Montanus’s verse in Rosalynde differs in crucial ways from the poetry Lodge 
offered in propria persona. Accordingly, it will be maintained that Montanus 
figures not Lodge but a Dyeresque poet as unauthorized would-be author- 
function. Complaints voiced in Montanus’s poems closely resemble those 
expressed in Dyer’s. Indeed, several of Montanus’s poems from Rosalynde were 
attributed to Dyer when reprinted in Englands Helicon in 1600.110 In Rosalynde, 
religious and moral authority is being lodged (the heavy-treading pun appears to 
have been current in the 1590s)111 in the printed text itself (and not in the 
authorial “voice”) as a place-holder for (Catholic) ecclesiastical mediation of 
Scripture. Hence, the text of Rosalynde can be regarded as the equivalent of 
Dyer’s “songe”, to which Dyer’s narrator had attributed authority in a seemingly 
ironic manner. Dyer/Montanus is thus (I argue) characterized in Rosalynde as 
unqualified to speak with spiritual authority in his poems precisely because he 
claims to speak on behalf of his own authority as mystic wool-gatherer, not on 
behalf of any religious institution.
As mentioned, Chapter 3 focuses on Southwell’s rewriting of Dyer’s lyric.
Classical Press, 2004); Harold E. Toliver, Pastoral Forms and Attitudes (Berkeley: University o f  
California Press, 1971).
108 For examples, see: George Abbot, The Reasons Which Doctour Hill Hath Brought, fo r  the 
Vpholding o f  Papistry (Oxford: Joseph Barnes, 1604), pp. 285-6, 288, 420; Gervase Babington, A 
Very Fruitfull Exposition o f  the Commaundements (London: Thoma [sic] Charde, 1583), pp. 334, 
336; John Bale, The Image o f  Both Churches (London: Thomas East, 1570), p. 71; Richard 
Bancroft, A Sermon Preached at Paules Crosse the 9. o f  Februarie Being the First Sunday in the 
Parleament, Anno 1588 (London: Gregorie Seton, 1588), p. 21; Meredith Hanmer, The Great 
Bragge and Challenge o f  M. Champion a Jesuite (London: Thomas Marsh, 1581), “M. Hanmer 
the Aunswerer vnto the Christian Reader”. Hooker himself refers to Montanus repeatedly as the 
type o f the presumptuous church-critic who claims divine inspiration; see, for example: Morris, 
ed. Ecclesiastical Polity, 1.253, 382.
109 Kirsopp Lake, ed. The Ecclesiastical History, by Eusebius, 2 volumes (Cambridge, MA & 
London: Harvard UP & Heinemann, 1975), 1.471, 475-9.
110 Hugh MacDonald, ed. Englands Helicon Editedfrom  the Edition o f 1600 with Additional 
Poems from  the Edition o f  1614 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949), pp. 142-3, 167.
111 Elam, “Golden World,” pp. 217-9.
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There, it will be argued that, in responding to Dyer’s heretical poem in parodic 
form, Southwell entered the ideological market-place of fictions, and thus risked 
placing his authority as ordained priest on a level with Dyer’s self-ordained 
authority as poet. Southwell appears to have soon abandoned the parodic method; 
this suggests that the Jesuit quickly became aware of that method’s perils. In 
Chapter 4 (“Thomas Lodge, Robert Southwell and Rosalynde”), therefore, I 
consider the possibility that the Jesuit missionary sought alternative venues for 
the out-reach aspect of his literary project (his attempt to sway potential waverers 
attracted by Lutheranism and its later variants). By guiding and coaching a well- 
placed lay Catholic writer such as Lodge, Southwell could have arranged for the 
implicit doctrinal messages of poetic works by lay Protestant authors to be 
parodied and debunked without compromising his own priestly authority. In 
addition, works by such as Lodge, wearing the disguise of romance and pastoral 
conventions, could be commercially printed and reach a far wider audience than
119Southwell could minister to in person.
However, I also argue more cautiously that Rosalynde itself provides 
evidence of the influence of Southwell upon Lodge from circa 1588. Thus, I 
maintain that Southwell influenced Lodge from a considerably earlier date than 
other scholars (with the notable exception of Eliane Cuvelier)113 have tended to 
suggest. Such scholars have taken the Lodge of 1596 at his word when he 
renounced in print the writing of profane literature and committed himself to 
religious topics.114 This scholarly consensus has arisen, I surmise, as a result of 
the modem tendency to regard texts as neatly divisible into secular and sacred 
categories.115 Nevertheless, the commitment of Lodge’s Rosalynde to Platonism
112 For Southwell’s concern about reaching larger numbers o f  English Catholics, see: F. W. 
Brownlow, Robert Southwell (New York: Twayne, 1996), p. 11.
113 Eliane Cuvelier, Thomas Lodge: Temoin de son Temps (c.1558-1625) (Paris: Didier Erudition, 
1984), pp. 118, 152-3,477-8.
114 Pierre Janelle, Robert Southwell the Writer: a Study in Religious Inspiration (London: Sheed 
& Ward, 1935), p. 56; N. Burton Paradise, Thomas Lodge: the History o f  an Elizabethan (n.p.: 
Yale UP, 1931), p. 125; Brownlow, Southwell, p. 44; Anne Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia: 
Redrawing the English Lyric Landscape, 1586-95 (Manchester & N ew  York: Manchester UP, 
2006), p. 150; Louis L. Martz, The Poetry o f  Meditation: a Study in English Religious Literature 
o f  the 17th Century (New Haven: Yale UP, 1954), pp. 259-60.
115 Anthony Raspa, The Emotive Image: Jesuit Poetics in the English Renaissance (Fort Worth: 
Texas Christian UP, 1983), pp. 51-2.
has been profitably explored, in particular by Walter R. Davis.116 Building on this 
work, but also extending its conclusions to religious matters, I seek to 
demonstrate that the Platonism of an Elizabethan text is most usefully discussed 
in conjunction with attendance to its religious affiliations.
A commitment to Platonism in the early modem period indicates a 
commitment to a transcendentalist conception of tmth. Lodge’s Platonism thus 
speaks to his commitment to the Catholic ecclesiastical hierarchy as source of 
spiritual authority. Accordingly, Lodge’s text is presented as not actually having 
been written by Lodge at all. Rather, it is the “golden” production of Lyly’s 
Euphues, written “in his Cell at Silexedra” (1)—a tablet from the mystic’s 
mountain (Lodge’s version is, therefore, a reflection of the ideal world as 
refracted via Euphues’ reflection in his Platonic cave). The text and not its 
ostensible author (Lodge) is the locus of authority, as place-holder for the 
Catholic priests currently in short supply in Elizabethan England. Rosalynde 
nonetheless invites reader participation through narrative. The reason for this 
simultaneous insistence upon and relaxation of priestly authority, I argue, is that 
freedom from passive subjectivity is being offered to English Catholics as a 
strategic interim measure.117 This adroit manoeuvre on the part of Lodge is in 
turn contested by As You Like I f  s retrospective interrogation of the author- 
function in Rosalynde through the addition of Jaques (the hitherto absent Lodge- 
surrogate) to the scenario.
By way of preparation for the thesis’ discussion of As You Like It, Chapter 
5 (“Southwell, Shakespeare and Lodge”) examines documents relating to 
possible connections between Lodge, Southwell and Shakespeare. First of all, I 
consider the epistle poem of Southwell’s Saint Peters Complaynt (1st printed
116 Walter R. Davis, “Masking in Arden: the Histrionics o f Lodge’s Rosalynde,” SEL 5 (1965), 
pp. 151-63; Idea and Act in Elizabethan Fiction (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1969), pp. 83-93. For a 
refinement o f  Davis’ Platonic reading o f  Rosalynde, see: Charles Larson, “Lodge’s Rosalynde: 
Decorum in Arden,” Studies in Short Fiction 14 (1977), pp. 117-27. For Lodge’s extension o f  
“the humanist program” in Rosalynde, see: Steve Mentz, ‘“A Note Beyond Your Reach’: Prose 
Romance’s Rivalry with Elizabethan Drama,” pp. 82-3, in Mary Ellen Lamb & Valerie Wayne, 
eds. iStaging Early Modern Romance: Prose Fiction, Dramatic Romance and Shakespeare (New  
York & Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 75-90.
117 John Bossy, The English Catholic Community, 1570-1850 (London: Darton, Longman &
Todd, 1975), p. 27.
1595), which is usually read as the Jesuit poet’s reproof of the irreligious 
worldliness of writers such as Shakespeare (who is one candidate for being the 
“W.S.” addressed in the epistle’s dedication). However, I argue, Southwell is 
actually objecting to certain writers’ exploitation of religious matters (not the 
neglect thereof). In addition, I suggest that this reproof may have had some 
bearing upon Shakespeare’s decision to abandon the writing of narrative verse 
after 1593.
Subsequently, I propose that in Wits Miserie (1596) Lodge repositions 
himself following the trial and execution of Southwell. Southwell’s attempt to 
reconcile the Roman Church and Elizabethan state had resulted in the Jesuit’s 
prolonged torture and brutal public execution.118 Not only that, but the very 
techniques for self-exploration which Southwell had arguably introduced to 
English poetry and prose, as part of the Jesuit’s attempt to equip English 
Catholics for a lack of access to Catholic priests and sacraments,119 had not been 
scorned but borrowed by writers with different priorities (as Lodge perceived 
matters)—writers such as Shakespeare. No longer committed to Southwellian 
appeasement, Lodge, I maintain, attacks Shakespeare in Wits Miserie, referring 
to the Stratfordian as a heretical “PLAIER Deuil”. With these points established, 
As You Like It emerges as not only Shakespeare’s borrowing and adaptation of 
the Jesuit-influenced religious position outlined in Lodge’s Rosalynde, but also 
the dramatist’s answer to Wits Miserie.
Scholarly inattention to the way in which the religious dimension of 
Rosalynde is bound up with its philosophical tenor has in turn obscured As You 
Like I fs  religious valence. Among the plentiful work done on the play’s 
departures from its source, the religious implications of those departures have 
occasionally been noted.120 However, the contest of rival theories of cognition 
which informs the texts’ differences has not been examined. Accordingly,
118 That Southwell sought such reconciliation is the thesis o f  Scott R. Pilarz’s study, Robert 
Southwell and the Mission o f  Literature, 1561-1595: Writing Reconciliation (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2004).
119 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 146.
120 For discussion o f the religious meaning ofA Y L rs  departures from Rosalynde, see: Edward I. 
Berry, “Rosalynde and Rosalind,” pp. 50-1, SQ  31 (1980), pp. 42-52; Asquith, Shadowplay, pp. 
138ff.
Chapter 6 (“As You Like I f  s Religious Revision of Rosalynde”) explores 
alterations the play makes to its main source in order to show how As You Like It 
engages directly with the religious position—and concomitant cognitive model 
thereof—of Lodge’s romance.
Chapter 7 (“Jaques the Lutheran”) argues that the relations between the 
author-function Jaques and the banished Duke Senior in Act 2 of the play figure 
and assess the Lutheran critique of papalist Catholicism. As You Like It thus 
indicates by way of contrast (again, via the pointed addition of the character of 
Jaques) that the play’s source, Rosalynde, adopts a cognitively impotent 
(“subject”) position with regard to temporal authority (whether papal or royal). In 
addition, the chapter examines the repeated presentation in As You Like It of 
staggered cognition—that is, the play’s tendency to have a character (x) report at 
length his/her prior observations of character y  to characters zz. Analysis of the 
First Lord’s report of his observation of Jaques in Act 2 Scene 1—this being an 
example of staggered cognition—shows the relationship between the Lutheran 
hermeneutic “revolution” and prior scholastic/academic developments in 
cognitive theory.
By figuring author-function as the ineffectual and melancholy Jaques, 
Shakespeare (I argue in Chapter 8: “As You Like It: a Purge for Neo-classicists”) 
challenges humanist assumptions. Taking into account Luther’s privileging of 
oral delivery of Christian doctrine over printed communication of same, the 
chapter reads As You Like It as addressing a widespread humanist 
misappropriation of Luther’s teachings. The chapter’s first section concludes by 
suggesting that Shakespeare, like Sir Thomas More, conceived of selfhood as 
performance involving the discarding of alienated personae (of which Jaques is an 
example). Hence, Jaques is not “Shakespeare” (or Lodge or Luther or anyone 
else) in any biographical sense but a figure for the inauthentic subjective 
conception of selfhood which underpins the very notion of the “author” and, 
thus, of author-function.
The chapter’s second section offers a close reading of the encounter 
between the banished Duke and Jaques in Act 2 Scene 7 of As You Like It,
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arguing that Shakespeare therein deconstructs Lutheran anti-papal rhetoric. That 
is, the scene inhabits Lutheran “allegorical” practice in order simultaneously to 
dismantle and make use of it. Via its presentation of Jaques as Lutheran mis- 
reader of Scripture, As You Like It demonstrates the inadequacy of a subjectivist 
model of cognition, showing that Christian “truth” is written and read 
(cognized/produced) on the stage of the world—in other words, in the realm of 
social experience (as figured by Shakespeare’s comedy-in-performance)—not on 
the printed page.
The reading of As You Like It offered in Chapters 6-8 focuses intensely on 
aspects of the play which relate directly to the thesis’ central concerns (religion, 
cognition and author-function). In the Conclusion, therefore, I consider further 
aspects of the play which would benefit from being examined in the light of the 
thesis’ findings. In particular, I note that space has not been found for sustained 
analysis of the characters of Rosalind and Celia. To have explored the figural 
valence of Rosalind and Celia adequately (that is, in a manner comparable to the 
Dyer-Southwell-Lodge-Shakespeare sequence pursued here in relation to author- 
function) would have required detailed tracking of alternative streams of 
influence, beginning with analysis of the treatment of the character “Rosalind(e)” 
in The Shepheardes Calender}21 This topic is pondered in the conclusion as an 
available means of compensating for its omission in the main body of the study.
In addition, while the thesis reads As You Like It as staged play as being 
very much in step with the establishment position presented by Hooker in the 
Ecclesiastical Polity, when the comedy is considered as reading-text, the 
situation might be expected to alter. Again, sustained examination of this aspect 
of the text was beyond the remit of the present thesis. Thus, the Conclusion also 
briefly considers some of the implications of the contrast between As You Like It 
on stage and on page.
121 The “ARGVMENT” and “GLOSSE” o f  ^ January e" in The Shepheardes Calender use the 
spelling “Rosalinde”; in the body o f  the poem, Colin Clout refers to “Rosalind''': J. C. Smith & E. 
de Selincourt, eds. Spenser: Poetical Works (London, Oxford & New York: Oxford UP, 1912), 
pp. 421-3.
Chapter 1.
The Allegorical Fallacy.
This chapter seeks to uphold the claim made in the Introduction that, according 
to a facultative model of cognition, allegory as a mode of communication is 
impossible given that facultative assemblies (and not individual subjects, nor the 
rational intellects thereof) produce meaning.1 St. Augustine’s De Doctrina 
Christiana is a key reference point in this endeavour. In that work, Augustine 
equates a properly Christian hermeneutic with charitable reading. Thus, by 
implicit contrast, Augustine exposes the allegorizing nature of uncharitable 
“readings”. Hence, it will be observed that, while it is impossible (facultatively 
speaking) to produce a functioning “allegory”, zMzgorization nonetheless 
frequently (indeed, almost always) occurs. To allegorize, in other words, is to 
“not-read”: to erase/obliterate through writing-over under the aegis of a 
subjectivist model of cognition, to colonize de facto a text in the name of one’s 
subjective values and imperialising cultural moment.
*
One is often told that allegory “presents one thing in words and another in
1 The argument derives from an awareness o f the metaphoricity o f all signs; see: Jonathan Culler, 
The Pursuit o f  Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction (London & New York: Routledge, 
2001), pp. 226-7; Edgar Wind, Pagan Mysteriesin the Renaissance, 2nd edition (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1967), p. 205.
meaning”. However, to accept this definition would be to inscribe the 
intentionalist fallacy into every act of communication. To paraphrase Wimsatt 
and Beardsley: neither readers nor theatre-audiences possess assured access to 
authorially-intended meaning.3 Meaning is produced by facultative assemblies, 
whether those assemblies consist of the members of a theatre-audience or a 
community of readers, or include the facultative components of a text’s single 
recipient. Levels of meaning, therefore, are to be regarded as neither inherent in a 
text nor located in some transcendental realm of ideas. Consequently, the term 
“allegory” names neither a trope nor a mode of communication (since “it” cannot 
facilitate communication).4
2 “Allegoria ... aliud verbis aliud sensu os tend it”: H. E. Butler, ed. The Institutio Oratoria o f  
Quintilian, 4 volumes, by Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (London & N ew  York: Heinemann & G. P. 
Putnam, 1920) III.326-7; see also: Puttenham, “English Poesy,” p. 158.
3 William K. Wimsatt, Jr. & Monroe C. Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” in William K. 
Wimsatt, Jr., The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning o f  Poetry and Two Preliminary Essays 
Written in Collaboration with Monroe C. Beardsley (Kentucky: University o f Kentucky Press, 
1954), pp. 3-20.
4 This claim does not derive from an impotent wish to consign the abundant scholarship on 
allegory to oblivion. Two examples o f  such scholarship from which I have particularly benefitted 
are: D. W. Robertson, Jr., A Preface to Chaucer: Studies in Medieval Perspective (Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 1962), pp. 286-390, and Erich Auerbach, “Figura,” in Scenes from  the Drama o f  
European Literature (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1959), pp. 11-76. Other relevant sources 
include: Henri de Lubac, M edieval Exegesis. Volume 1: The Four Senses o f  Scripture (Grand 
Rapids & Edinburgh: William B. Eerdmans & T. T. Clark, 1998); Jane K. Brown, The 
Persistence ofAllegory: Drama and Neoclassicism from  Shakespeare to Wagner (Philadelphia: 
University o f  Pennsylvania Press, 2007); Angus Fletcher, Allegory: the Theory o f  a Symbolic 
Mode (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1964), especially pp. 49-50 on allegory as a vehicle for demonic 
agency, pp. 67-9 on the interface between allegory and mimesis, and pp. 279-303 for an 
application o f psychoanalytical theory to the question o f allegory; Angus Fletcher, “Allegory 
without Ideas,” in Brenda Machosky, ed. Thinking Allegory Otherwise (Stanford: Stanford UP, 
2010), pp. 9-33 (especially p. 18 on the fallout from nominalism); Gordon Teskey, Allegory and  
Violence (Ithaca & London: Cornell UP, 1996), pp. 17-25; Maureen Quilligan, “Allegory and 
Female Agency,” in Machosky, ed. Thinking Allegory, pp. 163-87; Language o f  Allegory, with 
theorization o f  allegory as horizontal and polysemous as opposed to vertical and binaristic; John 
MacQueen, Allegory (London: Methuen, 1970); Edwin Honig, Dark Conceit: the Making o f  
Allegory (Hanover: University Press o f  N ew  England, 1959), especially pp. 15, 23-4, 191; Michel 
Jeanneret, “Renaissance Exegesis,” in Glyn P. Norton, ed. The Cambridge History o f  Literary 
Criticism. Volume 3: the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), pp. 36-43; Walter 
Benjamin, The Origin o f  German Tragic Drama (London & New York: Verso, 1998); Howard 
Caygill, “Walter Benjamin’s Concept o f  Allegory,” in Rita Copeland & Peter T. Struck, eds. The 
Cambridge Companion to Allegory (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010), pp. 241-53; Terry 
Eagleton, “The Baroque Allegory,” in Walter Benjamin, or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism  
(London & New York: Verso, 1981), pp. 3-24; Ira Clark, Christ Revealed: the H istory o f  the 
Neotypological Lyric in the English Renaissance (Gainesville: University Presses o f Florida, 
1982), pp. 1-28 (on how the anti-allegorical stance o f  Reformers led to a refunctioning o f  
typology); C. S. Lewis, The Allegory o f  Love: a Study in Medieval Tradition (New York: Oxford 
UP, 1936); Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd edition (London: Sheed & Ward, 1979),
Scriptural exegesis is obviously central to any consideration of the history 
of the term “allegory” in Western culture.5 Auerbach points out that, for 
authorities such as Tertullian, typological figures were not allegories.6 Where an 
“allegory” is held to say one thing but mean another,
f ig u ra  is som ething real and historical w hich announces som ething e lse  that is also real 
and historical. The relation betw een  the tw o events is revealed by an accord or sim ilarity  
. . .  Often vague sim ilarities in the structure o f  events or in their attendant circum stances 
suffice to m ake the fig u ra  recognizable; to find it, one had to be determ ined to interpret 
in a certain w ay .7
There are two points to stress here: firstly, Auerbach does not insist upon this 
process being a matter for the intellect; secondly, the term “determined” indicates 
that a receiver’s disposition, not the author’s intention, is crucial in the 
production of figural meaning. Whether receiving disposition is volitional or not 
is, therefore, a pertinent question. If one believes in free will, rhetoric may co­
pp. 71 -2, 81; Rosemond Tuve, Allegorical Imagery: Some Medieval Books and Their Posterity  
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1966); Don Cameron Allen, Mysteriously Meant: the Rediscovery o f  
Pagan Symbolism and Allegorical Interpretation in the Renaissance (Baltimore & London: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1970); Wind, Pagan M ysteries’, Jean Seznec, The Survival o f  the Pagan Gods: the 
Mythological Tradition and Its Place in Renaissance Humanism and Art (Princeton: Princeton 
UP, 1972); Bernard F. Huppe & D. W. Robertson, Jr., Fruyt and Chaf: Studies in Chaucer’s  
Allegories (Port Washington & London: Kennikat Press, 1963); Kenneth Borris, Allegory and 
Epic in English Renaissance Literature: Heroic Form in Sidney, Spenser and Milton (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2000); Brian Cummings, “Protestant Allegory,” in Copeland & Struck, eds. 
Allegory, pp. 177-90; Judith H. Anderson, Reading the Allegorical Intertext: Chaucer, Spenser, 
Shakespeare, Milton (New York: Fordham UP, 2008), especially pp. 9-10 on typology versus 
allegory in Auerbach, suggesting that some o f  Auerbach’s key terms have been subject to 
mistranslation; Jeremy Tambling, Allegory (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), especially pp. 47-8 on 
allegory developing from self-projection and ascetic practices.
5 For relevant discussion o f Biblical hermeneutics, see: Daniel Boyarin, ‘“This We Know To Be 
Carnal Israel’: Circumcision and the Erotic Life o f  God and Israel,” Critical Inquiry 18 (1992), 
pp. 474-505; de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis’, Yair Zakovitch, “Inner-Biblical Interpretation,” in 
Ronald Hendel, ed. Reading Genesis: Ten Methods (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010), pp. 92- 
118; Dina Stein, “Rabbinic Interpretation,” in Hendel, ed. Reading Genesis, pp. 119-35; Richard 
A. Layton, “Interpretation in the Early Church,” in Hendel, ed. Reading Genesis, pp. 136-56; 
Auerbach, “Figura,” pp. 28-55.
6 Tertullianus, Quintus Septimius Florens, Adversus Marcionem: Libri Quinque, 4.40 in 
Franciscus Oehler, ed. Tertulliani Quae Supersunt Omnia, 3 volumes (Leipzig: T. O. Weigel, 
1853), 11.45-336; D e Fuga in Persecutione, Chapter XI, in Oehler, ed. Tertulliani, 1.461-94; 
Auerbach, “Figura,” pp. 29-31. Anderson questions this aspect o f Auerbach’s position: Intertext, 
pp. 9ff.
7 Auerbach, “Figura,” p. 29.
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produce gracious consequences in a charitably disposed receiver; if one does not 
believe in free will, only supernatural grace can effect an equivalent result. (In 
the Introduction, it may be recalled, I suggested the latter distinction could be 
made between the positions of Melanchthon and Hooker.)
Auerbach acknowledges that the terms “figura” and “allegory” became 
interchangeable (with regard to usage) from the 4th century CE onwards.8 D. W. 
Robertson, Jr., however, does not uphold the Tertullian distinction between 
typology and allegory.9 Discussing Paul’s use of the term “allegory” at Galatians 
4:22ff., Robertson, Jr., comments:
The word a lleg o ry  here m eans, as it does am ong the grammarians, ‘saying one thing to 
m ean another,’ but the thing said in the first p lace is also true. The principle in vo lves  
neither the analysis o f  figurative language nor the interpretation o f  a superficially false  
fable. The things and events described in the O ld Testam ent remain things and events, 
but they are nevertheless significant by an a lleg o ry  f
Robertson, Jr. here cites the “grammarians” only then to cancel their definition 
with a “but”. According to Robertson, Jr., the grammarians claim that “allegory” 
occurs when a person says one thing to mean another; yes, says Robertson, Jr., 
allegory does mean that but it also occurs when a statement means what it says 
and means another thing, though the latter meaning may not yet be apparent. 
Allegory becomes manifest as such with (and as) Christian revelation. Hence, 
Robertson, Jr.’s account is arguably of a piece with the Christian assimilation of 
the Hebrew Scriptures.11 Implicit here is the notion that the events of the “Old 
Testament” are only “significant by an allegory”. This may be true according to 
Christian orthodoxy, but one is not obliged to accept it from a historicizing point 
of view.12 Robertson, Jr.’s dismissal of the relevance of “the analysis of 
figurative language” is also telling. He thus implies that a clear distinction may
8 Auerbach, “Figura,” p. 34.
9 Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, pp. 57, 190.
10 Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, p. 291.
11 Harold Bloom, “The Belated Testament,” in Jesus and Yahweh: the Names Divine (New York: 
Riverhead, 2005), pp. 41-51; de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, pp. 233ff.
12 De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, pp. 235-6.
be maintained between literal and figurative language. Such a distinction cannot
be upheld in practice; as Saussure demonstrated, all signs are conventional and,
1therefore, figurative to an extent.
Furthermore, Robertson, Jr., claims that, in a typological “allegory”, “[t]he 
relationship between the two elements, old and new, is implied rather than stated, 
but the spiritual meaning for the individual which arises from their combination 
is something which can result only from the intellectual effort o f the 
observer”.14As noted in the Introduction, Melanchthonian theology is founded 
upon Christianity being a matter for the heart not the intellect. Matthew 11:25, 
moreover, records Christ as praising God because “thou hast hid these things 
[proofs of salvation] from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them to little 
ones”. Robertson, Jr.’s disinclination to distinguish between typology and 
allegory, however, results in a Paul who bases his preaching upon an intellectual 
process.15 Nonetheless, Robertson, Jr. usefully records that “[t]he term allegory 
is said to have first been used by a grammarian around 60 B.C.”16 Paul (or his 
scribe, or some pseudo-Paul) could be borrowing a grammarian’s Greek term to 
describe a typological (and figurative) operation.17
Setting aside the philological problem of Paul’s usage as beyond the remit 
of the present thesis, the burden of my own position is that the Tertullian view is 
applicable to all figuration (leaving no scope for allegory as mode of 
communication). However, it is not a case of “imposing” post-Sausserean or
13 Charles Bally et al, eds. Course in General Linguistics, by Ferdinand de Saussure (London: 
Duckworth, 1983), pp. 67ff.
14 Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, p. 190 (emphases added).
15 For a categorical statement by a theological scholar that Paul employs typology not allegory 
here, see: Anthony Tyrrell Hanson, Studies in P au l’s Technique and Theology (London: SPCK, 
1974), pp. 94-5. Robertson, Jr., moreover, neglects to register the frequent elision o f  the terms 
“spiritalis” and “intelligibilis” in early Christian Latin texts; see: de Lubac, M edieval Exegesis, p. 
140. There is, o f course, an important difference between stating that the intellect is necessary for 
a particular meaning to be apprehended, and stating that a given meaning, once apprehended 
“intuitively” or spiritually (or, in the present thesis’ terminology, facultatively), can be 
understood and confirmed by the intellect.
16 Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, p. 290.n.l3.
17 For relevant commentary on the Galatians passage, see: J. B. Lightfoot, The Epistle o f  St. Paul 
to the Galatians (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1957), p. 180; John Bligh, Galatians in Greek: A 
Structural Analysis o f  St. P au l’s Epistle to the Galatians with Notes on the Greek (Detroit: 
University o f  Detroit Press, 1966), pp. 180-1; Ronald Y. K. Fung, The Epistle to the Galatians 
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans: 1988), p. 206; John Ziesler, The Epistle to the Galatians 
(London: Epworth Press, 1992), p. 68.
post-structuralist theory upon medieval and early modem texts. It is my 
contention that these issues were theorized by medieval and early modem 
scholars in a manner consistent with my own position. Augustine, for example, 
recognised that the Scriptures contain obscurities and apparent internal 
contradictions. In De Doctriana Christiana, the Church Father outlined a practice 
for handling instances of these:
Dem ostrandus est igitur prius m odus inueniendae locutionis, propriane an figurate sit. Et 
iste morum honestate neque ad fidei ueritatem proprie referri potest, figuratum esse  
cogn oscas.18
W e m ust first explain the w ay to discover whether an expression is literal or figurative. 
G enerally speaking it is this: anything in the divine discourse that cannot be related  
either to good  m orals or to the true faith should be taken as figurative.19
Furthermore, an important distinction may be made between post­
structuralist theory and medieval sign-theory such as Augustine’s. Where (for 
instance) Derrida concedes only the possibility of differance, Augustine (on the 
basis of Matthew 22:40 and 1.Timothy 1:5) identifies “charity” as the defining 
value of his hermeneutic.20 In reading a text, one’s ^position should be 
charitable: one thus aims to overcome love of the self by ^positioning the self 
and attaching one’s love to God. The aim, therefore, is neither to regard the text 
as a shimmering phantasm whose meaning is forever deferred nor to transform 
the other (any given text) into a replica or mirror of one’s self. Rather, the aim is 
to escape the self/other binary in producing a text’s meaning. Thus, Erasmus: 
“Scripturam diuinem non esse detorquendam ad nostros affectus, sed nostrum
18 Augustine o f  Hippo, “D e Doctrina Christiana,” III.X.14, in Joseph Martin, ed. Corpus 
Christanorum Series Latina XXXII: Aurelli Angustini Opera Pars IV.I (Tumholt: Typographa 
Brepols Editores Pontifici, 1962), pp. 1-167.
19 R. P. H. Green, ed. On Christian Teaching, by Augustine o f Hippo (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997), 
III.X.14.
20 Green, ed. Christian Teaching, III.XIV.22; Chadwick, ed. Confessions, X.3-4; XII.27 and p. 
259.n.21; XII.32.
sententiam ad Scripturae regulam emendandam”.21
Augustine’s hermeneutic of charity can be (and inevitably was) applied to 
any type of text.22 Reading a text charitably, however, is not to “Christianize” it, 
in the sense of making it consistent with Christian dogma. Rather, to read a text 
charitably is to be co-translated by it. To produce meaning from a text by, say, 
Marx, a reader should approach that text charitably. In doing so, there can be no 
attempt to make Marx’s text conform to Christian teachings. Similarly, adverse 
(but nonetheless charitable) criticism of Marx’s text would take the form of 
observing where (if anywhere) it sought to impose its own values upon (in other 
words, allegorize) a designated other.23
Augustine is held to have contributed to the practice of interpreting the 
Scriptures allegorically. He will have done so where he imposed his own values 
on texts. Such activity, however, does not (and could not) convert the Scriptures 
to an allegory. On those occasions when Augustine allegorizes Scripture, 
moreover, he does what modem allegorists do to (for example) Shakespeare’s 
texts. That is, when a passage in Shakespeare does not fit with what is currently 
held to be “realistic” in subjectivist/rationalist terms, it is often emended 
(allegorized).24
In “Interpreting the Variorum,” Stanley Fish characterizes Augustine’s 
hermeneutic as belonging to the nai've time when Christianity was widely 
believed in. Fish thus conflates Augustine’s hermeneutic with the Church
21 Desiderius Erasmus, “To John Carondelet,” p. 178 (11. 264-6), letter 1334 in P. S. Allen & H. 
M. Allen, eds. Opvs Epistolarvm Des. Erasmi Roterodami: Volume 5:1522-1524  (London: 
Oxford UP, 1924), pp. 172-92. “Holy Scripture should not be twisted to our inclinations, but our 
way o f thinking should be corrected in accordance with the norm o f  Scripture”: Desiderius 
Erasmus, “Letter to Carondelet: the Preface to His Edition o f  St. Hilary o f Poitiers, 1523,” p. 102 
in John C. Olin, Six Essays on Erasmus and a Translation o f  Erasmus ’ Letter to Carondelet,
1523 (New York: Fordham UP, 1979), pp. 93-120.
22 Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, p. 296.
23 Lines 3-4 o f  Sir Walter Ralegh’s “If Cynthia Be a Queen” offer an early modem expression o f  
this idea: Douglas Brooks-Davies, ed. Silver Poets o f  the 16th Century: Wyatt, Surrey, Ralegh, 
Philip Sidney, Mary Sidney, Michael Drayton and Sir John Davies, 2nd edition (London & 
Rutland, Vermont: J. N. Dent, 1992), p. 150.
24 Examples are provided in Chapter 6. For relevant background to this paragraph’s statements, 
see: Gerald L. Bruns, “Midrash and Allegory: the Beginnings o f Scriptural Interpretation,” p.
637, in Robert Alter & Frank Kermode, eds. The Literary Guide to the Bible (London: Fontana, 
1997), pp. 625-46; Glenn W. Most, “Hellenistic Allegory and Early Imperial Rhetoric,” pp. 27-8, 
in Copeland & Struck, eds. Allegory, pp. 26-38.
Father’s belief-position, regarding Augustine’s hermeneutic as being aimed 
towards “forever making the same text”.25As Robertson, Jr. observes, however, 
“in spiritual exegesis, there is no such thing as a single definitive interpretation”. 
Moreover, “St. Augustine welcomes the resulting diversity of interpretations”.26 
Switching targets, Fish observes that “for at least three hundred years, the most 
successful interpretive program has gone under the name ‘ordinary language’”. 
An editorial note in the 2001 Norton anthology of critical theory, which includes 
Fish’s essay, states that “[s]trictly speaking, [the ‘ordinary language movement’]
tfiis a 20 -century movement started by ... Wittgenstein ... though it is rooted in 
the work o f ... Locke”.27 From Locke to Wittgenstein is a long way. It seems 
rhetorically crude of Fish to state matters in such broad terms, especially as the 
descriptive and ostensibly pluralist model he eventually offers in place of all 
previous ones (all of which are to be regarded as prescriptive in contrast to 
Fish’s) turns out to be a determinist one, according to which meanings are 
produced as a result of one’s institutional formation.28
It is worth noting here, therefore, that Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning 
actually dissolves Augustine’s res I verba binary (a residue of Augustine’s 
Platonic/Stoic formation at odds with his hermeneutic theory).29 Indeed, for 
Wittgenstein, logic belongs to exegesis and is not a “thing” (or set of facts) which 
can be “represented” by language.30 Wittgenstein’s position thus offers a 
refinement of (post-)Augustinian sign theory arguably more consistent with 
Christianity than Augustine’s overall stance (Christ, the logos, himself figuring 
the dissolution of the sign/substance binary). Moreover, Wittgenstein’s 
contestation of logic-as-substantive (as opposed to logic-as-exegetical process
25 Stanley Fish, “Interpreting the Variorum,” p. 170, in Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This 
Class? The Authority o f  Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard UP,
1990), pp. 147-73.
26 Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, p. 298; see: Chadwick, ed. Confessions, XII. 17-43.
27 Leitch et al, eds. Theory, p. 2087.n.
28 Fish, “ Variorum,” pp. 171-3.
29 Chadwick, ed. Confessions, XII.32 and p. 263.n.22; Leitch et al, eds. Theory, p. 186; P. M. S. 
Hacker & Joachim Schulte, eds. Philiosophische Untersuchungen: Philosophical Investigations 
by Ludwig Wittgenstein, 4th edition (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009 [1st edition: 1953]), §§ 1- 
3; Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, p. 295.
30 Michael Potter, Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009), pp. 56-8.
vis-a-vis “reality”)31 anticipates the present thesis’ insistence that allegory (as 
opposed to allegorization) is impossible.
The position which Fish suggests is currently dominant would be better 
described, therefore, not as Wittgensteinian, but as a relatively unreflective 
“common sense” position, tacitly subscribed to by the intellectual mainstream of 
modem Western society, according to which signs refer to things—a position 
which received its classic formulation in Augustine!32 After all, given Saussure’s 
demonstration that all signs are fluid, it is difficult to see how a binaristic sign 
theory can be regarded as dominant in practice at any time.33 Given the fluidity 
recorded by Saussure, for communication to occur, any user of a sign-system 
must place trust in (in other words, must charitably dispose him/herself towards) 
other users of that sign-system.34 Wittgenstein’s logical process relies for its 
social (and scientific) efficacy upon this circumstance. Thus, according to 
Wittgenstein, Michael Potter notes, “truth and falsity are not internal to a 
proposition but are different relationships that may hold between a proposition 
and the relevant feature of the world”.35
My point is: deciding which “feature of the world” is “relevant” is the cmx 
of the matter. Communication, according to this model, relies on production of a 
text’s meaning by its recipient. If “successful communication” is understood to 
occur when a recipient’s production of meaning is held to bear a satisfactory 
resemblance to the sender’s notional intended meaning, then successful 
communication relies on charitable production of meaning (“I knew that was 
what you meant; I trusted your words and my own comprehension of them”).
One can only “know” this has occurred, of course, if the sender declares his/her 
intention. If data regarding intention is available in the initial text then how can 
that text be described as an allegory since the text says what it means? If, 
however, ratification requires that data be supplied in a second text (whether
31 Hacker & Schulte, eds. Philosophical Investigations, § 81.
32 Oswald Bayer, “Luther as an Interpreter o f  Holy Scripture,” p. 76, in Donald K. McKim, ed.
The Cambridge Companion to Martin Luther (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003), pp. 73-85.
33 Bally et al, eds. Linguistics, pp. 67ff.
34 See also: Chadwick, ed. Confessions, VI.7.
35 Potter, Notes on Logic, p. 136.
spoken or written) regarding intention expressed in a previous text, then how can 
the first text be said to have successfully communicated its meaning? Even if a 
communication of “allegory” were intended it would not be possible of 
achievement.36
Arguments apparently similar to aspects of the present chapter’s position 
have been made in the past without gaining widespread acceptance. Robertson, 
Jr., for instance, argued that all medieval texts expressed one meaning (“the
37concept that the love of God is all-important”) and should be read accordingly. 
My position differs from Robertson Jr.’s, however, in stressing that charity is 
performed by facultative assemblies, not locatable as an object of subjective 
cognition within a text. Furthermore, Robertson, Jr. asserted that medieval texts 
contain a literal meaning and an allegorical meaning, with the charitable message 
more or less concealed in the latter.
Wishing to persuade on Platonic grounds, therefore, Robertson insisted 
upon the presence of “deeper meaning” (or “allegory”) in medieval texts. 
Chaucer’s texts, after all, seem to support such an insistence. The Nun’s Priest, 
for example, refers to the fruit and the chaff of his text as (apparently) two levels 
of discourse:
But y e  that holden this tale a fo lye . ..
Taketh the m oralitie, good  m en.
For Seint Paul seith that al that written is,
To oure doctrine it is yw rite, yw is;
Taketh the fruyt, and lat the ch a f be stille .38
Setting aside the priest’s subtle extension of Paul’s meaning to “al that written 
is”, it is my contention that the “fruyt” of true meaning does not (and cannot)
36 Honig, Dark Conceit, pp. 23-4.
37 The quoted phrase is from D. S. Brewer, “The Criticism o f Chaucer in the 20th Century,” pp.
11-12, in A. C. Cawley, ed. Chaucer’s Mind and Art (Edinburgh & London: Oliver & Boyd, 
1969), pp. 3-28.
38 Larry D. Benson et al, eds. The Riverside Chaucer, 3rd edition (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1987), p. 
261.
inhere in a text; rather, such “fruyt” is produced by a facultative assembly 
(whether understood as located within a single reader or as formed by a 
community of readers). Likewise, “chaf ’ is not “objectively” “there” in the text. 
“Chaf’, too, is produced (in abundance) by facultative assemblies.
The French medieval literary scholar Michel Zink has pointed out that the 
term allegory was “never used in the Middle Ages [in France] in reference to the 
Roman de la Rose or works of similar inspiration”; rather, “all its uses in French 
texts of that period ... refer to the field of exegesis, not that of rhetoric”.39 That 
is, the term “allegory” was not used by medieval French theorists to denote a 
rhetorical figure or a mode of communication; allegoria referred to hermeneutic 
practice. However, as Zink’s observation implies, confusion regarding the term 
“allegory” arose from interdisciplinary contests. In Dante’s view, “the 
theologians take this sense [that is, the ‘hidden’ meaning conveyed by ‘allegory’] 
otherwise than do the poets”.40 “What Dante means by this distinction between 
the allegory of the poets and the allegory of the theologians is not entirely 
clear[,]” remark the editors of the 2001 Norton anthology of literary theory.41 
Bernard F. Huppe and Robertson, Jr. are more assertive: “By this distinction 
[Dante] means merely that the theologians use allegorical in a technical sense to 
refer to one of the levels of exegetical sentence, whereas poets use it to refer to a 
rhetorical trope.”42
In other words, the theological use of “allegorical” is held to apply to 
exegesis, not the writing of poetry. One assumes that Dante’s usage derives from 
the Latin-classical tradition given definitive form by Quintilian and taught 
throughout Europe in the medieval and early modem periods.43 Quintilian 
redundantly included allegory among the tropes. I say “redundantly” because, as 
Todorov has shown, no adequate distinction can be adduced between the
39 Zink, Literary Subjectivity, p. 255.n.
40 Dante, “/ /  Convivio,” p. 249, in Leitch et al, eds. Theory, pp. 249-50.
41 Leitch et al, eds. Theory, p. 249.n.2.
42 Huppe & Robertson, Jr., Fruyt and Chaf, p. 16.
43 Bonis, Allegory and Epic, p. 56; see also: Quilligan, Language o f  Allegory, p. 29. MacQueen 
states that Dante was the first to apply allegorical theory explicitly to vernacular literature: 
Allegory, p. 54.
examples Quintilian supplies for allegory and metaphor.44 One assumes, 
therefore, that the term “allegory” had lost its earlier non-rhetorical meaning in 
its transmission from Greek to Latin culture and had been assimilated to 
metaphor by the rhetorician Quintilian (or his source[s]) in the interests, perhaps, 
of inclusiveness. In line with this supposition, Kenneth Borris has noted that 
“literary theorists” of the Renaissance repeat Quintilian’s definition of allegory 
but also “often seem in search of formulations much beyond the limits of 
rhetorical definition”.45
*
In the centuries after Augustine, any rigid distinction between sacred and other 
texts, in terms of truth-value, ceased to obtain. Alanus de Insulis, “recognized as 
one of Chaucer’s authorities ... considered that his poetry has an aim similar to 
that of Scripture”.46 In Alanus’s De Planctu Naturae (1160-5?), for instance, 
Nature observes that “poets present falsehood”.47 However, she also states:
the poetic lyre g ives a false note on the outer bark o f  the com position  but w ithin te lls  the 
listeners a secret o f  deeper significance so that w hen the outer shell o f  fa lsehood  has 
been discarded the reader finds the sw eeter kernel o f  truth hidden w ithin.48
The trouble with poets, Nature continues, is that they write as though they do not 
know that “the dreams of Epicurus are now put to sleep, the insanity of 
Manichaeus healed, the subtleties of Aristotle made clear, the lies of Arrhius [s/c] 
belied”.49 Pagan errors and Christian heresies are here intermixed, one notes, and 
not presented in historical or hierarchical order. Should poets (in a manner akin
44 Tzvetan Todorov, Symbolism and Interpretation (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1982), pp. 46-7; see also: 
Fletcher, “Allegory without Ideas,” p. 33.n.l6.
45 Borris, Allegory and Epic, p. 58.
46 Huppe & Robertson, Jr., Fruyt and Chaf, p. 5; Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, p. 350.
47 James J. Sheridan, ed. The Plaint o f  Nature by Alanus de Insulis (Toronto: Pontifical Institute 
o f Mediaeval Studies, 1980), p. 139.
48 Sheridan, ed. Plaint, p. 140.
49 Sheridan, ed. Plaint, pp. 140-1.
to Cassius in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar [5.1.76-8])50 reject the teachings of the 
likes of Epicurus and Manichaeus, one surmises, there is nothing preventing their 
productions from being regarded as legitimate expressions of rational truth and 
Christian orthodoxy.
In the 14th book of his Genealogicae Deorum Gentilium (1360-62), 
meanwhile, Giovanni Boccaccio claims that true poets work in the same way as 
the Holy Spirit in composing their works, expressing coherent meaning in a 
complex integuement for the benefit of well-attuned readers:
N ec  sit qui existim et a poetis ueritates fictionibus inuidia conditas, au tut uelint om nino  
absconditorum  sensum  negare lectoribus, au tut artificiosiores appareant, set ut, que 
apposite u ilu issent, labore ingeniorum  quesita et diuersim ode intellect com perta tandem  
faciant cariora. Quod longe m agi stamen Sanctum fec isse  Spiritum unusquisque, cui 
sana m ens est, debet pro certissim o arbitrari.51
In the Didascalion (a treatise composed in Paris in the late 1120s52 which 
“became the standard elaboration of Augustinian literary theory”),53 Hugh of St. 
Victor identifies three orders of meaning, potentially discernible in any kind of 
text (spoken or written): the letter, the sense and the sentence. He proceeds to 
state:
that discourse in w hich  the hearer can con ceive nothing from the m ere telling u nless an 
exposition  is added thereto contains only the letter and a deeper m eaning [the sentence]
. . .  som ething else is left w hich  m ust be supplied for its understanding and w hich  is 
m ade clear by exposition .54
50 Quotations o f Shakespearean plays other than AYLI are from Stephen Greenblatt et al, eds. The 
Norton Shakespeare Based on the Oxford Edition (New York & London: Norton, 1997).
51 Jeremiah Reedy, ed. In Defence o f  Poetry: Genealogiae Deorum Gentilium Liber XIV. Edited  
from  University o f  Chicago MS. 100, by Giovanni Boccaccio (Toronto: Pontifical Institute o f  
Mediaeval Studies, 1978), p. 52 (Chapter 12,11. 60-6).
52 Jerome Taylor, ed. The Didascalion o f  Hugh o f  St. Victor: a M edieval Guide to the Arts (New  
York & London: Columbia UP, 1961), p. 3.
53 Huppe & Robertson, Jr., Fruyt and Chaf, p. 10.
54 Taylor, ed. Didascalion, p. 147 (VI.8).
In this statement, one may observe that the difficulty of a discourse is not 
inherent but determined by the hearer’s capacities and/or inclinations. As I 
understand the case, any “hearer”, regardless of their educational background and 
“intelligence”, could understand a given text—one which another hearer might 
find hopelessly obscure—by interpreting it charitably (in other words, via 
facultative attachment).55
This observation enables me to differentiate my position from that of 
Huppe and Robertson, Jr., who consider Hugh’s statement to mean that the 
reader must make an “intellectual effort” in order to understand medieval 
poetry.56 This privileging of the intellect is an expression of the subjectivist 
cognitive model (which identifies the rational intellect with the isolated human 
subject). From the facultative point of view, meaning is produced by an assembly 
whose members include sensory receptors and perceptual processors. The 
disposition of the intellect towards assembled material data is not pertinent to 
cognition per se. However, a fuller exposition of how facultative reception was 
understood to work may be reserved until Chapter 7, which examines As You 
Like I fs  presentation of that process in action.
Having presented the grounds for my view that the term “allegory” is used 
fallaciously to denote a mode of communication, the following chapter will seek 
to register religious meaning in Sir Edward Dyer’s poem “Hee That His Mirth 
Hath Loste”. Since that poem is usually read as a “secular” love lyric, arguing for 
a religious interpretation might be thought tantamount to reading the poem as a 
religious “allegory”. The present chapter should have made clear that this is not 
the case. More importantly for the thesis as a whole, the registration of non- 
allegorical religious meaning in Dyer’s text will be shown to be consistent with 
the view that the imposition of a sacred/secular binary on early modem texts is
55 John Donne provides a 17th-century witness to this hermeneutic model: “when we speake to 
godly men, we are sure to be believed, for God sayes it; if  we were to speake to naturall men 
onely, we might be believed”: Fifty Sermons, Preached by That Learned and Reverend Divine, 
John Donne, D r in Divinity, Late Deane o f  the Cathedrall Church o f  S. Pauls London (London:
M. F. J. Marriot & R. Royston, 1649), pp. 271-2.
56 Huppe & Robertson, Jr., Fruyt and Chaf, p. 20.
invidious. It remains standard procedure for scholars to observe such a binary as 
though the “religious” and the “secular” are descriptive categories.57 However, 
the present thesis holds that the insistence upon the sacred/secular binary is 
always effectively prescriptive.
57 See, for example, the categorizations o f poems in Steven W. May & William A. Ringler, Jr., 
Elizabethan Poetry: a Bibliography and First-Line Index o f  English Verse, 1559-1603, (London 
& New York: Thoemmes Continuum, 2004).
Chapter 2.
Sir Edward Dyer’s “Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste”: Author as Minister.
Though scholars customarily regard Sir Edward Dyer’s poem “Hee That His 
Mirth Hath Loste” (written circa 1571-3)1 as a “secular” love lament,2 the work 
(I will contend) communicated religious meaning in the period. The extent to 
which Dyer’s poem was praised by contemporary readers has, moreover, puzzled 
modem commentators.3 The suggested misreading and the puzzlement go hand 
in hand, in my view: Elizabethan readers may have valued Dyer’s poem for its 
religious-political discourse and the freedom it gave readers of diverse religious 
and political allegiances to insert themselves as “speaking subject”.
Following a brief biographical profile of Dyer, textual variants of the lyric 
will here be analysed in order to register potential religious and political 
meanings of the poem. In addition, the strategic placing of Dyer’s text within a 
sequence of poems in the Arundel-Harington manuscript will be considered as 
further evidence of contemporary reception.
*
1 Ralph M. Sargent suggests the poem was written between 1572 and 1575: the Life and Lyrics o f  
Sir Edward D yer (London: Oxford UP, 1935), p. 207. Textual evidence and topical arguments 
(presented below) indicate a date between 1571 and 1573.
2 Steven W. May, “Early Courtier Verse: Oxford, Dyer and Gascoigne,” pp. 63, 68, in Patrick 
Cheney et al, eds. Early Modern English Poetry: a Critical Companion (New York & Oxford: 
Oxford UP: 2007), pp. 60-9.
3 May, Courtier Poets, p. 64.
Leaving Oxford University around 1561, without a degree, Dyer travelled 
abroad, pursuing an unrecorded itinerary. Following his return to England, Dyer 
found employment as a secretary for Robert Dudley, the earl of Leicester.4 
Dyer’s relationship with Queen Elizabeth was, like his patron’s, unsettled; he 
was himself occasionally “banished from court, most notably around the time of 
the proposed [A lenin] marriage”.5 In a letter dated May 11 1573, Gilbert Talbot 
observed (in Steven May’s paraphrase) that “Dyer had been in disgrace with the 
queen for the past two years, but was now restored to favour”.6 The precise 
reason for Elizabeth’s anger on that occasion is not known. Dyer’s “loyalty was 
not called in question; rather, some flaw appeared in his judgement or his 
behaviour”.7
Notwithstanding his subsequent reinstatement in Elizabeth’s favour, and 
despite having been previously dispatched to Holland to negotiate with the Duke 
of Orange, Dyer stayed at court in 1585 during Leicester’s Netherlands 
campaign.8 Dyer, moreover, distanced himself from Leicester following the 
death of Sir Philip Sidney, having confessed to feeling “some anxiety about his 
responsibilities” during that earlier Dutch embassy.9
In June 1588, Dyer interviewed the alchemists Dee and Kelley in Prague— 
a rather quixotic occupation to be engaged in while the Spanish Armada was 
threatening England. May suggests that Dyer “probably bore an informal 
mandate from the crown” to undertake this journey.10 The trip’s timing leads one 
to speculate that Elizabeth may have arranged for Dyer to be absent.11 Possibly 
accompanied by Robert Southwell’s brother Thomas,12 Dyer is said to have spent
4 Sargent, Dyer, pp. 18-28; E. K. Chambers, Sir Henry Lee: an Elizabethan Portrait (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 1936), pp. 90-1.
5 Pilarz, Southwell, p. 87.
6 Steven W. May, “Dyer, Sir Edward (1543-1607),” ODNB.
7 Sargent, Dyer, p. 23.
8 May, “Dyer”.
9 Sargent, Dyer, p. 82.
10 May, “Dyer”; see also: Sargent, Dyer, pp. 95-6.
11 Many prominent English Catholics were interned at this time: Christopher Devlin, H am let’s 
Divinity and Other Essays (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1963), p. 51; the Catholic Montague was 
excused from leading his troops at Tilbury: Richard Wilson, Secret Shakespeare: Studies in 
Theatre, Religion and Resistence (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2004), p. 21.
12 Christopher Devlin, The Life o f  Robert Southwell, Poet and Martyr (London: Longmans,
1956), p. 202.
time in Prague with the Catholic Elizabeth Jane Weston.13 Whatever his religious 
affiliations, Dyer’s aura of unworldliness might explain why, despite being 
awarded numerous decorous positions, such as Chancellor of the Order of the 
Garter in 1596, Dyer attained no “position of genuine trust” in the Elizabethan 
administration.14 He was, however, sent to Denmark in 1589 to monitor 
negotiations preceding the marriage of James VI to Anne of Denmark.15
Writing prior to the development of “revisionist” history, Dyer’s 
biographer Ralph M. Sargent regarded the likes of Dyer, Sidney and Leicester as 
patriotic Protestants. However, E. G. R. Taylor places Dyer among Leicester and 
Hatton as possible Catholic-sympathizers.16 It is worth noting here that Sidney’s 
own religious position has been reevaluated by Stillman, with Sidney emerging 
as not Calvinist but Phillipist, under the influence of Languet (a disciple of 
Melanchthon).17 Other scholars, however, have objected that the modem urge to 
affix religious labels to early modem individuals results in unnecessary 
distortion.18 The present thesis’ commitment to the validity of a facultative model 
of cognition is in accordance with such a view. Identity, according to that model, 
is co-extensive with facultatively-produced environment.
Concluding his argument for the presence of a “Catholic poetic” in Songes 
and Sonettes (1557; commonly known as Tottel’s Miscellany), Stephen Hamrick 
states: “We cannot read such figurations of Catholicism [as Hamrick discerns in 
certain poems in Songes and Sonettes] as a simple index of confessional 
allegiances, but neither can we reject the possibility that such poems could
13 R. J. W. Evans, Rudolf II and His World: a Study in Intellectual History, 1576-1612 (London: 
Oxford UP, 1973), p. 151.
14 Sargent, Dyer, pp. 72, 128, 131
15 Sargent, Dyer, p. 124.
16 E. G. R. Taylor, Tudor Geography, 1485-1583 (London: Methuen, 1930), p. 107; Taylor 
provides no source for this statement. For Hatton’s Catholicism, see: Alice Gilmore Vines, 
Neither Fire nor Steel: Sir Christopher Hatton (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1978), p. 48; Diarmaid 
MacCulloch, Reformation: Europe’s House Divided, 1490-1700 (London: Penguin, 2004), p. 
385.
17 Stillman, Sidney, pp. 14ff, 64, 104, 143ff.
18 Peter Lake & Michael Questier, “Introduction,” pp. xv-xvi, in Peter Lake 8c Michael Questier, 
eds. Conformity and Orthodoxy in the English Church, circa 1560-1660 (Woodbridge: Boydell, 
2000), pp. ix-xx; Michael Questier, Catholicism and Community in Early Modern England: 
Politics, Aristocratic Patronage and Religion, c.1550-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006),
p. 66.
express Catholic sympathies”.19 Given that no authoritative version of Dyer’s 
poem is extant, and given that I will be arguing that the Elizabethan copyists of 
Dyer’s poem made alterations in line with their own doctrinal and political 
views, to speculate upon Dyer’s religious position at the outset might prove 
prejudicial to the proposed hermeneutic operation. To suppose that Dyer’s 
position, as individual, must be first outlined so that one can proceed to 
“understand” the variants of his poem would be to assume an idealist position 
which tends to treat textual variation as evidence of “corruption”. Nonetheless, 
Dyer’s own religious position will become relevant insofar as analysis of the 
variants’ pluralistic witness will describe a situational stimulus to which Dyer, as 
the nominal “author” of the poem, may be regarded as having had temporal and 
affective proximity.
That said, it will be helpful to make some general remarks about the 
religious and cultural situation in which Dyer’s poem and its variants came into 
existence. In the years following 1558, many Elizabethan subjects, it seems, were 
prepared to accept the Elizabethan Settlement as an institutional environment in 
which a Christian Catholic faith could be professed.20 As the 1560s progressed,
19 Stephen Hamrick, “Tottel’s Miscellany and the English Reformation,” p. 353, Criticism  44 
(2002), pp. 329-61.
20For relevant religious background, see: Lucy E. C. Wooding, Rethinking Catholicism in 
Reformation England (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000); Arnold Pritchyard, Catholic Loyalism in 
Elizabethan England (London: Scolar Press, 1979); J. J. Scarisbrick, The Reformation and the 
English People (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); Winthrop S. Hudson, The Cambridge Connection and  
the Elizabethan Settlement o f 1559 (Durham, North Carolina: Duke UP, 1980); R. Po-Chia Hsia, 
The World o f  Catholic Renewal, 1540-1770 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998); Pierre Janelle, 
The Catholic Reformation (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1971); Francis Aidan Gasquet, The Eve o f  the 
Reformation: Studies in the Religious Life and Thought o f  the English People in the P eriod  
Preceding the Rejection o f  the Roman Jurisdiction by Henry VIII (London: John C. Nimmo, 
1900); A. G. Dickens, The Counter-Reformation (London: Thames & Hudson, 1968); David V.
N. Bagchi, Luther’s Earliest Opponents: Catholic Controversialists, 1518-1525 (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1991); Eamon Duffy, The Stripping o f  the Altars: Traditional Religion in England, 
C.1400-C.1580, 2nd edition (New Haven & London: Yale UP, 2005); Saints and Sinners: a H istory 
o f  the Popes, 3rd edition (New Haven 8c London: Yale UP, 2006), pp. 37-246; Fires o f  Faith: 
Catholic England under Mary Tudor (New Haven & London: Yale UP, 2009); Norman Jones,
The English Reformation: Religion and Cultural Adaptation  (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002); John 
Bossy, “The Character o f Elizabethan Catholicism,” P& P  21 (1962), pp. 39-59; “The Counter- 
Reformation and the People o f Catholic Europe,” P& P  97 (1970), pp. 51-70; Community, 
Christianity in the West, 1400-1700 (Oxford & New York: Oxford UP, 1985); MacCulloch, 
Reformation; William Raleigh Trimble, The Catholic Laity in Elizabethan England, 1558-1603 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1964); Hubert Jedin, “Katholische Reformation oder 
Gegenreformation?” in Katholische Reformation oder Gegenreformation? Ein Versuch zur
however, some of those subjects may have become perplexed to find their 
Church changing around them.21 A loyal church-member who deplored such 
change might seek to withdraw from institutional influence as much as possible. 
Such an intention is possibly announced by the speakers in some of the non- 
Southwellian variants of Dyer’s poem discussed below. However, these
Klarung der Begrijfe nebst einer Jubilaumsbetrachtung iiber das Trienter Konzil (Luzern: Verlag 
Josef Stocker, 1946), pp. 7-38; H. Outram Evenett, The Spirit o f  the Counter-Reformation, edited 
by John Bossy (Notre Dame & London: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1968); John W. 
O’Malley, “Was Ignatius Loyola a Church Reformer? How To Look at Early Modem  
Catholicism,” CHR 77 (1991), pp. 177-93; The First Jesuits (Cambridge, MA & London:
Harvard UP, 1993); Trent and All That: Renaming Catholicism in the Early Modern Era 
(Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard UP, 2000); Wolfgang Reinhard, “Reformation, Counter- 
Reformation and the Early Modem State: a Reassessment,” CHR 75 (1989), pp. 383-405;
Michael C. Questier, Conversion, Politics and Religion in England, 1580-1625 (Cambridge 
Cambridge UP, 1996); Catholicism and Community:; Michael O’Connell, The Idolatrous Eye: 
Iconoclasm and Theatre in Early Modern England (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000); Max Weber, The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f  Capitalism  (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958); 
Elizabeth Gilliam 8c W. J. Tighe, “To ‘Run with the Time’: Archbishop Whitgift, the Lambeth 
Articles and the Politics o f Theological Ambiguity in Late Elizabethan England,” 16,h-Century 
Journal 23 (1992), pp. 325-40; Nicholas Tyacke, “Lancelot Andrewes and the Myth o f  
Anglicanism,” in Lake & Questier, eds. Conformity, pp. 5-33; Alexandra Walsham, “‘Yielding to 
the Extremity o f the Time’: Conformity, Orthodoxy and the Post-Reformation Catholic 
Community,” in Lake & Questier, eds. Conformity, pp. 211-36; Church Papists: Catholicism, 
Conformity and Confessional Polemic in Early Modern England (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1999); 
Providence in Early Modern England (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999); Carter Lindberg, The 
European Reformations, 2nd edition (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); Brian Cummings, The 
Literary Culture o f  the Reformation: Grammar and Grace (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002); Ann W. 
Ramsey, Liturgy, Politics and Salvation: the Catholic League in Paris and the Nature o f  Catholic 
Reform, 1540-1630 (Rochester: University o f  Rochester Press, 1999); Keith Thomas, Religion 
and the Decline o f  Magic: Studies in Popular Beliefs in 16th and 1 7,h-Century England (London: 
Penguin, 1991); Arnold Oskar Meyer, England and the Catholic Church under Queen Elizabeth 
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Triibner & Co, 1916); Ernest William Hunt, Dean Colet and His 
Theology (London: SPCK, 1956); Miri Rubin, Mother o f  God: a H istory o f  the Virgin M ary 
(London: Penguin, 2010); Christopher Haigh, ed. The English Reformation Revised  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1987); Christopher Haigh, English Reformations: Religion, Politics and Society 
under the Tudors (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993); Philip Caraman, ed. The Other Face: Catholic Life 
under Elizabeth I  (London: Longmans, 1960); John Hungerford Pollen, The English Catholics in 
the Reign o f  Queen Elizabeth: a Study o f  Their Politics, Civil Life and Government (London: 
Longmans, Green & Co, 1920); Raspa, Emotive Image’, Helen C. White, English Devotional 
Literature [Prose], 1600-1640 (Madison: University o f  Wisconsin, 1931); Louise Imogen 
Guiney, Recusant Poets. Volume 1: St. Thomas M ore to Ben Jonson (London & New York:
Sheed & Ward, 1938); Thomas H. Clancy, Papist Pamphleteers: the Allen-Persons Party and the 
Political Thought o f  the Counter-Reformation, 1572-1615 (Chicago: Loyola UP, 1964); Philip 
Hughes, Rome and the Counter-Reformation in England (n.p.: Bums & Oates, 1944); Peter 
Holmes, Resistance and Compromise: the Political Thought o f  the Elizabethan Catholics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982); Roland H. Bainton, Here 1 Stand: a Life o f  Martin Luther 
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1951); Heiko A. Oberman, Luther: Man between God and the 
Devil (New York: Image, 1989); Jaroslav Pelikan, Obedient Rebels: Catholic Substance and  
Protestant Principle in Luther’s Reformation (London: SCM Press, 1964); Ozment, Reform.
21 For discussion o f the Elizabethan Settlement’s relative capacity to accommodate crypto- 
Catholics prior to the 1570s, see: Walsham, Church Papists, pp. 18-20.
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declarations might be regarded as ironic in some or all of these cases. After all, 
inconsistency in the religious environment in which one ineluctably participates 
would result (according to a facultative model of cognition) in a tendency to 
speak not only mournfully but also ironically.
Amidst these ambiguities, the historical record allows one to observe that 
Dyer, notwithstanding his diplomatic appointments and missions, was inclined to 
investment in get-rich-quick schemes (such as the Frobisher and Davis 
expeditions)22 and speculation in alchemy.23 This characterization conflicts with 
the profile of the typical “Calvinist” (drawn by Keith Thomas)24 as a member of 
the middling classes who regards material success as the reward for hard work. 
Herself seemingly uncomfortable with predestinarian doctrines,25 Elizabeth 
seems to have been fond of Dyer, perhaps as a fellow Nicodemite.26
Regardless of his religious affiliations, Dyer acquired considerable 
contemporary fame as a poet. Indeed, such was Dyer’s renown as poet during 
Elizabeth’s reign that his name came to denote the author-function in English 
post-Reformation culture. James Vi’s bride Anne asked her husband to write her 
not a poem but “a Dyer”.27 Thomas Nashe referred to Dyer as “our patron, our 
first Orpheus or quintessence of invention”, as though the court-satellite 
embodied the very concept of the Poet in a Neoplatonic and Hermetic sense.28 
(The Florentine Neoplatonist Ficino had been the first to translate the Hermetic
22 Sargent, Dyer, pp. 40-6, 77.
23 Sargent, Dyer, pp. 95, 97-101, 103ff; Allen G. Debus, ed. Theatrum Chemicum Britannicum 
Containing Severall Poeticall Pieces o f  Our Famous English Philosophers, Who H ave Written 
the Hermetique Mysteries in Their Owne Ancient Language, by Elias Ashmole (New York & 
London: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1967 [reprint o f  London 1652 edition]), p. 483.
24 Thomas, Decline, p. 131,
25 For discussion o f Elizabeth’s resistance to aspects o f post-Lutheran/Melanchthonian reformist 
doctrine, including predestination, see: Gilliam & Tighe, “Whitgift,” p. 326; Felicity Heal, 
Reformation in Britain and Island (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003), pp. 310-1; Wooding, Rethinking, 
p. 196; Norman Jones, The Birth o f  the Elizabethan Age: England in the 1560s (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1993), pp. 64-5.
26 MacCulloch, Reformation, p. 290; Lindberg, European Reformations, p. 312; Patrick 
Collinson, “Windows in a Woman’s Soul: Questions about the Religion o f Queen Elizabeth I,” in 
Elizabethan Essays (London: Hambledon Press, 1994), pp. 87-118.
27 May, Courtier Poets, p. 67.
28 Ronald B. McKerrow, ed. The Works o f  Thomas Nashe, 4 volumes (London: A. H. Bullen, 
1904), III.76-7.
corpus into Latin.29 Justin Martyr [110-165 CE] had included Orpheus among the 
prisci theologii -a  chain of divinely inspired poets descending from either Moses 
or Hermes Trismegisthus.)30 As noted in the introduction, Dyer’s “Hee That His 
Mirth Hath Loste” is the only English poem quoted in The Countess o f 
Pembroke’s Arcadia, where the poem’s author is identified as “the lovely 
shepherd” (66)—anticipating another “author-function moment”: Shakespeare’s 
nod to Marlowe as “Dead Shepheard” in As You Like It (3.5.82-3). Thus, in a 
culture where the right of poetry to speak on religious matters was contested by 
radical reformers (who, though they insisted on their right to discuss religious 
matters in public venues, also insisted that religious discourse speak plainly and 
not wear courtly dress),31 Dyer’s implicit assertion of authority in writing poetry 
that addressed religious topics was comparable to his claiming the role of self­
ordained minister. Accordingly, the question of author-function as religious 
figure will prove central to the ensuing analysis.
*
As stated, no authoritative version of Dyer’s much-imitated poem, “Hee That His 
Mirth Hath Loste”, is extant. Dyer appears to have composed the poem at some 
time between 1571 and 1573. The earliest-surviving version of the poem might 
be the one preserved in the section of the Arundel-Harington manuscript entitled 
“Certayne Verses Made by Vncertayne Autors Written out of Charleton His 
Booke” (this version of Dyer’s poem is hereafter referred to as AH)—a section 
which Ruth Hughey says must have been transcribed after 15 72.32 “The 
unidentified Charleton,” May remarks, “was favoured with a text of [Dyer’s]
29 Frances Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition (London & New York: Routledge, 
2002), pp. 13ff.
30 Justin Martyr, “Justin’s Hortatory Address to the Greeks,” pp. 279-80, in Alexander Roberts & 
James Donaldson, eds. The Ante-Nicene Fathers: Translations o f  the Writings o f  the Fathers 
down to A.D. 325. Volume 1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985), pp. 273-89. See also: Sir Walter 
Ralegh, “Orpheus to Musaeus, Fragment 1 from Justin Martyr, Hortatory Address to the Greeks, 
Chapter 15 (from [The History o f  the World] Book 1, Chapter 6.7),” in Brooks-Davies, ed. Silver 
Poets, p. 170 and 424.n; Yates, Hermetic Tradition, pp. 15-16; Cody, Landscape, pp. 25-43.
31 Stephen Hamrick, The Catholic Imaginary and the Cults o f  Elizabeth, 1558-1582 (Famham: 
Ashgate, 2009), p. 51.
32 Hughey, ed. Arundel-Harington, 11.193.
poem closer than any other to Dyer’s original except for its omission, with [the 
version in Marsh’s Library, MS 183], of lines 53-56.”331 concur with Hughey’s 
view, however, that the evidence does not allow one to conclude that AH  more 
closely resembles Dyer’s composition than do the other extant versions.34 After 
all, Dyer might never have written down any version of the poem. Sargent 
maintains that Dyer sang his poems at social gatherings.35 It is possible that Dyer 
altered the lyric at each performance to suit the tastes/inclinations of a given 
audience.
Despite acknowledging ALTs temporal proximity to Dyer’s composition, 
May uses Cambridge University Library MS. Dd. 5.75, ff. 25-5v (CUL) as his 
copy-text, dating that manuscript’s transcription to c.15 82.36 “As copy text, the 
Cambridge Manuscript requires six more emendations than would AH  but 
supplies the four lines missing from AH  and Ma.” May declares: “These three 
texts [CUL, AH  and Ma] are far superior to the others.”37 However, analysis 
below will indicate that May’s preference for AH  and CUL as textual witnesses 
can be challenged. Certainly, May betrays an idealist bias when he criticizes 
Sargent’s previous selection of Bodleian MS. Ashmole, 781 (ASH) as copy-text 
on the grounds that the latter is a late transcription and contains “corruptions”. 
May objects that the concluding couplet unique to ASH is in “regular iambic 
heptameters as opposed to the consistent poulter’s measure of the preceding 
eighty lines. These metrically anomalous lines at the end of one of the most 
corrupt texts of the poem must be rejected as spurious.” I agree that the 
concluding couplet of ASH is “anomalous”, but May makes no clear case for his 
assertion that the rest of ASH represents “one of the most corrupt texts of the 
poem”. May does observe that ASH and “the [Bodleian] Tanner Manuscript 
share conjuctive errors at lines 40, 43 and 64”; however, he does not quote these 
“errors” or explain their erroneous nature. Nonetheless, May plausibly concludes
33 May, Courtier Poets, p. 292.
34 Hughey, ed. Arundel-Harington, 11.206.
35 Sargent, Dyer, p. 9.
36 May & Ringler, Jr., Index, p. 669.
37 May, Courtier Poets, p. 293.
that ASH and Tanner “are thus derived from a lost intermediary”.38 Against 
May’s low opinion of ASH it might be noted that it was Elias Ashmole who 
bequeathed the collection housing ASH to the Bodleian, Ashmole having
-5Qacquired portions of John Dee’s “monumental library”. Taylor describes Dyer 
as Dee’s “closest personal friend”.40 Indeed, Dyer became the godfather of Dee’s 
oldest son, Arthur, on 13 July 1579,41 and, as noted, spent considerable time with 
Dee in Prague. The 1583 catalogue of Dee’s library shows that “it housed 
between three and four thousand printed books and manuscripts ... universally 
encompassing every aspect of classical, medieval and Renaissance culture” 42 It 
is at least possible, then, that Dee possessed a copy of Dyer’s popular poem, 
recorded in ASH.43 Regarding (with Sargent), therefore, ASH’s claims as 
comparable to those of May and Hughey’s copy-texts, CUL and AH, in the 
interpretation offered below I synthesize the witness of these three variants.
As stated above, instead of supposing an ideal authorial version of Dyer’s 
poem, I prefer to posit a situational stimulus.44 Rhetorical consistency might then 
indicate a variant’s relative proximity to that stimulus, whereas local content 
which seems at odds with a text’s rhetorical tenor might be viewed not as 
evidence of “corruption” but as the result of interventions by agents who 
presuppose less need to maintain rhetorical consistency than the scribes of the 
source(s) they adapt.
38 May, Courtier Poets , p. 293. There are two further branches in the stemma: the versions in 
British Library, Harleian MS 6910, Huntingdon Library, MS HM 198, volume 2, folios 43-5 and 
Poems o f  Pembroke and Rudyard (1660; the first printed version) “descend from a common 
original”: May, Courtier Poets, p. 292; Bodleian, Rawlinson poet. MS 85 and British Library, 
Harleian MS 7392(2) also share “errors in common”: May, Courtier Poets, p. 293.
39 Maria Del Sapio Garbero, “Introduction: Shakespeare’s Rome and Renaissance 
‘Anthropographie’,” p. 15, in Maria del Sapio Garbero et al, eds. Questioning Bodies in 
Shakespeare’s Rome (Goettingen: V&R unipress, 2010), pp. 13-19; C. H. Josten, ed. Elias 
Ashmole (1617-1692): His Autobiographical and Historical Notes, and Other Contemporary 
Sources Relating to His Life and Work, 5 volumes (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1966), 1.188, III. 1264-5, 
IV.1293.
40 Taylor, Tudor Geography, pp. 76-7.
41 Taylor, Tudor Geography, p. 125.
42 Del Sapio Garbero, “Renaissance ‘Anthropographie’,” p. 15.
43 In a private email, October 16 2011, Steven W. May states that ASH was transcribed c. 1620-31 
and points out that ASH is currently inaccessible due to the condition o f  the manuscript.
44 See: Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: a Social Critique o f  the Judgement o f  Taste (London & New  
York: Routledge, 1984), p. 45.
Before discussing the three variants, it is necessary to offer a brief 
summary of the poem’s narrative (as neutrally as I can manage) in order to 
orientate the reader. The speakers in the variants discussed below alike insist that 
they remain faithful to the woman who has betrayed their trust in some 
undisclosed manner {AH 47-8, 55-6; ASH 47-8, 53; CUL 47-8, 59-60) 45 The 
speakers announce that they will henceforth live in seclusion {AH 59-60; ASH 
63-4; CUL 63-4); worms will be their only food {AH 61; ASH 65; CUL 65); they 
regard their after-life prospect as involving damnation {AH 67; ASH 71; CUL 
71).
With regard to the question of the poem’s overall tone, a useful point of 
agreement with May lies in our both finding the “worms” detail hyperbolic.46 
Quilligan has suggested that “the absurdity of the surface of a text is the 
necessary signal for the existence of allegory”.471 would prefer to say, following 
Augustine, that apparent absurdity indicates figuration. This does not mean that 
the “worms” necessarily figure some other diet; after all, irony is a figure. The 
hyperbolic detail might, for instance, be a clue that the entire poem is ironic: the 
speaker is overdoing it; the “woman” addressed might be imagined as rolling her 
eyes.
Of course, my would-be neutral summary of the poem might seem intended 
to suggest that the poem has a “religious” message, given the final emphasis on 
damnation. Conversely, the poem’s ironic tenor might indicate a worldly 
ambivalence vis-a-vis religion or, at least, scepticism towards the possibility of 
religious faith being capable of sincere public expression. In any case, I resist 
applying a secular/sacred binary to the poem; that is, in line with Hamrick’s 
approach, I do not suppose that the poem is either a secular love poem or a 
figurative religious poem. Regardless of Dyer’s own religious affiliations (or 
those of his copyists), the poem is post-Lutheran. An important aspect of the 
Lutheran challenge to the Roman Church was the protest against the Church’s
45 For the full texts o f AH, ASH and CUL, see: Appendix 1.1-3.
46 May, Courtier Poets, p. 55.
47 Quilligan, Language o f  Allegory, p. 28.
48 Hamrick, “Tottel’s Miscellany.”
ostensible commitment to dividing human society into clerical and lay sectors.49 
It became a reformist position that no such external division actually obtained in 
Christian society. The Roman Church could argue in return that the clerical/lay 
divide had (and could have) only ever been a formal scheme (as pre-Lutheran 
reform-minded Catholic texts had more than hinted).50 Accordingly, it seems 
anachronistic of textual scholars such as May and Ringler, Jr. to categorize 
Elizabethan poems as either secular or sacred (as they do in their Index), when 
precisely that binary had ceased to be touted as legitimate by post-Reformation 
Europe (notwithstanding continued commitment to that binary by conservative 
elements). Of course, texts continued to be referred to as more or less devotional, 
moral, immoral and so on. Conservative post-Reformation commentators might 
insist on referring to texts as either sacred or worldly; this does not justify 
modem scholars’ unquestioning retention of those default settings. A point I wish 
to stress, therefore, is that all texts can be read as participating in a flesh-spirit 
dialectic, without transhistorical imposition. (Indeed, as noted in the Introduction, 
it might be suggested that to read post-Lutheran texts otherwise does involve 
transhistorical imposition.) The poles of that dialectic are not isoconceptual with 
the externalized (institutional) categories of sacred and secular.51 Accordingly, I 
propose reading the variants of Dyer’s poem as participants in the flesh-spirit 
dialectic.
In any case, it is known that at least one contemporary reader regarded 
Dyer’s lyric as being concerned with matters beside the erotic. Sir John 
Harington refers directly to Dyer’s poem in the notes to his translation of 
Orlando Fnrioso Book 8. Speaking of “the Allegorie” of Ariosto’s text,
Harington focuses on “these impediments that disturbe men in their good
49 Bainton, Luther, pp. 232-3, 241ff; Bemd Wannenwetsch, “Luther’s Moral Theology,” pp. 123, 
126-7, in McKim, ed. Luther, pp. 120-35; James M. Kittelson, “Luther and Modem Church 
History,” pp. 268-9, in McKim, ed. Luther, pp. 259-71.
50 See, for example: Lorenzo Valla, “The Profession o f  the Religious (1439-1440),” in David 
Englander et al, eds. Culture and B elief in Europe, 1450-1600: an Anthology o f  Sources (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1990), pp. 30-9.
51 Robert Weimann, Authority and Representation in Early Modern Discourse (Baltimore & 
London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996), pp. 40-1.
course”.52 Harington’s remark speaks to a central issue of Dyer’s poem: the 
extent to which one’s fortunes in the world function as reliable signs of one’s 
spiritual condition. Harington figures worldly impediments to one’s “good 
course” as “owls”.53 An owl appears in Dyer’s poem: “the shreekinge owle” is to 
be the dejected one’s “clocke” {AH 64).54 Harington observes that such owls may 
be “driven away with the sunne shine”55 and refers to Dyer’s poem in the 
following comment:
for the light o f  understanding and the shining o f  true w orthiness, or (as M. D y e r  in an 
excellent verse termeth it) the light that shines in w orthines, d issolveth  and disperseth  
these ... im pedim ents, that let [that is, obstruct] a m an in h is jo m e y  to L o g estilla s  Court, 
that is to the court o f  vertue, o f  tem perance, o f  p ietie, w here all good  lessons are 
taught.56
As Hughey remarks, Harington’s comments “reveal the philosophic significance 
which the poem might have for an Elizabethan reader”.57 Philosophical, yes, but, 
given the explicit reference to “pietie”, religious also. Moreover, since Dyer 
acted as Harington’s guardian in the early 1580s, the latter man may be regarded
58as a well-informed reader of the poem.
A final point: Dyer’s lyric was arguably produced/altered in the copying to 
suit the religious and political positions or semi-public “fronts” of its copyists. 
Given this state of affairs, it might be wondered why one should continue to refer 
to Dyer in particular as the author of “Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste”. The 
principal answer is that the poem’s contemporary readers (Southwell—or his
52 Hughey, ed. Arundel-Harington, 11.207.
53 Hughey, ed. Arundel-Harington, 11.207.
54 Screeching owls feature prominently in the well-known Tudor ballad “A Lament for Our 
Lady’s Shrine at Walsingham”. The poem is usually read as expressing Catholic nostalgia. Philip 
Schwyzer, however, has argued that the poem was written by a newly-converted Catholic with a 
Protestant formation: Archaeologies o f  English Renaissance Literature (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2007), pp. 84-92. For the “Lament,” see Robert S. Miola, ed. Early Modern Catholicism: an 
Anthology o f  Primary Sources (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), pp. 172-3.
55 Hughey, ed. Arundel-Harington, 11.207.
56 Hughey, ed. Arundel-Harington, 11.207.
57 Hughey, ed. Arundel-Harington, 11.207.
58 Sargent, Dyer, pp. 74-5.
copyist—included) invariably ascribed the work to Dyer.59 Thus, whether Dyer 
(first) wrote the poem or not, the lyric participates as “a Dyer” in the 
development of the author-fimction in Elizabethan culture.
*
At the outset, the reader of Dyer’s poem learns that its protagonist is unhappy 
because his “faith is scomd” (ASH 2). Furthermore, the speaker’s existence is 
not outwardly unhappy: he is obliged to wear a mask, being “one that lives in 
shew, but inwardly doth dye” {AH 13). However, the protagonist insists that he is 
not dismayed by the prospect of the body's death for that “mak[es] free the better 
part” (CUL 10). This statement is consistent with Florentine Neoplatonism, 
which tended to treat the body as inferior to the spirit, notwithstanding the value 
it awarded to the physical as a means of access to the spiritual.60 In any case, 
Dyer’s speaker then specifies that the type of death he dreads is “of the mind” 
(ASH 11)—that is (from a Neoplatonic perspective), it relates to the soul. The 
influence of the late-medieval recovery of Aristotle is evident. Late-medieval 
Christian scholars seized upon Aristotle’s apparent identification of the active 
intellect as the only human faculty capable of surviving separation from the 
body. This understanding appears to inform the selection of the word “mind” 
here in Dyer’s poem where, according to more modem conceptions of Christian 
dualism, one might expect to read “soul” or “spirit”. It is important to stress, 
therefore, that the equation of “mind” with “soul” represents a Neoplatonic- 
Christian (or Averroistic) distortion of Aristotle, who, on the contrary, held the 
soul to be the form of the body.61 Thus, the anguish expressed by Dyer’s lover 
may be at least partly attributable to category error (“fancy” in the parlance of the 
period) resulting from philosophical-religious misalliance.
59 Sargent, Dyer, pp. 205, 208.
60 Fowler rightly says that “the single orthodox Neoplatonic system ... has never had a real 
existence: differences, even between the systems o f Pico and Ficino, obstinately divide the parts 
o f the chimera”: “Neoplatonic order,” p. 78.n. Nevertheless, the “system” is called Neo/?/a/onism 
for a reason.
61 Augustine’s view, by contrast, while also influenced by Neoplatonism evinces its priority to the 
Averroistic distortion o f  Aristotle: Chadwick, ed. Confessions, IV.25; X.40.
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Be that as it may, superlative pain is experienced by the speaker of ASH. A 
large part of that speaker’s anguish appears to be due to an obligation to hide 
most of this pain behind a mask of apparent well-being:
m y death is o f  the mind,
W hich alw ays yeeld s extream est paines, yet keepes the
m ost behind:
A s one that lives in shew e (11-13)
AH' s reading is softer:
m y greefe y s  o f  the m ynde,
W hich allw ays yeeld es extream est payns, but leaves the
w orst behind.
A s one that lives in shew  [ . . . ]  (11-13)
If, as I have suggested, the “mind/mynde” here is equivalent to the soul, there 
might be much difference between “death” and “greefe”—as though A H s  
protagonist is incapable of having true (spiritual) insight into what is in store for 
him. Moreover, where May perceives “corruptions” in ASH, I would draw 
attention to A H s arguably nonsensical “leaves” as compared with ASH’s 
“keepes”, which is cogent in combination with the notion of living “in shewe”. 
The full stop after A H s  “behind” (found also in CUL) results in syntactical 
breakdown, as the following “sentence” lacks a subject (13-16). CUL reads:
m y death is o f  the m ynd,
W hich alw ayes yeldes extrem est pangues but keepes the
w orst behind.
A s one w hich lyves in sh ow  [ . . . ]  (11-13 )
Here, the full stop after “behind” renders less precise the meaning of “keepes”. 
This conclusion might seem to rely too much on the secure registration of a
scribal colon and two full stops (or haphazardly to apply modem punctuation 
conventions to early modem manuscripts). The reader is invited to consult lines 
1-16 of Appendix 1.3, noting the relative syntactic regularity of lines 1-12.62 In 
marked contrast, the “sentence” in lines 13-16 is incomplete. ASH, on the other 
hand, maintains syntactic regularity at least until line 40.
An early modem colon could either mark a pause or suggest that a 
balancing phrase is to follow of equal importance to the phrase which went 
before.63 Thus, I would suggest that when the material presence of the colon in 
its 12th line is acknowledged, ASH implicitly attributes free will to its speaker: he 
chooses to keep the majority of his pain hidden behind a mask of well-being (but 
just for safety’s sake, employs a simile-construction). In CUL it is the speaker’s 
“death”—his spiritual condition—which “keepes the worst behind”. This version 
not only refrains from ascribing free will to the speaker but also implies that no 
matter how great his current suffering may be, the lover’s situation in the afterlife 
will be far worse. According to this interpretation, AH  and CUL adopt an ironic 
(and judgemental) attitude towards their own protagonists. Conversely, ASH 
appears to sympathize and, therefore, identify with the speaker’s predicament. 
Given that AH  and CUL’s intervention has resulted in syntactic breadown, 
moreover, it might be suggested that ASH is a better witness to the situational 
stimulus of Dyer’s composition.
In line 15, the speaker employs religious imagery, speaking of himself as 
one “Whose hart the alter is, whose spirit a sacrifice” (CUL). This is reminiscent 
of the “Catholic poetic” Hamrick has detected in many poems from Songes and 
Sonettes 64 Catholic ritual is reassigned a location in the body of the lover. On the 
other hand, such language is also characteristic of, say, Calvin’s Institutes 65 
Thus, Hamrick’s reluctance to regard such acts of figuration as reliable indices of
62 As transcribed by Hughey, AH  is less consistent, with lines 5-6 and 7-8 being incomplete 
“sentences”.
63 Ros King, “Language o f the Soul,” pp. 32-3, in Emma Driver et al, eds. The Shakespeare 
Encyclopedia: the Complete Guide to the Man and His Works (London: Apple, 2009), pp. 30-3; 
Francis Clement, The Petie Schole with an English Orthographie, Wherin by Rides Lately 
Prescribed Is Taught a Method To Enable Both a Childe To Reade Perfectly within One Moneth, 
& Also the Vnperfect To Write English Aright (London: Thomas Vautrolier, 1587), p. 25.
64 Hamrick, “Tottel’s Miscellany.”
65 Beveridge, ed. Institutes, III.3.16.
a speaker’s confessional allegiance is to be commended. As Hamrick argues, by 
such figuration, the speakers in these poems seem to be exploring religious 
questions in a perilous religio-political climate in the relative safety of ostensibly 
“secular” love poetry.66
CUL’s protagonist reveals that the “sacrifice” in question is being made 
“Unto the powers whom to appease no sorrow may suffise” (16). This might 
seem to be the standard indictment of the Petrarchan beloved as cruel mistress— 
one whom no amount of suffering can induce to relent. But the cruel “one” in 
Dyer’s poem is pluralised—and capitalised in ASH—as “the Powers”: the lover 
thus indicts a corporate assembly. Possibly, these “Powers” are the holders of 
political power.67 No amount of “sorow” can appease such beings.
Identifying “the Powers” becomes somewhat easier when Dyer’s speaker 
begins to apportion blame for his current predicament. The protagonist’s 
“thoughtes” are compared to Troy: “the town that Sinon bought and sold” (ASH 
20). Comparable references to Troy occur in Songes and Sonettes.6% However, 
Sinon—a classical figure of non-erotic treachery—appears out of place in a 
lover’s complaint; a reference to Helen’s career might be thought more fitting. 
Both “Troy” and “Sinon” also feature prominently in Shakespeare’s The Rape o f  
Lucrece, wherein Sinon again takes priority over Helen. After a two-stanza 
reprimand of Helen,69 the character of Sinon is discussed at much greater length 
as part of Lucrece’s musings on the Fall of Troy (1501-68). Like Dyer’s 
suffering speaker, Lucrece associates herself with the doomed city (“my Troy did 
perish” [1547]). John Klause suggests that Lucrece identifies the “Sinons” of the
66 Hamrick, “Tottel’s Miscellany.”
67 For the implications for Protestant resistance theory o f  Luther’s awareness o f  Paul’s usage o f  
the plural term “powers”, see: Bainton, Luther, pp. 381-2.
68 See, for example: Henry Howard’s “The Louer Comforteth Himself with the Worthinesse o f  
His Loue,” 11. 7-24 (p. 20) and “Complaint o f a Diyng Louer Refused vpon His Ladies Injust 
Mistaking o f His Writyng,” 11. 52 (p. 23): Nicolas Grimald, ed.[?] Songes and Sonettes: Written 
by the Ryght Honorable Lorde Henry Howard Late Earle o f  Surrye, and Other (London: Richard 
Tottel, 1557). Page numbers refer to a facsimile edition (Exeter: Shearsman Books, 2010).
69 William Shakespeare, “The Rape o f  Lucrece,” in Katherine Duncan-Jones & H. R. 
Woudhuysen, eds. Shakespeare’s Poems (London: CENGAGE Learning, 2007), pp. 231-383; 11. 
1471-84.
world as “smiling villains in high places” (99).70 Similarly, Dyer’s “Sinon” could 
figure those who have “bought and sold” the poem’s protagonist with unfulfilled 
offers of career advancement.
Around the time of the composition and reception of Dyer’s poem, “Sinon” 
functioned as a by-word for internal enemies of the Elizabethan regime’s true 
religious and political interests. After a more aggressively Protestant policy 
became “obtrusive” in Elizabethan England, what has been termed the first 
Catholic political pamphlet A Treatise o f Treasons (1572) appeared, arguing that 
“the real traitors in England were ... the two ‘Synons’: William Cecil and 
Nicholas Bacon”.71 Thus, just as the crafty Sinon had persuaded the Trojans to 
lower their guard and allow in a foreign religious device, so had Cecil and Bacon 
encouraged Elizabeth to distance herself from the conservative nobility and 
orthodox Christianity. Given the poem’s probable date of composition, it is 
scarcely credible that Dyer’s Sinon would not have been taken as an allusion to 
Cecil (and Bacon). On the other hand, like his patron Leicester, Dyer seems 
generally to have harmonized his actions with Cecil’s policies. Indeed, Sargent 
notes that while Dyer was acting as Leicester’s secretary, he was working as an 
agent for Burghley.72 Stephen Alford has persuasively argued that previous 
scholarly apprehensions of Elizabethan political factionalism, with, for instance, 
a Leicester faction competing against a Cecilian faction, have been too 
schematic.73 Arguing from such a schematic factionalist viewpoint, one could 
maintain that Dyer, in this poem, is implicitly praising Leicester’s upfront, old- 
fashioned loyalty, as against Cecil’s self-interested and more devious approach to 
politics and religion. Such an argument would assume that Dyer’s poem is either 
a sincere expression of its author’s personal views and/or a (dangerously) 
partisan production. Given the rhetorical sophistication of the Elizabethan period,
70 John Klause, Shakespeare, the Earl and the Jesuit (Cranbury: Fairleigh Dickinson UP, 2008), 
p. 99.
71 Clancy, Papist Pamphleteers, p. 15; A Table Gathered owt o f  a Booke Named A Treatise o f  
Treasons against Q. Elizabeth, and the Croune o f  England (Antwerp: J. Fowler, 1572).
72 Sargent, Dyer, pp. 27, 35. Leicester apparently took no part in the Ridolfi plot: Edwards, 
Marvellous Chance, p. 371.
73 Stephen Alford, The Early Elizabethan Polity: William Cecil and the British Succession Crisis, 
1558-1569 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998), pp. 97-8.
neither interpretation seems especially plausible. The question then remains: why 
would Dyer include a punning signature in a poem which appears to perpetuate 
the association of Cecil with Sinon?
It has been suggested that Dyer is the “ Volcatius” Lodge describes in 
“Satyre, 5” of A Fig for Momus (1595) as having been “laught in court” in the 
1570s, having “subbom’d, devis’d and wrought / To worke out Themis [Sir 
Christopher Hatton], from the place he sought” (50).74 The “Themis” 
identification remains under-substantiated; however, reading “Volcatius” as Dyer 
seems reasonable, given the poem’s statement that Volcatius “wept his follies to 
a woodden skreene” (50). Setting aside the line’s intriguing suggestion of a 
confessional box, Dyer is thought to have sung his own “The Songe in the Oke” 
to Queen Elizabeth from within an oak tree at Woodstock in 1575.75 On the other 
hand, Lodge operated at some remove from the court, and thus was obliged and 
possibly willing to tailor gossip in compressed poetic format. After all, it would 
appear that Hatton became a friend of Dyer’s.76 Nevertheless, around May 1573, 
Leicester and Burghley—working together—are said to have sought to replace 
Hatton with Dyer in Elizabeth’s favour.77 Hatton received a copy of A Treatise o f  
Treasons while recovering from illness in Antwerp in 1573. The letter 
accompanying the book, signed “T.G.”, asked Hatton “to deliver this warning 
book to Elizabeth and assumed that he was of the Catholic faith, mentioning that 
he had been baptised in that religion.”78 Prudently, Hatton passed the letter on to 
Burghley. Synthesizing these details, one could construct a scenario whereby 
Leicester commissioned Dyer to ventriloquize Hatton’s compromised religious 
position in a poem. Read thus, “Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste” is a dramatic
74 Sidney H. Atkins, “Dyer at Woodstock,” TLS, February 3 1945, p. 55; Cuvelier, Lodge, p. 356. 
A Fig fo r  Momus is in Volume 3 o f Lodge’s Works. For Atkins’s arguments that portions o f  A 
Fig fo r  Momus were written in the late-1570s, see: “George Stoddard,” TLS, January 18 1934, p. 
44; “Lodge’s A Fig fo r  Momus,” TLS, August 16 1934, p. 565; “A Fig fo r  Momus,” TLS, 
February 7 1935, p. 76.
75 Sargent, Dyer, pp. 29-34.
76 Vines, Hatton, pp. 25-6.
77 Vines, Hatton, p. 27.
78 Vines, Hatton, p. 29.
monologue, as spoken by a repining English Catholic.79 Dyer seems to indict 
himself by including his own name in the poem’s envoy, but also thereby 
protects himself from accusations of malice (while actually writing under 
Leicester’s protection). Since Cecil was working with Leicester in the supposed 
effort to replace Hatton with Dyer, he would be privy to the undertaking. Though 
extremely speculative, this hypothesis does, at least, offer an explanation for 
Dyer’s otherwise perplexing decision to attach his name to a poem attacking a 
“Sinon” around the time of the publication of A Treatise o f Treasons.
Such a sinister interpretation of events would not disqualify Dyer from 
himself having Catholic sympathies or leanings. It was precisely such 
sympathizers who were recruited by Cecil et al to perform tasks involving adroit 
communication with Catholics. For example, the Catholic Montague (whose 
1559 speech to parliament anticipated basic arguments of A Treatise o f  
Treasons)80 undertook diplomatic missions to Catholic states on behalf of 
Elizabeth’s regime,81 and moderates such as Thomas Sackville were employed 
by Cecil for dealings with English Catholics.82 With or without its author’s 
complicity, Dyer’s poem could even have functioned as a window into the souls 
of readers who appeared to identify with the poem’s stance. Indeed, the poem, 
with its emphasis on suffering and pain, could be regarded as a virtual torture 
device. Copying it, quoting it or expressing admiration for it, one confesses 
religious secrets. Again, this scenario may sound implausibly Machiavellian, but 
an anonymous English court memorandum of 1586 recommends the following 
behaviour to spies being sent to Spain:
H e [the spy] is to yeilde h im self, as it w ere, under shyfte to have advice and goastlie  
counsel, a lleging a m alcontentednesse in hym  with repyninge at his present fate: being  
desirous, i f  it m ight please sw eet Jesu , for his deare m other’s sake, to gain som e friends
79 Conditions for English Catholics became noticeably worse from 1570-1: Meyer, Catholic 
Church, p. 127; see also: Richard Simpson, Edmund Campion: a Biography, 2nd edition (London: 
John Hodges, 1896), p. 68; Jean-Christophe Mayer, Shakespeare’s Hybrid Faith: History, 
Religion and the Stage (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 160.n.30.
80 Questier, Catholicism and Community, p. 123.
81 Questier, Catholicism and Community, pp. 140ff.
82 Pollen, English Catholics, p. 81. See also: Pritchyard, Catholic Loyalism, pp. 58-9.
for his better access into foreign parts and C atholike countries, there to pass the tym e 
w ith the quiet and com fort o f  h is con scien ce and in the causes o f  his poor distressed  
countrym en.83
The spy, in other words, is to behave like the speaker in the “Dyer”. The 
memorandum postdates the composition of Dyer’s poem, of course, and it is 
possible the poem’s career suggested the strategy, rather than vice versa. In any 
case, the subsequent history of Dyer’s poem suggests that such a procedure could 
easily be thwarted by readers and copyists treating the poem in an ironical 
fashion—that is, in a manner which turned the poem’s latent confession of guilt 
back upon the author and the regime for which he might have been perceived to 
speak.
Leaving these speculative matters, I return to the material witness of the 
variants of Dyer’s poem. Line 21 of both AH  and CUL refers to their respective 
protagonist’s “mortall fall”, where ASH reads “mortall foe”. Again, I would 
suggest that AH  and CUL appear syntactically problematic here. In both versions, 
the “Whom” of line 22 (“Whom love and fortune once advanced but now have 
cast away” [CUL]) lacks an antecedent. (Hughey notes that line 22 in AH  is 
“written over an erasure”.)84 ASH’s reading, meanwhile, leads one to suppose 
that the “mortall foe” is the one “Whome love and fortune once advaunced and 
now hath cast away”. In other words, the lover himself is his own “mortall foe”. 
Doctrinal matters may have influenced these readings. Alexandra Walsham has 
observed that, regardless of the greater complexity of Calvin’s own position, 
Reformist understanding of Providence in Elizabethan England often regarded
o cworldly success as a sign of spiritual election. If he were to accept such a 
framework, the poem’s speaker could regard his fall from fortune’s favour as a 
sign of his being predestined to damnation. Thus, a Catholic (or gnesio-Lutheran)
83 British Museum, Harleian 295 f. 195; quoted in Albert J. Loomie, The Spanish Elizabethans: 
the English Exiles at the Court o f  Philip II (London: Bums & Oates, 1963), p. 73.
84 Hughey, ed. Arundel-Harington, 11.202.
85 Walsham, Providence, pp. 10-32, 69-87, 332-3; see also: Thomas, Decline, p. 130; Beveridge, 
ed. Institutes, 1.16.2; Weber, Protestant Ethic, p. 114.
becomes his/her own foe when interpellated by supralapsarianism.86 According 
to Article 17 of the Church of England’s Thirty-Nine Articles (“Of Predestination 
and Election”), it was always going to happen that way. Article 17’s description 
of the condition of those conscious of their damnation is similar to the 
predicament of Dyer’s narrator: “for curious and carnal persons, lacking the 
Spirit of Christ, to have continually before their eyes the sentence of Gods 
Predestination, is a most dangerous downfal, whereby the devil doth thrust them 
... into desperation”.87 The phrase “to have [one’s sentence] continually before 
their eyes” finds an equivalent in Dyer’s poem: “still [that is, continually] before 
my face my mortall foe [or ‘fall’] doth lay” (ASH 21). The“foe” or “fall” is here 
read as “mortall”, being a sign of the “carnal” one’s predestined damnation.
Though this reading makes grammatical and polemical sense, it seems 
strained. If this is the poem’s message, it is expressed with a lack of clarity which 
is uncharacteristic of the poem as a whole (especially ASH). It is possible that the 
lost version May detects behind ASH bore plainer witness to the poem’s 
situational stimulus. That said, it may also be observed that none of the three 
versions makes better sense in this respect when read as “secular” love poem.
The obscurity of lines 21-22, in other words, arguably results from a doctrinally 
dangerous statement having been removed or altered.
In a more defiant vein, Dyer’s protagonist suggests that his predicament is 
more the result of human injustice than divinely ordained destiny: “Forsaken first 
was I, then vtterly foregotten, / And he that came not to my faith, lo, my reward 
hath gotten” (ASH 39-40). These lines could be taken to imply that it is not 
God’s inscrutability that decides who is to number among the elect (in this life) 
but rather the ability to conform to worldly values. The speaker thus presents 
professors of the politically expedient faith (pragmatic Protestantism) as
86 Lindberg, European Reformations, pp. 38-9; see also: Cummings, Grammar and Grace, p. 291. 
For the Elizabethan reception o f supralapsarianism and predestinarianism, see: Alison Shell, 
Shakespeare and Religion (London: Methuen Drama, 2010), pp. 180-1.
87 “Appendix B: Additional Orders o f Service, Articles and Tables, 1662-1685,” p. 678 
(emphases added), in Brian Cummings, ed. The Book o f  Common Prayer: the Texts o f 1549, 1559 
and 1662 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011), pp. 668-86.
ambitious dissemblers who will espouse whatever doctrines circumstances 
require.
A hostile attitude to predestinarian doctrine could also explain the pointed 
reference by Dyer’s speaker to “grace reserved” {AH, ASH & CUL 44), which, 
combined with a reference to “secret thankfulness” (CUL 43), might be read as 
targeting the God of predestinarian doctrine as an ingrate: such a God accepts his 
worshippers’ prayers but offers nothing in return. According to this possibly 
hostile witness, the more abject Protestantism inclines the believer to become, the 
more aggressive he or she is forced to be in trying to obtain signs of election 
from a taciturn deity.
This note of accusation notwithstanding, the speaker appears willing to 
come to terms with predestinarian doctrine. A sophisticated understanding of the 
political need to mask one’s religious faith is demonstrated. Against this reading 
of the poem as a public demonstration of political cunning, though, it might be 
objected that the text was not intended for publication; rather its intended 
audience was a presumably sympathetic coterie. However, the poem is 
conspicuously coy about its entry into the public domain. Its speaker-as-author, 
for example, feigns a desire for anonymity:
M y songe, i f  anie aske w hose greivous Case is such,
D y  er  thou letst h is nam e be knowne: h is fo lly  k now es to
m uch,
But best w ere thee to hide, and neuer com e to light.
(A SH  77-9)
In AH, the speaker’s folly “shews to muche” (74; CUL’s line 78 is similar). 
Whatever the wording, the fact that the poem is extant shows the 
disingenuousness of the injunction. The obvious inclusion of the poet’s name 
{“Dy er”) indicates that the desire for anonymity is incomplete. Regarding such 
instances, Jonathan Crewe remarks:
conflicting w ish es for privileged  insidedness and for ex ten ded  fam ily influence attained 
through publicity w ould  necessarily  result in an attempt to have it both ways: to hide and 
reveal the secret at the sam e time; to let the right outsiders becom e insiders.88
The common identification of Dyer as the author of “Hee That His Mirth Hath 
Loste” would seem to corroborate this assessment.
With that point established, it would be as well to consider how 
“conciliatory” Dyer’s poem appears to be. Of particular note in this regard is the 
observation: “O fraile vnconstant kynd, and safe in trust too noe man! / Noe 
women angels are, and loe, my mystris is a woeman” (ASH 47-8; CUL and AH  
offer similar readings).89 If the poem is read as an Elizabethan courtier’s (secular) 
complaint concerning lack of promotion, the implication that the speaker’s 
beloved—whether or not she is Elizabeth herself—is not only “fraile” but 
“vnconstant” because she is female would do little to improve that courtier’s 
career prospects. Furthermore, the poem possibly thus indicates that a particular 
woman had previously been adopted as a female intercessory figure, comparable 
to an “angel”.90 If that female figure is Elizabeth, then the patent injustice of her 
administration has revealed the queen to be thoroughly mortal. Nevertheless, if 
the queen were to restore Dyer’s protagonist to favour, she would not only 
perform tacit agreement with his criticism of doctrines which tend to refuse 
efficacy to intercessors, but also perform efficacious intercession in thus 
rewarding his constancy and virtue. The survival of the poem and Dyer’s 
eventual readmission to the Court might indicate that something like this indeed 
occurred. As Gilbert Talbot wrote, in the May 11 1573 letter previously-quoted, 
the banished Dyer informed the queen that he was mortally sick and “unless she
88 Jonathan Crewe, Hidden Designs: the Critical Profession and Renaissance Literature (New  
York & London: Methuen, 1986), p. 78.
89 A version o f  the latter clause o f the latter line is the phrase quoted in Sidney’s Arcadia  (66).
90 Elizabeth’s function as intercessor is more explicitly advertised in: Thomas Bentley, The 
Monument o f  Matrones Conteining Seuen Seuerall Lamps o f  Virginitie, or Distinct Treatises; 
Whereof the First Fine Concerne Praier and Meditation: the Other Two Last, Precepts and  
Examples, as the Woorthie Works Partlie o f  Men, Partlie o f  Women; Com piledfor the Necessarie 
Vse o f  Both Sexes out o f  the Sacred Scriptures, and Other Approoued Authors (London: H. 
Denham, 1582); Bentley “confers upon Elizabeth the ‘gratious’ capacity to ‘pardon and forgive’ 
him”: Hamrick, Catholic Imaginary, p. 169.
would forgive him he was not like to recover, and hereupon her majesty hath 
forgiven him, and sent unto him a very comfortable message”.91 However, this 
may be reading the poem too autobiographically. When the variants are similar, 
the lack of scope for triangulation hinders registration of rhetorical stimulus.
An important variation can be analysed by considering the first of a set of 4 
lines in ASH and CUL which are entirely omitted from AH. The speaker in ASH 
refuses to portray himself as inconstant; he asserts: “Hers still remaine must I, by 
wronge, by death, by shame” (53; emphasis added). The speaker in CUL, 
however, declares: “Here styll remayn must I, by death, by wrong, by shame” 
(53; emphasis added). Rather threateningly, in CUL “death” tops the list of 
possible outcomes. More importantly for the present discussion, CUL’s speaker 
subsequently contradicts himself by announcing: “The solitarie wood my citie 
shall becom" (63; emphasis added). AH 's protagonist likewise states that “The 
solitarye woodes my cyte shall becom” (58), but without contradiction due to the 
omission of ASH and CUL’s lines 53-6. Presumably, a “secular” reading could 
explain this act of omission by ASH’s copyist as being accidental. (Looking at 
CUL, one wonders why a rejected lover would insist on remaining “here”—or 
even be capable of so remaining—unless, that is, he is either an impotent 
political subject or a member of an erring church which is figured as female.) To 
read AH  as “secular” love poem, therefore, one might import the “Her” reading: 
though the woman has treated the lover badly he will remain constant. However, 
restoring the “her” reading would thus tend to confirm that CUL’s version of line 
53 presents a political-religious alteration of its source, an alteration which 
involved CUL’s copyist in a subsequent contradiction. One might then observe 
that ASH’s speaker is already in exile: “The sollitarie woodes my Cittie shall 
remaine" (63; emphasis added). Here, I submit, is an important clue to the 
poem’s situational stimulus: it is as though the speaker has never moved but his 
mistress (the Elizabethan Settlement figured as female) has moved doctrinally, 
leaving him alone in exile on native conceptual turf. If Dyer was writing (at least 
partly) to implicate such as Hatton, it may be suggested that he did his job too
91 Quoted in A. H. Bullen, “Dyer, Sir Edward (d. 1607), Poet and Courtier,” ODNB.
well. Elizabeth, whose motto was Semper eadem (“always the same”),92 might 
not approve of the poem’s charge, however ironic or fictional its presentation.
In the following lines, the speaker insists upon his constancy: “I cannot sett 
at naught which I have held so dear” (CUL 55). He has no intention of changing 
his fundamental allegiance: “Nor that I meane hencefoorthe this straunge will to 
professe / As one that couid betray suche trothe to buyld on ficklenesse” {AH 53- 
4). The word “will” invites attention: the “will” here is something foreign which 
the speaker can choose not to “professe”. (The assertion of free will here—in the 
rather curious matter of refusing to concur with a “straunge will”— is possibly 
further evidence of CUL and A H  s rhetorical inconsistency, given that I have 
previously read those variants as opting not to allot free will to their respective 
protagonists.) The lines can be read as an assertion of unswerving loyalty to 
Elizabeth (possibly in response to the 1570 papal bull of excommunication).93 
Conversely, the adjective “straunge” might denote the importation of doctrinal 
innovations from, say, Geneva or Zurich, which now form part of Elizabethan 
England’s doctrinal assembly.94
All three variants of the poem appear keen to stress a non-seditious future 
for their protagonists. ASH’s speaker asserts: “I yeelde me Captive to my curse, 
my harde fate to fulfil” (62). Again, there is ambivalence regarding the question 
of volition: certainly one can “yeelde” to a state of captivity but can one properly 
be said to “yeelde” to “fate”? The selection of the verb “fulfil”, moreover, seems 
more appropriate to a religious discourse than a “secular” one. Might not a 
rejected Petrarchan lover simply accept his fate rather than yielding to it in order 
to “fulfil” it? CUL 62 and AH  58 use the same words but do not capitalize 
“captive”. ASH’s capitalization could encourage the reader to identify the 
speaker as Christ—from a Christian viewpoint, Christ is the only historical 
personage who could accurately be described as yielding to fate by becoming
92 Patrick Collinson, “Elizabeth I (1533-1603), Queen o f England and Ireland,” ODNB.
93 English Catholics were divided into “hostile camps o f reconcilables and irreconcilables” by the 
papal bull: Meyer, Catholic Church, pp. 79-80.
94 MacCulloch, Reformation, p. 510; N. Dimock, Papers on the Doctrine o f  the English Church 
Concerning the Eucharistic Presence, Volume 1 (London, New York, Bombay & Calcutta: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1911), pp. 104-5.
“Captive” in “harde” matter in order to fulfil a predestined role. The copyist of 
ASH may have introduced the capitalization but the selection of verbs is 
consistent across all variants. This would counter the argument that ASH offers a 
(late) religious adaptation of Dyer’s “secular” love poem.
The speakers of AH  and CUL both announce that their “wyne [shall be] of 
Niobe” (AH 59, 63). The obvious reading is that the lover’s “wine” will 
henceforth be tears, but why refer to tears metonymically by citing the pathetic 
Niobe? In Ovid’s Metamorphoses, Niobe’s children are slaughtered as a 
consequence of her impious boast that she has had more children than the outcast 
goddess Latona.95 If the protagonist in AH  and CUL is speaking (or being made 
to speak) from within a (penitent) Catholic paradigm, the reference to Niobe 
could function as a confession of prior Catholic hubris. The current post- 
Reformation circumstances in England would then be the “harde fate” which 
must be fulfilled by English Catholics. The following passage from Book 2 of 
Plato’s Republic may also be relevant:
but i f  any poets com pose a ‘Sorrows o f  N io b e ’ or a tale o f  the Pelipodae or Troy, or 
anything else o f  the kind, w e m ust either forbid them  to say that these w oes are the work  
o f  God, or else, they m ust devise som e such interpretation as w e now  require, and m ust 
declare that what G od did w as righteous and good , and they w ere benefitted by their 
chastisem ent. But that they w ere m iserable w ho paid the penalty, and that the doer o f  
this w as G od is a thing that the poet m ust not be suffered to say, for neither w ould  the 
saying o f  such things, i f  they are said, be h oly , nor w ould  they be profitable to us or 
concordant with them selves.96
Given the cultural prominence of Plato’s Republic, Dyer, or a subsequent 
copyist, might, therefore, discreetly be attacking predestinarian theology by 
referring to tears in a hyperbolic manner as “wyne of Niobe”.
95 Frank Justus Miller & G. P. Goold, eds. Ovid in Six Volumes. Ill: Metamorphoses, 3rd edition 
(Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard UP & Heinemann, 1977), VI. 146-312.
96 Paul Shorey, ed. The Republic, by Plato, 2 volumes (London &New York: Heinemann & G. P. 
Putnam’s, 1930), 380A.
Nonetheless, since Dyer’s poem was probably composed in the early 
1570s, its early readers were perhaps more likely to interpret “Niobe” as a topical 
political allusion. The Duke of Norfolk was executed in 1572 following the 
exposure of another “conspiracy” to marry the duke to Mary Stuart. Scholars 
have noted that Mary Stuart may be figured as Niobe in Ben Jonson’s Cynthia’s 
Revels (1.11.85-7; 5.9.16-17).97 The association could have had its beginnings in 
the fact that Niobe boasted of having more children than a goddess; Elizabeth, 
being “of barren stock”, was “infuriated” by the birth of Mary’s son.98 Alluding 
to this circumstance, Dyer’s much-copied poem, in variants such as AH  and 
CUL, may have popularized the association. Indeed, the poem appears in the 
Charleton sequence in the Arundel-Harington manuscript after two poems which 
are directly concerned with the Mary Stuart-Norfolk “conspiracy”.
Sir Henry Goodyer (1534-1595), the author of Arundel-Harington Poem 
147,99 had “conveyed some letters” (1. 31) for the imprisoned Mary Stuart. The 
poem was written circa 1572 when Goodyer was a prisoner in the Tower.100 The 
poem’s style is comparable to that of Dyer’s text, but Goodyer’s protagonist does 
not bemoan his lack of advancement. Rather, he confesses his “one yll” action 
(8), begs Elizabeth’s forgiveness (13-14) and justifies his action as not 
inconsistent with persuading Mary to rely on Elizabeth’s sympathy (19-21).
Goodyer’s poem is followed in the manuscript by a parodic answer written 
by Thomas Norton, co-author of Gorboduc and English translator of Calvin’s 
Institutes}01 Norton’s parody adopts Goodyer’s stanza form, metre and phrase- 
structure. As with the Dyer-Southwell pairing (to be discussed in the following 
chapter), the later poem offers a conflicting viewpoint to its model: “Yow did a
97 C. H. Herford & Percy Simpson, eds. Ben Jonson, 11 volumes (London: Oxford UP, 1932), 
IV.51, 175; IX.530.n.; B. N. de Luna, Jonson’s Romish Plot: A Study o f  Catiline and Its 
Historical Context (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1967), p. 11; Phillipa Berry, “Vacating the Centre o f  
Power: Cynthia’s Revels, the Property o f State and the Accession Crisis,” p. 405, in Jean- 
Christophe Mayer, ed. The Straggle fo r  the Succession in Late Elizabethan England: Politics, 
Polemics and Cultural Representations (Montpellier: IRCL, 2004), pp. 395-415.
98 Antonia Fraser, M ary Queen o f  Scots (London: Guild, 1987), p. 268.
99 Hughey, ed. Arundel-Harington, 1.179-180. Line references to this edition o f the poem are in 
the text.
100 Hughey, ed. Arundel-Harington, II. 194.
101 Hughey, ed. Arundel-Harington, 1.181. Line references to this edition o f the poem are in the 
text.
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perilous queene ... / more then advyse agaynst yowr princes heere / by 
cypheringe sleyghte to daunger the estate” (19-21)—Norton here apparently 
refers to Goodyer’s use of cipher in letters carried for Mary. This may in turn 
imply that Goodyer’s poem itself has hidden meanings, with which Norton’s 
answer engages.
This pair of poems is followed by “He That His Myrthe Hath Lost”. One 
notable aspect of Dyer’s poem, in all its variants, is that the nature of the 
speaker’s “sin” is never specified (in contrast here to Goodyer’s abject 
confession of a particular deed). It might be possible, therefore, for readers of the 
CUL and AH  variants of Dyer’s poem to infer that the “sin” of their respective 
protagonists was (and is) loyalty to Mary Stuart as rightful (and Catholic) heir to 
the English throne. Such a reading could explain the anguish of the poem’s lover 
at his mistress’s inconstancy: many English Catholics had been appalled by Mary 
Stuart’s hasty marriage to Bothwell, following the murder of her second husband, 
Lord Damley.102 According to this view, the “Sinon” attacked in Dyer’s poem 
again emerges as a composite allusion to Cecil and Nicholas Bacon; authorship 
of the Catholic pamphlets Treatise o f Treasons attacking these two counsellors 
as “Synons” has been attributed to either the secretariat of Mary’s ardent 
supporter John Leslie, the Bishop of Ross, or the bishop himself.103
As noted, at the time he wrote “Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste”, Dyer was 
working as the secretary of the earl of Leicester. Leicester himself had become 
embroiled in the Mary Stuart controversy prior to the Northern Rising of 1569.104 
Sargent remarks that “Dyer, as an agent of the earl, must have been privy to his 
movements throughout the affair [the intrigue involving Mary Queen of Scots in 
the late 1560s/early 1570s]”.105 In April 1567, Sir Nicholas Throckmorton wrote 
to inform the earl that he had “entrusted Dyer at Court with an oral message for 
Leicester”.106 This is the only recorded association of Dyer’s name with the Mary
102 Pollen, English Catholics, pp. 116-7.
103 Francis Edwards, The Marvellous Chance: Thomas H oward and the Ridophi Plot (London: 
Rupert Hart-Davis, 1968), pp. 391-7.
104 Pollen, English Catholics, p. 134; Sargent, Dyer, p. 19.
105 Sargent, Dyer, p. 19.
106 Sargent, Dyer, p. 19.
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Stuart plots and counterplots. Read against this background, the variants of 
Dyer’s poem function as salvos in ongoing religious/political debates, with the 
arc of their flight determined by the conditions of production and reception. 
Depending on alterations made in the copying, or on inflections produced by 
placement in a compilation-sequence,107 the poem could be read as advertising 
the principled loyalty of such as Leicester (the relevant principle[s] and object of 
loyalty depending on the aforementioned conditions) and/or as denigrating the 
self-serving pragmatism and duplicity of such as Cecil. That the poem may have 
arisen from Leicester (and Burghley) commissioning Dyer to write a lament 
which Hatton himself might conceivably utter would not prevent the poem, in 
suitably altered form, from subsequently being used in related but different ways.
Taking all of this into account, it is worth noting that ASH makes no 
reference to Niobe or to any kind of wine that is to be drunk. Instead ASH’s 
speaker offers the relatively uninteresting information that “My pillow [shall be] 
the moulde” (67). Indeed, this detail is rather redundant as the speaker also 
specifies (as does his equivalents in AH  and CUL) that his bed will be “the cragie 
rocke” (67). The redundancy suggests that ASH’s copyist has replaced the Niobe 
reference with some acceptable filler. In any case, the copyist of ASH retains 
other classical allusions present in AH  and CUL (to Carthage, Troy, Sinon [20] 
and “Sisiphus” [72]). Thus, it is not a question of ASH being, say, anti-humanist. 
One might suppose that the ASH-copyist has reasons for wishing to consign the 
Mary Stuart affair to history, but why in that case not exploit the opportunity to 
state overtly that the lover’s “wine” will be tears? Possibly, the lost variant May 
detects behind ASH itself lacked the “wine” clause. Alternatively, ASH may be 
voicing a conservative Catholic position of the late 1580s, or of the 1590s, by 
which time Jesuits such as Southwell had (re)imported to England the “literature
107 For discussion o f such meaningful placement o f poems in manuscript-sequences, see: Joshua 
Eckhardt, Manuscript Verse Collectors and the Politics o f  Anti-Courtly Love Poetry  (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2009), pp. 1-32; Randall Louis Anderson, ‘“The Merit o f  a Ms. Poem’: the Case for 
Bodleian MS Rawlinson Poet. 85,” p. 131, in Arthur F. Marotti & Michael D. Bristol, eds. Print, 
Manuscript, Performance: the Changing Patterns o f  the Media in Early Modern England 
(Columbus: Ohio State UP, 2000), pp. 127-71. Jason Scott-Warren makes the same point about 
collections o f  epigrams such as those made by Sir John Harington: Sir John Harington and the 
Book as Gift (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001), pp. 141-2.
of tears”108 (and expressed conspicuous criticism of the treatment of Mary 
Stuart).109 That is, a conservative Catholic copyist of the 1580s/90s, resistant to 
Jesuit influence, might regard references to not only Niobe but also tears as no 
longer comme il faut.
I do not wish to close this analysis on a narrowly topical note, however. 
After all, according to the Augustinian hermeneutic outlined in Chapter 1, a 
Christian reader produces textual meaning by reading charitably. Satire, insofar 
as it is uncharitable in its operations, could be (and was) regarded as 
unchristian.110An Augustinian reader of Dyer’s poem, therefore, would not dig 
for satirical or polemical intent but, rather, work to construct a charitable 
meaning. Once polemical/topical paradigms are qualified as being more relevant 
to particular copyists’ concerns, the poem’s speaker’s is (also) available to be 
identified as, to an extent, Christ himself, bemoaning the exiling of his Real 
Presence from the Elizabethan world.
This conclusion may seem to contradict earlier claims that the poem’s 
speaker is a perplexed Elizabethan mortal subject, struggling to come to terms 
with the encroachments of Calvinism. However, the continued possibility of 
efficacious imitation of (and participation in) Christ is a crucial point at issue.111 
Consequently, Dyer’s poem could be said to have pleased so many contemporary 
readers not because it was the early expression of an individual poetic voice but 
because, in a Christ-like fashion (but also, after all, in the manner of a sophist), 
the “author” had abstracted himself from the text. In a ministerial (but self­
ordained) manner, Dyer simultaneously declines subjective identity and acquires 
authority as a participant in Christ. Moreover, this authorial persona attains 
existence in the act o f reception. Thus, Dyer’s poem operates within the 
conventions of its genre, as described by Alison Shell: “[l]amentations are 
exhortatory; they purport to be the voice of objective woe interrogating the
108 Janelle, Southwell, p. 190; Shell, Catholicism, pp. 57, 87-8; Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 79.
109 R. C. Bald, ed. An Humble Supplication to Her Maiestie, by Robert Southwell (London &
New York: Cambridge UP, 1953).
110 Anne Lake Prescott, “Humour and Satire in the Renaissance,” in Norton, ed. Literary 
Criticism, pp. 284-91.
111 See: Ira Clark, Christ Revealed, pp. 1-28.
reader, subjectivity beginning with that reader’s response”.112 However, Shell’s 
terms observe a subjectivist model of cognition. “[Ojbjective woe” can only be 
located in some ideal realm. How then can a “subject” effectively identify with 
same? Dyer’s lamentation may appear (from a subjectivist perspective) to be 
uttered by a human subject but its performance of identity relies upon facultative 
reception—that is, it is neither uttered by nor read by (a) subject(s). Its accent is 
sounded “aright” when its meaning is co-performed-in-the-reading.
In the Introduction, I left available the possibility that Dyer’s speaker 
mocked the notion of text as facultative assembly, asserting instead his authority- 
to-speak on his own behalf. But the protagonist’s “folie” (CUL 78) is (I suggest) 
not attributable to the fact that he, as individual, presumes to speak. Rather, the 
folly arguably belongs to Christ: the notion that the “I” which one equates with 
the self is a cultural construct is folly in the eyes of the world. Interpreted thus, 
Dyer’s speaker does not mock facultative identity but adopts an ironic stance 
towards it, knowing that the world will regard such a notion as folly. Only those 
who read the poem in a Christian accent will avoid mistaking “Dy er” for Christ 
the actual (only) author. Dyer must “dy” to himself “er[e]” he can resurrect in 
Christ via a poem whose meaning is embodied by faithful witness;113 the poem’s 
faithful readers likewise participate in Christ by this witness. Hence, Dyer’s lover 
does not necessarily restrict his song to an individualistic audience of one in 
saying that “in the world can none but thee these accents sound aright” (ASH 
80): “thee” may refer to a facultative assembly, the Christian community.
The possibility that Dyer could write a poem spoken by a neglected Christ 
has already been canvassed. Katherine Duncan-Jones notes that “Dyer’s ‘Song’ 
at Woodstock [1575] ... ends with a somewhat blasphemous echo of a Biblical 
text often applied to Christ on the Cross: ‘O ye that here behold infortune’s fare: / 
There is no grief that may with mine compare’”.114 Turning to the Scriptural 
source, Lamentations 1:11-12, one notes the applicability of this text to a
112 Alison Shell, Catholicism, Controversy and the English Literary Imagination, 1558-1660 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), p. 177.
113 2 Corinthians 5:14-15.
114 Katherine Duncan-Jones, Sir Philip Sidney (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1991), pp. 101-2.
dramatization of Christ lamenting the denial of Real Presence in the Eucharist:
A ll her [Jerusalem ’s] peop le sigh, they seek  bread: they have g iven  all their precious 
things for food  to relieve the s o u l . . .  O all y e  that pass by the w ay, attend, and see i f  
there be any sorrow like to m y sorrow.
Punished anew by banishment from the hearts of English believers, Dyer’s Christ 
may be asking all those who had previously united with him by participating in 
the Eucharist to join him now in internalised ceremonies only, as necessitated by 
temporal conditions.
Chapter 3.
Robert Southwell’s “Phancification” of 
Dyer’s “Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste”.
The changes which the Jesuit poet Robert Southwell made to Sir Edward Dyer’s 
“Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste”, in writing a parody of the latter work (titled 
“Dyers Phancy Turned to a Sinners Complainte”),1 indicate that Southwell did 
not consider himself to be converting a secular text into a sacred one. Rather, 
Southwell, it will be argued, sought to diagnose and rectify the earlier work’s 
religious errors.
The earliest extant reference to “Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste” as “Dyers 
Phancy” occurs in the c .1592(?) “Waldegrave” manuscript of Southwell’s 
poetry.2 In the epistle prefacing the “Waldegrave” sequence, Southwell 
complains that “the Devill as hee affecteth Deitye and seeketh to have all the 
Complements of Divine honor applied to his service, so hath he amonge the rest 
possessed also most Poets with his idle phancies”.3 Southwell himself, therefore, 
appears to have branded Dyer’s poem a “phancy”. The last-quoted statement, 
moreover, appears to indicate that Southwell regards such poems as Dyer’s as the 
work of Catholic/Christian poets led astray by “the Devill”. Furthermore, 
Southwell’s “phancification” of Dyer’s poem shows the relevance of facultative 
rhetoric to the Jesuit’s poetic interventions. Different writers observe different 
topographies, but it may generally be said that “fancy” (phantasia)—the
1 Peter Davidson & Anne Sweeney, eds. Collected Poems, by Robert Southwell (Manchester: 
Carcanet, 2007), pp. 32-5.
2 James H. McDonald & Nancy Pollard Brown, eds. The Poems o f  Robert Southwell, S. J. 
(London: Oxford UP, 1967), pp. xxxv-li; Peter Davidson, “The Text o f  This Edition,” pp. 148-9, 
in Davidson & Sweeney, eds. Collected Poems, pp. 145-51.
3 Davidson & Sweeney, eds. Collected Poems, p. 1.
imaginative faculty—was regarded as the holding zone for mental conceptions 
assembled from received sensory data.4 When decisions need making, 
appropriate phantasia are examined in the “action of cogitatio”.5 Accordingly, 
the reports of the fancy per se are not to be taken as reliable witnesses of 
phenomena, given the distortions of sensory perceptions (the constituents of 
fancy). Labelling Dyer’s poem a “phancy”, therefore, indicates the spurious 
nature of the text’s claim to speak with authority. The author-fimction assumed in 
Dyer’s text is thus made to resemble a “false” prophet who—perhaps claiming to 
have been inspired by the Holy Spirit—offers to the Christian community an 
addition to established orthodoxy.6
However, in answering Dyer’s work in an equivalent poetic form,
Southwell entered a perilous field. Unlike the statement of a priest qua priest, a 
poetic statement does not perform propositionally. As Dyer’s friend Sidney 
insisted, in An Apology for Poetry, “the poet... nothing affirms, and therefore 
never lieth”. Unlike (presumably) a Roman Catholic priest, “[t]he poet never 
maketh any circles about your imagination, to conjure you to believe for true 
what he writes”.7 Therefore, in offering an orthodox view in the form of a 
corrective parody of an earlier (unorthodox) poem, Southwell aligns orthodoxy 
with the non-affirming. Consequently, both poems are available to be regarded as 
poets' “phancies”. It is likely that Southwell was aware of this danger. Hence, it 
will be maintained that this circumstance led the Jesuit subsequently to adopt 
more sophisticated literary strategies in combatting and preventing English 
Catholic apostasy.
*
4 Ruth Leila Anderson, Elizabethan Psychology and Shakespeare’s Plays (Iowa City: University 
o f Iowa, 1927), pp. 7-28; Harvey, Inward Wits.
5 Harvey, Inward Wits, p. 17.
6 In An Apology fo r  Poetry, Sidney implies that poets receive divine inspiration: “with the force 
o f a divine breath he [the poet] bringeth things forth far surpassing her doings”: Shepherd, ed. 
Apology, p. 101 (“her” relates to the “second nature” which God “set him [man] beyond and 
over”).
7 Shepherd, ed. Apology, pp. 123-4.
The intentions of a Jesuit priest sent on a mission to Elizabethan England may be 
surmised with more than usual confidence. The first missionary priests were 
given clear instructions by their Superior General: “Finis hujus missionis 
propositus est primum, conservandi, Christo propitio, et primovendi in fide et 
religion nostra Catholica omnes, qui in Anglia Catholica inveniuntur, deinde, ad 
earn reducendi quicunque ab ea, vel inscitia vel aliorum impulse aberrasent.”8
There is no record of Southwell being told to spread his Tridentine message 
by poetic means. Indeed, there are suggestions that aspects of Southwell’s poetic 
production were a cause of concern to his superior on the mission, Henry 
Garnet.9 Garnet did approve, though, of using printed media to spread the 
message, and had trained with the printer Richard Tottel before becoming a 
priest.10 On reaching London in 1586, Garnet organized a secret press and began 
producing “holy texts and catechisms to support faith, and other scholarly 
works”.11 Doctrinal flexibility was reserved for private conference with believers.
Given attempts by the Elizabethan authorities to characterize Jesuit priests 
as seditious agents, “complete abstention from political activity was ... explicitly
i  ^imposed on all Jesuits ... going to England”. Similarly, the Jesuit emissaries 
were advised not to engage in overt controversy with heretics, either orally or in 
writing. It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that in writing poetry for 
circulation in manuscript form, and in issuing prose from secret presses during 
his mission in England, Southwell pursued (or assumed that he could reasonably 
claim to be pursuing) the above two legitimate functions (encouraging committed 
Catholics and recovering strayed ones), and eschewed the cited forbidden 
activities (political action and overt polemical debate).
8 “Instructiones Datae P. Roberto Personio et P. Edmundo Campiano Fundatoribus 1580,” in Leo 
Hicks, ed. Letters and Memorials o f  Father Robert Persons, S. J. Volume 1 (to 1588) (London: 
CRS, 1942), pp. 316ff. (“The object aimed at by this mission is, firstly, to preserve, if  God is 
propitious, and to advance in the faith and in our Catholic religion all who are found to be 
Catholics in England; and, secondly, to bring back to it whoever may have strayed from it either 
through ignorance or at the instigation o f  others”: p. 319.)
9 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, pp. 98-9.
10 Philip Caraman, Henry Garnet, 1555-1606, and the Gunpowder Plot (London: Longmans, 
1964), p. 7.
11 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 97.
12 Devlin, Southwell, p. 57.
As Pilarz notes, “the Jesuits concentrated their efforts on the social elite”,
1 ^or on Catholic members of that group. Pilarz suggests two main reasons for this 
strategy: firstly, it was based on “Loyola’s conviction that powerful people ... 
most effectively serve faith and promote the common good”;14 secondly, the 
upper classes could offer protection to the fugitive priests. In addition, Catholics 
in England tended to concentrate around landed gentry. In the Elizabethan 
period, “every attempt to count Catholics reveals them as coagulated in local 
groups at the centre of which a gentleman’s household will usually be found”.15 
Targeting the “social elite”, therefore, was the most effective means of holding 
intercourse with England’s Catholic community.16 This strategic motivation, 
however, is not inconsistent with a broader socio-religious consideration. A 
respect for social (microcosmic) hierarchy reflects and reciprocally influences 
divine (macrocosmic) hierarchy. Thus, the Jesuits, in recognizing the claims of 
the Elizabethan nobility and gentry, relied, for pragmatic reasons, upon pre­
existing social forms as a reliable means of conveying their message, but their 
message was not necessarily inconsistent with the larger interests of the existing 
hierarchy.
In acknowledging the tastes and circumstances of his target audience, 
Southwell adopted a “class-conscious rhetorical strategy”.17 Addressing an elite 
audience, accustomed to creature comforts, Southwell emphasised, but also 
clarified, “anti-ascetic strands within Loyola’s teachings”.18 In “Principle and 
Foundation” (placed at the beginning of the Spiritual Exercises), Loyola explains 
that all earthly things
are created for human beings in order to help them  pursue the end for w hich  they are 
created [praise and service o f  God]. It fo llow s from this that one m ust use other created
13 Pilarz, Southwell, p. 37.
14 Pilarz, Southwell, p. 242.
15 Bossy, Community, p. 175.
16 Devlin, Southwell, p. 183.
17 Pilarz, Southwell, p. 62.
18 Pilarz, Southwell, p. 37.
things in so far as they help towards on e’s end, and free o n ese lf  from them  in order in so  
far as they are obstacles to o n e’s en d .19
Classical culture, according to this view, as a source of pleasure, has value in so 
far as it promotes Christian aims. Indeed, as the Jesuits developed their 
educational methods, classical works came to be regarded as necessary tools, 
given their evident appeal to and proven emotional impact upon pupils— 
particularly aristocratic ones, the extent of whose social influence, as noted, was 
an important factor. In Pierre Janelle’s assessment of the Jesuit position, human 
beings
m ust be enticed to righteousness by literary beauty, by the  literary beauty w hich  their 
present-day tastes lead them  to prefer. Their partiality for R enaissance standards should  
be gratified. Antiquity w ill remain the m odel to be im itated . . .  but in its outward form  
only . . .  Thus a classical garb w ill be m ade to clothe religious truth.20
The distinction Janelle makes between form and content—“garb” and 
“truth”—is symptomatic of a Platonic mode of thought. This attitude operates 
according to a humanist reception of a transcendentalist cognitive model, 
whereby “truth” is an ideal object available for apprehension by a volitional 
subject—i f  only the latter entity is adequately trained (the humanist confidence 
that such a capacity can be taught was a distinctive characteristic of the Jesuit 
educational project). Janelle’s distinction, therefore, is consistent with the 
implicit Platonism of Jesuit thought and policy. Such ideas informed the milieu 
where Southwell received his early education under William Allen at the Douai 
English College. The curriculum there was “grounded in the humanists’ 
conviction that literature, especially classical secular literature, was congenial 
with and conducive to the Catholic faith”.21 However, Southwell encountered 
even more positive assessments of classical culture after moving to the Jesuit
19 Joseph A. Munitiz & Philip Endean, eds. Personal Writings: Reminiscences, Spiritual Diary, 
Select Letters Including the Text o/T he Spiritual Exercises, by Saint Ignatius o f  Loyola, 2nd 
edition (London: Penguin, 2004), p. 289.
20 Janelle, Catholic Reformation, p. 138.
21 Pilarz, Southwell, p. 80.
college at Rome. One of his teachers there, the literary theorist Franciscus 
Bencius, maintained that poetry “being truly divine can be no other than
Christian; it was Christian in classical antiquity, despite all appearances to the
00contrary”. According to such a view, no distinction can be made between 
sacred and secular verse. Poetry, by definition, is always Christian and always 
religious’, conversely, works which do not observe Christian values, 
notwithstanding any use they make of ostensibly poetic forms, are heretical, 
fanciful. The term “pagan”, on this view, is synonymous with “heretical”, not 
with, say, “worldly”, “secular” or “sensual”. This position dismantles Janelle’s 
“garb”/“truth” binary: poetic form is always Christian; pagan poetic form is a 
contradiction in terms. Thus, elements of Jesuit artistic theory, as taught within 
the order, reject the form/content binary. The importance of this point with 
relation to the registration of meaning in Southwell’s works cannot be stressed 
enough.
John R. Roberts and Lorraine Roberts have argued that the moralistic ideas 
of the German Jesuit theorist Jacobus Pontanus had considerable influence upon 
Southwell. Pontanus’s major work, Poeticae Institutions, was not printed until 
1594, but the German’s teaching was influential from as early as 1573.23 
Pontanus condemned poetic works which were filled “with amatory lewdness”;24 
“the nature of poetry for Pontanus is not ‘artistry’ but moral wisdom”.25 He also 
complained that “secular poets aim ‘to gratify the vulgar’”.26 Roberts and 
Roberts refer the reader to the relevant pages of Janelle’s study of Southwell. 
However, Janelle states that Bencius’s position is “far more akin to Southwell’s
22 Janelle, Southwell, pp. 124-5; discussed also in: John R. Roberts & Lorraine Roberts, ‘“ To 
Weave a New Webbe in Their Owne Loome’: Robert Southwell and Counter-Reformation 
Poetics,” p. 68, in Helen Wilcox et al, eds. Sacred and Profane: Secular and Devotional 
Interplay in Early Modern Literature (Amsterdam: VU UP, 1996), pp. 63-77.
23 Janelle, Southwell, p. 118.n.5.
24 My source for this utterance by Pontanus is Roberts & Roberts, “New Webbe,” p. 67, who, in 
turn, cite Janelle, Catholic Reformation, p. 137. Unfortunately, Janelle does not provide a textual 
reference. As my aim here is to counter Roberts and Roberts’ position (which has had some 
influence), I have not felt obliged to compensate for the scholarly omissions o f Janelle and 
Roberts and Roberts by tracing Pontanus’s actual words.
25 Roberts & Roberts, “New Webbe,” p. 67.
26 Roberts & Roberts, “New Webbe,” p. 67 (“vulgo gratificans”: Poeticae Institutiones [1594], 
quoted in Janelle, Southwell, p. 120.n.l2).
real spirit than Pontanus’ distrust of human nature, of its love of beauty, of its 
ardent emotions”.27 Indeed, Southwell’s poetic practice, in my view, does not 
bear out Roberts and Roberts’s assessment. The courtly poems parodied by the 
young Jesuit missionary—including works by Dyer and Oxford—were not 
“wholly filled ‘with amatory lewdness’”. Even read as “secular” productions, 
these poems are patently moralistic, promoting Stoic dissatisfaction with, and 
withdrawal from, the court and the world. Secondly, it is inconsistent to argue 
that Southwell introduced exciting new poetic techniques to Elizabethan English 
verse (as Sweeney and other scholars persuasively do) and to argue that he was 
influenced by Pontanus’s prescription for poetry to eschew “artistry” and 
promulgate principally “moral wisdom”. After all, such a didactic conception of 
poetry remained characteristic of the very courtly works Southwell’s parodic 
interventions overhauled (according to Martz, Sweeney et al). Thirdly, Pontanus 
attacks “secular poets” for seeking to please the vulgar; again, the aristocratic and 
gentrified Elizabethan poets whose works Southwell parodied can hardly be said 
to have aimed their works at the “vulgar”. Though Dyer was considered by 
contemporaries to be Sidney’s rival as a literary innovator, the majority of Dyer’s 
works are presumed lost because they were only circulated in manuscript among 
members of the social elite. Pontanus’s views thus have no evident bearing on 
Southwell’s selection of targets for parody.
Pontanus’s views did, however, prove congenial to a cultural moment 
which post-dates Southwell’s activity as poet, a moment when confessional 
positions had hardened and it became more important to represent Catholicism as 
morally more rigorous than Protestantism in all of its manifestations. In 
Shakespeare and Religion, Alison Shell suggests that Southwell, in his poetic 
activity in England, was “repudiating certain aspects of the literary education 
which he would have undergone”.28 Certainly, Shell is right to say that 
“humanistic literary ideals” came under threat as religious polarization 
intensified.29 However, Southwell’s English texts show the Jesuit becoming more
27 Janelle, Southwell, p. 125.
28 Shell, Religion, pp. 79, 253.n.
29 Shell, Religion, p. 80.
flexible in his commitment to promoting orthodoxy, not less. Sweeney observes 
how, after arriving in England and becoming familiar with the actual conditions 
under which Elizabethan Catholics lived, Southwell’s initially judgemental 
attitude matured and mellowed.30 The young priest did not, that is, move towards 
a position consistent with Pontanus’s; he drew upon the flexibility promoted by 
such as Bencius’s formulations.
On arrival in England, Southwell would have been fully aware that “pagan” 
motifs could communicate Christian matter. Given, however, that Southwell had 
been specifically enjoined not to engage in overt doctrinal debates, to correct 
what he perceived as unorthodox works in public he would need to speak in a 
non-confessional register. One strategy he chose was to employ facultative 
rhetoric. Hence, in the opening sentence of the “Waldegrave” epistle—arguably 
his first “public” statement to English readers (and poets)—Southwell complains 
that “Poetes by abusing their talent and making the follies and feyninges of love 
the customary subject of theire base endeavors, have so discredited this faculty e 
that a Poett a lover and a Iyer, are by many reckoned but three words of one 
significacon”.31 The “facultye” referred to is evidently that of poetry itself.
Hence, poetry-as-faculty belongs to a larger facultative ensemble: the Christian 
community. Christian poets, that is, do not speak as inspired subjects, offering 
authoritative doctrinal “news” to their fellow subjects. Rather, they process and 
present data to a facultative assembly (an equivalent of the apostles) for 
ratification and ramification. However, because “the Devill” has possessed 
English poets with Platonist transcendentalist fancies, those poets have reified 
their function and now consider themselves autonomous individuals possessed of 
spiritual authority.32 Seeking to redeem the poetic faculty, Southwell does not 
adopt a similarly Platonist position and reprimand the English poets from a 
position of presumed moral superiority. Instead, he offers a facultative remedy:
30 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, pp. 6, 136; see also: Brownlow, Southwell, p. 72.
31 Davidson & Sweeney, eds. Collected Poems, p. 1 (emphases added). The echo o f Southwell’s 
language by Shakespeare’s Duke Theseus is considered in Chapter 5.
32 Chadwick, ed. Confessions, III. 16.
A nd because the best course to lett them  see the error o f  their works is to w eave a new e  
W ebb in theire ow ne loom e; I have here laied a few  course thridds together to invite 
som e skillfuller W ittes to goe  forward in the sam e.33
In standard Counter-Reformation fashion, Southwell here announces that 
he will play the role of Lutheran poet within a facultative assembly, so that 
facultative process (the collective genius of “skillfuller Wittes”, not his own 
intellect) can register and counter the individualistic/egoistic tendencies of 
Lutheranism. In other words, the Jesuit offers a toolkit for better facultative 
practice, not (pace Sweeney) simply better “natural” poetry in place of 
Neoplatonic or allegorical discourse.34
Such explicit statements by the Jesuit poet-priest have led scholars to 
conclude that Southwell’s principal aim in writing poetry was the “reformation” 
of English verse. Roberts and Roberts claim that “Southwell hoped that, through 
example, he would be redeeming poetry from paganism, old and new, and would 
show how it could be, in fact, the handmaiden of religion”.35 As stated, this is 
inconsistent with the Ignatian values which guided Southwell’s education. 
“Pagan” poetry could be “the handmaiden of religion” or active virtue, just as, in 
Dyer’s hands, it could be the “handmaiden” of (from a Jesuit point of view) 
conformism, Lutheran individualism and defeatist resignation. Instead of 
preaching Stoic resignation, and implying that it is consistent with Christ’s 
message—Southwell may be understood as saying—poets and their readers 
should remember that, though Christ’s values are not the world’s, one 
participates in Christ in the world.36 Consequently, in taking Southwell at (what 
seems to the modem secular eye to be) his word—in supposing that he registered
33 Davidson & Sweeney, eds. Collected Poems, p. 1.
34 Where Sweeney’s Southwell rejects allegory (pp. 10, 25)— especially Spenserian (pp. 166-7)—  
in favour o f  a “natural, honest, non-allegorical focus upon imagery” (p. 49), the Southwell o f  the 
present thesis exposes the allegorical machinery of, say, Spenser’s Faerie Queene as a strategic 
ploy (Southwell’s poetry being no more or less “natural” than Spenser’s). See also: Sweeney, 
Snow in Arcadia, p. 291.n.31 and Shell, Catholicism, pp. 72-7.
35 Roberts & Roberts, “New Webbe,” p. 64; see also Pilarz, Southwell, p. 84.
36 Psalms 145:2; Chadwick, ed. Confessions, X.70; 2 Corinthians 5:15.
no religious meaning in the courtly poems he revised—the religious discourse of 
those poems is effectively censored by a hegemonic secular materialism.
There is another reason why the argument that one of Southwell’s aims as a 
Jesuit author in England was to Christianize English poetry (and not reform it, in 
the sense of restoring its facultative process) should be regarded with care. As 
mentioned, Jesuit teachers were committed to using classical forms because they 
were popular and versatile. Classical texts were popular because they were 
aesthetically pleasing and emotionally affecting. Such qualities led the Jesuits to 
regard classical forms as effective tools for achieving Christian ends. As stated, 
certain Jesuit theorists even asserted that classical poetic forms were equivalent 
to Christian forms. Accordingly, if one decided to replace “classical forms” 
entirely, one could not be regarded as “reforming” poetry unless one 
simultaneously provided a non-classical poetic form, or forms, to serve Christian 
ends in the place of the rejected classical forms. Scholars such as Pilarz and 
Roberts and Roberts, in suggesting Southwell aimed principally to “reform” 
English verse by replacing its pagan “secular” forms with “sacred” ones, neglect 
to take this consequence of their argument(s) into account. Louis L. Martz, on the 
other hand, an early proponent of the same view, emphasises the point:
Southw ell [in his version o f  D yer’s poem ] . . .  sm oothes out a breach o f  rhythm here, 
adds a bright verb for a pale one there, tightens up the use o f  balanced phrasing, g iv es  
em phasis and unity at certain points through careful alliteration, deepens the thought by  
use o f  religious paradoxes, and, above all, creates a fairly tight unity.37
Martz’s assessment of the relative merits of the two poems is open to question 
(certainly, the classical idealism evident in his privileging of “unity” may be 
noted). For the moment, however, it only needs to be said that in the discussion 
of Southwell’s revision of Dyer offered below, the extent to which Southwell’s 
aim seems to be to “improve” Dyer’s poem as an aesthetic product will be 
considered. If it emerges that Southwell’s changes are constantly geared towards 
such an aim, then the argument that the stylistic reformation of English poetry
37 Martz, Meditation, p. 190.
was his principal goal will be substantiated. If, however, this does not emerge, 
then a contrary view may be advanced, namely that Southwell was not engaged 
in writing (to use Martz’s phrase) “sacred parodies” of secular works but, rather, 
was diagnosing and correcting the religious meanings of Elizabethan poems.38
Indeed, before proceeding to an analysis of Southwell’s rewriting of Dyer’s 
poem, it is necessary to address an important terminological point. Rosemond 
Tuve observes that the habit of using the term “sacred parody” to describe the 
conversion of “secular” poems to “religious” ones began among leading George 
Herbert scholars, such as Herbert Grierson and F. E. Hutchinson, and was taken 
up by such as Martz.39 However, Tuve points out that Herbert’s use of the term 
“parody” was at odds with contemporary definitions of the term (which resemble 
modem ones) as “burlesque”. Accordingly, Tuve argues that Herbert’s 
understanding of the term “parody” derived from the longstanding musical 
tradition of parodia missa. Productions in this tradition did not cancel out 
“secular” texts by overwriting them with “religious” ones but rather, in using 
familiar music, placed a new sacred text alongside a previous sacred text with a 
view to polysemous elaboration.40 “Par-ody” can thus be taken to mean “beside- 
song”.41 (It may be noted here that the singer of Dyer’s “song” calls for any 
listener in comparable circumstances to “take his place by me” [AH 11. 1-4, 73], 
as so many copyists/parodists—including Southwell—proceeded to do.) Hence, 
when scholars refer to Southwell’s rewriting of Dyer’s poem as a “sacred 
parody”, as virtually all modem commentators do in discussing the Jesuit’s re­
write, the term (according to Tuve’s assessment) requires that Dyer’s poem be a 
sacred work also.42 Obviously, such scholars—who evidently regard Dyer’s
38 Martz, Meditation, p. 186 (emphasis added).
39 Rosemond Tuve, “Sacred ‘Parody’ o f  Love Poetry and Herbert,” p. 212, in Thomas P. Roche, 
Jr., ed. Essays by Rosemond Tuve: Spenser, Herbert, Milton (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1970), pp. 
207-51. Hutchinson reads back from Dryden’s definition o f  parody: F. E. Hutchinson, ed. The 
Works o f  George Herbert (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1941), pp. 540-1.
40 Tuve, “Parody,” pp. 208-12.
41 Linda Hutcheon, A Theory o f  Parody: the Teachings o f2 0 lh -Century Art-forms (New York & 
London: Methuen, 1985), p. 32; Margaret A. Rose, Parody/Meta-fiction: an Analysis o f  Parody 
as a Critical Mirror to the Writing and Reception o f  Fiction (London: Croom Helm, 1979), p. 18.
42 Presumably aware o f this circumstance, Martz, following Grier and Hutchinson, refers to 
Herbert’s “neutral” use o f the term. Tuve points out that though Herbert’s activity is not 
aggressive, it is obviously not “neutral” either: “Parody”, pp. 214-6.
poem as a “secular” text—do not mean to employ the term in this way.43 
the term is misleading, being expressive of the modem commitment to a 
sacred/secular binary. Thus, I will refer to Southwell’s version as simply 
parody of Dyer’s poem.
*
Southwell’s version of Dyer’s poem begins:
H ee that his myrth hath lost 
W hose com fort is to rue 
W hose hope is falne w hose faith is eras’d 
W hose trust is founde untrue44
Where Dyer’s speaker invites the company of any whose “comfort is dismaid” 
(ASH 1), the Jesuit’s version suggests instead that his protagonist’s “comfort” is 
“to me”. This alteration implies that Dyer’s speaker takes comfort from self-pity 
and here invites others to join him in that attitude. Furthermore, where Dyer’s 
lover declares that his “faith is scomd” (ASH 2), Southwell’s speaker confesses 
instead that his “faith is eras’d”. Dyer’s protagonist, the alteration implies, is 
spiritually confused and in need of guidance (and is certainly not to be regarded 
as a sound spiritual adviser). Dyer’s lover complains that his “trust is all betraid” 
(ASH 2), but Southwell’s speaker admits instead that his “trust is founde untrue”. 
Thus, Southwell refuses to allow his protagonist to blame external agents for his 
current predicament.
Subsequently, where Dyer’s speaker refers to himself as one “Whose feare 
is fallen, whose succor voyde, whose hurt his death must be” (ASH 8),45
43 Roberts and Roberts, for example, state that the term “sacred parody” has been “given its 
fullest definition ... by Rosemond Tuve”. Their overall argument and subsequent discussion, 
however, indicate that they have misunderstood Tuve’s position: “New Webbe,” p. 70 and 
passim. Clark is aware that Tuve’s position represents a “caveat” vis-a-vis the scholarly 
consensus: Christ Revealed, p. 191.n.32.
44 Quotations from Southwell’s poem are from Sweeney & Davidson, eds. Collected Poems, pp. 
32-5. See Appendix 1.4 for the full text.
45 CUL has the more doctrinally aggressive “whose helpe his death must be” (8; emphasis added).
Indeed,
a
Southwell has “Whose tyme in teares whose race in ruth / Whose life a death 
must be” (15-16). Thus, the Jesuit agrees that the situation of the poem’s 
protagonist is a cause for sadness, but prescribes active expression of penitence 
(“teares”) and removes the suggestions that the lover’s “feare” (“fere” as 
beloved/spouse:46 the church?) is “fallen” and that sacramental “succor” is 
“voyde”.
Southwell follows Dyer’s text closely hereafter until Dyer’s speaker asserts 
that (mental) death “keepes the worst behinde” (CUL 12). Southwell declines to 
allow that a believer can speak with such (pessimistic) assurance about his post­
life destiny, saying instead that an anguished mental death “threttens worse 
behinde” (24; emphasis added).
The following change is even slighter but also telling: Southwell replaces 
“but” with “And” in his line 26. Dyer’s speaker complains that he is “one that 
lives in shewe but inwardly doth dye” (ASH 13); Southwell’s protagonist is “one 
that lives in shewe / And inwardly doth dye”. While this alteration holds obvious 
significance as a doctrinal correction, it appears baffling when read as part of an 
attempt at stylistic improvement. Dyer’s speaker evidently believes that on the 
surface he appears happy and that this offers a poignant contrast to his inner 
condition. Southwell’s “And”, however, suggests that living “in shewe” entails 
spiritual death. Therefore, reaching accommodation with a heretical environment 
involves dire spiritual consequences, not merely cause for self-pity.
Lines 29-32 of Southwell’s text describe one
W hose hart the A lter is
And hoast a god  to m ove
From w hom e m y evell doth feare revenge
H is good  doth prom ise love
Dyer’s threatening “Powers” whom “noe sorrowes can suffize” to appease (ASH 
16) are not admitted to Southwell’s text. It is not obvious that Southwell’s lines
46 “[F]ere, n .1” (2): OED.
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are “artistically” superior (or that they are offered as such).47 Dyer’s largely 
Latinate alliteration (“spirit”, “sacrifize”, “sorrowes”, “suffize” [ASH 15-16]) has 
been replaced by the paired “English” combinations “hart”, “hoast” and “god”, 
“good”. Southwell’s poetic “reform” is thus arguably Spenserian in its apparent 
commitment to the promotion of plain English lexis, in contast to the 
“Areopagite” tendency of Dyer’s Latinate vocabulary. Moreover, a case could 
be made that Southwell’s set of alliterative pairs alludes to a reciprocal and 
collaborative relationship between God and the worshipper,49 as opposed to the 
closed, self-regarding system implied by Dyer’s fourfold repetition; that is to say, 
aesthetic effect works in tandem with doctrinal correction. Most importantly, 
Southwell is keen to remind his readers that God’s “good doth promise love”; 
that, therefore, the self-pity arising from the fatalism of Dyer’s speaker is more to 
be eschewed. In the Jesuit’s view, remarks Sweeney, “injustice was a bad 
teacher: the only proper end of penance was ... a genuine change of heart... 
[This] could only come from ... realistic self-interrogation.”50 By this means, the 
human heart for Southwell can be transformed by repentance into a “hoast” 
capable of moving God.
An argument that Southwell was concerned with stylistic reform could be 
made, however, on the basis of the next notable alteration. Where Dyer’s speaker 
compares his thoughts to the ruins of Carthage or Troy (ASH 19-20), Southwell 
dispenses with classical allusion, offering the more concrete lines: “My thoughts 
[are] like ruyns old / Which shew how faire the building was / While grace did it 
upholde” (38-40). Recalling Southwell’s humanist education, one wonders what
47 For a similar observation, see: McDonald & Brown, eds. Southwell, p. 138.
48 “[S]pirit”, “sacrifize” and “suffize” have Latin roots (“spirit, n.”, “sacrifice, n.”, “suffice, v.”: 
OED); “sorrowes” is the old English exception in this group (“sorrow, n. & adj.”: OED).
However, it may be noted that “spirit” and “sacrifize’^ retain positive, or neutral, valence in 
Dyer’s lines, whereas old English “sorrowes” are described as insufficient. For Dyer’s 
membership o f the “Areopagites”, see: Edmund Spenser & Gabriel Harvey, Two Other Very 
Commendable Letters, o f  the Same Mens Writing: Both Touching the Foresaid Artificiall 
Versifying, and Certain Other Particulars (London: H. Bynneman, 1580).
49 Elsewhere, the Jesuit author expresses this notion in even stronger terms: “Southwell’s 
marriage in ‘At Home in Heaven’ o f Christ and the human soul is interesting [in that] ... it is the 
soul that seems to do the attracting: indeed, its ‘ghostly beautie offred force  to God’, chaining 
him, albeit in ‘the lynckes o f tender love’”: Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, pp. 26-7; note again the 
alliterative pairs: “ghostly ... God”, “lynckes ... love”.
50 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 52.
the Jesuit could find to object to, on purely poetic grounds, in Dyer’s allusion. To 
modem tastes, Southwell’s lines may appear shorn of hackneyed imagery, but to 
a Renaissance reader, Dyer’s sudden evocation of the classical past in what 
might, until that point, have passed for a poem of private complaint could have 
offered a powerful associative impetus. However, on reading Southwell’s poem, 
it becomes apparent in retrospect that Dyer’s protagonist, in associating his 
personal religious disaster with the collapse of once mighty empires, may be 
implying that the Roman Catholic church (figured as Troy) has also definitively 
fallen. Alternatively, he might be implying that the human condition itself is 
irretrievably fallen. Southwell’s speaker, however, records “how faire the 
building was / While grace did it uphold” (39-40). That is, if the beautiful edifice 
no longer appears “faire”, that change has been occasioned by the beholder’s fall 
from grace into a despairing state.
A subsequent grammatical change makes for an emphatic point of 
distinction between the two poems. Dyer’s speaker states that “In was stood my 
delighte, in is and shall my woe” (ASH 33). Newly-acquired knowledge appears 
to have disclosed to the lover that his former happiness was due to ignorance. 
Southwell agrees with Dyer’s protagonist that his current situation is “woeful”, 
but says “In was stands my delight” (65; emphasis added). The past belief has 
not been proved wrong; if the poem’s speaker reverts to its profession, he may 
regain delight.
Similarly, where Dyer’s lover is utterly fatalistic as regards his situation: “I 
looke for noe delight, releefe will come too late” (ASH 35), Southwell’s version 
suggests instead that the speaker is “Unworthy of reliefe” having “craved it too 
late” (69-70).
Most crucially of all, Southwell’s protagonist—unlike Dyer’s speaker— 
locates inconstancy in his own “fleshe” (93). This note of self-accusation makes 
for a suggestive contrast with the self-exonerating misogyny of Dyer’s lines:
O fraile vnconstant kind, and safe in trust to noe man!
N o e  w om en angels are, and loe, m y m ystris is a w oem an
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If Southwell’s principal aim had been to rescue English poetry from its erotic 
errors, one might expect him to stay close to his source when it declares its 
female love-object to be a ground of inconstancy.
Southwell subsequently makes an even more assertive change to his 
source. In Dyer’s poem, the speaker is a man of his word, who swears that the 
pledge shall never “faile that my faithe bore in hand” (CUL 59); conversely, 
Southwell’s sinner confesses: “I brake my plighted troth” (115). Arguably, only 
doctrinal aims could justify what would, rendered on any other terms, constitute 
an act of gross misrepresentation.
As mentioned, Dyer’s lover accepts a fatalistic creed: “Syth then it must be 
thus ... / I yeelde me Captive to my curse, my harde fate to fulfill” (ASH 61-2). 
Southwell retains the latter line but replaces line 61 with “But since that I have 
synnd / And scourge none is to ill” (121-2). Evidently, the Jesuit refuses as 
heretical the notion that “it must be thus”, for it denies free will.51
Southwell also makes minor but significant alterations to the reclusive 
itinerary of Dyer’s exile. For example, where Dyer’s speaker, in CUL, intends to 
drink “wyne of Niobie” (67), Southwell’s sinner discards the classical figure, 
announcing his intention, instead, to drink penitential “teares” (133). The attempt 
to connect (possibly sacramental) “wine” with Niobe’s futile grief is thus 
rejected. The Jesuit removes classical references found in ASH also: where 
ASH’s speaker views his “prospect into Hell”, containing “Sisiphus and all his 
pheres” (71-2), Southwell’s sinner sees “Judas and his cursed crew” (143).
The foregoing analysis has suggested the extent to which the Jesuit 
Southwell registered religious meaning in Dyer’s poem. However, it might be 
equally instructive to assess Southwell according to the values of Dyer’s poem. 
Dyer might have agreed with everything Southwell could tell him about
51 For Jesuit insistence on free will, see James Broderick, Robert BeUarmine: Saint and Scholar 
(London: Catholic Book Club, 1961), p. 191; O’Malley, First Jesuits, pp. 108-9, 249; Sweeney, 
Snow in Arcadia, pp. 26-7.
109
Tridentine doctrine and still defend his poem as a devout product of its 
circumstances. By the same token, instead of criticising Dyer, Southwell might 
be read as updating the court-satellite’s religious position (perhaps under cover of 
criticising him).52 Nonetheless, whatever allowances one makes for rhetorical 
games Dyer might have been playing, the fact that the poem could be taken non- 
ironically—or, at least, could ostensibly be taken so—by contemporary readers 
(as indicated in the previous chapter) is evidence of its capacity to communicate 
a particular pragmatic strategy (at the same time that it appears to criticize 
cynical pragmatism).
Where Dyer might have defended his poem as a well-intended salvo in a 
courtly game, Southwell’s act of parody implicitly accuses Dyer of an 
indiscretion: he has parodied the Mass in appearing to provide its textual 
substitute. According to the present interpretation, Southwell’s parody reads 
Dyer’s text asperformatively saying: “He that has lost access to the Real 
Presence, his previous source of comfort, do as I do: lament, for that is all one 
can do in a fallen world; do not, however, bemoan the absence of priests for, 
since all human beings are fallen, priests could never do you any good anyway.” 
However, Dyer’s text cannot erase from its cultural assembly the role which the 
priestly function previously performed. The slack has to be taken up somewhere. 
Indeed, it is presumed to be performed by Dyer’s poetic text itself, which offers 
(hollow) consolation. The poet-as-minister replaces the priest in the ostensibly 
egoless form of the author-fimction (actually, from the Southwellian point-of- 
view, a site for the reification of ego). Thus, though Southwell may not be 
attacking Dyer personally, his parody of Dyer’s poem is an attack on the 
burgeoning ego-cult of the author-fimction. The Jesuit’s Lutheran impersonation 
exposes the author-fimction as a parodic distortion of priesthood and, therefore, 
of Christianity (from a Catholic perspective).
In criticising the author-fimction, Southwell also implies that Dyer, as the 
ostensible author of such a poem, performs the role of (self)interpellated subject. 
This is an especially adroit manoeuvre. After all, as a modem student of
52 “One o f the readerships [Southwell] courted was in effect that o f men like Dyer and 
Wriothesley”: Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 169.
“literature”, one has learnt not to confuse the “I” of a literary text—for example, 
a lyric poem—with the author. The attempt of Dyer’s protagonist to abstract his 
ego from the text in order to qualify as a performer of Christian imitation, and 
liberate the co-cognizing reader, seems to anticipate and corroborate the theses of 
structuralists such as Roland Barthes and Foucault.53 However, Southwell’s 
parody shows that this move is precisely the means by which the reading of 
Christ’s passion as a self-pity valve for the abject individual enters literary texts. 
As noted, Dyer’s poem became known to its Elizabethan admirers as not a 
“phancy” but “a Dyer”. Sympathetic early modem readers—Catholic, Lutheran 
or confused floaters—granted authority to the poem insofar as they read it as an 
expression of the author's situation. This magnified subject-position is then made 
available to the poem’s readers in turn as something with which they can identify 
as likewise under-valued subjects.
Hence, it could be argued that the intentional and biographical fallacies 
begin with acquiescence in ultra-nominalism by post-Reformation subjects.5* 
According to Southwell’s parody, Dyer’s speaker is not Christ but a subject—an 
author manque—who has fabricated, and continues to fabricate, the very prison 
he complains of being held inside against his will.55
As discussed in the previous chapter, the speaker-as-author-fimction in 
Dyer’s poem appears aware that his text will take on other accents when read:
M y songe y f  any aske w hose greevous case ys suche 
D ie er thow e let h is nam e be know n his fo lly  sh ew s to
m uche.
But best yt is to hide and never com e to lighte 
ffor one the earthe m ay none but I the accente sound
aright. {AH 73-6)
53 Roland Barthes, “The Death o f the Author,” in Leitch et al, eds. Theory, pp. 1466-70; Foucault, 
“Author?” pp. 101-20.
54 For Luther’s complex relationship to nominalism, see: Oberman, Luther, pp. 119-23; Bayer, 
“Interpreter,” p. 76.
55 Chadwick, ed. Confessions, III. 16.
The poem’s ideal meaning, it appears, is incapable of being accessed by anyone 
“one the earthe”. Whichever version of Dyer’s poem one ponders, this statement 
(and its equivalents in CUL and ASH) works as a challenge. The reader is called 
upon to respond: “No, I do identify with the plight the song describes. I will act 
accordingly and, thus, sound the song’s accents right”. ASH, though, is adamant: 
no-one, including the protagonist himself, can “sound aright” the song’s ideal 
accent (77-80). In which case, the song (as a manner of speaking) is distinct from 
the impotent lover’s “case” (as a social and political matter). Considered thus, the 
lover—in contrast to the song itself—lacks agency: the author/speaker is a 
function who allows the song to speak through or rather as him; he provides an 
inadequate, durational vehicle for the ideal, like one of Plato’s reflecting cave- 
dwellers. From an idealist perspective, it emerges, discursive utterance is the 
representation of inevitable failure in the attempt to sound an ideal “aright”.
The envoy of Dyer’s poem occupies the three final stanzas of its longest 
variants, forming an appendix with an ambiguous relationship to the text’s main 
body. Hence, the envoy functions as a terminal: a site of conspicuous 
conventionality, or artifice, which implies (by way of contrast) that the preceding 
stanzas are, figuratively speaking, “real” (“figuratively” in that they inevitably 
fall short of the ideal). Consequently, it is important to note that the final three 
stanzas are omitted in most versions. Placed between other poems in 
compilations Dyer’s lyric acquires new terminals, new accents; idealism is 
obscured, material contingency asserts itself.
Southwell, too, omits the final three stanzas. His parody interrogates the 
claims of “Dyers Phancy” to be a truth statement which none is qualified to sing 
beside. Southwell’s text does not engage with Dyer’s poem as an artful 
construction whose truth is contingent on formal emplacement. However, 
Southwell has it both ways. The parody is placed near the centre of the 
“Waldegrave” manuscript: 18th of 40 poems (if one counts the opening sequence 
of poems on the Virgin Mary as one poem). It follows poems on “Davids 
Peccavi”, “Saint Peters Remorse” and “Mary Magdalens Blushe”, and it precedes 
poems entitled “A Vale of Teares”, “The Prodigall Chylds Soule Wracke” and
“Marie Magdalens Complaint at Christs Death”. The imputations of self-pity, 
worldliness and lack of faith are clear.
This apparent gamesmanship serves to remind the reader that, if Dyer-as- 
author has encroached on the priest’s territory, the priest has strayed into the 
swamplands of communicative failure (like Plato, imitating the imitators).56 
Orthodoxy itself engages in dialectical process, of course, but in designated 
venues. By writing a parody of Dyer’s poem, Southwell steps outside of the 
exclusive “circle” which bestows his authority as priest. Dyer’s Christ is Dyer’s 
fancy: defeatist, self-pitying. However, Southwell’s Christ, conscious of (his 
own) human faults, seeking to amend them, is in danger of becoming 
Southwell’s fancy in the marketplace of fictions.
Such a danger may have occurred to Southwell. Sweeney notes occasional 
expressions of concern by the young Jesuit at a lack of guidance from his mission 
superior Garnet.57 Consequently, his line-for-line parodies of Elizabethan poems 
appear to be early works in Southwell’s career as English-language poet.58
56 Jacques Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” p. 1860, in Leitch et al, eds. Theory, pp. 1830-76.
57 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 104.
58 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 136.
Chapter 4.
Thomas Lodge, Robert Southwell and Rosalynde.
This chapter is concerned with the influence upon the Elizabethan Catholic writer 
Thomas Lodge of not only Jesuit meditational practice but also, and especially, 
Jesuit doctrinal theories of justification, as distinguished from the doctrinal 
positions authorized by the Council of Trent. Analysis of aspects of Lodge’s 
romance Rosalynde will supply the main evidence for this influence. However, 
corroborative biographical and other historical evidence will be discussed first, 
by way of preparation for that analysis.
Developing the previous chapter’s argument that Southwell became wary 
of engaging parodically with doctrinal matters in his prose and poetry, I will 
consider the possibility that, by preparing and instructing Lodge to participate in 
comparable activity in his texts, Southwell solved the problem of venue. That is, 
a lay figure such as Lodge could engage with other Elizabethan writers in print 
about doctrinal matters without bringing religious orthodoxy and authority 
formally into question. A principal benefit of such an arrangement, from 
Southwell’s point of view, is that it would have enabled Jesuit theological 
breakthroughs to be communicated to a wider audience.
*
The will of Lodge’s father, Sir Thomas Lodge, appears “staunchly Protestant”,1 
and there is scholarly uncertainty about when exactly his son Thomas became a 
Catholic. The younger Thomas Lodge’s most overtly Catholic text, Prosopopeia
1 Edward Andrews Tenney, Thomas Lodge (New York: Russell & Russell, 1935), p. 87.
Containing the Teares o f the Holy, Blessed, and Sanctified Marie, the Mother o f  
God (1596) is dedicated to Lady Margaret Stanley, the Countess of Derby (5).2 
Thus, I am inclined to agree with Charles Whitworth’s view that Lodge’s 
Catholic sympathies date from the time Lodge spent “in mine infancie” (A Fig 
for Momus [4])3 in the house of Lord Henry Stanley.4 Bom c.1558, Lodge was 
page to the Stanleys from c.1564 to c.1571.5 The earliest (apparent) documentary 
evidence of Lodge’s Catholicism, however, dates from 1581,6 in which year
L od ge’s supplication for the M A  at O xford w as initially accepted and then, later that 
year, denied. In the interim a Thom as L odge, gentlem an, w as called  before the privy  
council to answer ‘certain m atters’ and a Thom as L odge w as im prisoned at the k in g ’s 
bench, according to the con fession  o f  an anti-Catholic informant.7
Lodge attended Trinity College, Oxford, from c.1573 to 1577.8 Jesuit scouts were 
known to have made the rounds of Oxford University in the period, looking for 
young men with “extraordinary pregnancy of wit”.9 In any case, as Tenney 
observes, “[i]f Thomas Lodge had no leanings toward Catholicism before [1573], 
he had ample opportunity to acquire them ... for Trinity nurtured many of the 
Roman persuasion”.10
Around 1579, Lodge wrote an answer to Stephen Gosson’s The Schoole o f  
Abuse. This work, usually referred to as A Defence o f Poetry, may have been 
entitled Honest Excuses}1 Its humanist defence of poetry—and the fact that
2 In Works, Volume 3.
3 In Works, Volume 3.
4 Charles Whitworth, “Thomas Lodge (1558-September 1625),” p. 139, in David A. Richardson, 
ed. 16lh-century Nondramatic Writers: Fourth Series (Detroit: Gale Research, 1966), pp. 136-49.
5 Wesley D. Rae, Thomas Lodge (New York: Twayne, 1967), pp. 13-14.
6 Tenney, Lodge, p. 80; Shell, Catholicism, p. 179.
7 Alexandra Halasz, “Thomas Lodge (1558-1625), Author and Physician,” ODNB.
8 Tenney, Lodge, pp. 47-8; Donna B. Hamilton, Anthony Munday and the Catholics, 1560-1633 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), p. 19.
9 Paradise, Lodge, p. 18; for the Jesuit Jasper Heywood’s “work at the universities” in the early 
1580s, see: Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, pp. 54, 86.
10 Tenney, Lodge, p. 57; Penry Williams, “Elizabethan Oxford: State, Church and University,” p. 
409, in James McConica, ed. The History o f  the University o f  Oxford. Volume 3: the Collegiate 
University (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1986), pp. 397-440; see also: Hamilton, Munday, p. 19.
11 C.S. Lewis, English Literature in the 16th Century Excluding Drama (London: Oxford UP, 
1954), p. 396.
Lodge’s next publication, An Alarum against Vsurers (1584), was dedicated to 
Sir Philip Sidney—suggest that Lodge was associated to an extent with Sidney at 
the time.12 The Catholic Lodge’s association with the Protestant Sidney might 
seem counter-intuitive. However, there is evidence that Sidney sympathized with 
particular Catholics if not with Catholicism as a papally-governed institution.13 
Indeed, Sidney met Campion in Prague and apparently confessed his religious 
doubts to the Jesuit. (Campion then wrote to the Jesuit Father General Acquaviva 
saying Sidney was ripe for conversion.)14 There is, therefore, room for common 
political and religious ground between Lodge and Sidney at this point.
Honest Excuses was “suppressed before publication, probably in 
consequence of the usual licence being refused”.15 The text is unusually explicit 
about the use of pagan figures for discussion of religious topics: “you know not” 
Lodge teases Gosson, “that the creation is signified in the Image of Prometheus', 
the fall of pryde in the person of Narcissus”.16 In short, no real distinction obtains 
between sacred and secular texts. Lodge thus implies that Gosson merely chooses 
not to acknowledge the religious content of the “secular” works to which he 
objects.17
Lodge’s Rosalynde appeared in print for the first time in 1590 but may 
have been written as early as 1587.18 The title-page specifies that the romance 
has been “Fetcht from the Canaries” (l).19 This detail is usually taken to indicate
12 Katherine Wilson, Fictions o f  Authorship in Late Elizabethan Narratives: Euphttes in Arcadia  
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006), pp. 138-9; for Sidney as anti-Puritan, see: John Buxton, Sir Philip 
Sidney and the English Renaissance, 2nd edition (London: Macmillan, 1964), p. 15; Stillman, 
Sidney.
13 Buxton, Sidney, pp. 53-4.
14 Duncan-Jones, Sidney, pp. 124-7, 135.
15 “Some Account o f Thomas Lodge and His Writings,” p. xx, in David Laing, ed. A Defence o f  
Poetry, Music and Stage-Plays To Which Are Added, by the Same Author, An Alarum against 
Usurers; and  The Delectable History o f  Forbonius and Prisceria, by Thomas Lodge (n.p.: 
Shakespeare Society, 1853), pp. xi-lxv. Lodge himself says the book was “forbad” by the “godly 
& reuerent yt had to deale in the cause”: “An Alarum against Vsurers,” p. 6, in Works, Volume 1.
16 Lodge, “A Reply to Stephen Gosson’s Schoole o f  Abuse in Defence o f  Poetry Musick and 
Stage Plays,” pp. 3-4, in Works, Volume 1.
17 Hamilton, Munday, p. 18.
18 Wilson, Authorship, p. 139; Sukanta Chaudhuri, Renaissance Pastoral and Its English 
Developments (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1989), p. 306.
19 Rosalynde appears in Lodge, Works, Volume 1.
that Lodge wrote the book while voyaging to the Azores, as the author seems to 
declare in the dedicatory letter to the Lord Chancellor, Henry Carey, Lord 
Hunsdon (1585 or 1586 are held to be the most likely dates for such a journey).20 
The book is “rough, as hatcht in the stormes of the Ocean, and feathered in the 
surges of many perillous seas” (4). It is worth noting, however, that the three 
books of Lodge’s which scholars tend to regard as being most strikingly explicit 
in their Catholicism—“Trvth’s Complaint ouer England” (1584),21 “the 
astonishingly Catholic Catharos” (1591)22 and Prosopopeia—each appeared 
immediately prior to one of Lodge’s three conspicuous departures from England: 
1585, putatively with Captain Clarke;23 August 1591, with Captain Cavendish;24 
and 1597, when Lodge headed to Avignon to swear allegiance to the Pope. Thus, 
these three texts can be read as Lodge defiantly burning his bridges prior to 
leaving England on three occasions. However, on at least one of those occasions 
he returned evincing a desire to repair those bridges by re-establishing his 
credentials as a loyal Elizabethan. That is, in the dedicatory letter to Carey, in 
Rosalynde, Lodge addresses the patriotic Carey heartily as a sailor and a scholar
20 Halasz, “Lodge”. However, see: Brian Nellist, “Introduction,” p. 14, in Brian Nellist & Simone 
Batin, eds. Rosalynd  (Keele: Rybum, 1995), pp. 7-22, where it is stated that Lodge sailed with 
Clarke in 1588. Writing the dedicatory letter in 1589 or 1590, Lodge might be seeking to account 
for his whereabouts during the Armada threat: Tenney, Lodge, p. 98. The Careys were 
“prominent patrons o f ... [Catholic] musicians like [Thomas] Morley and [John] Dowland”: H.
R. Woudhuysen, Sir Philip Sidney and the Circulation o f  Manuscripts, 1558-1640 (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1996), p. 265; Diana Poulton, John Dowland  (London: Faber & Faber, 1972), pp. 49, 
217-8.
21 For “Trvth’s Complaint” as evidently Catholic work, see: Edmund W. Gosse, “Memoir o f  
Thomas Lodge,” p. 12, in Lodge’s Works, Volume 1, pp. 1-46; Shell, Catholicism, p. 179;
Janelle, Southwell, p. 55; Cuvelier, Lodge, p. 503.
22 Kinney, Arthur F. Review o f  Cuvelier, Lodge, p. 794, Renaissance Quarterly 39 (1986), pp. 
794-6; see also: Cuvelier, Lodge, pp. 469ff.
23 It remains unclear whether Lodge actually sailed with Clarke or not; see: Tomas Monterrey, 
“Thomas Lodge’s Rosalynde and the Canary Islands,” SEDERI17 (2007), pp. 131-40. Lodge’s 
claim to have found the source for A Margarite o f  America during his sea travels, again in a 
preface, has likewise been regarded as fallacious: Claudette Pollack, “Lodge’s A Margarite o f  
America,” p. 1, Renaissance and Reformation 12 (1976), pp. 1-11; Davis, Idea, pp. 198-9.
24 Philip Drew, “Was Greene’s ‘Young Juvenal’ Nashe or Lodge?” p. 62, SEL 7 (1967), pp. 55- 
66. Alice Walker observes that Catharos was published while Lodge was abroad: “The Reading 
o f an Elizabethan: Some Sources o f the Prose Pamphlets o f  Thomas Lodge,” p. 266, Review o f  
English Studies 8 (1932), pp. 264-81; Cuvelier notes that “la proclamation du 18 octobre 1591 
contre les pretres catholiques et les Jesuites suivit de peu le depart de Lodge pour l’Amerique du 
Sud”: Lodge, p. 477. For the probable date o f Lodge’s return from the Cavendish expedition, see: 
Charles J. Sissons, “Thomas Lodge and His Family,” pp. 105-7, in Charles J. Sissons, ed. Thomas 
Lodge and Other Elizabethans (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1933), pp. 1-164.
(3-4)—as though he had never been a (Catholic) writer. After all, one might 
wonder what relevance the author’s recent sea-travels could have to Rosalynde, a 
noticeably landlocked romance.
It could be argued that, in speaking of his recent maritime experiences, 
Lodge is metaphorically confessing that he had previously been blown about on 
the seas of religious error, and the present romance is an account of his delivery 
from that perilous condition.25 (The metaphor of wildly errant voyage to the far 
side of the world is analogous to Orlando’s journey—subsequent to losing his 
wits—to the moon in Ariosto’s romance.)26 A prefatory letter “To the Courteous 
Reader Whatsoeuer” in Lodge’s subsequent publication, The Famous, True and 
Historicall Life o f Robert Second Duke o f Normandy” (1591), again uses the sea- 
voyage trope, referring to “The Loadstarres that directed me in my course” (4).27 
The latter statement may indicate that Lodge’s recent course of spiritual recovery 
had been supervised by a specific group of guides (here, Lodge neglects to 
mention any geographical itinerary). In the second dedicatory letter of 1590’s 
Rosalynde, Lodge offers “the Gentlemen Readers” “the fruits of his labors that he 
wrought in the Ocean, when euerie line was wet with a surge, & euerie humorous 
passion countercheck! with a storme” (7). The metaphorical nature of the sea- 
crossing seems undeniable here (unless one wishes to suppose that Lodge 
considers describing oneself as writing while waves literally crash across one’s 
desk as pertinent in some way). Lodge can be read as stating that he wept tears as 
he produced his manuscript. Indeed, instead of a meteorological storm, there are 
two rival forces: Lodge’s passions and the storm that “countercheckt” them. 
Lodge, having suffered tribulations, may have apprehended that his own 
passionate nature was the cause of them, not fortune (or the weather). 
Furthermore, I would argue that, writing circa 1587 of storms of tears, of
25 For a locus classicus o f the life o f  the sinner as sea-joumey see: J. G. Nichols, ed. Canzoniere, 
by Francesco Petrarca (Manchester: Carcanet, 2000), pp. 79-80; for an early modem English 
Catholic equivalent, see: Francis Tregian, “A Letter from Prison,” 11. 41-8; in Miola, ed., Early 
Modern Catholicism , p. 182; for the self as a storm-tossed boat in Songes and Sonettes (1557),
The Phoenix Nest (1593) and Southwell’s Saint Peters Complaynt, see: Janelle, Southwell, pp. 
217-8. See also: A. C. Southern, Elizabethan Recusant Prose, 1559-1582 (London: Sands 8c Co, 
1950), pp. 209-10; Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, pp. 305-6.
26 McNulty, ed. Orlando Furioso, XXXIV.63-67.
27 In Works, Volume 2.
humoral “fate” being overcome by volitional means, of passions being subdued 
by passion (not by reason), Lodge is revealing the effects of Jesuit influence. 
Janelle has identified the Jesuit Southwell as the primary agent responsible for 
introducing the “literature of tears” to England in 15 87.28 However, if one 
accepts that Lodge had been influenced by Southwell or some other Jesuit by 
1587-8, one might also observe that Lodge has not fully assimilated Ignatian 
principles. “If you like it, so”, he informs the gentlemen readers of Rosalynde (7). 
Such peremptory notes recur in Lodge’s paratexts and are not especially 
Southwellian in tone.29 On the other hand, it may also be noted that Lodge’s 
prefatory statements are often at odds with the main body of the works they 
precede, as though the author deemed it necessary to adopt an aggressive stance 
towards the world in these frames, regardless of the accompanying work’s 
content.30
Nonetheless, in the letter to Hunsdon, Lodge is advertising the fact that he 
has been abroad. Aside from any relevance his travels may have had to Hunsdon, 
Lodge can be read as advertising his wares to London book-stall browsers, 
announcing that he has “news” from overseas. In early modem England, 
romances and broadside ballads were the only ready means of distributing news 
outside of the direct auspices of the government and the ecclesiastical 
authorities.31 Donna Hamilton has pointed out that “packaging news important to 
the Catholic community by enveloping it, front and back, within statements of 
government policy provided Catholic writers with one way of getting that news
28 Janelle, Southwell, p. 190; see also: Peter Milward, Shakespeare’s Religious Background 
(London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1973), p. 54; Helen C. White, “Southwell: Metaphysical and 
Baroque,” pp. 159-60, MP  61 (1964), pp. 159-68. The earliness o f  Southwell’s contribution in 
this respect must be stressed. For example, Thomas Wright, a potential rival candidate for being 
an early transmitter o f  such notions, was not active in London until 1595: Pritchard, Catholic 
Loyalism, p. 61; Klause, Jesuit, p. 89.
29 Sissons, “Lodge,” p. 157.
30 Thus, for example, Lodge “adopts a fractious, ‘satyricall’ tone” in the preface to A Fig fo r  
Momus: Whitworth, “Lodge,” p. 145. A further example— a prefatory epistle from 
Prosopopeia— is discussed below.
31 Lennard J. Davis, Factual Fictions: the Origins o f  the English Novel (New York: Columbia 
UP, 1983), pp. 45-8. Davis sees broadsheet ballads, not romances, as the forerunners o f  modem  
newspapers, partly on the grounds that ballads were more popular; however, different newspapers 
address different “classes” o f  reader; romances, therefore, may have been aimed at particular 
classes o f reader.
out.”32 Inhabitants of a culture fed by 24-hour news channels should recall that 
news can be ten or twenty years old and still be news in a place where 
communication lines are broken. The Tridentine doctrinal formulations 
continued to be news for Elizabethan Catholics in the late 1580s and beyond.34 
However, Lodge’s 2nd epistle in Rosalynde addresses not Catholics but 
“Gentlemen”—that is, any fair-minded readers who wish to learn what they need 
to know, if they are to behave as Christian gentlemen according to the latest 
fashion.35
It might be wondered why, though, if Lodge’s Rosalynde can be read as a 
“Catholic” text, the authorities allowed it to be printed. A letter from Burghley to 
Walsingham, dated June 12 1588, suggests a possible answer:
I could  w ish  som e expert lem ed  man w old  fayne an answer as from a nom bre o f  
Catholiques that notuithstandyng ther ev ill Contentm ent for R elligion , shuld profess ther 
obedience and prom ice w ith ther lyves and pow er ageynst [s/c] all strang forces offryng  
to land in this realm .36
Such a statement indicates that the publication of certain types of Catholic text
•3 7was consistent with the regime’s interests. The reading of Lodge’s Rosalynde 
offered below will describe such a text: the position I infer from its content, for 
example, is consistent with (measured) support for a Stuart succession. Read 
figuratively, it does not advocate recusancy, and, doctrinally, it contains nothing 
which conservative Elizabethan Protestants could not accept (indeed it 
anticipates the English church’s subsequent movement away from High
32 Hamilton, Munday, p. 37.
33 Davis, Fictions, p. 50.
34 Lisa Ferraro Parmelee, Good Newes from  Fraunce: French Anti-League Propaganda in Late 
Elizabethan England (Rochester: University o f  Rochester Press, 1996), p. 16; Roberts & Roberts, 
“New Webbe,” p. 72.
35 Wooding notes that early Elizabethan Catholic works often “contained two prefaces, one which 
replied to the Protestant controversialists and the other which addressed the reader”: Rethinking, 
p. 193.
36 John Hungerford Pollen & William MacMahon, eds. The Venerable Philip Howard Earl o f  
Arundel 1557-1595: English Martyrs Volume II  (London: CRS, 1919), pp. 169-70. The letter is 
discussed by Devlin: H am let’s Divinity, p. 53.
37 See also: Pritchyard, Catholic Loyalism, p. 68.
Calvinism). These circumstances inform my decision to argue specifically for 
Southwell’s—as opposed to a generalized Jesuit—influence upon Lodge. As 
Pilarz has observed, Southwell delivered a reconciliatory message to Elizabethan 
England.38 Suitably edited and arranged, Southwell’s texts were published with 
the authorities’ collusion (as will be shown in Chapter 5) and were immensely 
popular with Protestant readers.39
It might be objected that the first publication of Rosalynde (if not its 
composition) postdates the Armada scare. However, “it remained useful for 
Elizabeth and her government to keep tight control over the succession question 
after the failure of the Armada”.40 Moreover, to encourage opposition to radical 
Protestant elements in England, it suited the Elizabethan government to maintain 
that a threat of Spanish invention continued to exist at various times during the 
1590s.41 For instance, the government claimed that the Jesuits had arrived in 
England in advance of invasion by Spanish forces landed at Normandy in late 
1591.42
If Rosalynde was written in 1587-8, though, one might wonder why it was 
not printed at that time. Courtly poets such as Sidney and Dyer saw printed 
publication as a dangerous venue for fictional texts. They apparently preferred to 
circulate their poetic productions via a select network of influential readers in 
manuscript.43 Conversely, Lodge had sought to print his works from as early as 
1579-80, though he had presumably learnt (from his experience with Gosson’s 
book) to observe a printing schedule attuned to what the state would tolerate.44 
Thus, with Rosalynde, Lodge may have pursued a two-stage strategy (manuscript 
first, print-version second), possibly aimed at different audiences (comparable to 
the modem two-stage process: hardback, paperback).
A conventional time-lag seems to have been observed. Norton and
38 Pilarz, Southwell.
39 Herbert Thurston, “Catholic Writers and Elizabethan Readers: II. Father Southwell the 
Euphuist,” pp. 232-3, The Month 83 (1895), pp. 231-45.
40 Andrew Zurcher, Shakespeare and Law  (London: Methuen Drama, 2010), p. 68.
41 Paola Pugliatti, Shakespeare and the Just War Tradition (Famham: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 55-62.
42 Brownlow, Southwell, p. 64. See also: Parmelee, Good Newes, pp. 17-18.
43 Duncan-Jones, ed. O ld Arcadia, p. iii.
44 Hamilton, Munday, p. 20.
Sackville’s Gorboduc, for example—a prominent example of a literary text with 
evident topical relevance—“was performed before Elizabeth in January 1562 and 
was published ... apparently without the authors’ permission, in September 
1565”.45 However, if this 2-3 year gap represents a conventional time-lag, the 
failure to obtain “the authors’ permission” might appear strange. On the other 
hand, authors in such cases may have conventionally adopted a pose of resisting 
publication.
Accepting the latter observation could explain Lodge’s addition of a more 
conspicuously Counter-Reformation-influenced “Scedule” to the 1592 edition of 
Rosalynde. In the “Scedule”, Lodge’s mouthpiece “Euphues” (John Lyly’s 
creation) insists his book is an anatomy of—not “wit” but— love “with as liuely 
colours as in Apelles table: roses to whip him [Love] when he is wanton, reasons 
to with stand him when he is wilie”.46 The promise of “liuely colours”and 
extreme naturalism of presentation are characteristics of reformist art (Catholic 
and northern European).47 The whips associated with orthodox asceticism have 
become roses; figures of creaturely beauty48 as a means of regulating desire are 
here preferred to flagellation.49 Reason retains a role, but comes second to roses. 
Lodge’s Euphues of 1592, in other words—after the waters had been tested by 
the 1590 edition—more boldly embraces the Jesuit prioritisation of the emotions 
over the intellect.50
Lodge-biographer N. Burton Paradise has noted apparent alterations in 
Lodge’s temperament around 1590. Paradise finds Lodge’s dedicatory letter in 
Scillaes Metamorphosis (1589) to be “marked by a note of querulousness”;
Lodge “is full of what he calls ‘divine discontent’”. By 1590 (in the Rosalynde 
dedications), “something seems to have happened which made Lodge exchange
45 Alford, Elizabethan Polity, p. 100.
46 Lodge, “Miscellaneous Pieces,” pp. 5-6, in Works, Volume 4.
47 Gauvin Alexander Bailey, Between Renaissance and Baroque: Jesuit Art in Rome, 1565-1610  
(Toronto, Buffalo & London: University o f Toronto Press, 2003), pp. 40, 47; Brownlow, 
Southwell, p. 39; Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, p. 63.
48 Robertson, Jr., pp. 95-6.
49 For a study o f flagellation which is o f  general relevance to aspects o f  the present thesis, see: 
Niklaus Largier, In Praise o f  the Whip: A Cultural History o f  Arousal (New York: Zone, 2007).
50 O’Malley, First Jesuits, pp. 41-2, 71, 371, 373; Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 13.
his mood of rather petulant unhappiness for one of confidence and high spirits”.51 
As noted earlier, Lodge’s “humourous passions” had been “countercheckt”. 
Consequently, Paradise finds Rosalynde to be uniquely “sunny” among Lodge’s 
fictions.52
Material traces possibly exist of a desire on the part of Elizabethan lay- 
writers to associate their productions with Southwell’s religious authority. Lodge 
contributed verses to the printed poetry collection The Phoenix Nest (1593). In the 
Induction to Lodge’s almost simultaneous publication Phillis, Gosse notes, 
“Lodge seems to claim for himself the responsibility of The Phoenix Nest”.53 
Lodge refers to himself in the Induction as “I that haue liu’d a Phoenix in loues 
flame / And felt that death /neuer would declare”.54 Gosse perhaps over-states 
the case; Lodge’s statement sounds more like a description of a recent conversion 
experience. However, according to its title-page, The Phoenix Nest was “set 
foorth” by one “R. S. of the Inner Temple, Gentleman”.55 Given that Robert 
Southwell was arrested in 1592, it is, of course, unlikely that the Jesuit played an 
editorial role as “R. S.”.56 Nonetheless, it is possible that persons associated with 
the volume sought to advertise that the project had been planned (“set foorth”) 
under Southwell’s auspices. Hyder E. Rollins, a modem editor of The Phoenix 
Nest, considers the suggestion that Southwell had any connection with the 
volume “ridiculous” on the grounds that it is full of “love-poems”.57 (What 
possible interest in love could the author of Marie Magdalens Funereal Teares 
have!) A rather perplexing reluctance to apprehend a connection between
51 Paradise, Lodge, pp. 37-8; see also: Gosse, “Lodge,” p. 13 (Scillaes Metamorphosis “seems to 
me to be a product o f the poet’s early London life [dating from 1585-6] ... the tone o f the 
preface, no less than the style o f the contents bears out this supposition”).
52 Paradise, Lodge, p. 96; Tenney uses the same adjective: Lodge, p. 104.
53 Gosse, “Lodge,” pp. 32-3; see also: J. Payne Collier, A Bibliographical and Critical Account o f  
the Rarest Books in the English Language, 2 volumes (London: Joseph Lilly, 1865), II. 162-3 
(“we cannot help thinking that Lodge himself may have had some hand in introducing corrections 
into the poems copied from [Phillis into The Phoenix Nest]”).
54 Lodge, “Phillis,” p. 5, in Works, Volume 2.
55 RJobert] Sfouthwell], ed. [?] The Phoenix Nest. Built Up with the M ost Rare and Refined 
Woorkes o f  Noble Men, Woorthy Knights, Gallant Gentlemen, Masters o f  Arts and Brave 
Schollers, Full o f  Varietie, Excellent Invention and Singular Delight. Never Before This Time 
Published. Set Foorth by R. S. o f  the Inner Temple, Gentleman (London: John Jackson, 1593).
56 Hugh MacDonald, “Introduction,” p. 4, in Hugh MacDonald, ed. The Phoenix Nest (London: 
Shakespeare Head Press, 1926), pp. 1-8.
57 Hyder E. Rollins, ed. The Phoenix Nest (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1931), p. xxii.
Christianity and love informs the secular-sacred binary imposed by Rollins. In 
Janelle’s view, on the other hand, Southwell’s “condensed, rhetorical style is 
strikingly akin to that of the Phoenix Nest”.5* Janelle also notes that “several 
publishers made free with [Southwell’s] initials in order to take advantage of his 
wide fame”.59 Collier records that “the opinion of bibliographers seems to have 
settled most on the belief, that R. S .... means Robert Southwell”.60 Hugh 
MacDonald, another modem editor of The Phoenix Nest, dismisses Southwell’s 
candidacy for identification as “R. S.” on the grounds that the Jesuit was not a 
member of the Inner Temple.61 Yet an association with Lincoln’s Inn “was 
proudly announced from 1584 to 1595 on the title pages of at least five of 
Lodge’s publications [though] he never entered the legal profession”.62 
(MacDonald, Rollins and Collier, incidentally, all prove unable to offer a 
plausible alternative candidate for “R. S.”.)
In any case, it may be noted that, when commissioning visual artworks in 
Renaissance Italy, “the Jesuits worked directly with the artists to formulate new 
styles appropriate for their [the Jesuits’] goals”.63 Similarly, a Jesuit such as 
Southwell may have encouraged Lodge to issue Rosalynde in print in 1590 as a 
way of communicating updated Catholic doctrinal values to English Catholics.64 
In the prefatory letter to Marie Magdalens Funeral Teares, Southwell exhibits 
full awareness of the need for masks in offering printed works, “without which 
moral tmths ‘would not find so free a passage’”.65 Southwell at this time was
58 Janelle, Southwell, p. 255.
59 Janelle, Southwell, p. 156.
60 Collier, Rarest Books, 11.163 (Collier neglects to support this assertion with references).
61 MacDonald, “Introduction,” p. 3.
62 Whitworth, “Lodge,” p. 139.
63 Bailey, Renaissance and Baroque, p. 16.
64 David Mathew, The Celtic Peoples and Renaissance Europe: a Study o f  the Celtic and Spanish 
Influences on Elizabethan History (London & New York: Sheed & Ward, 1933), p. 55; Wooding, 
Rethinking, p. 188. Philip Caraman notes that Southwell’s superior on the English mission, Henry 
Garnet, “gathered about him a nucleus o f craftsmen, unmarried men devoted to his service, who 
made it their vocation to assist his priests”: Henry Garnet, p. 105.
65 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 185; the Southwell passage may be consulted in W. Jos. Walter, 
ed. The Prose Works o f  Robert Southwell; Containing Mary Magdalen’s Funeral Tears, The 
Triumphs o f  Death, and An Epistle o f Comfort (London: Keating, Brown & Co, 1828), p. vii. For 
reports o f  Jesuit priests coaching Elizabethan English actors, see: Hugh Aveling, Northern 
Catholics: the Catholic Recusants o f  the North Riding o f  Yorkshire, 1558-1790 (London:
Geoffrey Chapman, 1966), p. 290.
himself engaged in writing and printing works with a view to disseminating 
Jesuit doctrinal innovations which went further than the Tridentine decrees in 
allowing scope for free will.66 Being fugitive from the law, Southwell was free to 
handle religious content overtly in his writings—free even from Rome’s 
control.67 Southwell, though, desired to reach a larger audience,68 and, as 
previously suggested, may have found that certain textual strategies were not 
fully in keeping with his role as priest. In other words, if the religious errors of 
courtly Elizabethan works were to be diagnosed and rectified in public by 
parodic means, it might better be done by a lay author.
A number of scholars have considered it probable that Southwell and 
Lodge were acquainted in London.69 (Herbert Thurston even suggests that it was 
Lodge who taught Southwell how to write euphuistically.)70 Lodge married Jane 
Aldred some time prior to 1596. Aldred had belonged to the household of the 
Countess of Arundel at the time when Southwell is thought to have conducted his 
mission from the Countess’s residence, Arundel House in the Strand.71 This 
circumstance led Devlin to imply that Southwell may even have arranged the 
marriage of Lodge and Aldred.72 However, as Cuvelier points out, Aldred was 
not a widow until 1592, by which time Southwell was in prison.73 Nonetheless, 
Cuvelier too supposes that Lodge and Southwell were acquainted, judging from 
the evidence of the Jesuit’s influence upon Lodge’s works of the late 1580s and 
early 1590s.74
Somewhat incongruously, Thurston concludes that Lodge numbered among 
the “finest wits” committed to “stilling Venus rose” whom Southwell reproved in
66 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, pp. 25-7.
67 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 97.
68 Brownlow, Southwell, p. 11.
69 Thurston, “Southwell the Euphuist,” p. 242; Pilarz, Southwell, p. xviii.
70 Thurston, “Southwell the Euphuist,” pp. 241-3.
71 Wilson, Authorship, p. 140; Pilarz, Southwell, pp. xviii, xxx; Janelle, Southwell, pp. 42, 55;
Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 113. Lodge later dedicated The Poore Mans Talentt (1623?) to the
Countess o f Arundel.
72 Devlin, Southwell, p. 267.
73 Cuvelier, Lodge, p. 118.n.80. Southwell would have encountered Jane’s husband, Solomon 
Aldred, when the latter was acting as a spy at the English College in Rome in 1583: J. H. Pollen, 
ed. “The Memoirs o f Father Robert Persons,” p. 34.n., in CRS Miscellanea II (London: Arden 
Press, 1906), pp. 12-218.
74 Cuvelier, Lodge, pp. 118, 152-3, 477-8.
the epistolary poem prefacing Saint Peters Complaynt (as discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 5).75 It seems inconsistent to describe Lodge and Southwell as 
sharing a desk in the Strand, so that Lodge could coach Southwell in his early 
attempts at euphuism, while also suggesting that Southwell issued a 
condemnation of Lodge’s poetic vanity in publicl Thurston’s habit of imposing a 
sacred/profane binary upon early modem texts may have led him to entertain 
such a hypothesis.
There is evidence, moreover, that precisely such covert strategies as I am 
positing Southwell adopted with Lodge were employed by the Jesuits with new 
converts. For example, after the Elizabethan courtier Thomas Pounde expressed a 
wish to join the Jesuits, the Father General of the order wrote to him on 
December 1 1578, saying:
This one thing . ..  I greatly desire o f  you, that you  publish to no one this your 
determination regarding our S ociety , neither by habit or dress, nor by discourse, but that 
you  keep your secret to you rse lf until better tim es com e forth, when this your desire . . .  
m ay be openly fo llow ed  out.76
Pounde was much more useful to the Society as a covert operative in Elizabethan 
England.
As already noted, in Robert Duke o f Normandy (a work published soon 
after Rosalynde), Lodge refers to “[t]he Loadstarres that directed me in my 
course [that is, in his writing of that text]” (4; emphasis added). Whether or not 
these “Loadstarres” are Lodge’s doctrinal advisers and spiritual directors,
Lodge’s prefatory matter retains its querulous stance. Lodge instructs “the 
Curteous Reader”: “if they [his “Loadstarres”] haue colours and no counterfeit, 
[then] doo me right to say they set down colours without counterfeit” (4). This 
statement could be read as Lodge commenting on the nature of his medieval (or 
other) literary sources. However, read thus, there is no evident reason for offering
75 Thurston, “Southwell the Euphuist,” p. 242.
76 Henry Foley, Jesuits in Conflict: or Historic Facts Illustrative o f  the Labours and Sufferings o f  
the English Mission and Province o f  the Society o f  Jesus (London: Bums & Oates, 1873), p. 52; 
see also: pp. 94, 148-54 for the comparable and related case o f George Gilbert.
a justification for his current endeavour. Certainly, “colours” is an ambiguous 
term. At this period, it could mean (especially in a legal context) “specious 
argument”;77 less pejoratively, it could refer to an explicit sign of allegiance”.78 
The second alternative seems relevant here, as it would be self-incriminating of 
Lodge to claim that he was compensating for the deficiencies of a specious 
argument by augmenting it with “counterfeit”. Thus, Lodge could be read as 
saying: “if my (Jesuit) guiding lights are able to declare their allegiance in their 
productions and require no recourse to poetic disguises, in fairness to me observe 
that their productions, consequently, preach to the converted whereas mine may 
appeal to general readers”. Lodge’s narrative, that is, combines a broadly 
attractive form with sound doctrine; therefore, his book should not be condemned 
(or read) as profane in intent, despite its worldly guise.
With the exception of Cuvelier, critics tend to date the influence of the 
Jesuit poet Southwell upon Lodge from 1596. This is understandable, given 
public statements made by Lodge that year. For example, in the epistle “To the 
Readers” prefacing Prosopopeia, Lodge states that previously he had “begot the 
foule forepassed progenie of my thoughts, in the night of my error” (10). Many 
scholars read such statements as repudiations of Lodge’s previous profane works, 
despite the fact that Lodge’s A Margarite o f America appeared in the same 
year.79 Indeed, some scholars even date Lodge’s Catholicism from 1596, 
indicating the extent to which a secular/sacred binary informs historicist 
readings.80 After all, the reproaches uttered by “Truth” in Lodge’s “Trvth’s 
Complaint ouer England” (appended to An Alarum against Usurers in 1584) are 
difficult to understand, as Edmund Gosse observed, without “supposing the satire 
to be a prudently concealed protest against the anti-Romanist action of 
Parliament, and the new stringent laws against the Jesuits” *x Lodge’s 1581 
imprisonment and his arguable presentation of Tridentine and subsequent Jesuit
77 Zurcher, Law, pp. 179, 306.n.32.
78 “[C]olour|color, n .1,” (d): OED.
79 Janelle, Southwell, p. 56; Brownlow, Southwell, p. 44; Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 150; 
Martz, Meditation, pp. 259-60; Shell, Religion, pp. 259-60.n.69.
80 Raspa, Emotive Image, p. 51. See also: Hamilton, Munday, p. 18.
81 Gosse, “Lodge,” p. 12 (emphases added).
doctrinal innovations in Rosalynde also combine to suggest that Lodge was a 
(Counter-Reformation-influenced) Catholic much earlier than 1596.
In company with other scholars, Paradise dates Southwell’s influence upon 
Lodge from 1596. He observes how the epistle “To the Readers” in Lodge’s 
Prosopopeia recalls Southwell’s Marie Magdalens Funeral Teares and Saint 
Peters Complaynt,82 There, Lodge compares his case to “other that haue wept (as 
Peter his apostasie, Marie her loss and misse of Christ,) their teares wrought 
from them either for repent or loue” (10).83 By 1596, St. Peter and Mary 
Magdalen were closely associated with Southwell, being the speakers in the 
Jesuit’s longest compositions. Thus, Lodge’s most explicit allusion to Southwell 
occurs in a prefatory letter. As noted earlier, Lodge tends to adopt a worldly pose 
in such paratexts. In the supposedly “Southwellian” Prosopopeia, therefore, 
Southwell is arguably relegated to the work’s worldly frame. Possibly, the Lodge 
of 1596 is implying (with Romans 12:2 in mind) that the young Jesuit had 
accommodated himself rather too well to the Elizabethan political world.
Scholars often register the epistle’s Southwellian allusions but fail to note the 
strikingly non-Southwellian nature of the main body of the text.84 As Cuvelier 
points out, in Prosopopeia, “Lodge y abandonne toutefois un instant le style 
eplore et ardent de la devotion pour l’invective”.85 What devotional piety is 
expressed in the work has been traced to the more orthodox influence of Luis de 
Granada.86 Moreover, the psychology of Lodge’s speaker in Prosopopeia—the 
Virgin Mary—is not explored in a manner comparable to the way in which 
Southwell had explored the mental and emotional states and processes of St.
Peter and Mary Magdalene. Instead, Lodge’s Mary offers conventional pieties at 
exhaustive length in a manner the modem reader is apt to regard as “uninspired
82 Paradise, Lodge, pp. 125-6.
83 Comma before parenthesis in the original.
84 Molly Murray, for example, mistakenly assumes that the “Marie” speaking in Prosopopeia  is 
the more prominently Southwellian Mary Magdalen: The Poetics o f  Conversion in Early Modern 
English Literature: Verse and Change from  Donne to Dryden  (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2009), p. 56.
85 Cuvelier, Lodge, p. 466.
86 Walker, “Reading,” p. 281.
and tedious”.87
In any case, as argued above, not only the prefatory matter but also the 
main narrative in Rosalynde appears already to reflect the emotional emphasis 
Southwell introduced to English writing in 1587. It is possible, therefore, that 
Southwell’s direct influence upon Lodge dates from around that year, and that, 
just as the Jesuit Father General sought to make the best use of Pounde in the 
run-up to the 1579 Ireland-campaign,88 Southwell encouraged Lodge to operate 
covertly, so as not to compromise a parodic (that is to say, a reconciliatory, non- 
aggressive, but hardly neutral) strategy—singing alongside the authorities’
89song.
*
Scholars frequently comment on the fact that Lodge pioneered a given form or 
topos in English literature. For example, An Alarum Against Vsnrers has been 
regarded as a forerunner of the modem realistic novel.90 Scyllaes Metamophosis, 
as epyllion and in its use of a 6-line stanza, anticipates Shakespeare’s Venus and 
Adonis,91 Arguing for a 1586-7 date of composition,92 Joseph W. Houppert 
considers Lodge’s The Wounds o f Civil War to be “the oldest extant English
87 Walker, “Reading,” p. 280.
88 For the view that the Jesuit missions to England sometimes had specific political and strategic 
aims, see: Michael L. Carrafiello, Robert Parsons and English Catholicism, 1580-1610 (London: 
Susquehanna UP, 1998), p. 11.
89 In Robert Second Duke o f  Normandy, a 7-year silence is imposed upon the penitent hero by his 
papally-appointed confessor, “in acknowledgement o f his accustomed leawdnesse”, during which 
time Robert “should walke in a fooles habite” (p. 46). Read biographically, this detail is 
consistent with the present argument, suggesting Lodge came under Southwell’s direct influence 
in 1589 and was sworn to conceal same until 1596.
90 Paradise, Lodge, p. 77.
91 Sandra Clark, ed. Amorous Rites: Elizabethan Erotic Narrative Verse (London: J. M. Dent, 
1994), p. xxxiii; Wilson, Authorship, p. 139; Gosse, “Lodge,” p. 14. The Southwellian 6-line 
stanza common to all the Jesuit poet’s many imitators is “sometimes called the “Venus and 
Adonis” stanza: Shell, Catholicism, pp. 82, 254.n. However, Lodge’s version appeared in print 
before Southwell’s (and Shakespeare’s).
92 Joseph W. Houppert, ed. The Wounds o f  Civil War, by Thomas Lodge (n.p.: Edward Arnold, 
1969), pp. xii-xiv. Paradise detects borrowings from Wounds in Marlowe’s Tamburlaine: Lodge, 
p. 131.
drama based on classical history”. Lodge, moreover, was the first Elizabethan 
poet to publish satires in notable quantities.94 Two questions, therefore, arise: 1) 
How did Lodge manage to break new ground so often? 2) Why did he receive so 
little credit for this?95
That Lodge repeatedly broke new literary ground suggests that he had 
access to the latest continental theories (doctrinal and literary—the distinction 
between these categories not being rigid at the period).96 Presumably, however, 
Lodge aimed his innovative works at a mixed but broadly conservative audience. 
Ironically, therefore, other English writers could then copy the forms Lodge 
introduced and produce “Counter-Reformation” works that could appeal to less- 
conservative “Anglicans” and more radical reformers.
The famous complaint about Shakespeare in Greenes Groats-Worth o f 
Witte (1592) is consistent with this assessment.97 Whether written by Robert
noGreene or not, the attack voices the angry response of a university-trained 
author to a non-university-trained agent’s “borrowing” of new forms in order to 
use them for populist purposes. (Greene, of course, pioneered the romance novel 
in Elizabethan culture along with Lodge and Sidney.)99
Another important innovation may be attributed (belatedly) to Lodge. 
Sweeney has argued that Southwell’s experience of the Ignatian Exercises 
facilitated his innovative presentations of the mental processes of fictional 
characters. Accordingly, Southwell’s Magdalen, Sweeney maintains, imported to 
English poetry “a ‘real’ self-exposing psychology, depicted in disordered mid­
93 Joseph W. Houppert, “Thomas Lodge,” p. 156, in Terence P. Logan & Denzell Smith, eds. The 
Predecessors o f  Shakespeare: a Survey and Bibliography o f  Recent Studies in English 
Renaissance Drama (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1973), pp. 153-60.
94 Rae, Lodge, p. 86; Joseph B. Collins, Christian Mysticism in the Elizabethan Age, with Its 
Background in M ystical Methodology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1920), p. 157; Larson, 
“Lodge’s Rosalynde,” p. 123; Whitworth, “Lodge,” p. 138; Lodge, A Fig fo r  Momus, p. 6. For 
Southwell’s involvement in the “beginning” o f “the [Elizabethan] trend for satirical poetry”, see: 
Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 99.
95 For Lodge’s “gnawing sense o f neglect”, see: Collins, Christian Mysticism, p. 157; Lodge, 
“Momus,” p. 23, in Works, III.
96 Martz, Meditation, p. 7.
97 G. B. Harrison, ed. Greenes Groats-Worth o f  Witte, Bought with a Million o f  Repentance 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1966), pp. 45-6.
98 Mentz, “Forming Greene,” p. 117.
99 For Lodge as pioneer o f pastoral romance in English, see: Clare R. Kinney, “Feigning Female 
Faining: Spenser, Lodge, Shakespeare and Rosalind,” p. 292, MP 95 (1998), pp. 291-315.
thought, mid-crisis, the sort that later appeared as ... realistic ‘personations’ in 
Shakespeare”.100 This suggestion is a welcome corrective to the usual reliance 
upon Shakespeare’s unique genius as the crucial factor in the Elizabethan 
revolution in fictional characterization. What also needs to be stressed, however, 
is the ready home Elizabethan culture provided for the Ignatian guide to 
interiority. As Ronald J. Corthell has argued, Catholics were “uniquely situated 
to experience the problem of the subject in Elizabethan England”. For Corthell, 
moreover, English recusant documents “pro- and anti- Catholic, represent an 
estranged or divided subject, a representation potentially productive of a 
discourse of interiority”.101 It would appear, therefore, that Southwell and other 
Jesuit missionaries found fertile cognitive terrain for their Ignatian seed. Hence, 
Lodge’s innovative representation of Rosalynd’s102 thought processes (discussed 
below) may indicate that the lay author had learned from Southwell how to 
employ Ignatian techniques in literary performance. Lodge would thus have 
pioneered (in print) Southwell’s Ignatian-inspired poetic breakthrough.103
Read as a Jesuit-inspired exploration of interiority for the purposes of 
teaching Elizabethan readers how to simulate the prohibited priest function,104 
“Rosalynds Passion” (as the monologue uttered by Lodge’s heroine upon her
100 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 146.
101 Ronald J. Corthell, ‘“The Secrecy o f  Man’: Recusant Discourse and the Elizabethan Subject,” 
p. 272, English Literary Review 19 (1989), pp. 272-90.
02 The title-page o f  the 1590 edition o f Lodge’s romance has the spelling “Rosalynde”. (The only 
title Lodge uses to refer to the 1590 text in the prefatory epistles is “Euphues Legacie” [8].) In the 
body o f the narrative, the heroine’s name— prior to her assumption o f  her Ganimede-disguise— is 
generally spelled “ROSALYND” (and the first page o f  the narrative is headed “Rosalynd”). With 
reference to books printed in England in the last quarter o f  the 16th century, Ronald B. McKerrow 
suggests that one should “regard the title-page not as part o f  the work to which it is prefixed, or as 
the production o f  its author”: An Introduction to Bibliography fo r  Literary Students (New Castle: 
Oak Knoll, 1994 [reprint o f 1928 edition]), p. 91. Accordingly, I retain the title-page’s spelling 
for the book’s title but refer to Lodge’s heroine as Rosalynd before she assumes her Ganimede- 
disguise and as Rosalynde after that point (the change will be signalled in a footnote). After the 
heroine removes her male disguise, the text abandons localized consistency and flickers between 
the two spellings as though registering alternative realities. From p. 133 to the narrative’s 
conclusion, “ROSALYND” appears 6 times and “ROSALYNDE” 4.
103 Other scholars who note Lodge’s innovations in representing fictional characters’ thought 
processes in Rosalynde include: Sylvan Bamet, ‘“ Strange Events’: Improbability in AYLI,” pp. 
171-2, in John Russell Brown, ed. Shakespeare: Much Ado About Nothing and AYLI—a 
Casebook (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 166-82; Dusinberre, ed. AYLI, p.83; Larson, 
“Lodge’s Rosalynde,” pp. 125-6; Chaudhuri, Renaissance Pastoral, pp. 310-1.
104 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, pp. 130-1.
beloved Rosader’s attractions is titled [27]) is a spiritual meditation in which the 
speaker evaluates her worthiness to be loved by Christ (as figured by Rosader). 
Love has “presented [Rosalynd] with the IDEA of ROSADERS perfection, and 
taking her at discouert, strooke her so deepe, as she felt her selfe grow passing 
passionate” (27). A mystical atmosphere is detectable in this description of an 
experience comparable in its sensual violence to that of St. Teresa of Avila. The 
meditation then proceeds in proper Ignatian fashion with an intense 
visualisation:105
she began to call to m inde the com elin esse o f  his person ... and the vertues th a t ... m ade 
him  so gracious in the e ies o f  euerie one. Sucking in thus the hony o f  loue, by imprinting 
in her thoughtes h is rare qualities, she began to surfit w ith the contem plation o f  his  
vertuous conditions. (27)
By way of dramatic contrast, having mentally conjured this image of 
perfection, Rosalynd then pictures herself: “but when she cald to remembrance 
her present estate ... desire began to shrink” (27). Rosalynd’s anguish upon 
apprehending infinite-seeming distance between herself and a divine object 
recalls Luther wrestling with the meaning of Paul’s letters. However, where 
Luther employed his self-bound intellect and humanist technique to cut through 
what he regarded as scholastic obfuscation in order to obtain “true” readings of 
Scripture, Lodge’s Rosalynd examines her own mind: “betweene a Chaos of 
confused thoughtes, she began to debate with her selfe in this manner” (27). This 
is not the unified Lutheran subject capable of auto-cognition by rational means. 
Rosalynd’s meditation employs facultative means to bring a “Chaos of confused 
thoughtes” to order (as a priest would endeavour to do were one to hand) with a 
view to rediscovering one’s likeness to (participation in) a triune (or facultative) 
God.
An orthodox meditation on the topic of the believer’s relationship to Christ 
would be expected to lament the believer’s condition as a sinner, one condemned
105 “The f irs t point is to see the persons in my imagination”: Robert W. Gleason, ed. The Spiritual 
Exercises o f  St. Ignatius (New York: Doubleday, 1989), p. 72.
to moral failure by Adam and Eve’s fall. Rosalynd does indeed focus on family 
history. The consequences of past political events prevent her from obtaining her 
desires: “Thy father is by TORISMOND banisht from the crowne” (28). The 
“banishf ’ ex-ruler thus resembles Adam (erstwhile lord of nature) exiled from 
Eden and deprived of his “crowne” of glory.106 Accordingly, Rosalynd describes 
herself as “the vnhappie daughter of a King detained captiue, liuing as disquieted 
in thy thoughts as thy father discontented in his exile” (28). By means of 
euphuistic parallelism, Gerismond’s current discontentment is connected to the 
“disquieted” condition of Rosalynd’s mind. If Rosalynd cannot bring her 
thoughts to order, this circumstance suggests, it is not because she is 
ontologically fallen but because she has allowed an adverse political “fate” to 
disorder her cognitive process.
Rosalynd proceeds: “Oh ROSALYND, hadst thou been borne lowe, thou 
hadst not fallen so high” (28). Here, Rosalynd seems to brag of her pedigree in a 
manner unbecoming to a romance heroine.107 However, if she is read as speaking 
on behalf of humanity, then her words offer a refutation of an ontological 
understanding of Original Sin. Such a refutation, moreover, contradicts the 
Council of Trent, which stated: “Si quis Adae praevaricationem sibi soli et non 
ejus propagini asserit nocuisse ... anathema sit”.108 Denying this postulate 
allowed one to consider the human will as not fallen in an ontological sense; 
therefore, human beings could cooperate in the performance of salvation. Trent 
denied such a conclusion:
Si quis hoc A dae peccatum , quod origine unum est, et propagation non im itation  
transfusum om nibus inest unicuique proprium, v e l per humanae naturae vires, ve l per 
aliud rem edium  asserit tolli, quam per meritum unius m ediatoris D om ini nostril Jesu
106 Fraser makes the same observation with reference to the banished Duke in AYLI: “Genesis,” p. 
125.
107 Nancy R. Lindheim, “Lyly’s Golden Legacy: Rosalynde and Pandosto,” p. 13, SEL 15 (1975), 
pp. 3-20.
108 “Sessio Quinta celebrata die XVII mensis Junii, MDXLVI: Decretum de Peccato Originali,” 
pp. 300-1, in H. J. Schroeder, ed. Canons and Decrees o f  the Council o f  Trent: Original Text with 
English Translation (St. Louis & London: B. Herder, 1941), pp. 300-2. “If anyone asserts that the 
transgression o f Adam injured him alone and not his posterity ... let him be anathema”:
Schroeder, ed. Trent, pp. 21-2.
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C hristi... anathema sit.109
As Sweeney observes:
Jesuit thinkers had . . .  developed  a m odified  attitude to the effects o f  Original Sin: our 
w ill w as w eakened but not annihilated by it, a llow ing for grace-fuelled effort; indeed, 
‘grace, alw ays the primary factor, allow ed  the w ill to “cooperate” with it, so that in som e  
m ysterious w ay human responsibility played its part in the process o f  sa lvation .’ This is 
a constant underlying thesis in S outhw ell’s poetry, and it gave com fort, as w ell as 
dignity to human enterprise that w as, for the m om ent, denied in Protestantism .110
Southwell’s influence (the present reading infers) has propelled Rosalynd—and 
Lodge—beyond the bounds of Catholic orthodoxy.
Furthermore, where one might expect Rosalynd’s clause “hadst thou been 
borne lowe” to be followed by the conclusion “thou hadst not fallen so far”, the 
speaker substitutes “high” for “far”. Losing status in the world’s eyes, such a 
substitution implies, is a means of rising in God’s regard. A further implication, I 
would suggest, is that the cause of Rosalynd’s current misery is not divine decree 
but a human or demonic misappropriation of power, resulting in the 
promulgation of a false teaching which inculcates despair. Bleak as this analysis 
sounds, it also reveals (in line with Jesuit thinking) that the situation can be 
rectified by human endeavour: human beings are not condemned to moral failure; 
indeed, they must collaborate with God to achieve salvation. It may be noted here 
that such formulations were more than Claudio Acquaviva—Jesuit Father 
General from 1581, and throughout Southwell’s mission—was prepared to 
endorse.111
“[Bjeing great of bloud,” Rosalynd next tells herself, “thine honour is
109 “Peccato Originali,” p. 301. “If anyone asserts that this sin o f  Adam, which in its origin is one, 
and by propagation, not by imitation, transfused into all, which is in each one as something that is 
his own, is taken away either by the forces o f  human nature or by remedy other than the merit o f  
the one mediator, our Lord Jesus Christ... let him be anathema”: Schroeder, ed. Trent, p. 22.
110 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 26. For Ignatian meditation as a means for human beings to 
escape “bondage to its fallen state”, see: Raspa, Emotive Image, pp. 45-8. For distinction between 
Jesuit and Tridentine positions, see: O’Malley, “Loyola,” pp. 76-7.
111 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 25.
more, if thou brookest misfortune with patience” (28). Lodge’s princess here 
confronts the Stoic formula which tended to hold Elizabethan conservatives in 
check, only to reject it thus: “Suppose I contrary fortune with content, yet Fates 
vnwilling to haue me any way happie haue forced loue to set my thoughts on fire 
with fancie” (28). The “loue” Rosalind feels is (it might be argued) no less 
“predestined” than any other aspect of her earthly career; that this “loue” appears 
incapable of fulfillment would then indicate that the universe is ruled by unkind 
“Fates”—a heretical thought. Reading back, however, Rosalind’s “Suppose” 
cancels the notion in advance. Moreover, unless her “loue” is of a religious 
(albeit troubling) nature, her statements here might disqualify Rosalynd as 
virtuous heroine. Read doctrinally, though, Rosalynd’s musings engage in the 
contemporary debate about whether one had to willingly solicit/accept grace or
119whether, on the contrary, grace is irresistible. The same debate arguably 
informs aspects of The Countess o f Pembroke’s Arcadia. Sidney’s narrator there 
describes love as “that wonderful passion which to be defined is impossible, by 
reason no words reach near to the strange nature of it. They only know it which 
inwardly feel it.”113 (Likewise, in Mary Magdalen’s Funeral Tears, Southwell’s 
narrator states: “Love is not controled by reason. It neither regardeth what can be, 
nor what shall be done, but only what itself desireth to do”.)114
Sidney’s treatment is more tentative than Lodge’s. No-one is on hand to 
gainsay Rosalynd’s arguments, as Musidorus does Pyrocles’s with the Platonic 
assertion: “Remember ... if we will be men, the reasonable part of the soul is to 
have absolute commandment”.115 Nonetheless, Musidorus himself soon proceeds 
to fall in love. Cross-dressing and pastoral disguise notwithstanding, the two 
friends remain the principal heroes of the earlier version of the romance, albeit 
ambivalently so;116 their careers, therefore, are not being presented to the would- 
be virtuous reader as necessarily courses to shun. A more complex salvific 
contest is being exhibited than that envisioned by the moral certainties of early
112 Schroeder, ed. Trent, pp. 29-46.
113 Duncan-Jones, ed. Old Arcadia, p. 11.
114 Walter, ed. Prose Works, p. 65.
115 Duncan-Jones, ed. Old Arcadia, pp. 17, 370.n
116 Duncan-Jones, ed. Old Arcadia, pp. xiv-xvi.
Renaissance humanism. Sidney, moreover, is known to have studied the 
Tridentine decrees in Italy during his continental travels.117 Hence, Counter- 
Reformation influence could have reached Lodge via Sidney. Further discussion, 
below, however, will argue that Southwell led Lodge into doctrinal territory 
uncharted in Arcadia.
In any case, Rosalynd subsequently descends from these spiritual heights to 
material considerations: “consider ROSALIND [s/c] his [Rosader’s] fortunes, 
and thy present estate, thou art poore and without patrimonie, and yet the 
daughter of a Prince, he a younger brother” (28). Rosalynd is more concerned 
about a lack of material means than her lover’s pedigree (she does not consider 
Rosader’s parentage); Rosader is “voide of such possessions as eyther might 
maintayne thy dignities, or reuenge thy fathers iniuries” (28). (The imprisoned 
Mary Stuart likewise hesitated to attach herself to any suitor without the means to 
promote her cause successfully.) “Tush ROSALYND,” Lodge’s heroine 
continues, “be not ouer rash; leape not before thou looke; eyther loue such a one 
as may with his landes purchase thy liberty, or els loue not at all” (29). The 
phrase “purchase thy liberty” reminds the reader that Rosalynd is currently an 
imprisoned princess. It is scarcely conceivable that such a character in a text 
written in 1587 could have been read as not alluding to Mary Stuart. (One of 
Southwell’s poems [“Decease release”] treated of Mary’s execution;118 
Southwell’s Humble Supplication [1592] details the conspiracy behind her
\  119execution.)
Finally, though, Rosalynd rejects material considerations: “Why 
ROSALYND, can such base thoughtes harbour in such high beauties?” (29). In 
the “Madrigal” she sings at the close of her meditation, she allows “Loue” to 
make “His bed amidst my tender breast” (29). She threatens the “wanton”, telling 
him she “will whip you hence ... with roses euerie day” (30), which (anticipating 
and endorsing the “Scedule” Lodge “annexed” to the 1592 edition)120 may
117 Buxton, Sidney, p. 72.
118 Davidson & Sweeney, eds. Collected Poems, pp. 41-2, 158-9.n.
119 Bald, ed. Humble Supplication.
120 Lodge, “Miscellaneous Pieces,” pp. 5-6, in Works, Volume 4.
describe an Ignatian penitential practice (involving a rosary, as promoted 
vigorously—in and around 1592—by Southwell’s fellow missionary Garnet).121 
Nonetheless, Rosalynd concedes that, in such a case, penitential activity is futile. 
This is not a bad thing, though, because the love she feels has a divine source: 
“He will repay me with annoy, / because a God” (30). Like the Virgin Mary in 
response to the angel Gabriel, Rosalynd submits to this divine decree: “Then sit 
thou safely on my knee, / And let thy bowre my bosome be” (30). Love of this 
version of the Virgin Mary will allow the lover to mature, as Christ matured in
1 9 0her womb.
*
During a picnic on the outskirts of the Forest of Ardennes, Rosalynd123- 
disguised-as-Ganimede points out to Aliena (her fellow princess Alinda in 
disguise) some verses carved on a tree, calling them “figures of men”. The verses 
are “Montanus Passion”; their contents reveal that “the flower of beautie” adored 
by the shepherd Montanus is “attir’d in scome” (like the conventional Petrarchan 
beloved). These devotional verses have been left by a fountain (awarded a capital 
“F”) in the “groue of some Goddesse” (36). Montanus’s plight signals that grace 
is not won by devotion, at least not in this wild territory.
That the shepherd’s poem is a religious complaint is arguably indicated 
when “Montanus” moans: “Had I the power to weepe sweet Mirrhas teares ... I 
then could beare the burden of my griefe” (37). Suitors seeking sensual 
gratification would presumably not consider ongoing rejection to be adequately 
compensated by the ability to shed copious tears. As Nellist and Batin’s gloss 
observes, the classical figure Myrrha “was metamorphosed into [a] weeping, 
oozing myrrh tree (denoting tears of penitence)”.124 Naming Mirrha, the mother
121 Henry Garnet, The Society o f  the Rosary (London: 1592); see: Caraman, Henry Garnet, pp. 
143-5.
122 Spenser’s “faithless Rosalind”, on the other hand, is “voide o f grace”: Smith & Selincourt, 
eds. Spenser, p. 442.
1231 retain the spelling “Rosalynd” until the longer version is adopted by the text.
124 Nellist & Batin, eds. Rosalynd, p. 49.n.
of Adonis, is an acceptable way of referring to a penitential female figure, 
reminiscent of, say, Mary Magdalen. (As noted above, Lodge had prescribed 
precisely such a coded use of classical figures in his Defence o f Poetry.) 
According to “Montanus Passion”, Mirrha’s tears were/are efficacious; however, 
Montanus (as, it would seem, irretrievably fallen being) lacks “the power” to 
weep them.
Cognizably sincere disclosure alone can improve matters between 
Montanus and his beloved: “not my teares, but truth with thee preuailes” (37)-— 
but, of course, between human subjects such disclosure is impossible. The case, 
therefore, is hopeless, as long as Montanus remains committed to subjectivism. 
Montanus does not criticise his mistress’s position, but appears to retain an 
attachment to the former value of tears. Thus, he figures exactly the type of 
Luther-influenced person the Jesuits had come to admonish and reclaim.
Subsequently, Aliena and Ganimede spy “an old shepheard” and “a yong 
swaine” conversing in a place designed for secrecy, where trees “with the 
thicknesse of their boughes so shadowed the place, that PHCEBUS could not prie 
into the secret of that Arbour”. Here spurts “a Fount so Christalline and cleere, 
that it seemed DIANA with her DRIADES and HEMADRIADES had that 
spring, as the secrete of all their bathings” (39). It sounds like a dissolved, 
dilapidated monastery, gradually returning to a state of nature. The scene also 
potentially recreates the first image which Jesuit novices encountered upon 
entering the gallery at the Novitiate of S. Andrea al Quirinale in Rome, “[t]he 
principal training centre for the entire Jesuit order”.125 That image showed “The 
Good Old Man and the Young Novice”, a figuration of “the spiritual journey the 
novices would undertake ... under the guidance of their superior”.126 Describing 
this crucial moment, Lodge’s narrator switches (for the only time in the romance) 
from third person plural (“they might perceiue” [39]) to first person plural: 
“drawing more nigh wee might descrie...”and “wee (to heare what these [woes] 
were) stole priuilie behind the thicke” (39-40; emphases added). Lodge selects
125 Bailey, Renaissance and Baroque, p. 38.
126 Bailey, Renaissance and Baroque, p. 61.
first person pronouns for greater immediacy, intimacy, involvement.
Montanus, the young swain, is reminiscent of Dyer’s lover: his 
“countenance ... full of sorowe, his face ... the verie pourtraiture of discontent, 
and his eyes full of woes, that liuing he seemed to dye” (40). “A Pleasant Eglog 
betweene Montanus and Coridon” ensues. In this exchange, Coridon begs 
Montanus to “sing for joy” in response to the beauty of their surroundings. 
However, Montanus knows no joy, on account of his mistress “Phcebes bitter 
scome” (40). “Phoebe” may function here as a conventional name for Queen 
Elizabeth I. Spenser, in the letter to Sir Walter Ralegh included in the first edition 
of The Faerie Queene, recalls that Ralegh figured Elizabeth as the goddess 
Cynthia and iterates the latter deity’s cognate names: Phoebe and Diana.127 
Scholars have argued that the concept of Elizabeth-as-goddess could have 
functioned as a Virgin Mary-surrogate for English subjects.128 In which case, 
from the Catholic Lodge’s perspective, “Phoebe” might figure an intercessor to 
whom one prays to no effect.
Montanus’s situation is not simply one of erotic deprivation:
In errours maske I blindfolde judgements eye ...
I seeme secure, yet know not how to trust:
I hue by that, which makes me liuing die ...
Plague to my selfe, consumed by my thought (41)
Montanus’s lament restates the plight of the speaker in Dyer’s poem, but in a 
more explicit vein. That is, Lodge renders overt the mournful speaker’s knowing 
acquiescence in an erroneous belief-system. Such a person wears the “maske” of 
“errour”: he feigns to profess assurance of salvation, all the time knowing that he
127 Smith & Selincourt, eds. Spenser, p. 407; see: Ralegh’s “The Vlth and Last Book o f the Ocean 
to Cynthia,” 11. 271, 327, in Brooks-Davies, ed. Silver Poets, pp. 150-63 (and the relevant notes 
on pp. 420-1) and “Now We Have Present Made,” 1. 2, in Brooks-Davies, ed. Silver Poets, pp. 
163-4; May, Courtier Poets, p. 55.
128 Roy Strong, The Cult o f  Elizabeth: Elizabeth Portraiture and Pageantry (London: Thames & 
Hudson, 1977), p. 16; Philippa Berry, O f Chastity and Power: Elizabethan Literature and the 
Unmarried Queen (London: Routledge, 1989); Helen Hackett, Virgin Mother, Maiden Queen: 
Elizabeth I  and the Cidt o f  the Virgin M ary (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995).
has no sound basis for that “trust”. In this way, one becomes one’s own enemy 
(as intimated in Dyer’s poem).
Seeking to enlighten his companion, Coridon offers moralistic platitudes, 
according to which, for example, love is
A  painted shrine ful-fild  w ith  rotten treasure,
A  heauen in shew , a hell to them  that proue ...
A  broken staffe w hich  fo llie  doth vpholde (41)
The heavy-handed religious imagery recalls Southwell’s re-write of Dyer’s 
poem. There is something futile about such a method of reproof. It defeats itself, 
retaining the sententiousness of the style it seeks to correct, but lacking the 
courtier’s wit and irony; it converts what ought to be a joyous message to earnest 
dreariness.
Unsurprisingly, Coridon’s argument has no effect on Montanus, principally 
because of the latter shepherd’s experience of an intense pleasure attendant upon 
his misery: “Thinke I of loue, o how my lines aspire? ... the Muses ... fill my 
braines with chast and holy fire” (42-3). Sent to convert wavering poets and their 
readers, Southwell had to confront the fact that Lutheranism had created infinite 
conceptual space for poets to explore; it also granted them the freedom to explore 
it. “Amaz’d I read the stile when I haue done”, crows Montanus.
Indeed, there is a mystical tenor to the shepherd’s raptures:
M y sheepe are turned to thoughts, w hom  froward w ill, [sic]
G uides in the restlesse Laborynth o f  loue,
Feare lends them pasture w heresoere they m oue,
A nd by their death their life  renueeth still. (43)
Note that it is Montanus’s will—which he cannot control—which makes his 
sheep-thoughts stray restlessly in a “Laborynth of loue”. Having wandered from 
their former, restful feeding place, the sheep-thoughts feed now on anxiety alone; 
dying, these anguished, aimless thoughts continually revive as new thoughts.
Montanus thus seeks to justify his creed on the grounds that, according to this 
new arrangement, sheep are not parishioners in the care of a priest, but thoughts 
in the care of the individual. In this system, sheep feed themselves; there is no 
role for an external priest. In short, Montanus prizes his spiritual anguish: 
“although I blythe me n o t... since sorrow is my sweete ... Montanus liketh well 
his lot” (43).
As Coridon recognises, there is no curing such a lover by reason alone.129 
The text endorses Coridon’s verdict by concluding the “Eglog” with a quotation 
from Terence’s Eunuchus, which includes the observation: “incerta hcec si tu 
pustules, ratione certa fieri nihilo plus agas, quam si des operam, vt cum ratione 
insanias” (45). In a pamphlet published in 1587, William Allen, the head of the 
Douai College, quotes the same tag in relation to the futility of arguing with 
Protestants: “to deale with such, either by humane, or Divine laws, were, Cum 
ratione insanire. [Margin: “To be madde with reason.] As the Poete said.”130
Coridon informs Aliena and Ganimede—the two travellers having 
approached the shepherds—that he cannot help Montanus: “Exhort him I may, 
but perswade him I cannot; for Loue admits neither of counsaile, nor reason” 
(46). If such as Montanus are to be “cured”, some new approach is required. 
Southwell had brought such an approach to England. This will be discussed in 
due course, with reference to the hero Rosader. For now, though, it is necessary 
to observe what further methods are applied to Montanus.
At a later point in the narrative, Rosalynd-disguised-as-Ganimede uses his 
receipt of a love-letter from Phoebe as an occasion to try and educate Montanus:
enter with a deepe insight into the despaire o f thy fancies, and thou shalt see the depth o f  
thine owne follies ... Thou seekest with PHCEBUS to winne DAPHNE, and shee flies 
faster than thou canst followe ... in courting PHCEBE thou barkest with the Wolues o f  
Syria against the Moone (119)
129 Richard Helgerson, The Elizabethan Prodigals (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University o f  
California Press, 1976), p. 113.
130 William Allen, The Copie o f  a Letter Written by M. Doctor Allen. Concerning the Yeelding Vp 
o f  the Citie o f  Dauentrie, vnto His Catholicke Majestie, by Sir William Stanley Knight (Antwerp: 
Joachim Trognsesius, 1587), p. 12.
Montanus’s rationalistic faith is irrational. The intellect alone cannot grasp 
“truth”. Montanus (in his “Passion” verse) has acknowledged the futility of his 
prayers. Hence, he implicitly confesses to idolatry—the worship of a hollow 
image; his prayers are as idle as the barking of wolves, seeking to influence the 
moon’s course.
Lodge’s reference to “Syria” may glance at English Catholic conformists 
(“Church Papists”).131 The English Catholic priest Alban Langdale had defended 
attendance of Elizabethan church services, using the Biblical example of 
Naaman. Though Jewish, Naaman participated in pagan rites in order to “exhibit 
his service to the king”. However, the prophet Elisha pardoned Naaman’s 
expedient action. Naaman performed this act of conformity in “Syria where all 
were idolaters”.132 As “[rjesident priest to the Montague household”, Langdale 
typified the kind of priest the Jesuits had been sent to bring back into line.133
As may be seen, Ganimede has strayed into polemics, after the manner of 
Coridon. This admonitory method achieves nothing. To effect a change in 
Montanus’s cognitive habitus, facultative rhetoric must be employed—indeed, 
facultative interaction must be performed (as in an Ignatian exercise). For this to 
occur, an emotional relationship needs to be established between both 
participants.134 Rosalynd-Ganimede cannot establish such a link with Montanus, 
for he is committed to subjective isolation, his unique selfhood. Hence, as seen, 
his anguish is insincere (he claims to enjoy being unhappy). He is not prepared to 
dismantle his self-ideal and reform it radically by facultative means.
Unable to stop loving Phoebe (the projection of his self-ideal), Montanus 
appears incurable, immobilised: “the Shepheard stoode as though hee had neither 
wonne nor lost” (120). Does, then, Montanus’s plight recall more that of a Dyer 
or a Sidney? After all, Sidney represented himself in the Old Arcadia as, like 
Montanus, a lovelorn shepherd (Philisides). Perhaps Lodge here represents the
131 Walsham, Church Papists.
132 Alban Langdale, “Reasons Why Catholics May Go to Church” (1580), in Miola, ed. Early 
Modern Catholicism , p. 72. Walsham, Church Papists, pp. 51-4.
133 Miola, ed. Early Modern Catholicism, p. 72.
134 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 27; O’Malley, First Jesuits, p. 41.
situation of English Protestant subjects such as Sidney who remained supposedly 
loyal to Elizabeth despite the fact that they were generally refused key positions 
within her administration, and no matter what engagements she appeared to 
countenance with Catholic princes.135 Exposure of that last form of betrayal is 
possibly figured when Montanus discovers that the letter Phoebe bade him carry 
treacherously declares her love for the new arrival Ganimede—after she had 
declared herself incapable of loving anyone.
However, Montanus says:
so hath Loue taught mee to honour PHCEBE, that I would prejudice my life to pleasure 
her, and die in despaire rather than she should perish for w ant... If she marrie though it 
be my Martyrdome: yet if  shee bee pleased I will brooke it with patience (121)
Recalling that such as Leicester and Sidney did not “brooke” the proposed 
Alen9on (French) match “with patience”, it appears that Lodge awards credit to 
Montanus as loyalist crypto-Catholic.136
After all, if Ganimede is employing Jesuit techniques to recover erring 
Catholics, it would make little sense for him to seek to win Phoebe for Montanus 
if the latter were to be read as Protestant. Moreover, that the fictional shepherd’s 
case was read by contemporaries as resembling Dyer’s is confirmed by the fact 
that two poems “by” Lodge’s Montanus reprinted in Englands Helicon (1600) 
were there ascribed to Dyer.137
*
The clearest indication that Jesuit doctrinal theories influenced the writing of
135 William J. Kennedy, “Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella and Petrarchanism,” p. 72, in Patrick 
Cheney et al, eds. Early Modern English Poetry: a Critical Companion (New York & Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2007), pp. 70-8.
136 Kennedy, “Sidney’s Astrophil,” p. 72; Wooding, Rethinking, p. 240; Southwell makes a 
comparable case for the principled loyalty o f Catholics in Bald, ed. Humble Supplication. See 
also, with reference to the presentation o f Montague (whose name might be alluded to in Lodge’s 
“Montanus”) as loyal Elizabethan Catholic in A Treatise o f  Treasons: Questier, Catholicism and  
Community, p. 145.
137 MacDonald, ed. Englands Helicon, pp. 142-3, 167.
Rosalynde is provided by the presentation of Rosader’s forgiveness of his brother 
Saladyne. At one point in the story, the fugitives Adam and Rosader find 
themselves starving in “the thicke of the forrest” (54). As the faithful servant of 
Sir John of Bourdeaux, Adam respects traditional values. Thus, he responds to 
current misfortune with Stoic resolve, telling himself to “thwart her [misfortune] 
with brooking all mishappes with patience”. However, the limits of a Stoic 
response to circumstances attendant on persecution are plainly observed. Seeing 
no means of preventing young Rosader’s death from starvation, Adam cries: 
“What shall I do? preuent the sight of his [Rosader’s] further missfortune, with a 
present dispatch of mine owne life” (55). This action, of course, would not help 
Rosader and might result in Adam’s damnation for self-murder. Hence, Stoicism 
is unable to suggest an adequate response in certain circumstances. In this 
mystical forest, Rosader’s starvation can be read as spiritual: deprived of the 
Eucharist in a Protestant land, his approach to death signifies his worsening state 
of sin. Hence, Southwell, on arrival in England, stressed to Catholic waverers the 
limits of a quietist (Stoic) response to their circumstances. One was not obliged 
to resist temporal evils (Stoicism is adequate to temporal trials), but one should 
seek access to the Eucharist, even if doing so is against the law.
Adam concludes that “despaire is a mercilesse sinne” (55) and adopts a 
new resolution, telling Rosader: “I will presently cut my veynes, & master, with 
the warme bloud relieue your fainting spirits: sucke on that till I ende, and you be 
comforted” (56). This baroque-sounding offer yields unmistakeable traces of the 
influence of Southwell. In a text printed as an epistle to his brother, the Jesuit 
author had written that if Christ’s “blood move you n o t... I would I might send 
you the sacrifice of my dearest veines, to try whether nature could awake 
remorse, and prepare a way for grace’s entrance”.138 Thus, in the character of a 
servant with the appropriate name “Adam”, Lodge represents the limits of the 
natural man’s ability to access grace unaided.
At this very moment in Rosader’s history Providence intervenes: “It
138 William B. Turnbull, ed. The Poetical Works o f  the Reverend Robert Southwell (London: John 
Russell Smith, 1856), p. lxiv.
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chaunced that day” that the banished king was holding a great feast in the forest. 
The role of “chance” is emphasised by repetition: “To that place by chance 
Fortune conducted ROSADER” (56; emphases added). This reliance on an 
almost miraculous intervention, in the context of the necessity of obtaining the 
spiritual food of the Eucharist at all costs, reflects the Jesuit theologian Luis de 
Molina’s insistence (published in Concordia Liheri Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis 
[1588]) on the bestowing-reception of grace as a human collaboration with God. 
The Stoic endures Fortune; the Jesuit-taught Catholic perceives “Fortune” to be a 
worldly illusion and restores Providence to its rightful place. However, though 
Providence supplies the occasion, the believer must perform the efficacious deed. 
That is, Rosader must not only forgive his wicked brother, but also risk his life to 
save him—for “chance” also leads Rosader to Saladyne’s sleeping body in the 
forest. A hungry lion watches the sleeping man, waiting to devour him when he 
wakes (83).
Earlier, the text has demonstrated that Rosader has been raised to observe 
the values of “Cheualrie” within a Stoic framework (20).139 Therefore, he has 
been taught to withstand rather than love his enemy. As a result, he was likely to 
fail to perform the efficacious deed required by the new Jesuit theology.
However, Rosalynd-disguised-as-Ganimede has intervened with a uniquely Jesuit 
technique.140 In the poems Rosader writes in honour of the absent Rosalynde, the 
lovesick youth expresses his sorrowful condition: “Full wofull... my heart” (25); 
“I bemoane / The absence of faire Rosalynde” (“Rosalyndes Description” [65]); 
“In sorrowes cell I laid me downe to sleepe” (“Rosaders Sonnet” [71]); “Search I 
the shade to flie my paine” (“Rosaders Second Sonetto”[75]). From these poems 
one learns that Rosader is in love and he is unhappy. There is no ethical element. 
After meeting Ganimede and Aliena in the forest and reading them his second 
sonnet, Rosader asks, “How like you this Sonnet[?]” Ganimede answers: “for the 
penne well, for the passion ill” (75). That Rosader loves Rosalynde is, it seems, 
all well and good, but it has had no improving effect on his tendency to bemoan
139 The relevant passage is discussed in Chapter 6.
140 From this point on the name o f Lodge’s heroine will be spelled “Rosalynde” in accordance 
with the text’s general practice.
his fate. Ganimede, however, seeks “to driue him out of this amorous 
melancholie” and the method he adopts is Jesuit-inspired (76). Just as the Jesuit 
colleges used drama as an educational tool (and as a means “to foster authentic 
commitment”),141 Lodge’s Ganimede offers to “represent ROSALYNDE” in a 
role-play session (77).
Dramatic representation offers a means of having the self-obsessed 
Rosader participate in a spiritual meditation without him knowing that he is 
doing so. Ganimede composes the essential features of the “place”: “see in some 
amorous Eglogue, how if ROSALYNDE were present, how thou couldst court 
her” (77; emphasis added). The emphasis on vision is important. In “The Wooing 
Eglogue” that follows, Rosader not only prays for pity but (unprompted) strikes a 
new note: “Looke on mine eyes made red with rufull teares, / From whence the 
raine of true remorse descendeth” (77; emphases added). “[RJemorse” for what? 
This is the utterance (at last) of one who is aware that he has committed sin; 
previously, Rosader had been preoccupied with his own misfortune. Ganimede- 
as-Rosalynde now adopts a Counter-Reformation poetic manner to woo/instruct 
Rosader:
Loues w antons arme their traitrous sutes w ith teares,
W ith vo w es, w ith  oathes, w ith  look es, w ith  show ers o f  golde:
But w hen the fruite o f  their affects appeares,
The sim ple heart by subtill sleights is solde. (78)
No less moralising than Coridon’s remonstrations (also in verse-form) with 
Montanus, this “Eglogue” nonetheless differs in that both participants are acting. 
(Of course, Montanus and Coridon might also be said to be enacting 
conventional roles, but that perspective is not ascribed to them within the 
narrative.) Thus, the resistance one puts up when one speaks in propria persona
141 Robert S. Miola, “Jesuit Drama in Early Modem England,” p. 72, in Dutton et al, eds. Theatre 
and Religion, pp. 71-86.
is dissolved.142 The “authentic-self-as-subject” becomes vulnerable to exposure 
as a role one’s culture has led one to adopt. Consequently, the isolated, suffering 
Christian subject threatens to appear as a misconceived parody of Christ. Where 
Montanus’s own pride in the pleasure he claimed to gain from his suffering 
deafens him to Coridon’s arguments, Rosader-performing-“Rosader” can 
surrender ground without loss of (egoistic) dignity. There are also differences in 
style and content: Ganimede-as-Rosalynde’s chain of repeated mini-phrases 
(“With vowes, with oathes, with lookes, with showers of golde”) convey a 
Southwellian urgency, whereas Coridon’s alliteration is euphuistic in its 
transpositions and, thus, requires more space (“As manie starres as glorious 
heauen containes, / As manie stormes as wayward winter weepes...” [44]).143 
Intimacy and intensity replace orotundity. Moreover, Ganimede does not 
condemn love as Coridon did, but insists only that “beautie leane ... to wit and 
soothfastnesse” before acceding to a lover’s suit (78). Most importantly, 
Ganimede’s Rosalynde agrees to “grace thee [Rosader] with her loue”, which 
dissolves Rosader’s melancholy at once:
Since R osalynde w ill Rosader respect 
Then let m y face ex ile  his sorrie cheere,
A nd frolicke in the com fort o f  affect (80)
However, when the “Eglogue” ends, Rosader observes, reasonably enough:
R O SA D E R  hath his R O SA L Y N D E: but as IX IO N  had IU N O , w ho thinking to p ossesse  
a goddesse, onely  imbraced a clowde: in these im aginarie fruitions o f  fancie, I resem ble  
the birds that fed them selues with ZE U XIS painted grapes ... so fareth it w ith m e, w ho ... 
onely in conceipt reape a w ished  for content (80)
142 Thomas M. McCoog, ‘“Playing the Champion’: the Role o f  Disputation in the Jesuit Mission,” 
p. 138, in Thomas M. McCoog, ed. The Reckoned Expense: Edmund Campion and the Early 
English Jesuits (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1996), pp. 119-39.
143 A Southwellian “chain” occurs in the second o f the following lines: “Fatt soyle, full springe, 
sweete olive, grape o f blisse / That yeldes, that streames, that powres, that does d istil...”, “Christs 
Bloody Sweate,” in Sweeney & Davidson, eds. Collected Poems, p. 17.
Imitations of the blood of Christ are not the thing itself. English Catholics cannot 
live by reading romances alone. Nonetheless, from the spiritual guide’s point of 
view, gains have been made: Rosader has expressed an understanding of the need 
for penance. Some change may already be presumed to be taking place within 
him.144 Indeed, Rosader says: “Yet doo I take these follies for high fortunes, and 
hope these fained affections doo deuine some unfained ende of ensuing fancies” 
(80-1). Likewise, reading Lodge’s Rosalynde, an Elizabethan Catholic might be 
reminded of values which had been neglected, and in that act of recollection 
apprehend a greater alteration soon to come.
As Lodge’s narrator puts it (allowing himself a rare inteijection): “all was 
well, hope is a sweete string to harpe on: and therefore let the Forrester a while 
shape himselfe to his shadow, and tarrie Fortunes leasure, till she may make a 
Metamorphosis fit for his purpose” (81). Such an optimistic understanding of 
how “Fortune” functions suggests it is Providence in disguise.145
Thus, in re-educating Rosader, Ganimede employs the very strategies 
which the Jesuits imported to England. This observation accounts for the 
intriguing moment after Rosader has departed, when Aliena remarks to 
Ganimede: “I haue heard them say, that what the Fates forepoint, that Fortune 
pricketh downe with a period”. The princess seems to hint here that Ganimede’s 
Jesuit-style methods do not leave everything to Providence, for she adds: “it 
cannot bee but such a shaddowe portends the issue of a substaunce, for to that 
ende did the Gods force the conceipt of this Eglogue [between you and Rosader], 
that they might discouer the ensuing consent of your affections” (82; emphasis 
added). That is, Aliena commends Ganimede on having found such a clever way 
to have Rosader participate in an imaginary rite of confession, in order to divine 
(and perhaps “force”) his religious allegiance.146
In response, Ganimede points out that such enactments are no proof of
144 O’Malley, First Jesuits, p. 39.
145 Velma Bourgeois Richmond notes that while Lodge subtracts the anti-clerical details o f  his 
source Gamelyn, he retains its faith in a Providential pattern: Shakespeare, Catholicism, and 
Romance (New York: Continuum, 2000), p. 134.
146 Jesuits were sometimes accused o f  making “use o f  the confessional to attract novices”: Meyer, 
Catholic Church, p. 111.
anything in themselves: “the match is not yet so surely made but he [Rosader] 
may misse of his market; but if Fortune be his friend, I will not be his foe” (82). 
It sounds like Ganimede is being crassly materialistic: if Rosader gets rich, 
Rosalynde will marry him. On the other hand, Ganimede can be read as 
countering Aliena’s imputation that he was forcing the issue by setting up the 
“eglogue” with Rosader on partisan terms. That is, Ganimede insists that the 
youth’s spiritual success will be decided by Providence (“Fortune”), not his 
(Ganimede’s) devices, however subtle. That the question of interpreting 
“Fortune” as either Providence or chance is at stake is confirmed by the 
following scene.
Saladyne, lost in the forest, “hungrie with long fasting”, falls asleep, and is 
watched by “a hungrie lion” which declines to attack him till he wakes. Lodge’s 
narrator observes that “Lions hate to pray on dead carkasses”. One might accept 
this with regard to actual sated lions, but not hungry ones. The improbability 
justifies the supposition that this beast is the Devil in disguise, who has no 
appetite for the already lost, but who nonetheless waits and watches for signs of 
vestigial virtue in the dormant Saladyne.147 However, “fortune that was careful 
ouer her champion, began to smile” (83). The narrator’s choice of terms suggests 
that “fortune” may be read as Providence, for while the non-Christian deity 
Fortune might smile upon or show favour to an individual, she was not therefore 
held to take “care” of anyone, nor perceived as needing “champion[s]” as such. 
After all, it would be a callous touch if the reader was supposed to read Fortune 
as smiling on the hero of a romance by giving him the opportunity to witness his 
brother being eaten by a lion.
However, notwithstanding his re-education by Ganimede, Rosader is not 
yet fully qualified to be the hero of this romance. In his ensuing meditation, he 
does interpret Fortune as mere chance, congratulating himself on his good luck: 
with his brother dead, he will regain his properties and “make her [Rosalynde] 
loue thee more willingly: for womens eyes are made of Chrisecoll, that is euer 
vnperfect vnlesse tempred with golde” (84). Rosader is the vehicle for a doctrinal
147 Wright, “Psalter Lion”; Chadwick, ed. Confessions, VII.27; Psalms 90:13
thesis here. From a “realistic” point of view, he is speaking out of character: this 
is the first time Rosader has echoed his father’s misogynous morality.148 Note 
also how this selfish meditation follows directly on Ganimede’s similar seeming- 
expression of crass materialism (“if Fortune be his friend, I will not be his foe” 
[82]). These two utterances appear to confirm loyalist Catholic prejudices 
regarding the material greed of Jesuit priests and the self-seeking nature of their 
young adherents. However, the generic thrust of the romance renders that verdict 
untenable. If the hero and heroine are so selfish, who cares if they get together? 
Hence, for the romance to function, it must be concluded that Rosalynde had 
Rosader’s spiritual “fortunes” in mind; that is, she hopes/foresees that the 
Providential outcome will be Rosader’s maturation as a Christian “champion”. 
(Of course, one might cynically read the entire romance as ironic, in which case 
Lodge may be understood as adopting a “let’s wait and see” attitude towards the 
Jesuit participation in a long-term project to restore Catholicism to England.)
Suddenly, “a new motion stroke him [Rosader] to the very hart”, 
whereupon “hee fell into this passionate humour. Ah Rosader, wert thou the 
sonne of Sir JOHN of Bourdeaux ...” (85). There are, it now appears, two ways 
of imitating old chivalrous Sir John: one, by allowing hackneyed truisms to 
justify one’s behaviour as in accord with custom, alias the way of the world; two, 
by putting others first. Ganimede’s role-play sessions had taught the latter 
message: repent of one’s own faults instead of seeking to blame or punish the 
faults of others—stop all this self-indulgent Petrarchan moaning. That Rosader 
had been in danger of resembling the wrong version of his father, and becoming 
morally indistinguishable from Saladyne, is made clear when Rosader reflects:
“Non sapit, qui non sibi sapit is fondly spoken in such bitter extreames” (85).
The iteration of the Latin tag which Saladyne had earlier misapplied (to justify 
pilfering Rosader’s inheritance) (16) secures the parallel. But here Rosader 
observes the self-deceiving folly of relying on such truisms when real decisions 
have to be made: if one is wicked, the self-serving logic of Saladyne’s 
application runs, and one knows oneself to be wicked, then one is justified in
148 “[W]omen are wantons,” says Sir John, “and yet men cannot want one” and so forth (12-13).
behaving wickedly.
In due course, Saladyne wakes “as a man in a traunce” to find himself 
saved from the lion by a stranger (not recognising his brother in his new spiritual 
condition). Nor does Rosader quite know him: “ROSADER... wondred to heare 
such courteous words come from his [brother’s] crabbed nature”. Moreover, 
Rosader now seems to have a new understanding of how things come to pass, for 
by “following my Deere to the fall,” he reports, he has been “conducted hether 
by some assenting Fate” (86). As usual in Lodge’s text, the capitalisation is 
significant;149 the “Deere”, I would suggest, is the fleeting, attractive image of 
Christ one pursues, consciously or not, in the midst of the world’s snares. 
Attracted to it without recognising its divine nature, one is Providentially led to 
one’s “Fate”. There is something pre-ordained about these events, Rosader now 
suspects, though he carefully avoids endorsing predestination by qualifying 
“Fate” as “assenting”; there appears to be some collaboration between his own 
willed action of pursuing the “Deere” and the workings of “Fate”.150 Sweeney 
has noted that precisely such a collaborative understanding of the operations of 
grace—the “scientia media”, as developed by Jesuit theologians such as Luis de 
Molina and Francisco Suarez (the latter being one of Southwell’s tutors at the 
Roman College)—was “pure gold to Southwell on mission in ‘heretic’ 
England”.151 It enabled the Jesuit to convince and reclaim Catholic waverers, 
many of whom had succumbed to Lutheranism.
*
This chapter has argued that Lodge’s Rosalynde expounds a Jesuit doctrine of 
justification in presenting the conversion of Rosader. In addition, the romance 
appears to address the scope of the Jesuit mission in its handling of the case of
149 Given the meaningful distribution o f the spellings “Rosalynd” and “Rosalynde” in the 
romance, I assume the text’s capitalization to be authorial.
150 Marcelle Thiebaux, The Stag o f  Love: the Chase in Medieval Literature (London: Cornell UP, 
1974), pp. 18-19.
151 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, pp. 24-5; see also: Michael A. Mullett, The Catholic Reformation 
(London & New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 165; MacCulloch, Reformation, p. 481; Voak, 
Hooker, pp. 58-9.
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the Dyeresque Montanus. Moreover, Rosalynd’s meditation upon her 
relationship to Rosader has been identified as an Ignatian-style spiritual exercise. 
In carrying out missionary work on behalf of—and in possible collaboration 
with—the Jesuit Southwell, Lodge’s text implicitly claims to speak on behalf o f  a 
spiritual authority located outside o f that text. The omission of the conventional 
heterobiographical pastoral author-figure, therefore (the equivalent of the 
Arcadias’ Philisides), becomes conspicuous.
Chapter 5.
Southwell, Shakespeare and Lodge.
By way of preparation for the following chapters on Shakespeare’s As You Like 
It, the present chapter examines documents relating to possible connections 
between Lodge, Southwell and Shakespeare. First of all, I consider the epistle 
poem (“The Author to the Reader”) which prefaces Southwell’s Saint Peters 
Complaynt (printed 1595). The epistle poem is usually read as the Jesuit poet’s 
reproof of the irreligious worldliness of writers such as Lodge and Shakespeare 
(the latter writer is a candidate for being the “W.S.” addressed in the epistle’s 
dedication). However, I contend that Southwell is actually objecting to writers 
who distill pagan toys from spiritual material for private purposes. In addition, I 
suggest a link between this reproof and Shakespeare’s decision to abandon the 
publication of narrative verse after 1593.
Furthermore, I argue that in Wits Miserie (1596), Lodge indicates that, 
following Southwell’s arrest and execution, seeking reconciliation with English 
Protestantism has less to recommend it.1 By this point, Shakespeare’s facultative 
rhetoric had arguably borrowed feathers from the Jesuit poetic project. Perhaps 
coming to suspect that Southwell’s reconciliatory strategies had, to some extent, 
furthered the encroachments of worldliness upon poetic terrain, Lodge (I suggest) 
includes an attack on Shakespeare in Wits Miserie, referring to the Stratfordian as 
a “PLAIER Deuil”.
With these arguments in place, As You Like It can be read as not only 
Shakespeare’s borrowing and adaptation of the Jesuit-influenced religious 
position outlined in Lodge’s Rosalynde, but also the dramatist’s reply to Wits 
Miserie.
1 According to Pilarz, Jesuits such as Robert Persons responded in a similar way: Southwell, p. 
238. See also: Pritchyard, Catholic Loyalism, p. 201.
*Prefaced to the 1595 edition of Southwell’s Saint Peters Complaynt is the epistle 
poem “The Author to the Reader”.2 The poem is dedicated to Southwell’s cousin, 
who had asked the Jesuit to send him some religious verse. In a 1616 St. Omer 
edition of Southwell’s verse, the cousin is identified by the initials “W.S.” 
Certainly, as Shell observes, “one cannot hang too much on a set of initials”.3 On 
the other hand, Shakespeare was Southwell’s cousin. There may be other 
candidates for “W.S”, but Shakespeare is one whom it became more acceptable 
to identify by his initials in 1616 (the year of Shakespeare’s death). Moreover, 
the poem which the epistle prefaces employs the same stanza form as Venus and 
Adonis. In any case, as Shell notes, “one contemporary commentator suggests 
very strongly that Shakespeare was thought at the time to be the addressee of 
Southwell’s reproof’. Shell refers here to “a long religious poem” with a 
Southwellian title: '‘'‘Saint Marie Magdalens Conversion ... published by a 
Catholic secret press in England, with a preface dated 1603.”4 The author, “I. 
C.”,5 refers to
Helens rape, and Troyes besieged Towne.
Troylus faith, and Cressids falsitie.
... Richards strategems for the English crowne.
... Tarquins lust, and lucrece chastity...
As Shell observes, “the characters make an eclectic group”. However, “given that 
all their stories were written up by Shakespeare, an overarching reference to 
Shakespeare’s work is surely intended”.6
2 Davidson & Sweeney, eds. Collected Poems, p. 63.
3 Shell, Religion, p. 89.
4 Shell, Religion, p. 89.
5 1 concur with Thurston’s surmise that “I. C.” was the Jesuit Joseph Cresswell: “Southwell the 
Euphuist,” p. 241. Cresswell supplied the materials for— or (it has been suggested) wrote— the 
first biography o f  Southwell: Loomie, Elizabethans, p. 207.
6 Shell, Religion, p. 90.
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Turning to Southwell’s epistolary “reproof’, one reads:
Still finest wits are stilling Venus Rose.
In paynim toyes the sweetest vaines are spent:
To Christian works, few have their tallents lent. (16-18)
Line 16 sounds to modem ears like Southwell the stereotypically religious author 
condemning erotic verse. However, as recorded in Chapter 3, the Jesuit-trained 
Southwell would have valued erotic verse as a means of wedding readers to the 
love of God. Furthermore, because modem scholars tend to impose a radical 
spiritual/sensual split, it is usually assumed that Southwell condemns celebration 
of “Venus Rose” (sensual love); however, that is not what he “condemns” in the 
epistolary poem. Southwell does not complain of worldly poets who are 
“praising” or “singing” “ Venus Rose”; he regrets that “finest wits” are stilling 
that “Rose” (which makes it sound as though the persons in question are 
“stealing” from the “Rose”). It might be argued that Southwell chooses the verb 
“still” merely for purposes of alliteration, but if one neglects to provide a 
rhetorical justification for that decision, one anachronistically credits the Jesuit 
with a romantic (and self-indulgent) preference for sound over sense. Instead of 
singing the praises of natural beauty, and thus acknowledging the sublime truth 
which “ Venus Rose” contains, as a means of bringing spiritual profit, “finest 
wits”, suggests Southwell, distill the essence of “Venus Rose” to make “paynim 
toyes” for private purposes.7 The “Rose”, after all, was a common figure for the 
Virgin Mary.8 In Lodge’s Prosopopeia, Mary is “the rose without prickles, the 
flower of the rose in the prime” (51). Distilling (“stilling”), moreover, is the
7 See: Chadwick, ed. Confessions, XII.34-5.
8 For association o f  the Virgin Mary and Venus, see: Rubin, Mother o f  God, p. 196. For 
discussion o f  two opposed-but-related conceptions o f  Venus in the period, see: Wind, Pagan  
Mysteries, pp. 138-40; Anderson, Intertext, pp. 146-9; Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, pp. 125-6; James 
M. Saslow, Ganymede in the Renaissance: Homosexuality in Art and Society (New Haven: Yale 
UP, 1986), p. 22. For Mary as rose, see: Anne Winston-Allen, Stories o f  the Rose: the Making o f  
the Rosary in the Middle Ages (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State UP, 1997), pp. 81-110; 
Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, p. 96.n.82; Pilarz, Southwell, p. 23; Sheridan, ed. Plaint, p. 67; Anthonie 
Copley, A Fig fo r  Fortune (London: Richard Johnes, 1596), pp. 89-90; Duffy, Altars, p. 428;
Mil ward, Religious Background, p. 93; Jack Goody, The Culture o f  Flowers (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1993), pp. 155-6,175.
opposite of “sublimation”.9 The essence of roses could be preserved for winter 
via distillation, but (from such as Lodge and Southwell’s point of view) a more 
enduring result could be obtained via the sublimation of natural beauty.10 Thus, 
Lodge: “Before the virgin ... concerned Christ, it was winter, but after she had 
conceiued the word of God, it became Summer. Finally, thorough the vapour of 
the holye Ghost the flower sprong” (51; emphasis added). Mary did not “still” 
the “crimson rose Jesus”; Lodge states that she “fixed not her happiness in 
vncertaine substaunce, but fastned her hope to her son Christ, intentiue in her 
works ... whose purpose was not to satisfie man, but to seeke after God” (52).
It is sometimes supposed that if Southwell’s “reproof’ was aimed at 
Shakespeare, the latter author ignored it (or answered it with the more “serious” 
Lucrece) and carried on writing “secular” works.11 This account neglects to offer 
any explanation for Shakespeare’s decision, post-1593/4, to abandon the 
publication of narrative poetry. It might be argued, though, that Southwell’s 
reproof influenced Shakespeare’s decision to discontinue publication of his 
narrative poetry. Since the present thesis concerns itself with As You Like It, I 
must restrict myself to observing that Shakespeare’s comedy can be read as not 
“stilling Venus Rose”. The play arguably employs facultative rhetoric in order to 
attach audiences’ sensory faculties to “ Venus Rose” (Rosalind) so that their wills 
may be wedded to heaven (Celia).
The existence of common ground, vis-a-vis the religious import of 
cognitive processes (and the role of facultative rhetoric in same), between the 
Jesuit Southwell and Shakespeare the Elizabethan conformist is not as 
implausible as, at first glance, it may appear.12 Southwell not only pursued a
9“[S]till, v.2,” OED; Wendy Wall, “Distillation: Transformations in and out o f the Kitchen,” p. 
101, in Joan Fitzpatrick, ed. Renaissance Foodfrom  Rabelais to Shakespeare: Culinary Readings 
and Culinary Histories (Famham: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 89-104.
10 See: Chadwick, ed. Confessions, X.53. For the association o f  the Virgin Mary with the beauties 
o f nature, and comparison o f Mary, “the most beautiful o f women,” with “the rose ... the most 
beautiful flower”, see: Rubin, Mother o f  God, pp. 146, 155.
11 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 150; Devlin, Southwell, pp. 269-73.
12 The present thesis’ view o f Shakespeare as a member o f the English Church who engaged in 
prolonged and profound dialogue with Southwell’s admonitions and poetic practices has been 
informed by examination o f Shakespeare’s works themselves and the following studies: 
Christopher Devlin, “Shakespeare’s Faith,” in Devlin, H am let’s Divinity, pp. 11-29; Robert 
Bearman, “John Shakespeare’s ‘Spiritual Testament’: a Reappraisal,” SS 56 (2006), pp. 184-202;
flexible literary strategy but also showed signs of acknowledging the rights of the 
English monarch to determine the country’s religion.13 This circumstance may 
inform the popularity of Southwell’s writings in orthodox Protestant circles. 
Alison Shell has seen “the semi-anonymity and continued popularity of 
Southwell’s poems” in 1590s England (and after) as evidence of “a collusion 
between officialdom, publisher and public”.14 The poet contributed to this 
collusion to an extent, devoting his longer works to penitent sinners such as St. 
Peter and Mary Magdalene, “acceptable to Protestants as well as Catholics”.15
Richard Wilson, Secret Shakespeare’, “Introduction: a Torturing Hour— Shakespeare and the 
Martyrs,” in Dutton et al, eds. Theatre and Religion, pp. 1-39; Eamon Duffy, “Bare Ruined 
Choirs: Remembering Catholicism in Shakespeare’s England,” in Dutton et al, eds. Theatre and  
Religion, pp. 40-57; E. A. J. Honigmann, Shakespeare: the ‘Lost Years', 2nd edition (Manchester: 
Manchester UP, 1998); Stephen Greenblatt, Will in the World: How Shakespeare Became 
Shakespeare (London: Pimlico, 2005); John E. Curran, Jr. Hamlet, Protestantism and the 
Mourning o f  Contingency—Not To Be (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006); John Klause, “Catholic and 
Protestant, Jesuit and Jew: Historical Religion in The Merchant o f  Venice," in Dennis Taylor & 
David Beauregard, eds. Shakespeare and the Culture o f  Christianity in Early Modern England 
(New York: Fordham UP, 2003), pp. 180-221; Jesuit’, Arthur M. Marotti, “Shakespeare and 
Catholicism,”in Dutton et al, eds. Theatre and Religion, pp. 218-41; Jeffrey Knapp, “Jonson, 
Shakespeare and the Religion o f  Players,” SS 54 (2001), pp. 57-70; Shakespeare’s Tribe’, 
“Author, King and Christ in Shakespeare’s Histories,” in Kenneth J. E. Graham & Philip D. 
Collington, eds. Shakespeare and Religious Change (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 
pp. 217-37; Bowden, Religion o f  Shakespeare’, Gary Taylor, “Divine [ ]sences,” SS 54 (2001), pp. 
13-30; Alison Shell, “Why Didn’t Shakespeare Write Religious Verse?” in Takashi Fozuka & J. 
R. Mulryne, eds. Shakespeare, Marlowe, Jonson: New Directions in Biography (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2006), pp. 85-112; Shakespeare and Religion’, Richmond, Romance’, Beatrice Groves, 
Texts and Traditions: Religion in Shakespeare, 1592-1604 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007); A. D. 
Nuttall, Shakespeare the Thinker (New Haven & London: Yale UP, 2007); Robert Lanier Reid, 
“Spenser and Shakespeare: Polarized Approaches to Psychology, Poetics and Patronage,” pp. 
109-20, in Lethbridge, ed. Shakespeare and Spenser, pp. 79-120; Jensen, Religion and Revelry, 
pp. 3-22, 94-233; Regina Mara Schwartz, Sacramental Poetics at the Dawn o f  Secularism: When 
God Left the World (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2008), pp. 39-58; Sarah Beckwith, “Shakespeare, 
Crypto-Catholicism, Crypto-Criticism,” Medieval and Religious Drama in England  19 (2006), 
pp. 259-70; Milward, Religious Background’, Catholicism’, The Plays and the Exercises: a Hidden 
Source o f  Shakespeare’s Inspiration? (Tokyo: Renaissance Institute, 2002); “Shakespeare’s 
Jesuit Schoolmasters,” in Dutton et al, eds. Theatre and Religion, pp. 71-86; Asquith, 
Shadowplay; Jean-Christophe Mayer, “Shakespeare’s Religious Background Revisited: Richard
II in a New Context,” in Taylor & Beauregard, eds. Culture o f  Christianity, pp. 103-20; H ybrid
Faith’, ‘“This Papist and His Poet’: Shakespeare’s Lancastrian Kings and Robert Parsons’s 
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David Beauregard, “Shakespeare on Monastic Life: Nuns and Friars in Measure fo r  Measure,” in 
Taylor & Beauregard, eds. Culture o f  Christianity, pp. 311-35.
13 Bald, ed. Humble Supplication, p. xxii; Corthell, “Recusant Discourse,” p. 280; Brownlow, 
Southwell, pp. 71-2. For Southwell’s conciliatory attitude towards the Cecils, see: Corthell, pp. 
281-6.
14 Shell, Catholicism, p. 63; see also: Parmelee, GoodNewes, p. 154.
15 Shell, Catholicism, pp. 80-1. The 1599 Scottish edition o f  Saint Peters Complaynte “bears the 
insignia Cum Privilegio Regio” and was printed by Robert Waldegrave, printer to James VI: 
Cummings, Grammar and Grace, p. 332. Earlier, Waldegrave had been the illegal printer o f  the
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When Southwell’s poems appeared in Catholic editions outside of England and 
Scotland, their “sensualist aspects were omitted”, which again suggests that in 
adapting his poetic output to the tastes of his intended English audience, 
Southwell had departed from Catholic orthodoxy.16 (Southwell did, however, 
write shorter poems celebrating the Virgin Mary; these tended to be omitted from 
the early English and Scottish editions.)17
Be that as it may, with Southwell gone, Lodge’s willingness to pursue 
reconciliatory strategies seems to have decreased. In his 1596 romance 
Margarita, Lodge declares Jesuit influence, informing his “Gentlemen Readers” 
that he found his romance’s source “in the librarie of the Jesuits” (4).18 However, 
the effects of that influence differ from those which the present thesis has 
hitherto inferred: Margarita as a lead female character lacks any vestiges of the 
“individuality” ascribable to Rosalynd; the agency of “women” in the world is no 
longer Lodge’s concern. All political agents in the tale are debauched, utterly 
corrupt.19 Male characters claim to love beloveds but really love only to pursue 
wicked pleasures. Thus, by 1596, Lodge appears to have abandoned flexible 
strategies vis-a-vis dealing with a corrupt political world. (His attitude to the 
French poet Desportes provides a corroborative example of the English author’s 
post-1595 conservatism. After admiring—or at least imitating/borrowing from— 
Desportes in the late-1580s/early-1590s, Lodge, in Wits Miserie, refers to the 
French poet by name, and accuses him of “plying the same trade as a devil”.)20 
Consequently, embittered and unsettled by the failure of Southwell’s mission, 
Lodge, I suggest, attacks Shakespeare in Wits Miserie, and the Worlds
first four Marprelate pamphlets: Joseph L. Black, ed. The Martin M arprelate Tracts: a 
Modernized and Annotated Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008), p. 1.
16 Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, p. 243. See also: Parmelee, G oodNewes, pp. 153-4.
17 Shell, Catholicism, p. 63.
18 In Works, Volume 3.
19 Walter R. Davis, “Silenced Women,” p. 200, in Constance C. Relihan, ed. Framing 
Elizabethan Fictions: Contemporary Approaches to Early Modern Narrative Prose (Kent & 
London: Kent State UP, 1996), pp. 187-209; Derek B. Alwes, “Elizabethan Dreaming: Fictional 
Dreams from Gascoigne to Lodge,” p. 167, in Relihan, ed. Elizabethan Fictions, pp. 153-67.
20 Anne Lake Prescott, French Poets and the English Renaissance: Studies in Fame and  
Transformation (New Haven & London: Yale UP, 1978), pp. 142, 145-6. See: Wits Miserie, p. 
53, in Works, Volume 4; Walter F. Staton, Jr., “A Lodge Borrowing from Watson,” Renaissance 
News 14 (1961), pp. 3-6.
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Madnesse: Discouering the Deuils Incarnat o f This Age (1596).
In the section of Wits Miserie entitled “Of the Great Deuill Belzebub, and 
What Monstrous and Strange Deuils He Hath Bred in Our Age”, Lodge speaks of 
“BELZEBUB ... Arch duke of Grecian fantasies” (61; latter emphasis added). 
“Grecian fantasies” is perhaps an echo—but also an adjustment—of “paynim 
toyes”. Where, according to my reading, Southwell had accused Elizabethan wits 
of making private profit from spiritual materials, Lodge appears to attack an 
individual or individuals (“BELZEBUB”) for promulgating heresies (“fantasies”) 
out of step with Latin orthodoxy, being “Grecian”.
The Greek provenance, moreover, may allude to the repackaging of 
Southwell’s language by another Grecian “duke”, Shakespeare’s Duke Theseus 
in A Midsummer Night's Dream. As noted in Chapter 3, Southwell had 
complained that a poet, a lover and a liar were in danger of being mistaken for 
aspects of the same entity. Shakespeare’s Theseus, seeming to echo Southwell, 
complains of “fairy toys” (5.1.3). The Duke describes systematically the 
cognitive disorder that produces these “toys”:
Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,
Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend 
More than cool reason ever comprehends. (4-6)
Theseus sees scholastic fancies out of control, dreaming up facultative species 
and other arcane terminology for unreal phenomena. A paraphrase of Southwell 
follows: “The lunatic, the lover, and the poet / Are of imagination all compact” 
(7-8).21 Evidently, Theseus considers poets, lunatics and lovers to be reified 
faculties; not reified intellects like himself, but reified fancies (“of imagination 
all compact”). In denying actual productive agency to the fancy (“How easy is a 
bush supposed a bear!” [22]), Theseus asserts that poems and plays can have no 
effect on rational readers/audience-members such as himself. Note, though, that 
Theseus exchanges Southwell’s “liar” for “[t]he lunatic”. As a successful
21 For the relationship between Southwell’s writings and Shakespeare’s, see: Klause, Jesuit.
politician, Theseus is aware that rhetoric (lying) has its rational uses. Also, being 
in conversation with his captured wife, the Amazon Hippolyta, he presumably 
has little desire to equate lovers and liars as ineffectual homunculi.
Hippolyta’s answer is a compact lesson in facultative process: “But,” she 
protests,
all their minds transfigured so together,
More witnesseth than fancy’s images,
And grows to something o f great constancy (23-6)
Faculties working in assembly are less likely than an individual’s reason, 
working in isolation, to be mistaken.
In the same section of Wits Miserie, Lodge goes on to observe that “al the 
heresies in the church were enough to condemne your [Belzebub’s] homes to be 
sawed off of your head” (61). The homs often associated in the period with 
cuckoldry are here linked to a different form of infidelity: heresy.22 Elsewhere in 
Wits Miserie, homs are attached to an actor. In the section entitled “Of Strange 
and Miraculous Deuils Ingendred by Mammon", Lodge comments:
They say likewise there is a PLAIER Deuil, a handsome sonne o f Mammons, but yet I 
haue not seene him, because he skulks in the countrie, if  I chance to meet him ... lie 
pleasantly conjure him, and though hee hath a high hat to hide his huge homes, lie haue 
a wind o f Wit to blow it off. (46)
Identifying the above statement as a reference to Shakespeare might seem at best 
arguable. The placing of the former attack in a sequence of theatre-related 
statements, however, is worth considering. After the attack on the “PLAIER 
Deuil”, Lodge turns his attention to actors in general:
For all o f that sect I say this much, If they vse no other mirth but Eutrapelian vrbanitie 
... it is to be borne withal; but filthie speaking, Scurrilitie, vnfit for chast eares ... should
22 See: Chadwick, ed. Confessions, III. 16.
not bee named amongst Christians. (46)
Thus, Lodge separates one “PLAIER Deuil” from the “sect” without supplying 
any reason other than the fact that the former individual currently “skulks in the 
countrie”.
In the third statement in this anti-theatrical sequence, Lodge denounces 
plays which contravene a Tridentine ruling. He writes: “in stage plaies to make 
vse of Hystoricall Scripture, I hold it with the legists odious, and as the Councill 
of Trent did, Sess. § 4. Fin. I condemne it” (46).23 As far as I am aware, the only 
other use of the term “Hystoricall Scripture” in printed works of the period 
occurs in another text published in 1596: Vlysses vpon Ajax. Written by 
Misodiaboles to His Friend Philaretes. This work, of unknown authorship, is an 
attack upon Misacmos (Sir John Harington, as author of The Metamorphoses o f  
Ajax), written by “Misodiaboles” (a hater of devils).24 Misodiaboles cites the 
same Tridentine clause as Lodge in Wits Miserie, and uses the term “Hystoricall 
Scripture” to designate the whole of Scripture. Moreover, Misodiaboles’s 
recourse to the Tridentine ruling informs disapproval of the “allegorical” 
wrenching of scriptural matter to suit one’s doctrinal purposes, not the adaptation 
of specific Biblical narratives.
Though I evidently wish to imply that Shakespeare is Lodge’s lone player- 
dramatist, working on play-scripts in the “countrie”, it must be acknowledged 
that making “vse of Hystoricall Scripture” is something Lodge attributes to the 
sect of actors no less than the “PLAIER Deuil”. Plays, that is, are not here treated 
as fixed and finished scripts produced by a dramatist in isolation. Indeed, not the 
rural loner, but the town-based players are, for Lodge, a potential source of 
“Eutrapelian vrbanitie”. Lodge’s call for “Eutrapelian” wit, moreover, may be 
particularly addressed to Will Kemp, the leading clown of Shakespeare’s 
company. “The leading player/character was in charge of overseeing and
23 See: Schroeder, ed. Trent, p. 20.
24 Elizabeth Story Donno, ed. Sir John Harington’s A New Discourse o f a Stale Subject, Called 
the Metamorphosis o f  Ajax: a Critical Annotated Edition (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1962), pp. 15-17.
directing the play,” Robert Weimann and Douglas Bruster have observed, “such 
direction involved providing explanations whenever necessary”.25 Thus, Lodge 
appears to urge accomplished (“Eutrapelian”) improvisers such as Kemp to exert
9 Amore influence upon the scripted plays in which they perform. After all, 
Bottom’s notorious mangling of a sublime passage from Paul’s first letter to the 
Corinthians towards the close of A Midsummer Night's Dream (4.2.204-7) may 
read like the consequence of a clown’s memorial reconstruction but is evidently 
scripted in.27 Such scripted “Scurrilitie”, in Lodge’s view, has a rural 
(Warwickshire?) source, like the Marprelate pamphlets—another sophisticated 
set of productions using folly as a stalking-horse.28
Thus, bearing in mind that elsewhere in Wits Miserie Lodge describes an 
early performance of Hamlet (62) and (I have argued) alludes to A Midsummer 
Night's Dream, the treatment of the “PLAIER Deuil” can be read as an update 
upon the attack on “Shake-scene” in Groats-worth.29 The actor-plagiarist of the 
latter text has, by 1596, withdrawn to concentrate on scripting activity, with 
scurrility now his chief offence in place of plagiarism. Admittedly, these 
comments are based on speculative readings. However, even if the reference to 
the “PLAIER Deuil” is not accepted as an allusion to Shakespeare, the relevant 
passage presents Lodge’s particular relationship to the stage (as of 1596) as 
conservative Catholic. There is nothing wrong with the stage (Lodge implies) 
when it confines itself to the performance of works of humanist provenance 
(texts by properly educated wits—gentlemen who have studied both Scripture 
and the classics). These performances may be enlivened by witty (non-scurrilous)
25 Robert Weimann & Douglas Bruster, Shakespeare and the Power o f  Performance: Stage and  
Page in the Elizabethan Theatre (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008), pp. 47-8.
26 Weimann and Bruster oppose the tendency to regard Kemp as a coarse performer replaced by 
the more “sophisticated” Robert Armin: Power o f  Performance, p. 87.
27 For Shakespeare as “the controlling intelligence” behind the plays he wrote by himself, see: 
Weimann & Bruster, Power o f  Performance, p. 189.
28 For the Warwickshire provenance o f the Marprelate texts, see: Dusinberre, ed. AYLI, p. 58; see 
also: Shell, Religion, pp. 57-8, 64-5.
29 For the view that Shakespeare wrote the Ur-Hamlet, see: E. A. J. Honigmann, “Shakespeare’s 
‘Lost Source Plays’,” pp. 299-300, Modern Language Review  49 (1954), pp. 293-307; 
Honigmann, Lost Years, p. 70; Harold Bloom, Shakespeare: the Invention o f  the Human (New  
York: Riverhead, 1998), pp. 383ff. Lodge, moreover, specifically mentions the manner in which 
the ghost o f Hamlet was performed, a role associated with Shakespeare as actor.
improvisations to meet topical and other needs of the moment.30
Such a state of affairs indeed appears to have obtained in the early years of 
Elizabethan commercial drama—from the first performances at the Red Lion in 
1567 to circa 1584 (for which period extant play-scripts of non-humanist 
provenance are lacking).31 It is noteworthy, therefore, that when the relevant 
passages in Groats-worth and Wits Miserie are considered together, Shakespeare 
appears guilty of two related “crimes”: encroaching upon humanist territory as 
dramatist and fusing the spiritual and the material by mingling scurrility with 
scriptural matter.
Lodge, of course, had himself recently been a dramatist. Michael 
O’Connell regards A Looking-Glasse for London, the play Lodge wrote in 
collaboration with Greene circa 1589-90, as evidence of “a ‘revival’ in the use of 
biblical sources ... in the early 1590s”.32 Whether or not one considers the 
number of extant biblically-sourced 1590s plays to offer sufficient evidence of 
such a “revival”, one thing is apparent: Lodge (with Greene) was again the 
literary pioneer. Thus, in Wits Miserie he appears to condemn his own 
innovation. Moreover, he sides not with the Jesuits before quoting Trent but with 
“the legists”.33 That is, he is announcing his return to legalistic Catholic 
orthodoxy.34 The zealous phrase “I condemn it” (on what basis does Lodge claim 
the authority to condemn such things?) shows a lack of humility foreign to the
30 For evidence o f  productions departing from playscripts to make religious and political points, 
see: Aveling, Northern Catholics, pp. 288-9.
31 Weimann & Bruster, Power o f  Performance, p. 8. For interrogation o f  Weimann (& Bruster)’s 
humanist/popular binary, see: Jeanne McCarthy, “Disciplining ‘Unexpert People’: Children’s 
Dramatic Practices and Page/Stage Tensions in Early English Theatre,” pp. 146-8, 158, in David 
Schalkwyk, ed. “The Achievement o f  Robert Weimann,” Shakespeare International Yearbook 10 
(2010), pp. 143-64.
32 O’Connell, Idolatrous Eye, p. 107. For the play’s probable date o f  composition, see: Waldo F. 
McNeir, “The Date o f A Looking Glass o f  London,” N&Q  2 (1955), pp. 282-3.
33 Compare Robert Persons’s attitude to Trent and Catholic conservatism: Persons considered 
Trent to have “been subject to political influences” and thought English Catholics should “build 
up from the very foundation ... our Catholic Church”: Carrafiello, Robert Parsons, p. 58. For the 
purposes o f  the argument’s relation to Lodge specifically, I restrict the historical terms o f  
reference to the Jesuits, but it is likely that the Counter-Reformation tendency towards an 
expedient reliance upon princely (as opposed to papal and/or parliamentarian) power is the larger 
force at work here; see Carrafiello, Robert Parsons, pp. 14, 27; Benjamin, German Tragic 
Drama, pp. 65, 81; Corthell, “Recusant Discourse,” p. 276.
34 Lodge’s post-1595 antitheatricalism recalls the antitheatricalism o f  the prominent Catholic 
reformer, Carlo Borromeo, not coincidentally famous as the inventor o f the private confessional 
box: O’Connell, Idolatrous Eye, pp. 30-2; Hamilton, Munday, p. 20.
Ignatian penitent.35 Lodge, therefore, both expresses and manifests a need for 
dogmatic rigidity. In announcing his Tridentine credentials at the same time as he 
misrepresents the Tridentine position (Trent having made no specific reference to 
stage-plays), Lodge displays a commitment to confessionalization.
35 Martz, Meditation, p. 147.
Chapter 6.
As You Like It's Religious Revision of Rosalynde.
This chapter analyses departures of Shakespeare’s As You Like It from its main 
source, Lodge’s Rosalynde. These departures, it will be argued, interrogate the 
religious position—and the concomitant cognitive model thereof—of Lodge’s 
pastoral romance.
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section focuses on the 
contrast between As You Like It's presentation of its hero, Orlando, in its first 
act, and the presentation of Rosader in Lodge’s romance. I argue that, in its 
characterization of the brothers Orlando and Oliver, the play complicates 
Rosalynde's interrogation of a Stoic conception of chivalric ethics. In addition, 
the play’s presentation of the wrestling bout at the usurper’s court aligns a 
perceived restriction of avenues for self-expression with constrictions 
engendered by the Catholic sacramental system in its late-medieval (post- 
Crusades) form. At the same time, the play implicitly explores the doctrine of 
predestination (via the character of Oliver).
In the second section, Shakespeare’s decision to make Lodge’s rival 
dukes brothers is examined. It will be pointed out that, pace modem editorial 
orthodoxy, Shakespeare gives the name “Frederick” to both dukes.
Accordingly, I argue that the dukes figure two human apprehensions of the 
divine.
The chapter’s third section considers differences between the conclusions 
of the comedy and the romance. For example, where the end of Lodge’s 
Rosalynde indicates that war is required to make a peace, the usurping duke in
As You Like It becomes a hermit and abandons his military campaign. This can 
be taken to imply that the appearance of tyranny is produced by cognitive 
distortion. The section also considers the play’s addition of the god Hymen to 
Lodge’s scenario. Where, Lodge’s Rosalynde offers no cognitive bridge 
between the reception of its textual performance and spiritual authority, As You 
Like It provides such a bridge via the conspicuous addition of a divine character 
who performs fusion in a socially necessary but nonetheless strictly formal 
manner.1 Thus, where Rosalynde offers itself as text as a temporary substitute 
for the priest-function, As You Like It performs the priest-fimction, celebrating 
the facultative participation of members of a Christian assembly in the divine.
*
In Shakespeare’s comedy, Lodge’s hero Rosader is renamed Orlando. The name 
“Rosader” resembles “Rosalynd” and so might have been changed to prevent 
confusion for theatre audiences. However, As You Like It elsewhere courts such 
confusion by, for instance, including two characters called “Jaques”. In any 
case, the choice of the name “Orlando” is significant, belonging as it does to 
one of the most famous fictional characters in Renaissance literature. Ariosto’s 
Orlando was known, of course, for becoming “ furioso” as a result of his 
passion. The name “Orlando” thus associates the play’s hero not only with 
feudal chivalric values, as promoted during the Crusades, but also with 
intemperate behaviour consequent upon unregulated passion (and the rectifying 
thereof).2
In line with his feudal chivalric name, Orlando expresses considerable 
pride in his lineage: “call you that keeping for a gentleman o f my birth f  he 
protests in the play’s opening speech, “that differs not from the stalling of an 
Oxe?” (8-10; emphases added). Orlando has evidently forgotten that “the 
stalling of an Oxe” was good enough for Christ, whose lineage was impeccable. 
Sir Philip Sidney makes a similar “error” in his Apology for Poetry. A historical
1 Dubrow, “Introduction,” pp. 50-1.
2 Scoufos, “Paradiso T e r r e s t r e p. 219.
text must show Socrates dying a criminal’s death whereas true poetry would 
not, Sidney argues there.3 Yet this is precisely how Scripture represents Christ’s 
death, and Sidney maintains that Scripture belongs to the highest type of poesy. 
The similarity to Orlando’s misprision is suggestive. The conservative position 
of Sidney and Lodge, informed by a Stoic conception of chivalric tradition, is 
arguably being exposed as inconsistent with Christianity.4
By rechristening Rosader “Orlando”, As You Like It associates its hero 
with the crusading ideal. The Crusades marked a moment when institutionalized 
(western) Christianity showed itself at odds with its essential message, 
embarking on expeditions of murder and plunder in Christ’s name (as endorsed 
by successive Popes). This was apparent to contemporary monks if not to more 
worldly “Christian” agents. As R. W. Southern records: “The monastic ideals of 
the 11th century were in the main hostile to the idea of the Crusade. To a Saint 
Anselm, for instance ... the Crusade made no appeal.”5 At the same historical 
moment, the large-scale sale of papal indulgences became established.6 It is 
relevant to note, therefore, that, in Rosalynde the hero’s wicked brother is 
named Saladyne, bearing in mind that Christian-occupied Jerusalem had fallen 
in 1187 to Saladin.7 As You Like It, on the other hand, opts to internalize 
“heathendom” within the hero, with the name “Orlando” associating its bearer 
with the worldly values of the Crusades and the mechanical winning of grace by 
individual merit. However, the play does not let the older brother entirely off 
the hook: “Saladyne” is renamed Oliver after the medieval Roland’s crusading 
comrade. Both brothers have been formed by chivalric ideals.
A further difference between the two texts corroborates the view that the 
play is concerned to attribute chivalric values to both Orlando and Oliver.
3 Shepherd, ed. Apology, pp. 111-2.
4 Larson, “Lodge’s Rosalynde,” pp. 121-2. See also: Groves, Texts and Traditions, p. 46.
Tyndale likewise objected to the unchristian chauvinism o f  pre-Reformation Catholicism: David 
Daniell, ed. The Obedience o f  a Christian Man, by William Tyndale (London: Penguin, 2000), 
pp. 28-9.
5 R. W. Southern, The Making o f  the Middle Ages (London: Pimlico, 1993), p. 50.
6 R. W. Southern, The Penguin History o f  the Church. Volume 2: Western Society and the 
Church in the Middle Ages (London: Penguin, 1970), pp. 136-7.
7 F. Donald Logan, A History o f  the Church in the Middle Ages (London & New York: 
Routledge, 2002), p. 184; Southern, Making, p. 55.
Having suborned the Norman wrestler near the beginning of Rosalynde, 
Lodge’s Saladyne “went to young ROSADER, (who in all his thoughts reacht 
at honour, and gazed no lower than vertue commaunded him)” (20; emphases 
added). Saladyne plays the reputation-guilt card: “now brother (quoth he) for 
the honor of Sir JOHN of Bourdeaux our renowmed father, to famous [sic] that 
house that neuer hath been found without men approoued in Cheualrie...’” and 
so forth (20). Thus, Lodge presents Saladyne’s malicious abuse of the chivalric 
code, not the wrongness of that code per se. Shakespeare’s treatment, by 
contrast, suggests that, as a result of cultural influences, champions are apt to 
mislead themselves: Orlando decides to take part in the wrestling without any 
persuasion from Oliver, his motive being (to judge from the concerns expressed 
in his opening speech) a desire to have his social status confirmed by public 
witness.
Furthermore, the innate superiority of the (predestinated) Christian 
implied by the name “Rosader” (“fashioned by/after the rose”?) is interrogated 
by the play’s rebranding. “Rosader” has the form of a past participle— 
something always already accomplished;8 “Orlando”, on the other hand, has the 
form of a present participle, which suggests the name’s bearer is always in a 
state of becoming: a “goldening”. (Similarly, Shakespeare’s Rosalind presents 
Orlando with a chain [1.2.234.sd.] while Lodge’s Rosalynd awards Rosader a 
jewel [25]: Orlando’s salvation is diachronic and relational; Rosader’s 
synchronic and idealist.)9
If Orlando is becoming a worthy Christian hero, he has made scant 
progress at the play’s outset. His snobbery is indicated in the opening speech, 
where he harps upon his neglected social status and his lack of appropriate 
education: Oliver’s “horses are bred better” (10), he moans, and “are taught 
their mannage ... but I (his brother) gaine nothing vnder him but growth” (11- 
13). Thus, Orlando complains, Oliver “mines my gentility with my education”
8 Arthur F. Kinney notes that Lodge prefers to site humanity’s corruption in the past: Humanist 
Poetics: Thought, Rhetoricand Fiction in 16th Century’ England (Amherst: University o f  
Massachusetts Press, 1986), p. 391.
9 This point is informed by Jacques Lacan, “The Agency o f  the Letter in the Unconscious,” p. 
1296, in Leitch et al, eds. Theory, pp. 1290-1302. See also: Berry, “Rosalynde,” p. 44.
(19-20). Upon recalling his threatened “gentility”, Orlando belatedly remembers 
his father—the disgruntled hero had forgotten to refer to Sir Roland even by a 
pronoun while discussing his unsatisfactory bequest in the play’s opening lines 
(1-2). He now declares:
This is it Adam that grieues me, and the spirit o f my Father, which I thinke is within 
mee, begins to mutinie against this seruitude. I will no longer endure it, though yet I 
know no wise remedy how to auoid it. (20-23)
Seeking justification for self-assertion, Orlando invokes his dead father—Sir 
Roland’s own ethical code, potentially, could lend support to a mutinous action. 
However, in contrast to Rosalynde, where Sir Roland’s equivalent Sir John of 
Bourdeaux expounds his Stoic moral code at tedious length, As You Like It does 
not disclose by direct means the values of Sir Roland.
Evidently, Sir Roland’s code does differ from Sir John’s because the 
youngest son in As You Likelt receives not the largest bequest from his father, 
like his equivalent in Lodge, but the smallest. This circumstance possibly 
speaks to medieval and early modem debates concerning the value of the 
“religious” life (a life lived in seclusion from the “world”). As is well-known, 
prior to the Reformation, younger sons of the nobility and gentry were often 
disposed of by being sent to monasteries10 (the newer gentry tending to prefer 
the more affordable option of Augustinian endowments).11 Of course, this 
circumstance bears no obvious relation to late-Elizabethan concerns. Orlando 
complains that he is not being allowed “such exercises as may become a 
gentleman” (1.1.67-8). Dusinberre infers from Orlando’s earlier complaint that 
Oliver’s horses are “taught their manage” (12) while he (Orlando) is taught 
nothing, that the younger brother thinks he should be taught how to ride, fence 
and tilt, etc}2 Orlando, however, expresses no concern for the social utility of 
such exercises. From a chivalric point of view, Orlando’s “proper” training
10 John W. Draper, “Orlando, the Younger Brother,” p. 72, PQ  13 (1934), pp. 72-7.
11 Southern, Western Society, pp. 245-6. The apparent stinginess o f Sir Roland’s bequest to 
Orlando in A YLI may reflect the de Boys’ social status.
12 Dusinberre, ed. AYLI, pp. 154.n, 150.n.
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would prepare him to be an elite soldier. Following the invention of gunpowder, 
though, times had changed (as recorded in Ariosto’s Orlando Furioso)}3 In 
other words, the causes of Orlando’s social deprivation go deeper than Oliver’s 
enmity. On the other hand, Oliver has evidently not sought alternative outlets 
for Orlando’s abundant physical energy. Thus, the play’s opening scene 
implicitly broaches the topic of educational reform, offering an equivalent of 
Francis Bacon’s complaints in The Advancement o f Learning (1605), albeit 
uttered by a less articulate product of the current system. Orlando does not 
express any desire to be sent to school like his brother Jaques, despite the fact 
that “report speakes goldenly of his [Jaques’] profit” (5-6). In fact, Orlando 
does not seem to know what he wants; following the demise of the chivalric and 
crusading ideals, society has neglected to provide worthwhile occupations for 
the younger sons of the gentry and nobility.
The use of monasteries for the disposal of superfluous children of those 
social groups “naturally imposed on families an obligation to make suitable 
provision for their upkeep. Parents commonly gave large gifts to the 
monasteries to which they offered a child.”14 Thus, in Rosalynde, the evident 
adequacy of Sir John’s bequest may figure the provision of (already noble) 
younger sons (such as Rosader) with a ready-made path to heaven via a 
monastery. That pathway is obstructed—fortunately as it turns out—by 
Saladyne pilfering the youngest brother’s inheritance. This reading, 
incidentally, provides an explanation—lacking in other interpretations15—as to 
why the wicked brother in both texts exploits only the youngest brother; both 
texts appear to engage hereby with the validity of “religious” vocations 
(crusading or contemplative), not with abstract wickedness.
Recognizing the play’s concern with educational reform, and the 
imbrication of that topic with the question of religious ideals, facilitates greater 
understanding of the figural work performed by the wrestling bout in Act 1 
Scene 2. In that scene, the usurping Duke regards Orlando as a misguided
13 McNulty, ed. Orlando Furioso, IX.24.5-25.8.
14 Southern, Western Society, p. 228.
15 Owens, “Melancholy,” pp. 18-19.
contender when the latter prepares to tackle the powerful wrestling champion 
Charles. The Duke places emphasis on the perversity of Orlando’s will and the 
danger it entails: “since the youth will not be intreated His owne perill on his 
forwardnesse” (142-3). Though, in terms of romantic convention, the Duke 
occupies the role of wicked usurper, he expresses a desire to have his daughter 
Celia and her cousin Rosalind “disswade” Orlando from the contest (152). This 
indicates that any “wickedness” apprehended in the Duke is a consequence of 
cognition.16
Celia responds to her father’s request by warning Orlando (in a cognitive 
vein): “if you saw your selfe with your eies, or knew your selfe with your 
judgment, the feare of your aduenture would counsel you to a more equall 
enterprise” (167-70). Orlando’s evident lack of self-knowledge is thus 
foregrounded. In response, Orlando begs the ladies, “I beseech you, punish mee 
not with your harde thoughts” (175-6; emphasis added). The use of the word 
“harde” (instead of “soft” or “pitying”) indicates the youth’s perception that the 
two women are judging him ethically.17As noted, Orlando’s avowed concerns 
are self-centred and worldly (at the same time they are idealistic rather than 
pragmatic): in this wrestling match he hopes to demonstrate his courage and 
strength and win honour. In actively seeking to win recognition (as unsolicited 
“challenger” [162]), Orlando displays an egoistic desire for glory (a will to 
power, in modem parlance). However, despite his earlier preoccupation with 
questions of social status, Orlando now declares that there is something 
existential at stake in his current action. He implies that the present contest is a 
means by which his individuality may be registered: “If I bee foil’d,” he says,
there is but one sham ’d that w as neuer gracious: i f  k il’d, but one dead that is w illin g  to 
be so: I shall do m y friends no wrong, for I haue none to lam ent me: the w orld no  
injurie, for in it I haue nothing: onely in the world I fil vp a place, w hich m ay bee better 
supplied, w hen I haue m ade it em ptie. (178-84)
16 Ward, AYLI, pp. 22-3.
17 For wrestling as extemalization o f a “moral situation”, see: Roland Barthes, M ythologies (St 
Albans: Granada, 1973), p. 18.
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For Hunt, this speech of Orlando’s is self-pitying and melancholy.18 Certainly, 
there is a “no-one thinks I’m special” tone to it. Moreover, Orlando declares 
that he has never been “gracious”, a controversial assertion for a baptised 
Christian to make. (A hint of Anabaptism may be detected.) Nevertheless, the 
statement marks a turning point: Orlando has made a crucial admission, one that 
qualifies (in both senses of the term) his earlier exhibition of pride. 
Consideration of another departure from Lodge’s text will help to elaborate this 
point.
In Lodge, Rosader’s private (honour-seeking) motive for wrestling is 
converted to a public one, following his promise to avenge the deaths of the 
wrestlers who fought before him (22-3). In contrast to this, the audience of As 
You Like It is not shown Orlando’s response to the tears of the non-Stoic father 
of the wrestler Charles’s earlier victims.19 In the play, Orlando remains self- 
absorbed. Rosader’s replacement of his egotistical motive with a heroic one 
invites the reader’s sympathy. Since the equivalent alteration is absent in As You 
Like It, how comes it that the play’s audience-members and readers hope 
Orlando will win the fight? The alteration indicates that the rejection of egoism 
by Lodge’s Rosader-as-wrestler is only apparent: wrestling out of pity for others 
is not a heroic sublimation of egoism but a projection of egoism onto the 
spiritual plane. Audience-members/readers, however, continue to “identify” 
with Shakespeare’s Orlando despite the latter’s failure to reject egoism at this 
stage because the truth of his appeal (that he has no other means of registering 
his social existence) is acknowledged. Luther insisted that justification cannot 
be won by wilful means—by heroic actions stimulated by pity for others which 
is, in fact, egoism in disguise. On the other hand, not only may one legitimately 
seek to demonstrate the extent of one’s potential civic usefulness, one has a duty 
to realize that usefulness.20
It is also necessary here to consider the figural function of Charles the
18 Hunt, p. 121.
19 Dusinberre, ed. AYLI, p. 168.n.
20 Weber, Protestant Ethic, pp. 80-1.
wrestler. In Act 1 Scene 1, Charles declares himself absolutely assured of 
victory in the forthcoming bout with Orlando (120-4). Thus, like Orlando 
himself, Charles exhibits pride. Indeed, in Scene 2, Charles emerges as a 
boaster, given to crude taunts: “Come,” he calls, “where is this yong gallant, 
that is so desirous to lie with his mother earth?” (191-2); this allows the 
previously proud Orlando to appear modest in comparison: “Readie Sir,” he 
answers, “but his will hath in it a more modest working” (193-4). The Duke 
announces: “You shall trie but one fall” (195). Now Charles not only exhibits 
assurance of victory, but also sarcastically mocks the impotence of presiding 
authority: “No, I warrant your Grace you shall not entreat him to a second, that 
haue so mightily perswaded him from a first” (196-8). Orlando then says: “You 
meane to mocke me after: you should not haue mockt me before” (199-200). In 
other words, pride comes before a fall.
The surprising rudeness of Charles’s remark to a tyrant known to be given 
to violent mood-swings (255) offers a clue to the larger theological concerns 
regarding the necessity for Christ’s Incarnation which appear to inform this 
scene. According to a view which came to be consistently held among
i Ltheologians by the 11 century, the Incarnation was necessary in order for man 
to be emancipated from his willed enslavement to the Devil, consequent upon 
Adam’s act of disobedience. As man had committed his error of free will, man 
had to make good the error. But man could not do this, being enslaved to the 
Devil. The only way out of this fatalistic impasse was for God to become man. 
By this means, the Devil could be tricked into breaking his side of the bargain 
by overstepping his bounds and arranging for his henchman Death to claim 
Christ as just another man. Death could not, however, legitimately claim the 
part of Christ that was God. According to this view, the Incarnation was a trick 
played on the Devil and his henchman Death. Man was thus freed from the 
Devil’s service.21 All of this is arguably figured in the first two scenes of As You 
Like It: Oliver (Lucifer)22 assures his henchman Charles (Death) that he may
21 Southern, Making, pp. 223-4; see also: Chadwick, ed. Confessions, VII.27; Romans 7:24;
John 14:30; Colossians 2:14.
22 Aspects o f Oliver’s resemblance to Lucifer are discussed below.
indeed kill Orlando (Man). Charles taunts the presiding Duke (God) for his 
failure to prevent the death of Orlando. Orlando, who suspects that “the spirit of 
my Father ... is within mee” (1.1.20-1), informs Charles that he should not 
boast until he knows the final outcome. (I am not suggesting As You Like It thus 
endorses the medieval understanding of the Incarnation; the latter’s lack of 
consistency with divine dignity had been patent for centuries—at least since 
Anselm.23 Rather, the play draws upon this model in order to analyse the 
mismatch of Orlando’s values with the usurping Duke’s.)
Further details of the wrestling scene may now be considered. The 
wrestling champion Charles easily and violently slays the three young men he 
encounters first (1.2.119-25). Unlike Lodge, Shakespeare does not specify the 
social status of the earlier challengers. Their father is described as “poore” only 
after their death and so the adjective may have an emotional meaning. Le Beau, 
meanwhile, describes the victims as “proper yong men, of excellent growth”
(115). In a play which uses the word “gentle” so frequently, it is noticeable that 
these victims are not styled gentlemen. The play is not being snobbish: the 
omission of any reference to gentility indicates that the first two challengers 
retained too much pride—too much churlishness, too much of “Charles”—in 
their own nature to defeat him; hence, they were of comparable physical stature 
(no-one objected to their bouts on the grounds of mismatched size). Orlando, on 
the other hand, appears horribly mismatched because, in fact, his arrogance is 
not as great as his social presumption would indicate.
Orlando proceeds to win the bout. The defeated Charles “cannot speake”: 
death’s erstwhile vaunting pride is silenced (209). The presiding Duke now 
should dispense justice and reward Orlando’s victory. However, when Orlando 
declares himself to be the son of “Sir Roland de Boys” (211-2), the Duke 
regretfully observes that “The world esteem’d thy father honourable, / But I did 
find him still my enemie” (214-5). This is another departure from Lodge’s text. 
In Rosalynde, the usurper declares his love for Rosader’s father, the Stoic Sir 
John. In As You Like It, the Duke is displeased by Orlando’s proud
23 Southern, Making, pp. 224-5; R. W. Southern, Saint Anselm and His Biographer: a Study o f  
Monastic Life and Thought, 1059-c.l 130 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1966), pp. 89ff.
announcement of his human parentage.
Of course, salvation is not to be won by solely human means. Orlando as 
yet remains unaware of his participation in Christ. Orlando’s victory is not 
cosmically valid because he speaks only of human parentage. One could, 
therefore, construct a case that the usurping Duke’s position is legitimate. 
However, the Duke (usurper or not) is patently not God. For example, he has to 
wait to be told Orlando’s name (1.2.210-1). In addition, an emphasis upon the 
need to descend from the right house brings to mind the well-known practice of 
nepotism in the papal institution.24
On the other hand, the presiding Duke’s regret at Orlando’s declaration of 
his human lineage is sincere: “I would thou hadst beene son to some man else” 
he begins by saying (213). What use is this observation/wish to Orlando? How 
could he have “beene son to some man else”? The Duke’s statement is, 
therefore, otiose unless one reads it as: “if you had been the Son of God, not a 
son of Adam, I could acknowledge your victory”. The Duke goes on to say:
“But fare thee well, thou art a gallant youth” (218). Now softening after 
bristling at Orlando’s declaration of his human parentage, the Duke offers a 
significant variation upon his earlier statement: “I would thou had’st told me of 
another Father” (219). Now it is not a question of somehow being son to a 
different father but of telling of (professing) a different father. In other words, if 
Orlando had told the Duke (as he had previously told the princesses) that he was 
a nothing, here to allow his Father, God, to work through him, then matters 
would be different. But Orlando’s human pride reasserted itself at a crucial 
moment: he took personal credit for the victory in the name of “Sir Roland”.
Following the Duke’s exit, Celia says: “Were I my Father (Coze) would I 
do this?” (220). Not: “Were I in my father’s place...” but “Were I my 
Father...?” Heaven (Celia) denies any participation in this all too human 
version of God. The Duke is not possessed of divine infallibility: he claims 
spiritual authority but can err.
From the medieval perspective of the via antiqua, God could not, by his
24 Southern, Western Society, p. 132; Duffy, Popes, pp. 190-1; Hsia, Catholic Renewal, p. 97.
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very nature, act otherwise than justly, in accordance with human concepts of 
goodness and justice. Thus, the sacraments—including non-scriptural ones such 
as baptism and confession—could be relied upon as channels of grace. (How 
could a just God allow those sacraments to be implemented and trusted in for so 
many centuries, if they were not efficacious?) According to this view, all that 
would (and should) be required to rectify the communications breakdown 
between feudal values and sacramental values (themselves a consequence of 
feudal influence!) figured in Act 1 of As You Like It is the replacement of a 
tyrannical pope (or equivalent ruler laying absolute claim to spiritual authority) 
with a just one; that is, the reformation of the papacy/sacral monarchy not its 
abolition.
Luther, however, was influenced by the via moderna: God is inevitably 
just but his justice may not accord with human understanding.25 The play thus 
might seem to align itself with Lutheran anti-papalism but for that pointed 
remark of Celia’s. Put another way: Celia is obviously not really the voice of 
heaven, but (I am suggesting) Shakespeare’s ventriloquism of same. For 
institutional religious reform to be achieved, one does not do nothing and leave 
all up to God (as the via moderna might dictate); one reforms human 
conceptions of divinity so that they may coincide (more) with Celia’s/heaven’s 
notional ontic state. The play, I submit, employs facultative rhetoric as the 
agency of such reformation (as Chapters 7 and 8 will aim to show).
In another important departure from its proximate source, the play 
removes the motivation for the older brother’s hatred. In Rosalynde, Saladyne 
resents the larger legacy awarded to Rosader. In As You Like It, Oliver receives 
the larger legacy but confesses:
m y soule (yet I know  not w hy) hates nothing m ore then [Orlando]: yet h ee’s gentle, 
neuer sch o o l’d, and yet learned, full o f  noble deuise, o f  all sorts enchantingly beloued, 
and indeed so m uch in the heart o f  the world ... that I am altogether m isprised. (1 5 4 -6 0 )
25 Bagchi, Opponents, pp. 24-5.
Oliver’s motiveless jealousy has a primal quality, reminiscent of the envy 
Lucifer expresses upon hearing of God’s intention to create Man, as related in 
the Miracle plays. In the play’s only monologue, Oliver insists that he is 
incapable of doing otherwise than hating Orlando. There thus seems to be a 
predetermined quality to that hatred, as though Oliver embodies some evil 
principle at work in the cosmos. In The City o f God, Saint Augustine writes: 
“tamen lege iustitiae boni homines malis angelis praeferantur”.27 This may 
explain why, despite not having evinced any admirable qualities, a Luciferan 
Oliver declares himself “misprised”. A subsequent passage in Augustine’s text 
anticipates, moreover, Shakespeare’s portrayal of Oliver. Augustine describes 
Lucifer’s strategy in exile: “malesuada versutia in hominis sensum serpere 
affectans, cui utique stanti, quoniam ipse ceciderat, invidebat”.28 A comparable 
strategy is employed in As You Like It, when Oliver tells the wrestler Charles 
that Orlando is “full of ambition, an enuoius emulator of euery mans good parts 
... hee will practise against thee by poyson, entrap thee by some treacherous 
deuise ... I speake but brotherly of him” (134-46). The Luciferan Oliver here 
attributes his own nature to Orlando. Like Lucifer—also a first-born—he 
resents his “younger brother”, who seems to possess more of his father’s 
(God’s) spirit.29
Consequent upon this deterministic rationale for Oliver’s envy would be
25 Rosemary Woolf, The English M ystery Plays (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University o f  
California Press, 1972), pp. 115-6. See also Ricardo J. Quinones, The Changes o f  Cain: 
Violence and the Lost Brother in Cain and Abel Literature (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991), pp. 
15-16. Ward sees Oliver as prefiguring Milton’s Satan: A YLI, p. 72. Given that the enmity o f
Orlando and Oliver recalls that o f Cain and Abel in Genesis, it is worth noting that Lancelot 
Andrewes preached on Genesis 4 at St. Giles in 1599. Printed marginal annotation in the 
published version o f the sermon identifies Cain and Abel as “the ‘reprobate’ and the ‘elect’” 
respectively. Andrewes explains that Cain was “not respected” by God because “he was one o f  
the ‘rebelles lumini’”: Tyacke, “Lancelot Andrewes,” p. 13.
27 McCracken, ed. City o f  God, Xl.xvi (“yet by the law o f  righteousness good men are rated 
above bad angels”).
28 McCracken, ed. City o f  God, XlV.xi (“After his fall, he sought by corrupting guile to work 
his way into the heart o f man, whose unfallen state surely he envied since he himself had 
fallen”).
29 For humanity as the angels’ “younger brother”, see: Robert Bellarmine, “77ie Mind's Ascent 
to God by the Ladder o f  Created Things,” p. 194, in John Patrick Donnelly & Roland J. Teske, 
eds. Spiritual Writings, by Robert Bellarmine (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1989), pp. 47-230.
the notion that the reforms ostensibly achieved by Protestantism are not to be 
understood as means by which God tests humanity’s (and \a fortiori?] the 
Catholic church’s) virtue through suffering. Rather, they are to be understood as 
playing a crucial role in the build-up to the imminent end-times. The former 
(non-eschatological) conclusion was an enabling aspect of the Counter- 
Reformation platform and is represented in Lodge’s Rosalynde by the non- 
cosmic rationale for Saladyne’s resentment (Catholics had been prodigal and 
therefore the Reformation, with all its consequences, was merited).30 Hence, 
Lodge’s text cannily restricted the need for violent resistance to the temporal 
plane.
In As You Like It, though, some form of violent resistance to the religious- 
political status quo might be justified (from Orlando’s point of view), since a 
principle of primal evil appears responsible for the current state of affairs. 
Recalling, however, that Orlando shares Oliver’s chivalric values, a useful 
counterweight is provided by Lodowick Brysket’s A Discovrse o f Civill Life 
(1606). Brysket there disapproves of the notion that “a man for cause of honour 
may arme himselfe against his country”.31 Rather, Bryskett insists, says Paul N. 
Siegel, that “reputation should be gained in war against a national enemy”.32 
Shakespeare’s adoption of the names “Orlando” and “Oliver”, champions of the 
medieval resistance to Islam, has obvious relevance here. Instead of Christian 
fighting Christian in internecine squabbles over doctrine, Christian “heroes” 
should unite in virtuous missions into infidel lands. On the other hand, 
commitment to the crusading ideal does not sit well with the analytical tenor of 
As You Like It. As mentioned, Shakespeare internalizes infidelity: true 
Christians should make war against the infidelity in their own nature, not 
project their lack of faith onto their brother-Christians.
However, the play does suggest a cause for Oliver’s malice (though he is
30 J. Stevenson, ed. The Life o f  Jane Dormer, Duchess ofF eria  (London: Bums & Oates, 1887), 
by Henry Clifford, p. 74; Sandra Jusdado, “The Appellant Priests and the Succession Issue,” pp. 
201-2, in Mayer, ed. Succession, pp. 199-216; O’Malley, First Jesuits, pp. 276-7.
31 Lodowyck Brysket, A Discovrse o f  Civill Life Containing the Ethike Part o f  Morall 
Philosophic (London: Edward Blount, 1606), p. 74.
32 Paul N. Siegel, Shakespeare in His Time and Ours (Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame 
Press, 1968), p. 129.
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unaware of it). Celia and Rosalind’s love for each other, unique in human 
history (according to Charles) for its lack of ego-based individuality (1.1.102- 
7),33 is said to result from the circumstance that they have been bred together 
from the cradle, neither one given precedence over the other, until, presumably, 
political events disturbed that equity. Rosalind, whose name translates as 
“beautiful rose”, can be taken to figure physical beauty,34 or the natural world 
(the field which the Baconian scientific project seeks to master). When the 
heavenly order (figured by “Celia”) is not regarded as being of greater intrinsic 
worth than the earthly order, but is instead apprehended as interfused with it, 
then the rationale for contemptus mundi is removed.35 Doctrines based on 
contempt for the natural world are then revealed to be erroneous. Conversely, if 
a hierarchical relationship is insisted upon as an ontological given, one that 
determines the intrinsic worth of all given elements within the system, then the 
notionally “higher” member will insist on always being valued above the lower. 
A member, therefore, who fails to perceive that only through virtuous actions 
do they (performatively) justify their nominal position, may be led to vent 
his/her resentment on apparent climbers. In short, if Oliver has been educated to 
believe that being bom first automatically makes him superior, then his hatred 
of Orlando does have a human (but non-subjective) cause. Intriguingly, one 
consequence of this error arising from indoctrination is that it appears to make 
evil actions seem unmotivated (as Oliver’s malice seems to Oliver himself), and 
therefore speciously validates a deterministic creed.36
33 William Kerrigan, “Female Friends and Fraternal Enemies in AYLI,” pp. 191-2, in Valeria 
Finucci & Regina Schwartz, eds. Desire in the Renaissance: Psychoanalysis and Literature 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1994), pp. 184-203.
34 Judson Boyce Allen, The Friar as Critic: Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages 
(Nashville: Vanderbilt UP, 1971), pp. 111-3.
35 “Plato ... lost the real fruit o f his opinion, by considering o f forms as absolutely abstracted 
from matter, and not confined and determined by matter”: “The Advancement o f  Learning,” p. 
196, in Brian Vickers, ed. The Major Works, by Francis Bacon, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2002), pp. 120-299.
36 “In the picture o f  the ‘malecontent’ [in Wits Miserie] it is interesting to see how Lodge 
accepts motiveless malignity as a familiar fact calling for no explanation. The ‘right 
malecontent Deuill ... hating his countrie o f meer innated and corrupt villanie’”: Lewis, English 
Literature, p. 410.
*Unlike Lodge, Shakespeare makes his rival dukes brothers. Similarly, the 
playwright doubles the three sons of Sir Roland: each has name-sakes in the 
play (as discussed below). This concern with doubleness suggests that 
considerable significance attaches to the relationship between the “old” and 
“new” dukes.
In fact, not only does Shakespeare make the rival dukes brothers, he gives 
them the same name. In Act 1 Scene 2, Celia asks which “knight” the fool is 
referring to in his banter about oaths. Answers the clown: “One that old 
Fredericke your father loues” (80-1). At this point, members of a theatre 
audience register to whom the Clown addresses this remark. This is important 
because “Fredericke” is said by the clown to love a knight who “neuer had anie 
[honour]” and who, moreover, practises equivocation (76). That is a serious 
charge to level at a Renaissance duke. As the clown is answering Celia, the 
reader may suppose that he speaks of her father. On the other hand, the text 
identifies “Fredericke” as old; Rosalind’s father is the older brother, and indeed 
it is she who answers the clown: “My Fathers loue is enough to honour him 
enough [s/c]” (82-3).
The confusion is deliberate: “Fredericke” is the name of both women’s 
fathers. Modem editors (after Theobald) assume an error, however, and ascribe 
the line to Celia because the usurping Duke is identified as Frederick in the final 
act. Thus, for example, Horace Howard Fumess objected, in the 1890 variorum 
edition of the play: “it is impossible that the two brothers should both have the 
same name”.37 (Perhaps Fumess had not read The Comedy o f Errors recently.) 
Likewise, de Somoygi insists that the line requires emendation as Rosalind 
answers the Clown and “her father’s name cannot be Frederick”.38 However, in 
a play which doubles the names Orlando/Roland, Jaques and Oliver, how can 
one be so certain that both brothers are not meant to be taken as rival
37 Horace Howard Fumess, ed. A New Variorum Edition o f  Shakespeare: A Y LI (New York: 
Dover 1963), p. 28.
38 De Somoygi, ed. AYLI, p. 177 (emphasis added).
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apprehensions of one entity—for example, as rightful and wrongful avatars of 
(divine) authority respectively? After all, although uttering a defining relative 
clause, the clown does not use the adjective “old” to qualify the noun “Duke” 
but the name “Fredericke”, which implies there is an old Fredericke and a 
young one. In short, there is no justification for emending the text here.39
When, later in the same scene, the tyrant duke expresses regret over 
Orlando’s naming of his father, the offended youth responds: “I am more proud 
to be Sir Rolands sonne ... and would not change that calling / To be adopted 
heire to Fredricke” (221-2). Again, Rosalind (not Celia) answers this remark: 
“My Father lou’d Sir Roland as his soule, / And all the world was of my Fathers 
minde” (224-5). It appears that the relative merits of opposed Frederickian 
attitudes to Sir Roland is the topic under discussion.
When the banished duke is introduced in Act 2 Scene 1, the stage 
directions identify him as “Duke Senior”. This title clarifies that he is the older 
of the two versions of Frederick, as the clown’s earlier phrasing also stated.
(The title “Duke Senior” is never spoken onstage.) The use of the term “senior” 
was loaded in the period, for it was the word William Tyndale initially used in 
place of “priest” in translating the Bible.40 Tyndale insisted that 
presbyters/seniors were only ministers of the Word: their function was to teach 
and nothing else. A priest, on the other hand, was understood as synonymous 
with “sacer”; that is, a priest was one who sacrificed Christ on the altar in the 
form of the Eucharist. The First Folio, therefore, arguably introduces the 
banished Duke as “Duke Priest”.
The ambiguity as to whose father is called “Fredericke” draws attention to 
Shakespeare’s rejection of the names of Lodge’s rival rulers, Torismonde and
39 Charles Gildon, summarising the plot ofAYLFm  “Remarks on the Plays o f  Shakespear,”—  
first published in Rowe’s 1710 edition o f Shakespeare— wrote: “Frederick the Duke o f some 
part o f France is Depos’d, and Banish’d by his younger Brother”; he does not name the usurper: 
p. 79, in Tomarken, zd.AYLI, pp. 79-80. The “Dramatis Personas” o f Samuel Johnson’s 1765 
Shakespeare edition lists both Rosalind and Celia as “daughter to Frederick”, but lists the rival- 
dukes as “DUKE” and “Frederick, brother to the Duke, and usurper", p. 133. In his 
commentary, Johnson objects to Theobald’s supposition that the Dukes cannot be “Namesakes” 
on the grounds that “the Dramatis Personce were first enumerated by Rowe”, p. 141; in 
Tomarken, ed.AYLI, pp. 133-224.
40 Sir Thomas More, “A Dialogue Concerning Heresies,” p. 53, in Miola, ed. Early Modern 
Catholicism, pp. 49-55.
Gerismonde. Reading “Geri” as “gyre”, both names appear to mean “the world 
turns”.41 Implicit in Lodge’s choice of names for rulers past and present, 
therefore, is the notion that obedience to authority is all that matters, whoever is 
actually ruling is a matter of indifference to the religious mind.
Shakespeare’s choice of the name “Frederick” for his dukes brings to 
mind Castiglione’s The Book o f the Courtier. At the start of Book 1, Castiglione 
asserts (in contrast to the Stoic indifference of Lodge to worldly affairs) that the 
greatest felicity a man can hath is to be “governed with very good Princes”, and 
praises “the famous memorye of Duke Fridericke, who in his dayes was the 
light of Italy”.42 Siegel notes that “Duke Fridericke” is the name given to the 
“idealized court-ruler” in this central text of courtly culture, he being “wise and 
benevolent” (a valid placeholder, that is, for God).43 Though Castiglione took 
Cicero’s De Oratore as his chief model in writing The Courtier, he adapted that 
model to “the exigencies of a courtly establishment and its autocratic ruler”; 
thus, The Book o f the Courtier “marks historically ... the transformation of the 
late feudal warrior aristocrat into the polite courtier ... that occurred as first 
princely courts and then the absolutist state forced the nobility to give up its ... 
feudal entitlements”.44 The relevance of this transformation to the situation of 
Orlando (and Oliver) in As You Like It is patent, especially in the light of what 
has been said about the two brothers’ commitment to chivalric values.
An implicit question is asked by this particular revision of Lodge: as the 
world turns, and modes of production change, what are the characteristics and 
functions of a good ruler (God’s lieutenant) under, say, post-feudal conditions? 
Jettisoning “Torismond” and “Gerismond”, Shakespeare calls his duke(s) 
“Frederick” (“rich in faith”). Thus, by way of contrast with Lodge’s 
nomenclature, Shakespeare’s choice of name for his ducal brothers suggests that 
not only temporal powers but also spiritual authorities change as a consequence
41 Kinney considers the two names to be interchangeable: Humanist Poetics, p. 378.
42 Virginia Cox, ed. The Book o f  the Courtier, by Baldassare Castiglione, trans: Sir Thomas 
Hoby (London: Dent, 1994), p. 23.
43 Siegel, Shakespeare, p. 179.
44 Daniel Javitch, “Preface,” p. viii, in Javitch, ed., The Book o f  the Courtier: the Singleton 
Translation, by Baldasar Castiglione (New York & London: Norton, 2002), pp. vii-xvi.
of changes in modes of production (including cognitive production).
*
At the end of Rosalynde, Rosader, Saladyne and Phoebe, having undergone their 
personal reformations, marry Rosalynd, Alinda and Montanus respectively. This 
epidemic of marriage suggests that a loving reconciliation is being projected by 
Lodge’s romance rather than an enforced restitution of Catholic power.45 
Accordingly, the programme Lodge appears to endorse would involve a 
peaceful Stuart succession to the English throne, permitting the establishment of 
a national (Catholic) church along the lines of the Gallican ecclesiastical body, 
as perhaps hinted by the romance’s French setting.46 Lodge’s choice of primary 
dedicatee for Rosalynde is, therefore, significant. Henry Carey, Lord Hunsdon, 
was a conservative loyalist entrusted with responsibility for controlling the 
English/Scottish border during the Armada threat. He was also a frequent 
ambassador to Edinburgh, his trustworthiness appreciated by Elizabeth I and 
James VI. Hence, Lodge could not, in good faith, dedicate to such a man a 
metaphorical representation of the restoration of full papal authority in England. 
Nonetheless, the romance does indicate that violent action of some kind will be 
necessary to establish the Stuart succession on the correct institutional footing.47
Towards the close of Rosalynde, Femandyne, “a Scholler in Paris” (137) 
and the brother of Rosader and Saladyne, arrives in the forest with news that 
“hard by at the edge of this forrest the twelue Peeres of France are vp in Armes 
to recouer thy [Gerismond’s] right; and TORISMOND troupt with a crue of 
desperate runnagates is ready to bid them battaile” (137-8). Such an 
intervention by French peers on behalf of a usurped power had been prophesied 
by a poet favoured by Mary Stuart (and much translated by Lodge): Pierre
45 Tracey Sedinger, ‘“If Sight and Shape Be True’: the Epistemology o f  Cross-dressing on the 
London Stage,” p. 71, SQ  48 (1997), pp. 63-79.
46 Andrew Hadfield finds a comparable agenda: Shakespeare and Republicanism  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2005), p. 187.
47 Nelson, “Pastoral Forms,” p. 157. In his reply to Gosson, Lodge warned: “a peace muste 
needes haue a warre” (24).
Ronsard, in “Sonnet”, a poem dedicating his 1578 collected works to that 
sovereign. The French poet, writes James Emerson Phillips, “threatened that, 
unless Elizabeth mitigated her wrath, the heroes of France would take up the
4 qcause of the beauteous Scottish Queen”. (Lodge became “Ronsard’s most 
tireless adapter in the 1590s” but is known to have been reading him before that 
time.)49
With Torismond slain, the restored Gerismond calls a parliament within 
30 days and “by the consent of his Nobles he created ROSADER heire apparant 
to the kingdom” (139). This outcome was in line with Catholic thought. “It was 
generally accepted as orthodox Catholic theology,” writes Peter Holmes, “that 
ultimate political authority lay not in the hands of the prince, but in those of the 
commonwealth”.50
An obvious aspect of Shakespeare’s alteration of Lodge’s conclusion, 
therefore, is that the restoration of Duke Frederick Senior is achieved by 
peaceful means. As in Lodge, the “Second Brother” appears (in deus ex 
machina fashion) and reports:
Duke Frederick hearing how that euerie day 
Men o f great worth resorted to this forrest,
Addrest a mightie power ...
... purposely to take 
His brother here, and put him to the sword (5.4.152-6)
However, Second Brother then adds that the tyrant duke met “an old Religious 
man” at “the skirts of this wilde Wood” (157-8). Scholars and editors 
sometimes associate this “old Religious man” with the “old religious uncle” 
referred to earlier by Rosalind-disguised-as-Ganimed (3.2.332).51 However, that
48 James Emerson Phillips, Images o f  a Queen: Mary Stuart in 16lh Century Literature 
(Berkeley & Los Angeles: University o f California Press, 1964), p. 106.
49 Prescott, French Poets, p. 112; Marian Grubb, “Lodge’s Borrowings from Ronsard,” MLN  45 
(1930), pp. 357-60; John Holmes, “Thomas Lodge’s Amours: the Copy-Text for Imitations o f  
Ronsard in Phillis,” N&Q  53 (2006), pp. 55-7.
50 Holmes, Resistance and Compromise, p. 63.
51 Dusinberre, ed. AYLI, p. 324.n.
misogynous personage belonged to Rosalind’s account of her upbringing. The 
location of the current “old Religious man” (“the skirts” of the wood) tallies 
with one recently supplied by Oliver for Corin’s cottage (“the Purlews of this 
Forrest” [4.3.75]). Hence, Corin is a textually available candidate for the “old 
Religious man” encountered by the tyrant-duke. Second Brother says that the 
tyrant, “[a]fter some question with him [the old religious man], was converted” 
(5.4.159). What news could the plain-speaking Corin give Frederick, Jr. to 
effect this Pauline conversion of one who previously persecuted friends of Sir 
Roland? The name “Corin” partakes of “Corinthians”, recipients of the 
convertite Paul’s correspondence. Celia and Rosalind’s “very faithfull Feeder” 
(2.4.98), I suggest, has communicated the miracle of Orlando’s Christ-like act 
in forgiving and saving his brother Oliver. Orlando’s bloody and loving 
sacrifice atones for the sins of others (and for the pre-Reformation abuse of 
papal authority).52
In short, the play’s departure from Lodge here rejects the necessity for 
papal-sponsored military intervention to secure the restoration of sound 
religious authority in England. Rather, the play suggests, once passionate and 
resentful young Englishmen facultatively cognize Christ by reforming 
themselves and forgiving former injuries, apparent “tyranny” will convert to 
legitimate authority. That is, the apprehension of tyranny will turn out to have 
been the product of distorted cognition.
One final major departure from Lodge remains to be discussed: 
Shakespeare’s addition of the god Hymen to Lodge’s scenario. As mentioned in 
the Introduction, Lodge not only omits the conventional heterobiographical 
author-figure from his pastoral romance (an equivalent of the Arcadias’ 
Philisides), he also presents his narrative as having been written by someone
52 A passage in Augustine is relevant: “Itemque ad Romanos agit [Rom. 8: 28-39], ut 
persecutionis huius mundi caritate uincantur spe certa in adiutorio dei. Agit autem et granditer et 
ornate. Scimus, inquit, quoniam diligentibus deum omnia cooperantur in bonum, his qui 
secundam propositum vocati sunt. Quoniam quos ante praesciuit, et praesdestinauit conformes 
imagnis filii sui, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus”: “Doctrina Christiana,” IV.XX.43. 
“First-bom” (“primogenitus”) is clearly given figurative valence here; see also: Chadwick, ed. 
Confessions, VII.15; Romans 9:13.
other than himself (namely, Lyly’s Euphues). Thus, the narrator of Rosalynde is 
not “Thomas Lodge”. By this means Lodge locates the source of authority—the 
fount of narrative “truth”—outside of his text. Consequently, the cognitive 
union facilitated by the centrally-accented structure of Rosalynde offers no 
means of union with that external authority.
In Chapter 8, it will be argued that As You Like It reinserts the missing 
heterobiographical figure from Lodge’s text in the form of Jaques. Here, 
however, the addition of Hymen is the focus of attention. Like Rosalynde, As 
You Like It performs central accent: as far as audience-members are concerned, 
Rosalind and Orlando unite at the centre of the play (4.1.127ff); in addition, 
Orlando performs an efficacious imitation of Christ prior to the final act. 
Rosalind-disguised-as-Ganimed then claims to have magical powers, telling 
Orlando that she will deliver Rosalind to him in person (5.2.57-66). Of course, 
Rosalind does not need magical powers to deliver herself to Orlando. 
Nonetheless, delivery of her presence is the occasion of a divine manifestation 
before a public assembly (5.4.110-1). Spiritual authority is not external to the 
play; it manifests in the final scene.
The following two chapters will argue that the melancholy Jaques is a 
figure for author-function in the play. Perhaps, then, Jaques should be the one to 
summon Hymen (in line with the suggestion in Chapter 2 that the author- 
function present in Dyer’s poem performs a ministerial role). According to a 
subjectivist model of cognition, such a figure would be best qualified to 
apprehend the divine: the intellect apprehends Christ, by meditation upon the 
Scriptures, and makes religious truth manifest in the world via preaching.
Earlier in the play, Jaques shows himself to be a stickler for sacramental 
procedure, advising Touchstone and Audrey to consult a priest who will tell 
them what marriage means (3.3.77ff). In this intervention, however (as with 
every other he attempts in the play), Jaques—being a figure for the author- 
function as intellect—achieves nothing. The intellect by itself is incapable of 
affecting reality. It can only render judgement, after the fact. Thus, Jaques plays 
no part in the facultative elicitation of Hymen’s manifestation.
It is precisely the function of the appetitive faculty, however, to interact 
directly with the world. This faculty is figured (I maintain) in the play by 
Orlando, lover of Rosalind (natural beauty). The appetitive faculty is not 
superior to the intellect, but its functions are always prior to intellection. 
Orlando’s performative union with Rosalind at 4.1.127ff. necessarily precedes 
the union of the will (Oliver) with heaven (Celia) (described at 5.2.31-40).
Sober discernment had not been invited to the unofficial “wedding” of Rosalind 
and Orlando; hence, Orlando expresses frustration and impatience at 5.2.42-6 
and 49, being unaware that he is already united with Rosalind. The sacramental 
rite in Act 5 Scene 4, performed by Hymen (123-144) with an impromptu assist 
from Jaques (184-90), is the ratification of the entire process.
Jaques administers blessings to the four married couples, though it might 
be expected that this task would be performed by Duke Senior, the play’s 
nominal authority figure. However, since cognitive processes are facultative, 
not exclusively rational, the intellect (here figured by Jaques)—in addition to 
institutional power—must approve them. After all, if the intellect (however 
inflated or misled) does not accept the spiritual truth of what has been 
performed, how long can the institution based on that performance endure? At 
last, Jaques actively intervenes: he speaks the blessings (184-90). Jaques does 
not challenge but rather acknowledges and comments upon what has been 
performed. With that, his task is done. This version of the intellect opts not to 
enchain itself to the institution—it is not for “dancing meazures” (191). Jaques 
departs in order to converse with the latest occupant of the hermit’s cave (178- 
82, 193-4).
*
In conclusion, it may be observed that As You Like It does not target for 
correction those aspects of Rosalynde which present a Jesuit-influenced doctrine 
of justification. It does, however, correct other, more conservative aspects of its 
source. For example, the sacramental system of penance as it was traditionally
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understood in its late-medieval reception, is (I have argued) shown to be 
unworkable—not because Christians are saved by “faith alone” but because 
popes, priests and sacral monarchs are strictly formal representatives of divine 
authority: they cannot see into human hearts. This does not render the spiritual 
condition of believers opaque, however, as a subjectivist model of cognition 
would assume (that model only regarding objects of the rational faculty, as 
assembled by the senses, as to any extent knowable). Christians—As You Like It 
indicates—perform justification by facultative means: the soul’s appetitive 
faculty is attracted to the good, recognizing it as the beautiful.53 Acted upon by 
the rhetorical power of natural beauty,54 the appetitive faculty endeavours to 
unite with its “object”. This endeavour will fail as long as natural beauty is 
regarded as a quality belonging to an isolated object capable of possession by an 
isolated subject. Orlando does not win Rosalind as prize-object through heroism 
but rather performatively demonstrates his cognitive union with beauty—he 
performs a graceful action—when he rescues his brother. As a result (or 
simultaneously), the soul’s volitional faculty—Oliver—turns to the good (in the 
form of the heavenly Celia). With this achieved, the “fallen” creature becomes 
capable of meritorious action, as a consequence of its having conformed itself to 
God’s likeness.
Unlike Rosalynde, As You Like It does not offer a message to its audience 
as an interim substitute for “the real thing” (access to Catholic priests and the 
Eucharist). As Oliver says (with regard to Rosalind’s swoon): “This was not 
counterfeit: there is too great testimony in your complexion that it was a passion 
of earnest” (4.3.168-70). The conversion of passion to grace is the Christian 
operation, though it clothes itself according to current fashion.
53 In anti-materialistic facultative models, the appetitive faculty is “replaced” by the faculty o f  
memory. The appetite, though, properly understood, is memory: one must have previously 
tasted/experienced something to now have an appetite for it. Thus, recognition o f natural beauty 
is precisely that— re-cognition o f  heavenly beauty experienced prior to birth as natural beauty. 
Accordingly, the first words spoken by Orlando, in the play’s opening line, are “As I remember 
Adam” (with no comma before “Adam” in the Folio text).
54 Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, p. 66.
Chapter 7.
Jaques the Lutheran.
As You Like It’s second act will here be read as an assessment of the Lutheran 
critique of papal Catholicism, conducted via the character of Jaques and his 
combative relationship with the banished Duke Senior. This reading supplements 
the previous chapter’s contention that the play’s departures from its source, 
Lodge’s Rosalynde, enact a conversation with anti-papalism.
In addition, I will examine the repeated presentation in As You Like It of 
staggered cognition—the play’s tendency to have a character (x) report at length 
his/her prior observations of character y  to characters zz. Analysis of the First 
Lord’s report of his observation of Jaques in Act 2 Scene 1—this being an 
example of staggered cognition—will seek to demonstrate the relationship 
between the Lutheran hermeneutic “revolution” and cognitive theory.
*
Having given the theme of the auto-cognitive benefits of suffering his best 
rhetorical shot (2.1.1-17), the banished Duke Frederick Senior is confronted by 
his follower Amiens’ pagan-materialist understanding of “fortune” (“happy is 
your Grace / That can translate the stubbomnesse of fortune / Into so quiet and so 
sweet a stile” [18-20]). Amiens’ doxy-deaf praise is a non sequitur for the 
humanist educator. Having encountered this fresh evidence of the limitations of 
reason and Ciceronian rhetoric, the Duke does not abandon his didactic 
enterprise, but turns to alternative media. The Duke, it should be noted, has just 
declared a commitment to what many might consider to be over-determination:
“this,” he says,
our life exempt from publike haunt,
Findes tongues in trees, bookes in the running brookes,
Sermons in stones, and good in euery thing. (15-17)
The Duke thus applies the Augustinian hermeneutic (as outlined in Chapter 
1) to all nature as text. Not only is the spiritual meaning of natural phenomena 
apparent when “publike” noise is subtracted from the cognitive process, but that 
meaning has charity (“good”) as universal referent. Accordingly, the “venison” 
which the Duke now proceeds to recommend that he and Amiens hunt figures, I 
suggest, not meat for the carnal man but passions of the flesh to be “hunted” 
(expelled) by means of penitential exercises (here specifically flagellation). 
Hunting as a figure for spiritual exercise was a medieval commonplace, 
appearing in texts both clerical and lay.1 The opening of Psalm 41 was influential 
in this tradition:
As the hart panteth after the fountains o f waters: so my soul panteth after thee, O 
God (1.2)2
Here, the soul, figured as a hart, is not hunted, but quests for God, figured as 
“fountains of waters”. However, in The Prophecy of Jeremias, hunters are figures 
for “true Christian prelates”:3
Behold, I will send many fishers, saith the Lord, and they shall fish them [that is, the 
children o f Israel]: and after this I will send them many hunters, and they shall hunt them
1 Huppe and Robertson, Jr., Fruyt and Chaf, pp. 48-50, 53-4, 58, 62, 83, 89, 91-2, 97, 100; 
Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, pp. 113, 192-3, 255, 263-4, 464-5; Saslow, Ganymede, p. 69. Robertson, 
Jr. suggests the Ars Amatoria as an early source: p. 193; see: Publius Ovidius Naso, “Artis 
Amatorie: The Art o f  Love," Book 1 Lines 21-4, in E. H. Warmington, ed. Ovid in Six Volumes. 
Volume 2: The Art o f Love, and Other Poems, 2nd edition (London & New York: Heinemann, 
1939), pp. 11-175; however, see also: Psalms 28:9, 37:3; Chadwick, ed. Confessions, XI.3.
2 The Rheims-Douay gloss/title to Psalm 41 bears some relation to the themes o f AYLI: 
“Quemadmodum desiderat. The fervent desire o f the just after God: hope in afflictions”.
3 Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, p. 255.
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from every mountain (16:16)
Having gained a degree of self-insight, the exiled Duke is careful to include not 
only Amiens but also (via the ethical dative) himself in the penitential “hunt”: 
“shall we goe and kil vs venison?” (21).
Surely, though, figural precedents notwithstanding, deer are actually hunted 
in this play? It may be recalled that the wrestling bout in Act 1 Scene 2 turns out 
to be just a wrestling bout: Orlando is refused a prize on the grounds of his 
worldly affiliations. That is, the presiding Duke (I argued) treated the contest as a 
form of sacramental rite whereby Orlando’s works could merit a reward (if he 
belonged to the right family). Read thus, the bout figures the apprehension of 
physical actions as (potentially) spiritually efficacious procedures. It is my 
contention that an equivalent (complex) situation obtains here: the banished Duke 
speaks, figuratively, of flagellation as a spiritually efficacious activity. According 
to the text’s cognitive play with the “real” and the “misprized”, however, the 
Duke and his followers may be doing no more than whip flesh to no gainful end. 
The futility and misguided nature of the action are in turn presented figuratively 
as the unnecessary/untimely hunting of venison. (The Duke’s description of the 
weather suggests it is winter in the forest, but Owens notes that “[ajccording to 
contemporary sources, it [deer] was hunted in summer”.)4 Killing for sport or to 
secure a luxurious diet when simpler food is available is a superfluous, and, 
therefore, sinful action, as Sidney’s Philisides insists. At first, says the mournful 
shepherd, man pretended to share dominion of the world with the beasts, but
A t length for glutton taste he did them  kill;
A t last for sport their silly  lives did spill.
But yet, O man, rage not beyond thy need;
D eem  it no gloire to sw ell in tyranny.
Thou art o f  blood; jo y  not to m ake things b leed.5
4 Owens, “Melancholy,” p. 26.n.21.
5 Duncan-Jones, ed. Old Arcadia, pp. 224-5.
In isolation, the quotation from Sidney might seem obviously concerned with 
actual hunting. However, Philisides is delivering a beast fable\ thus, he adds:
And you, poor beasts, in patience bide your hell,
Or know your strengths, and then you shall do well.6
Sidney scholars such as Blair Worden have explored the political significance 
(and ambiguities) of this couplet.7 For my present purpose, it only needs to be 
observed that when hunting is mentioned in Elizabethan pastoral, it is done so in 
a figural manner. Berry notes, incidentally, that hunting is never mentioned in the 
narrative of the Old Arcadia and receives only two mentions in the eclogues 
(“both times in relation to Philisides”).8 Intriguingly, “Shakespeare’s exploitation 
of [hunt] imagery is unique among dramatists of the period”.9
What justification do I have, though, besides precedent, for importing these 
complications into As You Like Itl With regard to restraining subjective 
interpretative excess, I rely here—as throughout the thesis—upon the 
Augustinian (if not the Lutheran) hermeneutic, taking into account the post- 
Augustinian scholastic expansion of the applicability of that hermeneutic to all 
texts including natural phenomena. Luther asserted that no figural meaning 
should be attributed to a scriptural text unless to do otherwise would result in 
absurdity. Thus, where Augustine’s concern was for charity always to emerge as 
scriptural referent (even at the cost, presumably, of apparently wrenching a text 
to secure that outcome), Luther let charity fall by the wayside being more 
concerned to protect Holy Writ from absurdity.10 Without wishing to denigrate or
6 Duncan-Jones, ed. Old Arcadia, p. 225.
7 Blair Worden, The Sound o f  Virtue: Philip Sidney’s  Arcadia and Elizabethan Politics (New  
Haven & London: Yale UP, 1996), pp. 287-93.
8 Edward Berry, Shakespeare and the Hunt: a Cultural and Social Study (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 2001), p. 161 (in the New Arcadia, however, Sidney “brought hunting within the narrative as 
an aristocratic sport”).
9 Berry, Hunt, p. 14.
10 There might seem to be some conflict here with the supposed influence upon Luther o f  the via 
moderna. According to the via moderna model, apparent scriptural absurdities would be a 
consequence o f human fallibility, not an incentive to interpret figuratively. However, Luther
caricature Luther, I would suggest that the Wittenberg-based scholar was either 
hermeneutically nai've or disingenuous in the early stages of his contest with 
Rome as regards the “plain meaning” of Scripture.11 In any case, in the wake of, 
say, Luther’s contest with Erasmus regarding the scriptural basis for the freedom 
or bondage of the human will, it readily became apparent that scriptural 
statements rarely admit of a single universally acceptable interpretation. Thus, 
regardless of Luther and other reformers’ explicit preference for “literal” 
readings, figural interpretations are the norm whenever Scripture is read. As 
noted, moreover, the banished Duke extends the application of the Augustinian 
hermeneutic to all of nature as text. Luther, for his part, opposed the division of 
human society into religious and lay sectors. If the Augustinian and Lutheran 
hermeneutics apply to Scripture, therefore, they apply to all of the creation, in its 
“natural” and human cultural forms, with God as (sole) author.
Applying the Lutheran hermeneutic to the present case, one might say 
“What need to read the Duke’s hunting of venison as flagellation? He’s in a 
forest, he needs food and deer abound...” Certainly, if one reads the relevant 
speeches in Act 1 Scene 2 in isolation, that argument cannot easily be gainsaid. 
From the Augustinian perspective, however, one struggles to find a meaning 
consistent with charity in the banished Duke’s simultaneous perception of “good 
in euery thing” and eagerness to slaughter deer. Luther’s follower Tyndale, 
moreover, observed that individual phrases of texts should not be interpreted in 
isolation to suit one’s polemical intention.12 That is, read in a Lutheran way, the 
Duke’s moral inconsistency is (locally) patent. Reading in an Augustinian (and 
Tyndalian) way, one reserves judgement until the text as a whole may be 
assessed.
“The melancholy Jaques”, the reader/audience is told in Act 2 Scene 1,
relies on Scripture as the efficacious vehicle o f  human cognition o f  God; Scripture does not 
necessarily partake o f  divine attributes.
11 Pendergast, Religion, p. 47; MacCulloch, Reformation, p. 345.
12 William Tyndale, “A Prologue upon the Epistle o f St Paul to the Romans,” p. 505, in Henry 
Walter, ed. Doctrinal Treatises and Introductions to Different Portions o f  the Holy Scriptures, by 
William Tyndale (Cambridge: Parker Society, 1848), pp. 483-509; the relevant passage is 
discussed in Greenblatt, Self-fashioning, pp. 102-4. The need to attend to the meaning o f  texts in 
their entirety was also emphasized by leading humanists, such as Erasmus and Melanchthon: 
Stillman, Sidney, p. 64.
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“grieues” at the Duke’s recurrent slaughter of deer (26). Reading “realistically”, 
modem readers sometimes interpret Jaques’ protest as animal rights activism (for 
example, the character is a zealous vegetarian in Kenneth Brannagh’s 2006 film 
adaptation of the play). However, in Act 4 Scene 2, a jubilant Jaques is eager to 
“present” the one “that killed the Deare ... to the Duke like a Romane 
Conquerour” (1, 3-4). Applying Luther’s hermeneutic, the vegetarian Jaques of 
the “realistic” reading may be discarded. Jaques objects to the Duke’s (manner 
of) slaying deer, not the slaying of deer per se. Indeed, observation of the correct 
manner of deer-slaughter is a cause for communal celebration; it also prompts a 
wish (on Jaques’ part alone) to taunt the erring Duke with signs that the reformed 
rite has been performed (“it would do well,” Jaques continues, preparing for the 
presentation of the anonymous deerslayer to the Duke, “to set the deer’s homs 
upon his head for a branch of victory” [4-5]).13 Now it is Jaques, not the Duke, 
who appears morally inconsistent from a “realistic” point of view. To rescue 
Shakespeare, the Duke and Jaques from absurdity, therefore, the hunting of deer 
needs to be read figuratively. I suggest that the killing of the deer figures the 
conversion of death to victory, in the face of Roman tyranny, as performed by 
Christ on the cross and by his subsequent (sacramental) imitators. Of course, the 
sacrament in question cannot be that of penance in the Lutheran scheme of Act 4 
Scene 2; rather it is the reformed rite of the Eucharist (in pagan costume). One 
might infer, though, that having Jaques wish to present the celebrant “like a 
Romane Conquerour”indicates the reformed rite is no more than a burlesque 
version of the Roman one.
Since Jaques’ appearance of inconsistency is removed once Act 4 Scene 2 
is read figuratively, the same service may be performed for the banished Duke of 
Act 2 Scene 1. James Black has pointed out that the Duke’s speech does not 
accurately describing actual hunting practices: “deer are not conveniently taken 
by being shot in their backsides”.14 Likewise, Edward Berry notes that “haunches
13 Berry, Hunt, p. 182.
14 James Black, “The Marriage-Music o f Arden,” p. 387, English Studies in Canada 6 (1980), pp. 
385-97.
were never a target in hunting”, being “among the most desirable cuts”.15 That 
the Duke specifies that “round hanches” are the targets of the “forked heads” he 
envisions, therefore, suggests that those “forked heads” figure the bifurcated ends 
of whips, as applied to human buttocks.
However, the Duke has recently insisted there is “good in euery thing” 
(2.1.17). What need for flagellation? He acknowledges the seeming 
contradiction:
And yet it irkes me the poore dapled fooles 
Being natiue Burgers o f this desert City,
Should intheir [sic] owne confines with forked heads 
Haue their round hanches goard. (22-5)
This is a complex statement. First of all, it is difficult to understand how a “desert 
[that is, empty] City” can have “natiue[s]”.16 The “obvious” answer is that the 
Duke is saying that his animal quarry live in an unpeopled forest. (The “realist” 
reading thus relies on figuration.) But the term “Burger” in the early modem 
period appears to have meant “citizen”;17 hence, the Duke could be paraphrased 
as saying “these citizens live in a city without citizens”. The “obvious” answer 
makes no sense. Moreover, does one suppose that the Duke chooses his similes at 
random? Why does he call the deer “Burgers”?
The earliest examples of “burgher” given in the OED date from the 16th 
century.18 However, the word derives from Old Saxon “burg”, meaning “fort”.19 
Thus, the word “burger” may denote a protected inhabitant belonging to a feudal 
structure. The medieval French chronicler Guibert of Nogent, for instance, refers 
to “burgensibus” in relation to the “abbatiae Sancti Joannis”:20 “the burghers of
15 Berry, Hunt, p. 173.
16 For asimilar usage o f  “desert”, see: Duncan-Jones, ed. Old Arcadia, pp. 11 and 369.n.
17 “[BJurgher, n.,” OED.
18 “[BJurgher, n .” OED.
19 “[BJorough, n .” OED.
20 Bourgin, Georges, ed. Histoire de Sa Vie (1053-1124), by Guibert o f Nogent (Paris: Alphonse 
Picard et Fils, 1907), p. 149.
the abbey of Saint-Jean”.21 Guibert’s modem English editor, John F. Benton, 
observes that these burghers “may be thought of as serfs of the abbey who had 
burgess rights in Laon in return for the dues they paid the church”.22 Thus, to 
read the Duke’s term “Burger” as exactly synonymous with “citizen” flattens the 
former term’s registration of changes consequent upon the decay of feudal 
culture. Restoring that awareness could dissolve the apparent self-contradiction in 
the Duke’s comment. The “deer” may be regarded as Christians who have 
deserted the City of God; perhaps they have exchanged native serfdom (as 
servants of God) for apparent worldly “liberty”. Accordingly, they are subject to 
great suffering for their sins (to the Duke’s impotent regret). There is “good in 
euery thing”, but people fail to apprehend this and, in pursuit of individualistic 
liberty, enslave themselves to sin. Arguably, the Duke equates his own current 
acts of penance with the suffering of the “natiue burgers”—he too had deserted 
the City of God in his former enjoyment of “painted pompe” (2.1.2).23
At this moment, another of the Duke’s followers—the First Lord— 
introduces the character of Jaques. Jaques plays no dramatically necessary role in 
the unfolding of the play’s plot (slender as that is) and yet is provided with a 
lengthy description prior to his arrival onstage. Hence, one is led to assume that 
he is of particular conceptual importance. Jaques, moreover, is presented (made 
present) for the Duke and his company’s—and the audience’s/reader’s— 
cognition by the First Lord, who has observed and eavesdropped upon Jaques. 
This is but one of many instances of the play’s performance of staged or (if the 
theatrical pun obtmdes) staggered cognition. For example, in Act 1 Le Beau 
describes defeated wrestlers (“Three proper yong men, of excellent growth and 
presence” [2.115-6]) for the cognitive benefit of Rosalind and Celia (and the 
theatre audience/reader). Often in the play, a character is first apprehended by 
sensory means by one character and the results of that apprehension are then
21 John F. Benton, ed. S elf and Society in Medieval France: the Memoirs o f  Abbot Guibert o f  
Nogent (Toronto, Buffalo & London: University o f Toronto Press, 1984), p. 160.
22 Benton, ed. Guibert, p. 160.n.8; see also: Bourgin, ed. Histoire, p. 149.n.l.
23 See: Chadwick, ed. Confessions, V.2 (“they have fled ... for you [God] do not desert anything 
you have made ... you have not abandoned your creation as they have deserted their Creator”).
relayed to further characters.24 The prior apprehensions are almost never 
presented on stage (exceptions include Orlando’s mention of the starving Adam 
to Duke Senior and his company [2.7.129-134] and Orlando’s description of his 
first meeting with Ganimed, again to Duke Senior et al [5.4.28-9]).
It might be said that such “staggering” is often merely the dramatist’s 
attempt to heighten audience anticipation. Nonetheless, the play’s repetition of 
the device is striking. It is, for instance, applied three times to descriptions of 
Orlando (by Le Beau, who refers to him as “the best” [1.2.109-11], Celia 
[3.2.174-241] and the transformed Oliver [4.3.97-155]). In the latter case, the 
appeal to dramaturgical criteria is countered by the observation that the 
presentation of Orlando’s combat with the lion holds greater obvious dramatic 
potential than Oliver’s Spenserian (and/or Copleyan) account of same.25 
Regardless of its capacity to generate audience anticipation, the device’s frequent 
appearance in the play indicates a preoccupation with cognitive process.
Such staggering could have no bearing on cognition per se, according to a 
subjectivist cognitive model. That is, once a subject perceives an object, discrete 
cognitive act x is concluded. Reporting finite cognitive act x to another person 
would lead to the performance of finite cognitive acty by that recipient; it would 
not contribute to an always incomplete cognitive process. According to the 
subjectivist model, the receiving subject could ask questions leading the initial 
observer to alter their opinion. The witnesses in As You Like It, however, never 
alter their “opinions” (vis-a-vis their prior respective apprehensions) as a 
consequence of any response to their reportage. This is because they do not have 
opinions. In making these reports, they are not representations of individuals but
24 Further examples include: First Lord as reporter {reporting on “ladies” [themselves reporting 
on Celia to the First Lord]) > Duke Frederick, Jr. et al, as recipients (2.2.4-7); Second Lord 
(Hisperia [Rosalind and Celia] > Second Lord) > Duke Frederick, Jr. et a l (2.2.10-16); Adam 
(Oliver) > Orlando (2.3.17-26); Orlando (Adam) > Duke Senior et al (2.7.129-134); Orlando (Sir 
Roland) > Duke Senior (2.7.195-8); Oliver (Orlando) > Duke Frederick, Jr.et al (3.1.1); Celia 
(Orlando) > Rosalind (3.2.174-241); Oliver (Orlando [Ganimed and Celia] > Oliver) > 
Rosalind/Celia (4.3.82-7); Oliver (Orlando) > Rosalind/Celia (4.3.97-155).
25 For the Catholic Copley’s imitation o f the Spenserian poetic in A Fig fo r  Fortune (1596), see: 
Susannah Brietz Monta, Martyrdom and Literature in Early Modern England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2005), pp. 100-4. Oliver’s statement (from an omniscient viewpoint) that Orlando 
“threw his eye aside” (4.3.101) bears some relation to the portentous style o f Copley’s narrator, 
who at one point describes himself as “Casting my eye aside”: Fortune, p. 73.
facultative presentations.
Before continuing it will be helpful to outline some relevant details of 
facultative cognition. First of all, one should distinguish (as did Hooker)26 
between a facultative taxonomy of the soul and facultative cognition per se. In 
the facultative taxonomy, as derived from Plato via Aristotle, the latter’s Arabic 
commentators and the scholastics, the soul is conceived as comprising three 
faculties (in the Anselmian and Piconian models, these are itemized as the 
appetitive, volitional and intellectual faculties).27 Facultative cognition per se 
involves sensory data being gathered by different sensory organs and presented to 
the “common sense” {koine aesthesis) for synthesis.28 For instance, visual data 
presented to two eyes is combined there to form a single mental “image”. Multi- 
sensual experiences (such as touching and tasting an apple) are likewise 
assembled in/by the koine aesthesis.
Read facultatively, therefore, Le Beau, in relaying information to Rosalind, 
Celia and the clown, functions in a manner akin to a set of sense-organs reporting 
to the koine aesthesis (note that he provides visual and aural data [1.2.119-25]). 
However, characters who are information-bearers in one scene may be receivers 
in another scene. They do not consistently figure this or that component in a 
cognitive assembly. (After all, sometimes the ears “inform” the eyes, and vice 
versa, and so on with other sensory combinations.) Celia, while listening to Le 
Beau, is part of the receiving sensorium; elsewhere, she acts as a set of sense- . 
organs in apprehending Orlando in the forest—prior to relaying that apprehension 
to an impatient Rosalind (3.2.174-241).
26 As discussed in the Introduction.
27 For Plato’s formulation, see: Shorey, ed. Republic, 434D-436C; for the Aristotelian reception, 
see: Hugh Lawson-Tancred, “Introduction,” pp. 4 4 ,46 , 99, in Lawson-Tancred, ed. De Anima 
(On the Soul), by Aristotle (London: Penguin, 1986), pp. 11-116. For Anselm’s version, see: 
Southern, Anselm, pp. 224-5; for Pico’s triad, see: Fowler, “Neoplatonic Order,” p. 59.
28 Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Inner Touch: Archaeology o f  a Sensation (New York: Zone, 2007), 
p. 38. Aristotle’s koine aesthesis is usually Latinized as the sensus communis. Following Heller- 
Roazen, I retain the Greek term because it defamiliarizes the concept, foregrounding the matter at 
issue: that the act o f  cognition is usually taken for granted. The koine aesthesis!sensus communis 
is also sometimes referred to as the fantasia. This, however, can lead to confusion— firstly, 
because in Aristotle the fantasia  is a function o f the koine aesthesis; secondly, following 
Avicenna, Albertus Magnus and Roger Bacon divided the sensus communis from imagination 
“according to whether [the latter faculty] receives [sense-impressions] or retains them”: Harvey, 
Inward Wits, p. 71.n.l38.
When components act in co-operation, “social” hierarchy does not affect 
reception. First-hand witnesses are allowed to have their say; the data they 
present is accepted on its own terms. Alternative views, however, are also 
allowed their input. No facultative reporter can over-rule another by fiat. 
Probable certainty is approximated by the combining of data. Evident 
contradictions, however, can lead to the questioning of data. For example, the 
eyes see a bent stick in the water and report this to the koine aesthesis. “Yes,” 
says the assembly, “you do see a bent stick.” The hand then reports: “the stick 
feels straight.” Evidentiary contradiction leads to judgement (discernment) being 
reserved. Available data may then be submitted to the intellect for ratification 
according to this or that theoretical model or further evidence may be sought. 
This is the psychic commonwealth in action. It is pertinent, therefore, that the 
tyrant Duke Frederick, Jr. does not adopt such an approach in declaring Rosalind 
a traitor (“Let it suffice thee that I trust thee not” [1.3.52]).
As You Like It thus presents cognition as a staggered process. Sensory data 
is gathered and then presented to a group of characters for corroborative 
processing. (The single exception is Celia’s reporting of her sighting of Orlando 
to Rosalind alone: Rosalind’s impatience leads to a violation of assembly 
protocol.) The repeated pattern—whereby sensory data tends only to be reported, 
while subsequent communal corroboration is actually performed—might be a 
function of the dramatic format. On the other hand, it could indicate an 
inclination to regard unmediated sensory experience, especially ocular, as 
commonly over-privileged; hence, communal synthesis of multi-sensory data is 
promoted instead. The latter point is consistent with Luther’s insistence that the 
preached word take precedence over images adored in isolation. Note though that 
this position is not anti-visual as such.29
In performing staggered cognition, however, As You Like It does not
29 This is in line with Luther’s tolerance for icons and imagery in churches. Witness, for example, 
his clashes with Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt vis-a-vis the latter’s iconoclasm: Markus 
Wriedt, “Luther’s Theology,” pp. 104-6, in McKim, ed. Luther, pp. 86-119; Oberman, Lather, pp. 
302-3. This aspect o f Luther’s position is elided in Huston Diehl, Staging Reform, Reforming the 
Stage: Protestantism and Popular Theatre in Early Modern England (Ithaca & London: Cornell 
UP, 1997).
perform cognition of the initial phenomenon as existent being. Rather, cognition 
of appearance/s occurs (the koine aesthesis has no direct access to phenomena). 
As noted, moreover, judgement/discernment (the forming of a settled opinion vis- 
a-vis the initial phenomenon) is postponed until a later moment (cognition per se 
is in fact never complete). (That is, in each case except one: Oliver’s report of 
Orlando’s combat with the lioness.)30 These cases, in other words, do not perform 
the presentation of assembled sensory data to the intellect for ratification. Thus, 
though Jaques figures the intellectual faculty, the play presents its data to the 
faculties of the audience/reader—to be assessed as they/he/she like/s it. Hence, 
the framing function performed by Jaques de Boys (as passive intellect) is 
equivalent to the spectation-audition/reading experience of audience/reader.31
The dramatic relevance of having Rosalind hear multiple descriptions of 
Orlando is evident. Where, though, does the dramatic significance lie in having 
the banished Duke Senior receive an extensive report concerning Jaques? In 
answer, it may be noted that the Duke’s oblique treatment of the need for 
penance is the cue for Jaques’ first “appearance”. Here comes news of someone 
meditating upon related doctrinal (and cognitive) issues. While the Duke ponders 
the meaning of being blasted by “the winters winde”, Jaques watches a wounded 
stag weep and expounds upon the meaning of the spectacle at length, while also 
commenting upon the banished Duke’s moral failings. The views of Jaques the 
would-be reformer are delivered to the Duke by a spy: “Indeed”, says the First 
Lord,
The m elancholy Jaqu es  grieues at that
[the hunted creatures’ suffering in their native precincts],
And in that kinde sw eares you  doe m ore vsurpe 
Than doth your brother that hath banish’d you  (25-8)
30 Discussion o f  this “exception” belongs to a sustained consideration o f the character o f  
Rosalind; space restrictions therefore allow only a diagnostic outline o f the matter in the 
Conclusion.
31 For the distinction between the active and passive intellects, see: Lawson-Tancred, ed. De  
Anima, 417b.
According to the First Lord, Jaques is not sad but “melancholy”, a 
pejorative term in the period denoting spiritual failure and/or political 
discontent. The use of the term as a defining epithet implies that Jaques does 
not so much compassionately “grieue” at the hunted creatures’ suffering, as 
object to the malpractice of the hunting institution.33 At the same time, according 
to the First Lord, Jaques accuses the exiled Duke of an act of usurpation more 
serious (“in that kinde”—that is, in a manner of speaking, or speaking 
“allegorically”) than his brother’s political act of seizure. In Jaques’ view, it 
seems, the Duke exceeds the authority given to him by law and custom more by 
promulgating the efficacy of works (here in the form of penance) than his 
harsher-seeming brother does by ruling tyrannically.
The fundamental question posed by the Lord’s report, however, is: what 
phenomenon did Jaques experience by “the brooke that brawles along this wood” 
(32)? The obvious answer for previous commentators has been “a wounded stag”. 
According to the reading offered earlier of the Duke’s use of the term “venison”, 
the phenomenon experienced by Jaques took the form of one of the Duke’s “Coe- 
mates” (1) flagellating himself. Jaques speaks of the Duke’s usurpation of the 
animals he hunts. How does the Duke usurp flagellants? To account for this, it 
needs to be observed that the First Lord is reporting the series of possible 
meanings Jaques attaches to the phenomenon he witnessed. Each appearance of 
the “stag”—each meaning Jaques reads onto the experienced phenomenon—is 
discrete, produced serially, and has no certifiable attachment to the existent 
phenomenon.
Jaques’ charge of usurpation glances at more than just the papal 
endorsement of the efficacy of works. The usurpation of the claims of both 
secular clergy to parochial authority and of beggars to alms by the spread of 
mendicant friars is also potentially recalled here. Erasmus dedicates a section of
32 Stoll, “Malcontent Type,” p. 284.
33 Martin Luther referred to the papacy as “Nimrod, the mighty hunter”: “The Babylonian 
Captivity o f  the Church? (1520), p. 364, in Theodore G. Tappert, ed. Selected Writings o f  Martin 
Luther, 4 volumes (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007), 1.355-478; he also described the place where the 
Pope stored his profits from selling indulgences as the “skinning house”: ‘T o the Christian 
Nobility o f  the German Nation Concerning the Reform o f  the Christian Estate,” (1520), p. 324, in 
Tappert, ed. Selected Writings, 1.251-353.
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Encomium o f Moria (1511) to an attack upon “those that are commonly called 
religious” or “Monks and Friars”.34 “Some of them,” Erasmus complained,
“make a lot of money from wearing filthy clothes and begging; they go from door 
to door bellowing out demands for bread .. .doing ordinary beggars out of a lot of 
business”.35 The main objection to the mendicants expressed by secular clergy, 
meanwhile, was “the usurpation of the rights of the parish clergy”.36 Why, 
though, would Jaques associate the Duke and his followers with begging monks 
(friars)? First, it needs to be stressed that the tendency of putatively anti- 
“allegorical” Reformers to produce multiple meanings from a “text” is itself a 
target of satire here. In thus earnestly teasing out the possible applications of 
Jaques’ remarks, I also become the target. Be that as it may, a remark of John 
Wyclif’s provides a clue to the link between Church corruption (as figured by the 
banished Duke) and the friars. In O f Prelates, Wyclif complains that “men 
supposen that newe religious han leue of worldly prelatis to preche here fablis 
and lesyngis and to robbe the pore peple bi beggyng”.37 The two types of 
usurpation performed by the friars are here itemized, but “worldly prelates” bear 
the blame for tolerating this new movement. A link obtains between the Church 
(and papacy’s) corruption by worldly values and the spread of the reformist 
mendicant movement.
A usurper (political or “allegorical”) must replace (not merely kill) the 
previous occupant of the usurped seat. Hence, it becomes absurd to interpret the 
quarry here as actual animals (the banished Duke does not become a zoological 
deer by hunting them). According to the two readings offered above, the usurped 
former “rulers” of the forest are either the creatures (sins/passions) hunted by the 
Duke or “regular beggars” deprived of their livelihoods. To a Lutheran, a pope 
who legitimates the traffic in indulgences usurps the authority of all believers and 
betrays the Christian obligation to believe in salvation by faith alone. In a
34 Desiderius Erasmus, “An Encomium o f Moria or Praise o f Folly,” p.77, in Roger Clarke, ed. 
Praise o f Folly aw /Pope Julius Barred from Heaven, by Desiderius Erasmus (Richmond: 
Oneworld, 2008), pp. 1-115.
35 Erasmus, “Encomium,” p. 78.
36 Charles Dahlberg, “Chaucer’s Cock and Fox,” p. 284, JEGP 53 (1954), pp. 277-90.
37 F. D. Matthew, ed. The English Works o f  Wyclif {London: Early English Text Society, 1880), p. 
59.
Lutheran’s eyes, a minister of God (a “senior” not a “sacer”) should only teach 
(as the Duke has tried, and failed, to teach Amiens).38
Continuing his report, the First Lord tells the exiled Duke that he saw 
Jaques reclining “[vjnder an oake, whose anticke roote peepes out / Vpon the 
brooke that brawles along this wood” (31-2). This is the first mention of this 
ancient oak tree, a Shakespearean addition to Lodge’s forest which lends itself to 
“mystical interpretations”.39 That is, the oak in this Edenic location appears to 
figure the Tree of Life.40 Interpreted thus, “the brooke” to which the oak tree is 
adjacent would be the fountain of grace supplied by Christ’s sacrifice 41
That versions of the three brothers are represented lying beneath the oak 
tree/Tree of Life at different stages of the play42 suggests that they may be figures 
for the (Aristotelian) stages of a man’s life: youth, maturity and seniority 43 
However, the meaning of the category “age” is a question asked by the play. 
(Jaques’ famous discourse on the “Seven Ages of Man” signals the currency of 
rival models to the Aristotelian [2.7.140-67].) When Orlando defeats his older 
brother in a wrestling bout, he observes: “Come, come elder brother, you are too 
yong in this” (1.1.50-1). Age, it appears, can be understood metaphorically. (The 
severe Jaques is referred to as “the olde gentleman” by Audrey [5.1.3-4].)
Oliver complains of Orlando being more valued by the world than himself 
(1.1.156-60), while Orlando is dismissive of his brother Jaques de Boys’ 
intellectual achievements “at schoole” (5-6). This tetchy rivalry may be ascribed 
to the three (topographical) faculties of the human soul, competing for cognitive 
pre-eminence. Accordingly, the de Boys brothers could figure the 
Anselmian/Piconian triad: the appetitive (Orlando), the intellectual (Jaques) and 
the volitional (Oliver). In the Introduction I observed that Shakespeare’s 
facultative rhetoric had much in common with Hooker’s and by no means
38 Martin Luther, “Treatise on Good Works? (1520), p. 174, in Tappert, ed. Selected Writings, 
1.97-196.
39 Fortin, “Tongues,” p. 124.
40 Scoufos, “Paradiso Terrestre?  p. 221.
41 Martz, Meditation, pp. 71-2; Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, p. 93.
42 Jaques: 2.1.30-2; Orlando: 3.2.227-8; Oliver: 4.3.103-6.
43 Henrie Cuffe, The Differences o f  the Ages o f  M an’s Life: together with the Originall Causes, 
Progresse, and End Thereof (London: Arnold Hatfield, 1607), p. 116.
required direct acquaintance—or (more pertinently) intellectual agreement—with 
the scholastic or Florentine traditions. That Shakespeare was at least indirectly 
acquainted with Neoplatonism is indisputable, given its prevalence in Elizabethan 
poetry (not least in The Faerie Queene) and, indeed, the scattered Neoplatonic 
passages in Shakespeare’s own works (including As You Like It).44 Whether or 
not Shakespeare had read any of the Florentine Neoplatonists, the (ontological) 
hierarchical bias of Neoplatonism is contested in As You Like It by the play’s 
commitment to viewing hierarchies as purely formal necessities.45 According to 
the play’s non-ontological conception of the category “age”, the relative status 
(seniority) of the faculties depends upon cultural norms.
Like many modems, Jaques qua Lutheran would regard scholastic faculty 
psychology with scepticism and distaste. The melancholy Jaques, therefore, 
according to the present thesis, figures an intellectual faculty that mistakes itself 
for—and thus reifies itself as—an individual or isolated subject.
With these points established, I can return to the First Lord’s report, 
concerning Jaques by the brook:
To the which place a poore sequestred Stag 
That from the Hunters aime had tane a hurt,
Did come to languish; and indeed my Lord 
The wretched animall heau’d forth such groanes 
That their discharge did stretch his leatheme coat 
Almost to bursting, and the big round teares 
Cours’d one another downe his innocent nose 
In pitteous chase: and thus the hairie foole,
Much marked of the melancholie Jaques,
44 For discussion o f Neoplatonism in AYLI, see: Scoufos, “Paradiso Terrestre'"', Elam, “Golden 
World,” pp. 219-20.n.3.
45 Scoufos maintains that A YLI echoes Pico and Ficino’s overturning o f “the old hierarchies”. 
However, such an overturning is not unambiguously present in either o f the two major Florentine 
Neoplatonists. Scoufos writes: “Harmony between man and the outer powers was no longer a 
one-way relationship,” according to the Florentine Neoplatonists, “mankind’s volitional surge 
upward toward God— up the ladder o f love— must surely be paralleled by God’s movement 
downward man”. There is evident strain in describing two coinciding trajectories as “parallel”—  
the need for a ladder presupposes a hierarchy: “Paradiso Terrestre,” p. 224.
Stood on th’extremest verge o f the swift brooke,
Augmenting it with teares. (33-43)
As previous scholars have noted, this is a description of a scene commonly found 
in Renaissance emblem books.46 The moralistic and figurative nature of the 
speech, therefore, would have been evident to contemporary audiences/readers. 
The First Lord, in responding to the banished Duke’s suggestion that he, Amiens 
and others go “kill vs venison”, sustains the figuration of penitential acts as hunt. 
He reports that Jaques has witnessed one of the Duke’s followers vainly (in 
Jaques’ opinion) imitating Christ’s suffering on the cross by flagellating 
himself—hence, the “groanes” and “teares” 47 Moreover, as Edward Berry notes, 
in Jaques’ reported speech, “[t]he human responsible for the actual grief of the 
deer ... is virtually [absent] ... the stag has ‘ta’en a hurt’ from ‘the hunter’s aim’. 
The stag itself is therefore complicit in its own wounding.”48 The latter phrase 
has obvious application to the case of a flagellant. In any case, the “sobbing deer” 
image “had a long poetic and iconographic history. Almost always, the image is 
anthropomorphic, the actual experience of the deer serving as a mere vehicle for 
human grief’.49 Thus, reading/hearing of Jaques’ speech, it is “difficult to tell 
whose pain is really at issue ... his language so confuses deer behaviour with 
human behaviour that one is tempted to say that the ‘real’ subjects of the passage 
are ... human beings.”50 Jaques’ “confusing” language is consistent with 
medieval rhetoric, in which the image of the stricken stag was used as a figure for 
the crucified Christ.51 Furthermore, the adjective “hairie” could metonymically 
denote the hair-shirt worn by the penitent as imitator of Christ.
That this “Stag” has been “sequestered” (“removed from office”),52 may
46 Michael Bath, “Weeping Stags and Melancholy Lovers: the Iconography o f  AYLI, Il.i,” 
Emblematica 1 (1986), pp. 13-52; Raymond B. Waddington, “Moralizing the Spectacle: Dramatic 
Emblems m A Y L I?? . 1 5 5 ,5 0 3 3  (1982), pp. 155-63.
47 For “stag” as weeping penitent, see: Bath, “Weeping Stags,” pp. 18-19; Thiebaux, Stag o f  Love, 
pp. 45-6.
48 Berry, Hunt, p. 175.
49 Berry, Hunt, p. 171.
50 Berry, Hunt, pp. 27-8.
51 Berry, Hunt, pp. 27-8; see also: Thiebaux, Stag o f  Love, pp. 40-7.
52 Dusinberre, ed. AYLI, p. 192.n; Berry, Hunt, p. 175.
indicate that it is one of the Duke’s “Coe-mates, and brothers in exile” (2.1.1)—a 
cleric prevented from performing his proper function/office. As mentioned 
above, Jaques seizes the opportunity to extract a series of meanings from a single 
phenomenon. That is, Jaques also “sees” the stag “as” a Christian (priest or not) 
who, in obedience to the Church’s teachings, neglects his office of engaging in 
useful activity in the world and spends time instead performing futile penitent 
“works”. The penitent’s “nose” is “innocent” (or, in the modem idiom, clean) 
because of Christ’s sacrifice, not as a consequence of any ritualized penitential 
observances.
Certainly, if the text were to be read as referring to the hunting of a 
zoological stag, the exiled Duke would seem a moral monster. For the same 
gentle Duke who regrets the goring of venison in their “owne confines” responds 
to this description of a stag weeping in agony not by saying “How terrible, I hope 
it was soon put out of its misery” but by asking,
what said Jaques?
Did he not moralize this spectacle? (3.43-4)
Thus, the amused Duke acknowledges that the First Lord is parodying Lutheran 
polemics. Though dedicated to reading Scripture “literally”, and despite being 
avowedly opposed to “allegory”, Protestant reformers, not excluding Luther, 
indulged in de facto “allegorical” moralizations as much as, if not more than, 
their Catholic opponents.53 The First Lord, therefore, has been engaged in 
counter-espionage: Jaques himself had been spying, under cover of the oak, on 
one of their company as he performed penitential acts. The Duke now anticipates 
a long, moralizing pamphlet from the Reformist press excoriating this practice 
and ranging over a multitude of (more or less) related topics. Sure enough, the
53 See, for example: Hugh Latimer, “Sermon on the Ploughers,” (1548), in Englander et al, eds. 
Sources, pp. 364-74; Pendergast, Religion, pp. 48-50. For “moralize” as “dominant term for 
allegorical process”, see: Tuve, Allegorical Imagery, pp. 11-12. For the “allegorization”o f deer- 
hunting, see: A. Stuart Daley, ‘“To Moralize a Spectacle’: A YLI, Act 2, Scene 1,” p. 150, PQ  65 
(1986), pp. 147-70; Chris Fitter, “The Slain Deer and Political Imperium: AYLI and Anthony 
Munday’s ‘Nymph Complaining for the Death o f  Her Fawn’,” pp. 196, 199, JEGP  98 (1999), pp. 
193-218.
First Lord proceeds to report how Jaques transformed the image
into a thousand similies.
First, for his weeping into the needlesse streame;
Poore Deere quoth he, thou mak’st a testament 
As worldlings doe, giuing thy sum o f more 
To that which had too must [s/c] (45-9)
That the stream is “needlesse” is customarily glossed “realistically” as 
meaning that a brook has water without anyone crying into it.54 This reflects 
badly on either Jaques, the First Lord or Shakespeare’s rhetorical abilities, for, 
used thus, “needlesse” is mere sentiment and the image is banal. Since neither 
Jaques nor the First Lord elsewhere conspicuously display the traits of a bad poet, 
either Shakespeare nods or the stream should be apprehended as other than an 
actual water feature. As suggested above, it figures the fountain of grace flowing 
from the crucified Christ’s side. From the Lutheran’s point of view, the 
flagellant’s self-punishment is superfluous, for Christ’s sacrifice has no need of 
further contribution. A redundant image is thus converted into an observation 
upon redundancy.
Moreover, the blood of Christ flowing in the stream, and present in the 
wine of the Eucharist, is associated here with “a testament”. Jaques does not say, 
however, that “some worldlings” behave in the manner described; rather, he 
implies that all “worldlings” do this. In what sense may all people be said to 
leave wealth to the excessively wealthy? His remarks, however, are apt when 
read as pointing out to the flagellant that, although he thinks he is engaging in a 
spiritual action, he is actually behaving just like worldly people; the implication 
being that, though material wealth is held to be an obstacle to salvation, yet 
people leave their goods to friends and family as though they are doing them a 
good turn; in the same way, the flagellant thinks he collaborates with Christ by 
punishing himself in this fashion, when, in fact, Christ has no need of anyone’s
54 Alan Brissenden, ed. AYLI (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1993), p. 127.n; Dusinberre, ed.AYLI, p.
193.n.
help.
The Second Folio altered the obviously erroneous “must” to “much”, but 
not until J. P. Collier’s edition of 1842-4 was “had” changed to “hath” on the 
assumption that a grammatical error was present.55 Indeed, if the phrase were 
applied to an actual stag weeping into the brook, the present tense would be 
correct. However, if Jaques addresses a flagellant thinking he is retroactively 
assisting Christ’s Passion, the past tense, as retained by the Second Folio and 
subsequent editions, is carefully chosen. Jaques, like Luther, stresses that the 
Atonement occurred once and for all in the past; hence, the current suffering is 
needless.
That said, it is not easy to make sense of the next phrase in the First Lord’s 
account: “then being there alone, / Left and abandoned of his veluet friend” (49- 
50). Modem editions stmggle with this remark. Dusinberre makes “then” the start 
of a new sentence (as do other editors),56 reading it as a description of the stag 
being “Left and abandoned” by the rest of the herd. Why, though, in that case, 
use two terms (“Left and abandoned”)? According to George T. Wright, 
Shakespeare often employs such “adjectival hendiadys” to “blur ... logical 
lines”.57 In any case, the herd would require the plural “friends”. Dusinberre opts 
to argue that “friend” is possibly left singular to “glance at the queen’s 
[Elizabeth’s] relationship to Essex”.58 However, this reading of “friend” as Essex 
is entirely localised; even contemporary readers of the text would have been 
obliged to guess that (for one instance only) alluding to Essex is the reason for a 
grammatical “error”.
The speech as a whole needs to be considered. The First Lord itemises 
Jaques’ “thousand similies”, beginning: “First, for his weeping into the needlesse 
streame” (emphasis added); this is the first topic Jaques uses to frame a simile 
(the deer is like a worldling). The First (and Second etc.) Folio’s punctuation, 
observing early modem conventions, perhaps obscures from modem eyes the
55 De Somoygi, ed. A YLI, p. 181.
56 Dusinberre, ed. AYLI, p. 193; Brissenden, ed. AYLI, p. 127; Michael Hattaway, ed. AYLI 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000), p. 101.
57 George T. Wright, “Hendiadys and Hamlet,” pp. 174, \1 \,P M L A  96 (1981), pp. 168-93.
58 Dusinberre, ed. AYLI, p. 194.n.
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signalling of the second item in the Lord’s list. The word “then” follows a colon, 
which could function as the equivalent of a modem semi-colon. That is, “then” 
introduces the second topic upon which Jaques moralizes, which is the deer’s 
“being there alone, / Left and abandoned of his veluet friend”. The adjective 
“veluet” has also exercised editors. Since “in Elizabethan London only aristocrats 
were allowed to wear velvet”, Dusinberre uses the detail to support her Essex- 
reading.59
Above, venison and the stag were apprehended as the flagellated body. 
Jaques, however, is producing “simi/zes”: he is reading non-charitably, cynically, 
“allegorically”, “moraliz[ing] this spectacle”. Thus, he compares the isolated 
“Deere” to a helpless person “[ljeft and abandoned” by a sumptuously-dressed 
friend. Jaques, therefore, arguably interprets the stag as a Christ-figure previously 
protected by association with wealthy and worldly institutions.
Jaques (via the First Lord) proceeds in his interpretation: “’Tis right quoth 
he, thus miserie doth part / The Flux of companie” (51-2). The selection of the 
unpleasant term “Flux” reflects Jaques’ distaste for affiliated groups (which in 
turn may recall Luther’s dislike of fraternities).60 When circumstances become 
adverse, in Jaques’ view, such solid-seeming companies break up into those in 
and those out o/harm’s way. This detail speaks to the larger argument being 
made here, that Jaques is committed to a subjectivist model of cognition, which 
reifies the isolated individual as rational subject. “The Flux of companie” which 
Jaques regards as a phantasmic semblance of cohesion, is, however, according to 
a facultative model, the actual and necessary co-agent (or “Coe-mate”) of all 
cognition. Hence, it is incapable of actually being divided by “miserie” (as the 
expansion of Duke Senior’s company-in-exile confirms).
The subsequent section of the passage runs:
Anon a careless Heard 
Full o f the pasture, jumps along by him 
And neuer staies to greet him: I quoth Jaques,
59 Dusinberre, ed. AYLI, p. 194.n.
60 Luther, “Christian Nobility,” pp. 328-9; “Babylonian Captivity,” p. 399.
Sweepe on you fat and greazie Citizens,
’Tis just the fashion (52-6)
This herd is “careless”: devoid of charity. They pass the weeping stag without 
greeting him. These are “fat and greazie Citizens”, who observe not the golden 
rule but “the fashion” (current false materialistic values).
The First Lord concludes:
Thus most inuectively he pierceth through 
The body o f Countrie, Citie, Court,
Yea, and o f this our life, swearing that we 
Are meere vsurpers, tyrants and whats worse 
To fright the Annimals, and to kill them vp 
In their assign’d and natiue dwelling place. (58-63)
The Lord reports how Jaques (himself, ironically, now the hunter) “pierceth 
through”—he sharply criticises—the current forms of the three estates identified 
by Luther as the basic elements of human society: the Church, oeconomia 
(“household rule”) and politia (secular authority)—in literary pastoral terms, 
“Countrie, Citie, Court” respectively.61 The three stages of the critique are 
flagged in the preceding section of the First Lord’s speech by the linking words 
“First”, “then” and “anon”. “First” introduces the error of penitential practices, 
targetting, therefore, the religious estate; “then” prefaces the observation that 
“miserie” parts company, which would relate to the failure of social institutions 
(oeconomia) such as, say, fraternities under stress; and “anon” leads to complaint 
about selfish “Citizens”, themselves allowed to grow “fat” in order to be 
exploited in turn by their temporal masters {politia).
However, the First Lord seems to add a rogue “estate”, saying Jaques also 
“pierceth through ... this our life”.62 Roving in some way across the categories is 
the exiled Duke’s company, which has usurped power in the other spheres.
61 Wannenwetsch, “Theology,” p. 130.
62 Bainton notes that Luther converted Augustine’s four estates into three, omitting the monk: 
Luther, p. 240.
Transordinal displacement was a particular bugbear of Luther’s: “Luther spoke 
out against the various forms of religiously motivated ‘desertion’ of [the] 
orders”.63 Papal corruption per se had, of course, for centuries invited criticism; 
nonetheless, the hierarchical stability which the institution of the Church 
provided was, evidently, deemed sufficient compensation for the social harm 
caused by clerical abuses. Church corruption thus secured tacit toleration. 
However, when the Church itself encouraged innovations which threatened that 
hierarchical organisation, the sequence of events leading to the Reformation was 
arguably set in motion. The Duke and his followers, therefore, are not only 
criticized by Jaques for an excessive emphasis on penitential practice—thus 
neglecting the cure of souls—but also for seeking to infiltrate social institutions 
and for laying claim to temporal power.
Luther attacked “the Friars who lived their life as ‘parasite’ existences at 
the cost of others who cared for those institutions which, in their zeal for a better 
justice ... the religious presupposed but devalued”.64 The link between the 
fraternal orders and papal corruption may not be obvious. The Franciscan order 
in particular had begun as a reformist movement, seeking to promote the 
apostolic lifestyle.65 Over time, as is well-known, the order acquired property, 
forcing it to abandon its ideal of poverty. As a solution, the Church stepped in: it 
would be the nominal possessor of the Franciscans’ (extensive) property.66 Of 
course, this led to reciprocal fraternal influence—doctrinal and other—within the 
Church.67 Likewise, the Dominicans had gained considerable doctrinal influence 
by assisting the Church, for example, in the suppression of the Catharist heresy.68 
By such means, the fraternal orders secured papal approval for their mission to
63 Wannenwetsch, “Theology,” p. 132 (emphases added).
64 Wannenwetsch, “Theology,” p. 132; see also: Luther, “Christian Nobility,” p. 308.
65 Emilie Griffin, ed. The Life o f  St. Francis, by St. Bonaventure (New York: HarperCollins, 
2005), pp. 23-31.
66 G. K. Chesterton, St. Thomas Aquinas \ St. Francis o f  Assisi (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2002), pp. 312-3.
67 Logan, Middle Ages, p. 218; Duffy, Saints and Sinners, p. 156; Luther, “Christian Nobility,” 
pp. 308-9.
68 Duffy, Saints and Sinners, p. 149; Bossy, Christianity, p. 92.
export monastic ideals into the parish and the city69—a procedure Jaques may be 
referring to here as “fright[ing] the Annimals”: terrifying the souls in parishes 
(“their assign’d and natiue dwelling place”).70
Connecting Luther’s criticism of the mendicant orders to Jaques’ 
moralizations may still seem fanciful. After all, there are no explicit references to 
friars in the scene and, in any case, what relevance could the topic have for late- 
1590s theatre-audiences/readers? True, the validity of the mendicant out-reach 
was not a burning issue circa 1599; however, the social consequences of a 
diminished regard for the practice of confession remained a cause of concern.71 
The topics of the mendicant project(s) and the performance of confession are 
closely connected, as will be shown below. Above, the wrestling bout in Act 1 
Scene 2 of the play was read as Orlando’s confessional failure (though Orlando 
does not regard it as such). How does one process one’s sinful acts, the play 
seems to ask, when sacramental confession is no longer available?
Though Luther did not regard confession as a sacrament, he did not 
consider it to be a harmful practice in itself, if practised with sensitivity and in 
accord with a belief in salvation by faith alone. However, in order to survive 
(and, it was argued, prosper), friars stressed the need for more regular and more 
rigorous confession, and were backed up in this by papal proclamations.72 
Parishioners could enjoy a stable relationship with their resident priests.73 Thus, 
the validity of the confessional exchange was underwritten by the participation of 
an informed and familiar spiritual guide, sensitive to local conditions. However, 
from Luther’s perspective, with the advent of the friars, the confessional system 
became a papally-sponsored control system, geared towards the generation of 
fear and guilt, and the production of obedient subjects.
Confessants were encouraged to regard themselves as their confessors saw
69 Vernon Staley, The Catholic Religion: a Manual o f  Instruction fo r  Members o f  the Anglican 
Church, 9th edition (Oxford, London & New York: 1898), p. 92.
70 Luther refers to “the insurmountable task which they [that is, the Roman Church] have imposed 
upon us, namely, that we are to frame a contrition for every sin”: “Babylonian Captivity,” p. 437; 
see also: Tyndale, Obedience, p. 82.
71 For useful discussion, see: Barroll, Artificial Persons, pp. 13-14.n.6.
72 Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther: a Study in Psychoanalysis and History (New York & 
London: Norton, 1958), pp. 75-6, 227.
73 Staley, Catholic Religion, p. 93.
them. The confessant performed a subject position as judge while discursively 
joined with the confessor. This “subject” then regarded the confessant’s recent 
career as object—a medium for sinful actions—thus rendering self-cognition 
performable. In seeing oneself as an object, however, one does not necessarily 
commit to an ontological understanding of the self as unified subject (hence 
cognizable as object). Medieval languages, it will be recalled, had no equivalent 
term for the modem word “personality”. “Persona” was understood to refer to 
the mask of an actor.74 Saying “yesterday /  was jealous” is problematic, 
therefore, in that the jealous “person” is not participating in the act of confession. 
Hence, it may be said that, in order to facilitate confession, a facultative model of 
cognition made strategic use of a subject-object model, without ontological 
commitment to same.75 The confessant might say: “yesterday, a jealous deed was 
performed by this creature” (jealousy is not attributed to the personality of the 
confessant). By occupying the role of subject, guided by a priest, the confessant 
achieves distance from committed sinful actions, in a sense expelling them from 
the self as objects.
The friars, however, evidently held sinful actions to congest as a result of 
confession being too infrequent. Sins do not simply manifest as a series of 
discrete objects which one may expel at a convenient moment. This implies in 
turn that sins are not acts but properties. With more frequent confession, the 
objects apprehended in the confessional begin to take on a stubborn consistency. 
The same sinful objects keep appearing. One comes to suspect that one is a sinful 
subject: a producer of sinful objects. Subsequent to that “realization”, confession 
cannot be held to work because one’s sinful nature cannot be expelled—only 
itemized expressions of that nature may be recalled and regretted.
Luther today is still sometimes regarded as presiding over the birth of the 
modem subject, the individual. It might be said that, on the contrary, he opposed 
the Church’s production of guilt-ridden subjects, and wished to dispel the illusion
74 Benton, “Consciousness o f Self,” p. 284.
75 Thus, Margery Kempe, repeatedly refers to herself as “this creature” or “the creature”— seven 
times, for example, in Chapter 21 o f her book: Barry Windeatt, ed. The Booke o f  M argery Kempe 
(London: Penguin, 1985), pp. 84-6.
that conceptual subjects and objects partake of ontological essence. A major 
problem for Luther, though, lay in contesting Church production of the guilty 
subject without encouraging the production of self-seeking guilt-free subjects 
(“libertines”). To do this, one does not “liberate” subjects from the Church; 
rather, one promotes a return to the understanding of subjectivity as strategic 
performance, or act.
Thus, in figuring author-function as Jaques qua Lutheran, As You Like It 
does not celebrate the author as individual genius, a free subject capable of 
supplanting the priest-function. As stated, Jaques also figures the intellectual 
faculty. However, he is melancholy, he is spiritually afflicted and incapable, 
therefore, of efficiently performing his function as intellectual faculty. Hence, 
Jaques should not be regarded as, say, a biographical portrait of Luther. Rather, 
Jaques figures the intellectual faculty reified as unified subject as a result of a 
miscomprehension (or inevitable consequence) of Lutheranism. One consequence 
of that miscomprehension is the supposition that all believers are their own 
spiritual authorities. According to such a view, authors can not only offer texts as 
substitutes for the rites previously performed by Catholic priests but also discuss 
doctrinal issues with subjective authority. Hence, As You Like It reinserts the 
conventional heterobiographical character omitted from Lodge’s Rosalynde, in 
order to indicate the surreptitious nature of the latter text’s usurpation of spiritual 
authority (at the very moment it insisted, or feigned to insist, that true authority 
lay outside of its text). Hence, also, the play includes another extended report of 
an experience Jaques has in the forest—his encounter with a fool—in order to 
articulate a cure for Jaques’ melancholy. This encounter will be discussed in the 
following chapter.
Chapter 8.
As You Like It: a Purge for Neo-classicists.
Building upon Chapter 7’s analysis of Jaques as Lutheran, the present chapter 
seeks to demonstrate that As You Like It addresses widespread misappropriation 
of Luther’s teachings. The chapter’s first section concludes by suggesting that 
Shakespeare, like Sir Thomas More, conceived of selfhood as performance 
involving the discarding of alienated personae (of which Jaques is an example). 
Hence, Jaques is not “Shakespeare” (nor, for that matter, is he Lodge or Luther) 
in any biographical sense but a figure for the inauthentic subjective conception of 
selfhood which underpins the very notion of the “author” and, thus, of author- 
fimction. Subjective authority, moreover, tends to be associated in the period (by 
Platonic defenders of poetry such as Sidney) with classical ideals.1 By presenting 
the author-function as a relatively impotent consequence of the cognitive 
processing of sensory experience—rather than as a masterful, authoritative judge 
of same—As You Like It offers a purge for neo-classicists.2
1 Owens, “Melancholy,” p. 15.
2 This appears to have been recognized in the period. “William Kemp” in the second part o f  The 
Return from  Parnassus (performed 1601-2) states that “our fellow Shakespeare hath given him 
[Ben Jonson] a purge that made him bewray his credit”: quoted in James P. Bednarz,
Shakespeare and the P oets’ War (New York: Columbia UP, 2001), pp. 20-1. For discussion o f  
the competing scholarly views regarding the nature o f  the “purge” administered to Jonson by 
Shakespeare, see: Bednarz, P o ets’ War, pp. 20-2, 282-3.n.6. The present chapter’s argument 
indicates that AYLI in toto is that purge (for Bednarz’s analysis oiAYLI'm  relation to Jonson, 
Jonsonian satire and the “purge”, see: P oets’ War, pp. 105-31). Vox AYLI as “populist critique o f  
university-born literature”, see: Lesley Wade Soule, Actor as Anti-Character: Dionysus, the D evil 
and the Boy Rosalind {Westport & London: Greenwood, 2000), p. 171. With regards to the play’s 
multi-media approach, Soule notes the “music hall” variety o f  AYLPs actions (songs, dance, 
wrestling, a procession, a masque and other visual spectacles) and observes that it has more songs 
than any other Shakespearean comedy: p. 141. See also: Lesley Anne [sic\ Soule, “Subverting 
Ros: Cocky Ros in the Forest o f  Arden,” pp. 135-6, New Theatre Quarterly 7 (1991), pp. 126-36.
The chapter’s second section offers a close reading of the encounter 
between the banished Duke and Jaques in Act 2 Scene 7 of As You Like It, 
arguing that Shakespeare therein deconstructs Lutheran anti-papal rhetoric. That 
is, the scene inhabits Lutheran “allegorical” practice in order simultaneously to 
dismantle and make use of it. Accordingly, Jaques’ account (and allegorical 
usage) of his encounter with a fool in the forest is read as a presentation of the 
Lutheran encounter with Scripture. By insisting on faith alone as necessary for 
salvation, while appearing to rely on rationalist access to scriptural “truth” (in 
place of institutional process) as a basis for preaching that message, Luther paved 
the way for a subjectivist conception of Christian selfhood.3 Via its presentation 
of Jaques as Luther-influenced mis-reader of Scripture, As You Like It 
demonstrates the inadequacy of that subjectivist conception, showing that 
Christian “truth” is written and read (performed and cognized) on the stage of the 
world—in the realm of social experience (as figured by Shakespeare’s comedy- 
in-performance)—not on the printed page.
*
Early modem pastoral literary works conventionally explore author-function via 
the inclusion of a heterobiographical character—a character featured within the 
narrative who bears a special relation to the work’s actual author. Especially 
influential in the Renaissance, Sannazaro’s Arcadia features the author’s 
namesake Sincero (note the playfully quasi-homophonic nature of the name),4 
Spenser’s Shepheardes Calender and Faerie Queene host Colin Clout (a 
borrowing from Skelton),5 Sidney’s Arcadias contain Philisides (eliding the 
author’s Christian and surnames, linking father and son in a Christ-like manner),6
3 See: Cummings, Grammar and Grace, pp. 29-30. It is not being asserted that Luther 
consciously privileged reason, but that Luther’s emphasis on Scripture at the expense o f  the 
Church-as-visible-institution entailed a prioritization o f individuals’ use o f reason.
4 Scoufos, “Paradiso Terrestre,” pp. 216-7, 220 (noting Jaques’ resemblance to Sincero), 
227.n.25; Kronenfeld, “Shakespeare’s Jaques,” p. 451; Bednarz, P oets’ War, p. 117.
5 Humphrey Tonkin, Spenser’s Courteous Pastoral: Book Six o/T he Faerie Queene (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1972), pp. 137-9.
6 For Sidney’s response to Sannazaro, see: Rosenmeyer, Green Cabinet, pp. 226-7.
and (less famously) “Anthony Munday became ‘shepherd Tonie’ in England’s 
Helicon (1600).”7 An example from an influential pastoral drama may also be 
cited: the Tirsi of Tasso’s Aminta.8 The present thesis regards Jaques as As You 
Like It's equivalent heterobiographical figure. Of course, over the years, Jaques 
has been said to contain elements of certain of Shakespeare’s contemporaries (in 
particular Marston and Jonson).9 However, the present reading has the benefit of 
formal justification, stressing the conventional function of Jaques’ role. 
Accordingly, the character will be read as bearing a formal relation to not only 
the play’s actual author but also to Thomas Lodge, the author of the play’s main 
source, Rosalynde.10
The previous chapter noted an ironic detail in the First Lord’s report upon 
the melancholy Jaques. The banished Duke and his men as hunters of venison are 
the nearest objects of Jaques’ “inuectiue” (2.1.58); however, the First Lord says 
that Jaques himself “pierceth through the body” of all three estates along with 
“this our life” (58-9; emphasis added). Thus, if the banished Duke has usurped 
authority by hunting, Jaques the piercer (the parallel suggests) also makes a false 
claim to speak with authority in satirizing the Duke’s practice. This exposure of 
the hypocritical nature of Jaques’ activity as satirist informs my reading of 
Jaques as author-function. Insofar as writers use texts to express their own 
(political and personal) viewpoints, regardless of any lip-service paid to the 
pursuit of nobler aims, they become mercenary hunters of others’ faults when 
(from a Christian point of view) they should be paying more attention to their 
own.
I describe these “hunters” as “mercenary” because such writers, in 
Elizabethan culture, participate in commercial transactions in issuing their works. 
Given that non-commercial discourse circulates freely in the public and private
7 Bednarz, Poets ’ War, p. 117.
8 Charles Jemigan & Irene Marchegiani Jones, eds. Aminta: a Pastoral Play, by Torquato Tasso, 
(New York: Italica, 2000), pp. xiv-xvii.
9 For Jaques as Marston, see: Latham, ed. A YLI, pp. xlviii-li; Brissenden, ed. A YLI, p. 31; as 
Jonson, see: Latham, p. xlviii; Dusinberre, ed .AYLI, pp. 368-73; Hunt, AYLI, pp. 110-3.
10 For previous association o f Jaques with Lodge, see: Dusinberre, ed. AYLI, pp. 81-2; Peter Levi, 
The Frontiers o f  Paradise: a Study o f  Monks and Monasteries (London: Collins Harvill, 1988), p. 
28; Paradise, Lodge, p. 90; Guiney, Recusant Poets, p. 235.
spheres—for example, in the form of conversation—such works, in order to 
persuade potential buyers of their use-value, advertise themselves as possessing 
qualities which justify the purchase-price.11 News-bearing might be one such 
quality; however, bearing news is never a neutral activity. Some moral inflection 
always obtains in the telling of news. When concrete news is in short supply, 
moreover, “news” can be produced by extrapolating moral content from available 
data. In order to produce such protracted moral discourse, one needs familiar 
targets. Jaques as satirist, therefore, figures the author as parasite who requires 
“corrupt” authority figures. By satirizing such figures, the author can win fame, 
exhibit his moral superiority and make money. He is thus a mercenary “hunter” 
of sins no less than the Pope of Reformist anti-clerical satire. (Lodge, one recalls, 
was a pioneer in the publication of satirical poetry in Elizabethan culture.)12
However, is not Shakespeare a “hunter”—a wielder/shaker of a pen as 
spear with which to pierce others—in this way as well? In satirizing the satirist, 
surely Shakespeare participates in the same commercial hypocrisy. Regardless of 
Shakespeare’s personal commitment to publishing his dramatic works, this is true 
to an extent. Nonetheless, it is important to stress that Jaques as a figure for 
author-function does not mark the site of actual moral authority in As You Like It. 
Of course, the same could be said for, say, the Philisides of Sidney’s Arcadias. 
However, as discussed in the Introduction, the narrators of those romances are 
identifiable with Philip Sidney the nominated author, and those narrative voices 
do function as bearers of moral authority (demonstrating knowledge of the 
spiritual condition of the characters they describe, for instance). Jaques is 
allowed to perform a chorus-like function in As You Like It, but his moral 
qualifications are undermined by his various encounters with the banished Duke, 
Rosalind, Orlando and Touchstone. The play lacks a formal chorus and, of 
course, has no continuous “narrator”. Authority is thus dispersed throughout the
11 Alexandra Halasz, The Marketplace o f  Print: Pamphlets and the Public Sphere in Early 
Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997), p. 29.
12 The author o f Greenes Groats-worth o f  Wit (ventriloquizing Robert Greene) addresses Lodge 
as “yong Juuenall, that byting Satyrist, that lastly with mee together writ a Comedie ... thou hast 
a libertie to reprooue all”: Harrison, ed. “Groats-worth,” pp. 44-5. For the identification o f  “yong 
Juuenair as Lodge, see: Drew, “Juvenal.”
text and is not circumscribed by the text. Rather, “critical” discernment is 
produced (not passively received, as with the Arcadias) when the play is 
audited/spectated/read.
Thus, where Sidney’s Arcadia folds inwards, with a framing narrator 
reflecting on a “younger”, melancholy version of himself (Philisides), As You 
Like It explodes that fold, placing the older of two Jaques (the melancholy 
Jaques -pere) in the midst of the play. Jaques de Boys, referred to in the play’s 
opening scene and appearing (at last) in the final scene, marks the formal frame 
of the play-text. As scholar, Jaques de Boys also figures the activity of the reader 
as co-producer of the performed play-text. The play’s Epilogue, however, where 
the actor playing Rosalind speaks as both character and “actor”, indicates that the 
play’s formal boundaries do not (cannot) provide closure.13 Consequently, 
audience-members/readers are reminded that they co-produce Jaques the 
hypocritical satirist along with the other characters in the play, and that, 
therefore, any criticism performed is likewise co-accomplished by them.
An author such as Lodge, being committed to an idealist notion of 
immutable truth, may attempt to fix his meaning by recording it in print, but he 
cannot control distribution and reception. Reception, that author may be startled 
to learn, produces meaning, not the author’s mind (or the Holy Spirit via same). 
The Lodge of the 1590 Rosalynde seems relatively blithe. However, the 
“Scedule” Lodge added to the 1592 edition of Rosalynde betrays concern that 
people had been misreading his text:14 “Let them [Philautus’ sons, the notional 
readers of the romance] read it as Archelaus did Cassender, to profit by it: and in 
reading let them meditate: for I haue approued it the best method”.15 The use of 
the word “meditate” implies that the romance is not to be consumed rapidly for 
its story, but read as many times—and pondered for as long—as necessary for its 
meaning to be properly understood. A text, the author apprehends, does not
13 Anny Crunelle Vanrigh, ‘“ What a Case Am I in Then’: Hymen and Limen m A Y L If  p. 5, 
Q/W /E/R/T/Yl (1997), pp. 5-14; Valerie Traub, “The Homoerotics o f  Shakespearean Comedy,” 
p. 712, in Russ McDonald, ed. Shakespeare: an Anthology o f  Criticism and Theory, 1945-2000  
(Malden, Oxford & Carlton: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 704-26; Belsey, “Sexual Difference,” p. 181.
14 As Kinney also infers: Humanist Poetics, p. 386.
15 Lodge, “Miscellaneous Pieces,” p. 6, in Works IV.
convey a fixed meaning merely by appearing in print. What can one do about this 
(besides nag frivolous readers)?
By way of answer, More advises Hythlodaeus in Utopia: “oblique ductu 
conandum est, atque adnitendum tibi, uti pro tua uirili omnia tractes 
commode”.16 This advice offends Hythlodaeus’s commitment to “truth”:
17“Caeterum falsa loqui, sitne philosophi nescio, certe non est meum,” he objects. 
The position of More’s Hythlodaeus anticipates Lodge’s own Platonic 
viewpoint18—hence, I contend, the conventional heterobiographical figure is 
absent from Rosalynde. When one speaks “the truth”, what need for a marker of 
one’s ironic attitude to one’s own position?
As You Like I f  s Jaques has much in common with More’s Hythlodaeus. 
Jaques is “the olde gentleman” (5.1.3-4); Hythlodaeus: “uergentis ad senium 
aetatis”.19 Like Jaques, Hythlodaeus is a seasoned traveller (“uultu adustu”).20
Jaques “sold [his] own lands to see other men’s” (4.1.20-1); of Hythlodaeus, it is
0 1said: “relictu fratribus patrimonio”; thus, Hythlodaeus, too, was able to travel. 
Jaques travelled to obtain “experience” (4.1.23); Hythlodaeus “totum se 
addixerat philosophiae”.22 Rosalind recognizes Jaques’ literary ancestry: 
“Farewell, Monsieur Traveller. Look you lisp and wear strange suits” (4.1.30-1; 
emphases added); More describes Hythlodaeus with “penula neglectim ab 
humero dependente”.23 Shakespeare, in other words, adds the Hythlodaeus-like 
Jaques to Lodge’s scenario in order to restore ironic detachment.
“In fleeing fascism,” suggests Gilles Deleuze, “we rediscover fascist
16 Edward Surtz & J. H. Hexter, eds. The Complete Works o f  Sir Thomas More, Volume 4 (New  
Haven & London: Yale UP, 1965), p. 98 (“by the indirect approach you must seek and strive to 
the best o f  your power to handle matters tactfully”: pp. 99, 101). For discussion o f  More’s ironic 
authorial strategies, see: Greenblatt, Self-fashioning, pp. 27, 33. Greenblatt also points out the 
resemblance o f Sir Thomas More’s Hythlodaeus (whose name means “well-learned in nonsense”: 
p. 54) to More’s portraits o f Luther and Tyndale: p. 58.
17 Surtz & Hexter, eds. Works, p. 100 (“To speak falsehoods, for all I know, may be the part o f  a 
philosopher, but it is certainly not for me”: p. 101).
Hythlodaeus repeatedly cites Plato as authority for his position: Surtz & Hexter, eds. Works, 
pp. 100-5.
19 Surtz & Hexter, eds. Works, p. 48 (“a man o f advanced years”: p. 49).
20 Surtz & Hexter, eds. Works, p. 48 (“with sunburnt countenance”: p. 49).
21 Surtz & Hexter, eds. Works, p. 50 (“He left his patrimony at home ... to his brothers”: p. 51).
22 Surtz & Hexter, eds. Works, p. 50 (“he had devoted himself unreservedly to philosophy”: p.
51).
23 Surtz & Hexter, eds. Works, p. 48 (“cloak hanging carelessly from his shoulder”: p. 49).
coagulations on the line of flight... reconstituting ... our formations of power”.24 
This describes in modem terms the process whereby Lodge, after managing his 
passional drives via Ignatian exercises (as I have suggested he did), succumbed 
to a Counter-Reformation moralistic certainty. The very process of 
enlightenment “carries off the writer”. The writer belongs to the formal 
beginning—and would like to retain control of the end—of the writing process: 
the will to possess the truth (the beginning), the conversion of others to one’s 
own truth (the rhetorical end). However, “[i]t is never the beginning or the end 
which are interesting,” cautions Deleuze, “the beginning and end are points.
What is interesting is the middle.”25 The middle is traversed by writer after writer 
but belongs to no writer—belongs only to its own process. If a writer wishes to 
remain the occasion of the process over the course of a series of works he must, 
like Thomas More, (repeatedly) abstract himself from that process. Hythlodaeus, 
for example, as Greenblatt observes, “represents all that More deliberately 
excluded from the personality he created and played”. Greenblatt, in line with his 
thesis of “self-fashioning”, speaks of this process as “More’s self-creation” (as 
though “More”, as the notional remainder following the presumed-essential 
More’s projection of Hythlodaeus, bears a “more real” relation to a notional 
selfhood than “Hythlodaeus”).26 Greenblatt’s analysis actually describes the 
generation of not one viable “personality” but of disposable personas. “More” is 
generated via abstraction facilitated by the generation of Hythlodaeus—yet why 
should the process end there or be regarded as the willed act of an assumed 
essential selfhood? This is the fundamental contradiction in Greenblatt’s thesis: 
the self cannot fashion the self unless it already exists; the self is therefore not 
“self-fashioned”. If the self is to be regarded as a process at all (or, as Greenblatt 
implies, as the consequence of a process) then one must suppose that the “self’ is 
what remains following acts of abstraction performed by an agency other than
24 Gilles Deleuze & Claire Pamet, Dialogues //(L ondon & New York: Continuum, 2006), p. 29.
25 Deleuze & Pamet, Dialogues II, p. 29.
26 Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-fashioning: from  More to Shakespeare (Chicago & 
London: University o f  Chicago Press, 1980), p. 33.
that self.27 Thus, it would be more accurate to describe More’s (and, I submit, 
Shakespeare’s) overall activity as writer (not as Hythlodaean author) as a 
facultative, ongoing performance which produces a series of personas as alienated 
by-products. In As You Like It, for example, Shakespeare alienates Lodge-aspects 
of his self-performance as Jaques, figure of author-function. The writer, 
moreover, necessarily betrays (discards) the institutional formats which occasion 
the line of flight.28 Catholicism, and not Protestantism, is (theoretically) 
committed to precisely such a notion of ongoing relational transformation (as 
opposed to approximation to a normative ideal). In this sense, it may be argued 
that Shakespeare was Catholic, if not a Catholic.
Hence, Jaques is not “Shakespeare” because he is not the author of the play 
(nor is Shakespeare, facultatively-speaking).29 The author-function is relegated to 
the role of virtual spectator of an action beyond the control of any script. Jaques’ 
“seven ages” sermon, for instance, requires the (from Jaques’ point of view) 
unscripted arrival of Orlando bearing Adam on his back. Meaning is performed 
by an assembly’s cognition of embodied data. Still, it might be objected that 
Shakespeare builds this awareness into the script itself (scripting the reliance of 
Jaques’ sermon upon Orlando’s performed action), so the play does, after all, 
prioritize authorial intellect, whether or not it critiques Jaques as one conception 
of author-function. Certainly, a page-bound work such as More’s Utopia cannot 
avoid appearing as a product of ingenuity ascribed to an individual author. 
However, a dramatic performance staged before an assembly produces a 
communal text. Attending a play is, in a sense, participating in a guided reading, 
an experience equivalent to consulting a priest (or attending to the opinions of, 
say, a prose romance’s narrator)—but the priest in this case is not the dramatist- 
as-author; the “priest” is cognition-by-assembly.
27 For a comparable position, see: Barroll, Artificial Persons, pp. 70-3. Barroll discusses The 
Imitation o f  Christ as an important source in this regard.
28 Deleuze & Pamet, Dialogues II, p. 30.
29 Shakespeare is here accepted as the formal cause o f  the play-script as a given set o f  words, but 
the text o f AYLI is not isomorphic with that set. Authority is co-performed by the text-as-received 
not performed in the play-script.
*In Act 2 Scene 7 of As You Like It, Jaques at last confronts the banished Duke, 
appearing not melancholy as the Duke has heard him described, but looking 
“merrily” (11). In answer to the Duke’s expression of surprise at his happy 
demeanour, Jaques cries:
A Foole, a foole: I met a foole i ’th Forrest,
A motley Foole (a miserable world:)
As I do Hue by foode, I met a foole,
Who laid him downe, and bask’d him in the Sun 
And rail’d on Lady Fortune in good termes,
In good set termes, and yet a motley foole. (12-17)
Why was Jaques so very surprised by this encounter? A forest is a peculiar place 
to bump into a court jester (one assumes Jaques has met Touchstone), but other 
characters—Corin, Audrey, Martext, Orlando and William—meet Touchstone in 
Arden without evident astonishment. A person would be as surprised as Jaques, 
however, if, while meditating upon the folly of the world, a living breathing fool 
were to manifest before their eyes. That Jaques was meditating on precisely that 
is suggested by his inteijected comment in the quoted speech: “a miserable 
world”.
Other explanations for this interjection have been offered. Dusinberre 
suggests that “Jaques remembers just in time [?], amidst laughing at the fool, his 
own role as melancholy satirist”.30 Hattaway follows Hilda M. Hulme in 
suspecting a textual error but also suggests “the subtext could be a belated reply 
to the Duke’s rhetorical question” (which would make the gist of the remark no 
more evident).31 Brissenden also cites Hulme but suggests that Jaques is so 
surprised to encounter a fool in the forest that he concludes “the world is full of
30 Dusinberre, ed. A YLI, p. 217.n.
31 Hattaway, ed. A YLI, p. 116.n; Hilda M. Hulme, Explorations in Shakespeare’s Language: 
Some Problems o f  Lexical Meaning in the Dramatic Text (London: Longmans, 1962), pp. 207-8.
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them, according to the proverb, ‘The world is full of fools’”.32 This option seems 
no less arguable than my present suggestion. However, it should be noted that 
(since surprise is being held responsible for the lack of logical connection) it is 
based on the unlikely supposition that Jaques had not reached such a conclusion 
long before the present encounter. (And anyway, Jaques had no doubt 
encountered as many fools—in his estimation—in the forest as at court.) As 
Brissenden reads it, Jaques is saying “I met a fool in the forest! Therefore, the 
world must be full of fools.” Thus, Jaques’ pleasure is presumed to derive from 
his having found proof that the world is full of fools. This would be a mordant 
rather than an ecstatic operation and as such does not account for the semantic 
rupture. Indeed, it seems an uncharacteristically poor piece of psychological 
observation on the dramatist’s part to have Jaques deliver a detached satirical 
remark in the middle of a burst of excitement. According to my interpretation, 
Jaques says: “I met a fool in the forest, a motley fool, the miserable world in 
human form”. The benefit of this reading is that it allows that Jaques had long 
since concluded the world was full of fools. The source of his surprise, therefore, 
remains elusive unless one supposes that it derives from this folly having 
suddenly manifested in bodily form before his eyes. Touchstone’s appearance is 
thus more surprising to Jaques than to any other resident of the forest because he 
is in the habit of meditating upon human folly. The fool has seemingly stepped 
out of the world of his own preoccupations.
Jaques as subjectivist (one preoccupied with “a melancholy of mine owne” 
[4.1.15]) regards phenomena as isolated objects of perception. These objects 
offer passive bases from which to produce abstract meanings by a process of 
intellection alone (as Jaques did copiously with regard to the flagellant-as-stag). 
However, the physical manifestation of an idea upon which he was meditating in 
the forest would offer a hint to Jaques that, on the contrary, cognitive processes 
produce reality.33 It should be stressed, though, that any alteration in Jaques’
32 Brissenden, ed. AYLI, p. 143.n.
33 “Jaques had chosen the spot by the brook for ... meditation”: Winfried Schleiner, “Jaques and 
the Melancholy Stag,” p. 178, English Language Notes 17.3 (1980), pp. 175-9. For Hazlitt,
Jaques is “the only purely contemplative character in Shakespeare”, in Tomarken, ed. AYLI, p.
17; for contestation o f Hazlitt’s assertion, see: Brissenden, ed. AYLI, p. 31. Levi notes that “a
understanding of cognitive process is nascent—he remains a subjectivist for the 
duration of the play.
It will be useful here to back-track a little and consider (in a Bradleyan 
spirit) what specific meditations Jaques had been engaged in, before the fool 
appeared. One gathers that Jaques has been spying on the Duke (just as the First 
Lord has monitored Jaques’ behaviour). In describing this “Foole”, Jaques seems 
to refer to the Duke himself—the man who claims to enjoy the weather in this 
cold forest, as though winter wind were sunshine, and expatiates “In good set 
termes” (classically-polished rhetorical speeches) on Lady Fortune’s incapacity 
to harm him. After all, unless Jaques is being disingenuous—unless he is actually 
satirising the Duke—it is odd that he cites the guise of fool as apt for his own 
project of social reform, when the fool’s words, according to Jaques, show that 
his knowledge is “mangled” (42).
Lutheran propaganda may inform Jaques’ description of a “Foole” in 
“motley”.34 After his encounter with the Dominican papal emissary Cajetan, for 
example, Luther declared that “the cardinal was no more fitted to handle the case 
than an ass to play on a harp”. Cartoonists “took up the theme and pictured the 
pope himself in this pose”. Hence, printed images of an ass dressed as the pope, 
playing bag-pipes, began to proliferate along with portraits of “The Cardinal- 
Fool”, showing two faces—one of a cardinal, one of a fool—joined together so 
that the nose of one was the chin of the other, thus indicating that these two 
characters were but one foolish creature in different costumes. The guise of a 
fool was thus understood as being equivalent to papal and priestly robes.36
Jaques also arguably caricatures aged popes as incarnations of Old Father 
Time.37 Indeed, Jaques laughs “like Chanticleere” for an hour non-stop at the
recurring image o f  meditation in 17th-century painting” shows the meditating figure “lying full 
length resting on one elbow”, a posture attributed to Jaques by the First Lord (“he lay along / 
Vnder an oake” [2.1.30-1]): Frontiers o f  Paradise, p. 107.
34 Dickens, Counter-Reformation, p. 101. For Luther as satirist, see: Cummings, Grammar and  
Grace, pp. 35-6.
35 Bainton, Luther, p. 96.
36 Bainton, Luther, pp. 96-7.
37 For the suggestion that Hymen identifies Rosalind as “Truth” and the point that “[n]o emblem 
is more familiar than that o f Time leading forth his daughter [Truth] from a cave or dungeon”, 
see: Waddington, “Moralizing the Spectacle,” p. 162.
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fool’s business with his clock (30-33). Chaucer’s “Nun’s Priest’s Tale” suggests 
a reason for Jaques’ amusement: “Well sikerer was his [Chanticleere’s] 
crowing,” says the Nun’s Priest, “Than is a clokke or an abbey orlogge”.38 Abbey 
clocks regulated the performance of salvation according to a schedule.39 
Conversely, Jaques qua Lutheran regards all true believers as priests guided by 
conscience, not a ritual timetable, and thus laughs like Chanticleere at the fool’s 
mockery of monastic observations.
The Duke possibly suspects that he is the target of Jaques’ satire, for he 
asks “What foole is this?”, as though to say: “Are you referring to me in this 
fashion?” (35). Jaques chooses not to answer directly, preferring to keep the 
Duke in suspense (the market for satire has to be prolonged). The satirist offers 
instead a teasing association of the “Foole” with Peter’s betrayal of Christ. That 
is, Jaques identifies the fool only as “One that hath bin a Courtier” (36).
Attending Caiphas’ court is the cause of Peter’s lapse in Southwell’s Saint Peters 
Complaynt (where the cock—a forerunner of Chanticleere—of course puts in an 
appearance, too).40 This anecdote, though extremely slight in the Gospel account, 
had come to be associated with the corruption of the Papal Court through its 
involvement in temporal possessions and power. Jaques thus intimates that, if the 
description of the fool seems to apply to the Duke, that may tell the Duke 
something about himself; Jaques, thereby, escapes the charge that he is directly 
(discourteously) calling the Duke a fool.
Over the course of this conversation between Jaques and the Duke, the 
audience will have had time to surmise that Jaques really has met a fool in the 
forest, in the form of Celia’s clown (though why the clown had been roaming 
about on his own is never explained). The tension caused by the pointed nature of 
the anti-papal satire will have been dissipated to some extent by this dawning 
apprehension. Jaques has a get-out clause; he is using an actual encounter with a
38 Benson et al, eds. Riverside Chaucer, p. 253.
39 Shell, Religion, pp. 136-7. For Chaucer’s Chanticleere narrative as an (anti-allegorical) account 
o f rivalries between friars and monks, see: Dahlberg, “Cock and Fox,” pp. 277-90.
40 Davidson & Sweeney, eds. Collected Poems, p. 71 (11. 259ff); A. D. Cousins, The Catholic 
Religious Poets from  Southwell to Crashaw: a Critical History (London: Sheed & Ward, 1991),
p. 66.
fool as a stalking-horse for his satire.41
However, any “cheap” anti-papal satire here is simultaneous with exposure 
of Reformers/Lutherans as self-righteous and uncharitable. Just as the Cardinal- 
Fool’s head can be turned to show either “Cardinal” or “Fool”, so can this 
exchange be cognized in two ways: anti-Papalist or anti-Lutheran. Critics such as 
Keir Elam have argued that in designing such structures Shakespeare offers no 
“meaning”, only an image which reveals earnest people to be fools when they 
argue (as I am doing) for a particular interpretation.42 It is healthy to 
acknowledge the danger. Nonetheless, Elam’s argument rests upon a modem act 
of allegorization, reading modem doubts regarding the possibility of effective 
communication into early modem texts. Elam’s scepticism, in other words, 
requires that human communication always fail (without being able to account 
for how one knows when a given attempt at communication has failed).
To recapitulate: Jaques’ speech has two “levels” of meaning from Jaques’ 
point of view, one “literal” (relating to the fool of his forest-encounter) and one 
“allegorical” (relating to satire of the papacy). The rhetorical aim of Jaques’ 
“allegory”, however, cannot be achieved unless the Duke infers that he is being 
referred to as the Fool. In which case the “literal” idea of the fool is exposed for 
what it always was—an act of bad faith, a smokescreen—and the actual meaning 
is revealed to be an anti-papal tirade.43 Certainly, this conception of the process
41 For Luther’s similarly strategic presentation o f  him self as a fool in his writings, see: Wriedt, 
“Luther’s Theology,” p. 101.
42 Keir Elam, “Introduction,” pp. 10-11,24, in Elam, ed. Twelfth Night, by William Shakespeare 
(London: CENGAGE Learning [Arden3], 2008), pp. 1-153.
43 This diagnosis o f  the erasure o f material presence in the conscious manipulation o f an 
“allegorical” sign implicit in Shakespeare’s text, and the association o f same with Lutheran anti- 
papal satire, is consistent with the Jesuit theologian Robert Bellarmine’s rebuttal o f Lutheranism 
in the first volume o f his Controversies, where Bellarmine insists on the inherent goodness o f  
matter; see: M. L. Balam, “Bellarmine and the Sacramental Principle,” p. 312, The Month 160 
(1932), pp. 308-16. According to Bellarmine’s view, to engage consciously in allegory is to 
express sacrilegious contempt for the material referents o f signs, this being related to the heresy 
o f denying Christ’s taking on o f  human form: “He chose a human way, which the sense-bound 
creature could see and appreciate”: p. 314. Greenblatt’s assessment indicates the relationship 
between Lutheranism and the present study’s understanding o f  “allegory”: “Luther’s power over 
the unsuspecting, who long for a release from an uncertain, imperfect, and guilt-ridden existence, 
derives from his unscrupulous understanding that, in the absence o f reality, the mere forms o f  
reality will suffice”: Self-fashioning, p. 59. The production o f “mere forms”, o f course, is as 
impossible as allegory. However, while Greenblatt’s account offers a fair summary o f certain 
types o f “Lutheranism”, it does not accurately register Luther’s own position. Luther, after all,
would work smoothly enough in an account of the earlier stag/trans-ordinal 
usurpation meditation; however, here there is a complicating factor: Jaques did 
meet a fool. In other words, where (according to my argument) the “stag” was 
Jaques’ intellectual translation of a flagellant, the “fool” of his meditation has a 
physical manifestation. His current discourse, in reverting to its customary 
satirical/“allegorical” mode, fails to acknowledge crucial implications of this 
phenomenological difference.
It should by now be evident why Jaques remains incapable of responding 
appropriately to his encounter with the fool. The only legitimate target of “satire” 
from a Christian point of view is the satirical self—specifically, tendencies in 
that self to doubt the participation of the human in the divine. Hence, the egoistic 
notion of the “I” (the intellectual faculty misapprehended and reified as 
individual totality) is a prime target. Consequently, satirical critique of 
“selfhood” is not exclusively auto-directed. In As You Like It the intellectual 
faculty reified as rational individual self has been named “Jaques”, which, 
pronounced “jakes”, echoes the Elizabethan slang for toilet. Refuse from the 
information gathered by the senses and processed by the koine aesthesis ends up 
here. When the intellect isolates itself from the koine aesthesis —as Jaques has 
done, in isolating himself from the society Arden affords—it can only speculate 
on the meaning of appearances. The communal cognitive process described in 
the previous chapter is omitted. Both that cognitive process and Jaques’ 
operations are “empirical”. The isolated intellect, however, receives all sensory 
data as of equal validity (and, therefore, equal potential non-validity). There is, 
thus, no reliable empirical means of discerning the relation of appearances to 
existent phenomena. The intellect may believe everything the senses tell it; or 
doubt everything the senses tell it.
Hence, Jaques is an appropriate name for the author-function as self- 
righteous moral authority. Print is empirical refuse—the relic of experience(s), 
suitable matter for a jakes (toilet). Printed works often claim to speak with 
authority: such works as Lodge’s Rosalynde expect to be meditated upon
was committed to the doctrine o f Real Presence. (Greenblatt leaves unclear the extent to which he 
is ventriloquizing More’s position in this passage.)
228
(seeming to chafe at being merely read by fellow participants in a cognitive 
assembly). Lyly, in the letter “To the Gentlemen Readers” prefacing Euphues, 
declares himself (sincerely or not) “content this winter to haue my doings read 
for a toye, that in sommer they may be ready for trash”.44 Lodge, on the other 
hand, despite claiming to offer a sequel to Euphues, insists, in 1592, that his 
romance be pored over until it is understood. Rosalynde, that is,presents itself as 
not a participant in today’s conversation but a tablet from the mountain.
Similarly, where Shakespeare’s play is called As You Like It, Lodge’s letter 
to the readers of Rosalynde states: “If you like it so” (7). Like the cognitive 
reporters discussed in the previous chapter, its opinion is not to be changed. 
Unlike those reporters, it does not present itself as contributing information to a 
larger assembly for consideration. It speaks as an isolated subject addressing 
other isolated subjects from a position of greater (borrowed) authority. Thus, it 
communicates and relies upon subjection/abjection, its progressive Jesuit 
“content” notwithstanding.
As stated in the Introduction, subjectivity is incapable of performance, even 
on its own (Platonic) terms. Meaning and self-performance occur when printed 
texts are read, not before. Printed texts which refuse this notion pose as isolated 
units—however, they cannot function as texts as such. An unread piece of print is 
not a text. This is perhaps why Orlando calls Jaques a cipher (3.2.282): in 
isolation a “human being” is nothing—an unread (non)text. The dangers of a 
subjectivist concept of Christianity are thereby indicated. The intellectual ego 
usurps the claims of other faculties when regarded as the subject of all 
experience. However, a non-existent subject cannot be the agent o f faith. Hence, 
Jaques is melancholy: he has accepted the Lutheran precept sola fide but cannot 
believe.
This de facto scepticism expresses itself as anti-Christian satire—satire 
which “goes the wrong way”, from the intellect outwards: the intellectual self 
criticizes others. Thus (to anticipate interpretation offered below), Jaques puts his 
(subjective) reading of Scripture to uncharitable use as the basis for a critique of
44 Bond, ed. Works, 1.182.
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the banished Duke and his followers.
As already noted, Jaques does not apprehend crucial implications of the 
physical manifestation of the fool of his meditation(s). The fool’s bodily 
presence says: “How would you even be able to speculate about, and so 
condemn, the world’s sense-ridden folly without your senses? How then can you 
blame the senses for folly?”45 Jaques interprets the experience in precisely the 
opposite way: he becomes merry because his meditation has “come to life” in a 
seeming confirmation of the truth of his pessimistic speculations. Hence, he 
concludes, upon encountering the fool: “a miserable world”—the world is as 
objectively foolish as his subjective interpretation of Scripture has led him to 
suppose.
The fool, Jaques reports, then “laid him downe and bask’d in the Sun” (15). 
Jaques evidently means that the fool reposed in the sunlight. One problem with 
deciding that such a normal-seeming action is being “realistically represented” is 
that, according to the banished Duke and his lords, the forest is currently a cold 
environment where the winter wind blows (1.6-10; 5.6-7). Nonetheless, during 
his encounter with the fool, Jaques ’ forest is a place of warmth and light.46 Then, 
the realist-interpreter must suppose, the sun came out for a brief spell and the 
clown made the most of it. Jaques’ emphatic wonder at this simple action, 
though, suggests that he interpreted the source of light as Christ himself 
(conveyed via Scripture). By means of a glorious inglorious death (analogous to 
the pyric fate of the phoenix) God revealed the world to be a hospitable 
environment where all humanity may bask (bathe, be baptised) in grace.
To recap and clarify: while meditating on Scripture and the folly of the 
world, Jaques has an encounter with a materially present fool, whom he 
interprets as in some way embodying the insight into universal folly he has 
gained by reading Scripture.47 He (mis)interprets this experience as confirmation 
of his ability to perceive “the truth” of Scripture. Likewise, Jaques regards this
45 Chadwick, ed. Confessions, V.4; X.18.
46 A. Stuart Daley, “The Midsummer Deer o f AYLI,” PQ  58 (1979), pp. 103-7; “Dispraise,” pp. 
301-2.
47 Luther and other Protestants considered Scripture to be “the same thing as Christ”: Cummings, 
Grammar and Grace, p. 44; Questier, Conversion, p. 69.n.l35.
“objective” manifestation of folly as justification for his (Lutheran) critique of 
the banished Duke. Thus, he uses the experience with the fool as the basis for 
further “allegorical” satire on the Duke’s folly.
On the other hand, the “fool” (the audience is at liberty to suppose) is 
Celia’s clown, not objective truth. As heaven’s clown, the fool is a figure for the 
folly of supposing one can access divine truth merely by reading Scripture 
(mistaking the letter for the spirit). Scripture is motley: a patchwork textual 
assembly, isolated passages from which can always be understood in various 
ways.
With these points established, Jaques’ misinterpretation of his encounter 
with the fool can be further explored. According to Jaques, the fool observed 
how
from houre to houre, we ripe, and ripe,
And then from houre to houre, we rot, and rot,
And thereby hangs a tale. (26-8)
This paraphrases Southwell’s Epistle o f Comfort: “Every day we die, and hourly 
lose some part of our life; and even while we grow, we decrease.”48 Both 
statements seem to partake of the pessimism of bleaker scriptural texts such as 
Ecclesiastes. It should be noted, though, that the fool does not draw a despairing 
conclusion from his “reading” but seems rather to suggest that interpretations are 
to be sought: “And thereby hangs a tale”. Southwell’s text might also be taken to 
inform Jaques’ “Seven Ages” speech (140-67), for it continues: “We have lost
our infancy, our childhood, our youth and all, till this present day; and this very
day death by minutes is secretly purloining from us”.49 However, there is a 
crucial difference: Southwell gives a central accent to “this present day” between 
the terminals of infancy and death. Thus, he does not recommend apathetic 
despair but stresses that Christian works are to be done now. Jaques’ speech, by 
contrast, describes only linear succession—there is no ripening, no noon in
48 Walter, ed. Prose Works, p. 167.
49 Walter, ed. Prose Works, p. 167.
Jaques’ day.50 The solar stage which Jaques omits from the conventional “seven 
ages” sequence, moreover, is the one denoting Christ as man’s perfection.51 The 
Aristotelian conception of nature as teleological process is here ignored.52 By 
omitting the solar stage of human maturity, Jaques arguably omits salvific 
imitation of Christ (alias works).
In short, I am suggesting that Jaques enacts the Luther-influenced failure to 
recognize that Scripture is a mirror, not a document where truth is recorded in 
printed form. One does not read therein a stable written message; rather, in 
reading, one co-produces Scripture’s meaning via one’s mode o f perception (as 
you like it). The fool, therefore, is Scripture: a mirror of Jaques’ own folly. 
Jaques’ misinterpretation of the fool as confirmation of his own wisdom figures 
all subjectivist Scriptural reading, in that such reading produces meanings 
determined by one’s own biases—hence the irony of Jaques’ sarcastic praise for 
the “deepe contemplatiue” fool (31).
As mentioned above, the banished Duke responds to Jaques’ account of the 
fool with a straight-forward question: “What foole is this?” This line commences 
a lengthy passage (35-87) cut from the Douai manuscript-version of As You Like 
* It (1694-5). The other cuts in this manuscript, used in the education of “children 
sent abroad by their Catholic families”, seem motivated by the desire to remove 
“risque jokes and allusions”. However, the removal of lines 35-87 appears 
intended to subtract Jaques’ satire from the piece. Dusinberre implies that the 
motive for this would be to make a “faster-moving narrative”.54 The earlier 
exposition of Jaques’ anti-papal “allegory” suggests other reasons.
Impressed by the fool’s ability to voice criticism of the Church-as-court in 
such safely “mangled forms”, Jaques declares, “I am ambitious for a motley
50 Kieman Ryan, Shakespeare’s Comedies (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 219.
51 Alan Taylor Bradford, “Jaques’s Distortion o f the Seven Ages Paradigm,” pp. 174-5, SQ  27 
(1976), pp. 171-6; Michael J. B. Allen, “Jaques against the Seven Ages o f the Proclan Man,” pp. 
336, 339, Modern Language Quarterly 42 (1981), pp. 331-46. For the contrast between Jaques’ 
linear “seven ages” and the play’s circular octave o f  married couples, see: Owens, “Melancholy,” 
pp. 24-5; Vanrigh, “Hymen,”p. 6.
52 David Bostock, ed. Physics, by Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996), II. 1; see also: Chadwick, 
ed. Confessions, IV. 10; V.9; Ephesians 4:13.
53 Dusinberre, e&.AYLI, pp. 380, 385; see also: G. Blakemore Evans, “The Douai Manuscript—  
Six Shakespearean Transcripts,” P 0  41 (1962), pp. 158-72.
54 Dusinberre, ed .AYLI, pp. 384-5.
coat”.55 That is, having learned from the fool something of the lesson More 
(whose name, of course, was observed to resemble the Latin moras—“fool”) 
tried to teach Hythlodaeus, Jaques has decided that he has no choice but to pose 
as a fool, since all human beings are fools/fallen. However, it is never made clear 
why Jaques seeks the Duke’s permission to adopt a motley suit. A professional 
fool needs a patron, but the fact that Jaques, who previously emphasised his wish 
to avoid the exiled Duke, now acknowledges his need for the latter’s patronage 
suggests that the Duke is uniquely authorised to grant Jaques’ suit. That is,
Jaques requires a religious institutional mandate to preach his personal 
understanding of Scripture. Indeed, he states:
I must haue liberty 
Withall, as large a Charter as the winde,
To blow on whom I please (7.47-9)
Such a “Charter” would allow Jaques to criticise even the Pope himself. Only the 
Pope, therefore, could grant such a privilege. Jaques is not advertising his own 
wisdom: he (mockingly) acknowledges that the Duke and his companions 
possess “better judgements” and asks that they “weed” those faculties “Of all 
opinion ... / That I am wise” (45-7). In other words, Jaques will function as the 
mouthpiece of the Holy Spirit (“the winde”), channelled via his reading of 
Scripture.56
Most pointedly, Jaques specifies:
And they that are most gauled with my folly,
They most must laugh: And why sir must they so?
The why is plaine, as way to Parish Church (50-2)
55 In The Papacy in Rome, an Answer to the Celebrated Romanist in Leipzig (1520), Luther 
wrote: “Because my Lord Christ and his holy Word ... are held to be but mockery and fools’ wit, 
I must likewise drop all seriousness and see whether I, too, have learned how to play the fool and 
clown”: pp. 202-3, in Tappert, ed. Selected Writings, 1.197-249.
56 Brissenden, ed. AYLI, p. 146.n.
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The way to a parish church was so plain because the footpath to it was so well- 
trodden—everyone went there on a regular basis.57 Jaques’ new message with 
regard the true and neglected meaning of Scripture is to be promulgated there 
from now on every week (if he receives his mandate). Hence, the targets of the 
resulting criticism who will be “most gauled” (because lambasted severely in 
every sermon in every parish) will be the corrupt head and members of the 
Church. However, they “most must laugh” and not seem unresponsive, for 
otherwise they will merely prove the truth of the criticism (that they refuse to 
respond to criticism).58 It is worth observing here that Jaques neglects to indicate 
that the fool he met ever used his motley license to criticise any particular person 
or institution. Yet the nature of the role Jaques now envisages for himself 
retroactively indicates that he considers such to have been the fool’s business in 
the obscure remarks quoted previously.
Furthermore, Jaques promises that universal reform will be the result of his 
ministry:
Give me leaue 
To speake my minde, and I will through and through 
Cleanse the foule bodie o f th’infected world,
If they will patiently receiue my medicine (58-61)
Note the passivity required in the world-as-audience: Jaques intends to deliver 
sermons from a subjective position of moral superiority, not engage in dialogues. 
In a strictly Lutheran vein, moreover, Jaques does not claim to be able to redeem 
the world’s fallen condition, but he does desire the means of reforming the 
world’s corporate “bodie”—the universal (Catholic) Church—head and 
members.
The Duke becomes angry with Jaques here, exhibiting perturbation for the 
only time in the play (“Fie on thee,” he says [62]). This response recalls the 
severity with which King Thamus responds to Theuth’s offer of his invention,
57 Dusinberre, ed. AYLI, p. 220.n.
58 Luther, “Babylonian Captivity,” pp. 423-4.
writing, in Plato’s Phaedrus.59 Like Theuth, Jaques thinks (or pretends to think) 
that his “gift” will afford a neutral means of improving human society: “What,” 
he says, in response to the Duke’s angry words, “for a Counter, would I do, but 
good?” (63).60 The Duke angrily explains that Jaques-as-pharmakon would do
Most mischeeouous foule sin, in chiding sin:
For thou thy selfe hast bene a Libertine,
As sensuall as the brutish sting it selfe,
And all th’imbossed sores, and headed euils,
That thou with license o f free foot hast caught,
Would’st thou disgorge into the generall world. (64-9)
Here is one of the play’s most explicit indications of the currency of the 
facultative model of cognition. Read “logically”, the Duke’s charge makes no 
sense: why, because Jaques has been a libertine, will his chiding the sins of 
others automatically pollute the world? However, when the venting/vending of 
satire is understood facultatively as the projection outward of violence 
occasioned by one’s own sins, and which properly, therefore, should be directed 
at the sinful tendencies in the self, then the Duke’s charge makes perfect sense. 
The more sinful Jaques has been himself, the more sins he will attribute to the 
targets of his satire. Thus, in uttering condemnation of the world, he will make 
the world conform (more and more) to his own, sinful inner state.
Jaques makes no attempt to answer the Duke’s charge. This indicates to the 
audience/reader that the Duke has scored a palpable hit. On the other hand, that 
the Duke’s anger uniquely manifests at this moment is the accusation’s own 
refutation. The “father” recognizes himself in the “son” and abandons his 
customary (condescending) pose of paternal indulgence. As Derrida shows, 
Plato’s banishment of poets from his ideal republic and Thamus’ rejection of the 
invention of writing are of a piece. Plato performs poetry in his dialogues; the 
laws of Thamus’ state are themselves exemplary (and, therefore, examples of
59 Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” p. 1852.
60 “[CJounter, n.3,” (2.c): “a thing o f  no intrinsic value”: OED.
“writing” that aid the memory).61 What is being banished/rejected, therefore, is 
not writing or poetry per se but a venue for opposing voices. The Duke is not 
perfect in self-knowledge (no-one can be). Likewise, no pope, priest or Church 
Father can unilaterally transmit the truth of Scripture through edict, sermon 
and/or exposition. Jaques, however, cannot make this case without 
acknowledging the purely subjective basis of his own claims to speak.
Yet if any and all criticism of an institution by persons outside of that 
institution is to be dismissed as self-serving and socially polluting, how can 
corrupt institutions ever be reformed? Explication of the answer requires the 
presentation of simultaneity. The point is made thus: Orlando’s loving sacrifice 
(his rescue of Oliver from the lioness) reforms the corrupt institution figured by 
both Dukes (in their tyranny and indulgence). More specifically: apprehension of 
the Christian meaning of Orlando’s loving sacrifice achieves that. That is, 
Orlando reforms an erroneous conception of God (belonging to himself and his 
society, and figured by the tyrant version of Duke Frederick) by overcoming his 
own pride, anger and desire for revenge. God could not forgive him when he 
tried to confess (at the wrestling bout) because the God he believed in was an 
unforgiving tyrant God.
The play performs this work of reformation by multi-sensory means. When 
the “old Religious man” (5.4.158)—Corin, whose name recalls Paul’s epistles to 
the Corinthians—informs the tyrant Duke of the meaning of Orlando’s 
sacrifice—that by combatting one’s own sins, one commutes the sins of others— 
reform is achieved; the tyrant Duke converts. Theological wrangling, no matter 
how motivated and no matter of what intellectual calibre, achieves nothing. The 
stage of the world, not the page of Scripture (nor the pages of neo-classical, 
humanist texts), is where Christianity is “written” and read.
Given that Jaques has here been read as figuring the intellectual faculty, the 
following passage from Colet’s commentary on the first letter to the Corinthians 
is pertinent:
61 Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” pp. 1852-3.
Corinthii et sua ipsorum opinionae et aliorum etiam habiti sapientes non nihil arbitrati 
sunt venire in sermonem posse, de quo non disertissime disputarent, de quoque etiam 
probabilem sententiam non proferrant: homines insolenter conflsi suis ingeniis, et 
sapientam sibi arrogantes, in quaque re et veritatem et falsitatem posse suis viribus 
deprehendere opinati sunt; gens ingeniosa, abundans, et ocio et literis, ac simul 
artificiosa quadam eloquentia freta, quicquid in medium venerat, id in utramvis partem 
et suadere et dissuadere nihil diffisa est. Fuit ilia Greca natio, illis argutiis versatibilis 
humani ingenii, semper prompta ad argumendum et redarguendum; sed hiis humanae 
mentis deliramentis miserabiliter decepta. Siquidem quo putarunt maxime se videre et 
veritatem percipere posse, eo maxime excecata fiierat Grecia, ne veritatem intueretur.62
The Corinthians, accounted wise both in their own opinion and in that o f others, 
supposed that there could be no topic o f discourse, about which they could not dispute 
most subtly, and deliver a plausible decision. Presumptuously relying on their own 
abilities, and arrogating to themselves the title o f  wisdom, they imagined that they could, 
by their own resources, detect the true and the false in everything. An intellectual race, 
with leisure and literature, confiding at the same time in an elaborate kind o f rhetoric, 
they had no scruple at pleading on either side ... Inn these subtleties o f the versatile 
human intellect, the Greek nation was ever adroit... but yet was woefully deluded by 
such vagaries o f the mind. For, in fact, the very  fa c u lty  by which the Greeks thought they 
could best see and discern the truth was the one by which they were most blinded.63
Jaques announces his decision to converse with the convertite Frederick, Jr. 
Presumably from that Frederick, Jaques will soon also hear the Corinthian 
message and—as with another famous convertite, Augustine—the full 
conversion so desperately sought by intellectual means will be accomplished 
facultatively. Allowing space for free will, the play leaves Jaques’ final condition 
an open question.64
By way of conclusion, it may be noted that Orlando’s arrival after Jaques’ 
defence of satire marks the end of the section cut from the Douai manuscript. The
62 J. H. Lupton, ed. Enarratio in Epistolam Primam S. Pauli ad  Corinthios, by John Colet 
(London: Bell & Daldy, 1874), pp. 176-7.
63 Translation from Hunt, Colet, pp. 93-4 (emphases added).
64 Marshall, “Doubled Jaques,” pp. 391-2. See also: Scoufos, “Paradiso Terrestref  p. 225; 
Dubrow, “Introduction,” p. 34.
foregoing analysis indicates why the Douai college would omit that particular 
exchange between the exiled Duke and Jaques in a text for Catholic children. For 
political reasons, a facultative understanding of cognition was in the process of 
being replaced by a subjectivist conception. Once it mattered more than anything 
else which Church a political subject was loyal to, a facultative model of identity 
only muddied the issue for both sides.65 There was no reason to explicate such a 
passage to Catholic pupils of the 17th Century. (And, left unexplicated, it might 
be mistaken for straight-forward anti-papal satire.) Hence, in a very short time, 
under the aegis of confessionalization, the facultative model (as bearer of—and 
as dependent upon—Christian universality) became obscure.
65 Reinhard, “Reassessment,” pp. 114-5.
Conclusion.
In this thesis, I have found it convenient to structure an implicit narrative of 
Elizabethan theology using prominent writers as reference points (Dyer, 
Southwell, Lodge and Shakespeare), paying particular attention to their 
respective cognitive models and positions vis-a-vis author-fimction. In Chapter 2, 
I suggested that the earliest of these writers, Sir Edward Dyer, in “Hee That His 
Mirth Hath Loste”, presented a participant-in-Christ as a speaker ironically aware 
of his own “folly”. In producing this text, Dyer as ostensible “author” dies to 
himself (the argument holds) in order to participate in a communal Christ via 
reception of “his” poem as Eucharist-surrogate. Here, by way of summation, one 
might consider a question that it was not possible to explore in that chapter; 
namely, why offer a Eucharist-surrogate as poem? That is, accepting the 
chapter’s contention that Dyer’s protagonist presents an auto-ministerial 
viewpoint, should not that protagonist (and his author) be aware that, from a 
general Christian perspective, tribulations are to be welcomed as crosses to bear? 
Why, in that case, bemoan the encroachments of either Calvinism or some 
centralizing monarchical equivalent of papal tyranny instead of simply entering 
one’s religious retreat—as the poem’s speaker claims he intends to do—but 
silently, without complaining in public? If Dyer’s poem does not address 
doctrinal matters, why does it present a speaker so concerned about his spiritual 
condition? If the poem does address doctrinal matters, then Dyer claims authority 
to speak as a sound interpreter of Scripture.
In response to radical appropriations of his message, Luther came to 
distinguish (by no means always clearly) between the priesthood of all believers 
and the need for ordained ministers in a Christian community.1 Unlike an 
ordained Lutheran minister, Dyer lacks any official mandate to speak on
1 Eric W. Gritsch, Martin—G od’s Court Jester (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), pp. 183-5.
doctrinal matters. Dyer’s protagonist, for his part, implies that his mistress has 
failed to reward his virtue, while promoting others of lesser “faith”. Thus, one 
might read the poem as a political intervention, written from an all-too-human 
perspective. In other words, the poem can be read as implicitly coercive. As 
stated, the poem is arguably offered as a Eucharist-surrogate: performatively, the 
speaker has assumed ministerial office and addresses a community of like- 
minded potential (internal) exiles. “Hee That His Mirth Hath Loste” thus, I have 
suggested, presents itself as self-authorizing, or, rather, it locates authority in the 
Christian community as distinct from the community of Elizabethan subjects. 
(Writing as establishment-man, two decades later, Hooker laid great emphasis on 
the identity of precisely these two communities.)
One might suggest that Dyer articulates a conservative position on behalf 
of his patron of that period, the earl of Leicester. Available evidence does not 
allow one to conclude that this particular poem—specifically its popularity—was 
the cause of Dyer’s expulsion from court (which event approximately coincided 
with the poem’s probable date of composition). Interpretation offered in Chapter 
2 suggests, after all, that the poem demonstrates that a political lesson has been 
assimilated. There is, in any case, no need to establish such a precise causational 
link. It is enough to say that Elizabeth was especially sensitive at that stage of her 
reign (the early 1570s) to public challenges to her role as supreme governor of 
the English church.
Chapter 3’s analysis indicates that the Jesuit Robert Southwell did not 
approve of Dyer’s strategy. Southwell is unlikely to have been unaware of the 
political dimension of Dyer’s poem just outlined. Thus, it is striking that, in 
rebutting Dyer’s text, Southwell occupies the de facto position of defender of 
Elizabeth’s ecclesiastical supremacy against a conservative post-papal ministry 
abiding in the wings.2 The time-lag between Dyer’s poem and Southwell’s 
parody, however, should be taken into consideration: Dyer’s poem spoke to the
2 A. Lytton Sells, The Italian Influence in English Poetry: from  Chaucer to Southwell (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1955), p. 329; Jedin, “Katholische Reformation.” Relevant to 
Southwell’s attitude is the distinction F. J. Shirley makes between the positions o f  Hooker and 
Suarez: Richard Hooker and Contemporary Political Ideas (London: SPCK, 1949), pp. 151, 160- 
82.
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political and ecclesiastical conditions of the 1570s; Southwell, therefore, may not 
be criticizing Dyer’s political strategy in respect to its moment of publication but 
may be revising it according to the political needs of the late-1580s. Nonetheless, 
the point holds: Southwell assumes a de facto position as defender of royal 
supremacy. Hence, perhaps, Elizabeth’s expression of regret following 
Southwell’s execution, claiming that her advisers “had deceived her with 
calumnies” regarding the Jesuit’s political position.3
To counteract Elizabethan Lutheranism, Southwell, Chapter 3 argued, 
occupied it from within—for example, by writing parodies of Elizabethan courtly 
verse, including Dyer’s poem. One participates in Christ, Southwell’s revision of 
Dyer’s lyric implies, by dying to the self not in (egoistic) Stoic resignation but 
via communal Christian activity. The inherent danger of establishing parity 
between Elizabethan verse and orthodox Catholic poetry, however, perhaps led 
Southwell (the present thesis has suggested) to seek venues where the parodic 
project could be conducted by lay Catholic writers, including Thomas Lodge. 
Accordingly, Chapter 4 argued that Lodge’s Rosalynde expounds a Jesuit 
doctrine of justification. In carrying out this missionary work on behalf of—and 
in possible collaboration with—the Jesuit Southwell, Lodge’s text implicitly 
claims to speak on behalf o f  a spiritual authority located outside o f that text. 
Therefore, Lodge’s omission of the conventional heterobiographical pastoral 
author-figure (the equivalent of the Arcadias’ Philisides) invited close 
examination.
In Chapter 5, it was suggested that Lodge lost confidence in reconciliatory 
strategies following Southwell’s arrest and execution. Accordingly, in Wits 
Miserie (1596), Lodge (I proposed) attacked Shakespeare as a skulking “PLAIER 
Deuil”, writing plays in a rural location, using scriptural material in unorthodox, 
“scurrilous” ways. Shakespeare answered Lodge by adapting Rosalynde as the 
comedy As You Like It (1599). The latter text corrects the more conservative 
aspects of its source, as Chapter 6-8 demonstrated. Christians qua Christians—As
3 Devlin, Southwell, p. 318.
You Like It indicates—perform justification by facultative means, not 
strategically under adverse temporal conditions, but at all times and in all places.
That, in outline, is the argument of the present thesis. The emphasis on 
author-function, it may be acknowledged, has resulted (in accordance with the 
conventions of the period) in a masculinist bias. Space has not been found for 
sustained consideration of, for example, the characters of Rosalind and Celia. To 
have explored the figural valence of Rosalind and Celia adequately would have 
required detailed tracking of alternative streams of influence, including analysis 
of the treatment of the character “Rosalind(e)” in The Shepheardes Calender. 
However, one aspect of the play’s treatment of Rosalind may be briefly 
considered here.
As noted in Chapter 7, judgement/discernment (the forming of a settled 
opinion vis-a-vis apprehended phenomena), according to the facultative cognitive 
model, is best postponed until a moment subsequent to the accumulation of an 
adequate range of sensory data. As You Like It observes this delay in each of its 
presentations of staggered cognition except one: Oliver’s report of Orlando’s 
combat with the lioness. For that very reason, it is striking that the scene itself 
prominently foregrounds an instance of staggered cognition: Rosalind faints not 
at the sight of blood (4.3.92) but upon learning that the blood she has already 
observed on the napkin held by Oliver has been shed by Orlando in his combat 
with the lioness (153-55 and s.d). As with the “deer” reported to have been 
witnessed by Jaques in Act 2 Scene 1, the lioness is not a zoological entity. As 
noted by Neil H. Wright, Oliver describes, in the manner of an omniscient 
narrator, Orlando’s moments of indecision following his discovery of the 
sleeping Oliver being observed by the hungry lioness.4 Not only does Oliver 
recount bodily gestures which he could not have witnessed from a “realistic” 
point of view (4.3.99ff), he also—like Sidney’s narrator in the Arcadia—records 
Orlando’s thoughts. He knows what occasioned his brother’s various hesitations 
and what finally enabled him to overcome them:
4 Wright, “Psalter Lion”.
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Twice did he tume his backe and purposed so 
[to leave Oliver as ‘Food to the ... Lyonnesse’]
But kindnesse, nobler euer then reuenge,
And Nature stronger then his just occasion,
Made him giue battell to the Lyonnesse (124-9)
These circumstances indicate that the battle with the “lioness” occurs in a 
space to which Orlando and Oliver share common access. According to 
facultative topology, the soul comprises three principal faculties. In the 
Anselmian/Piconian model these are the will, the intellect and the appetite. I have 
argued that these are figured by the characters of Oliver (will), Jaques (intellect) 
and Orlando (appetite), with the melancholy Jaques and Jaques de Boys sharing 
duties as respectively the active and passive sub-faculties of the intellect. Thus, it 
follows that the interior space to which Orlando and Oliver both have access is 
the human soul. The intellectual faculty is absent from this encounter, due to the 
will’s dormancy and the appetite’s excessive strength, but is recalled (as Jaques 
de Boys) from “schoole” as a consequence of the outcome, when the appetite 
converts its strength/passion to charitable use and the will awakens (131).
Since the battle occurs in the human soul, and the hungry lioness is not 
biological, what is the nature of the blood on the napkin? As soon as Rosalind is 
informed by Oliver that the blood belongs to Orlando, she cognizes its meaning 
immediately, over-riding the facultative process exhibited in the play’s other 
presentations of staggered cognition. (It may be recalled that Rosalind’s 
impatience was a determining feature in another departure from facultative 
protocol.) Rosalind’s immediate cognition of the meaning of the blood, following 
Oliver’s account, occasions her swoon. (The swoon is not feigned according to 
Oliver’s witness [4.3.168-70].) This response has been read as a sexist 
insinuation that Rosalind-disguised-as-Ganimed thus reveals her gender.5 
However, read facultatively, the response confirms Rosalind’s participation in
5 Juliet Dusinberre, “AYLI,” p. 415, in Richard Dutton & Jean Howard, eds. A Companion to 
Shakespeare’s Works. Volume 3: the Comedies (Maldon, Oxford & Carlton: Blackwell, 2003), 
pp. 411-28.
Orlando’s spiritual condition. As observed in the course of the thesis, Rosalind 
figures earthly beauty, being the inseparable companion of Celia: heavenly 
beauty. (Rosalind is not, therefore, equated with the “physical” because she is 
female.) Rosalind, as a figure for the body per se, participates in the soul’s being. 
According to Aristotle, the soul is the form of the body. (Augustine’s 
interpretation of the term “flesh” in Paul’s letter to the Galatians is consistent 
with the Aristotelian view.)6 On this perspective, by participating in Christ’s 
sacrifice, Orlando redeems the body. Again, Augustine’s position is relevant:
Et adgravamur ergo corruptibili corpore, et ipsius adgravationis causam non naturam 
substantiamque corporis sed eius corruptionem scientes nolumus corpore spoliari, sed 
eius immortalitate vestiri. Et tune erim erit, sed quia corruptibile non erit, non gravabit.
Consequently, we are burdened by the corruptible body, and yet knowing that the cause 
o f our burdening is not the true being and substance o f the body but its decay, we do not 
want to be stripped o f the body, but to be clothed with its immortality. For then too there 
will be a body, but because it will not be subject to decay, it will not be a burden.7
The body will die in the natural course of things—as possibly figured by 
Rosalind’s swoon—but through participation in Christ it will revive, as Rosalind 
does (“Looke,” says Oliver, indicating the prone Ganimed, “he recouers” 
[4.3.159]).
Rosalind’s delayed but (when it comes) immediate response indicates that 
she cognizes the blood on the napkin as the miraculous sign of Orlando’s 
participation in Christ. That is, she apprehends his loving sacrifice—the selfless 
act of saving another without anticipation of reward, the preparedness to put the 
interests of the dormant will before those of the appetite (how easy, after all, for 
Orlando to have let the lioness consume his will and thus obtain the material 
means to satisfy his sensual desires).
6 “[E]o locutionis modo quo totum significatur a parte ipsum hominem vult nomine camis 
intelligi”: McCracken, ed. City o f  God, XIV.2 (“he means the word ‘flesh’ to be understood as 
meaning ‘man’ by that figure o f speech which uses a part to indicate the whole”). See also: 
Chadwick, ed. Confessions, III. 10.
7 McCracken, ed. City o f  God, XIV.2.
The dormant will observes the battle as interested spectator, being 
dependent on the appetitive faculty’s translation of passion to grace. Who or 
what, then, “wills” Orlando’s decision to wrestle with the lioness? With the will 
unable either to accede to or to resist the urges of the appetite, grace is the only 
available agency. Hooker’s use of facultative rhetoric, as discussed in the 
Introduction, indicated that grace is rhetoric. Orlando has recently been worked 
upon at length by Rosalind’s rhetorical powers (and the rhetorical effect of her 
presence). Her theatrical lessons, delivered in confessional role-play sessions, 
were not salvific in themselves but they prepared Orlando so that his passion 
could convert to grace when the crucial moment offered itself.8 His own action in 
turn becomes a rhetorical intervention, occasioning the conversion of his will 
(unlike Saladyne—his equivalent in Lodge—Oliver has not repented prior to his 
rescue by his estranged brother).9 How different a process this is, incidentally, to 
deciding to take part in a wrestling bout because one’s social status is not being 
adequately acknowledged, and then exhibiting pique when one’s high pedigree 
and “virtue” go unrewarded.
Unlike Spenser’s Rosalind, Lodge’s heroine speaks a great deal.10 
Shakespeare’s Rosalind is no less loquacious but she faints, where Lodge’s 
princess does not, because of that miraculous blood, which (I suggest) announces 
that she and Orlando share a bond akin to that of the Virgin Mary and Christ.11 In 
other words, Rosalind has co-fashioned with Orlando a manifestation of Christ 
(as witnessed by the blood on the napkin). Rosalind thus cognizes her own 
participation in the mystical blood-loss via the napkin and faints from loss of
8 Here comparative study o f Spenser and Shakespeare’s Rosalind/e’s would prove especially 
useful, given that Spenser’s Rosalind is not allowed to speak directly in The Shepheardes 
Calender.
9 Saladyne announces his intention to perform “some penaunce” in a soliloquy prior to his own 
banishment by Torismond the usurper (60).
10 Kinney, “Female Faining,” pp. 292, 312.
11 For the Virgin Mary as a figure for the priesthood (being herself the first maker o f  Christ), see: 
Barbara Newman, Sister o f  Wisdom: St. H ildegard’s Theology o f  the Feminine (Aldershot: Scolar 
Press, 1987), p. 194; Marina Warner, Alone o f  All Her Sex: the Myth and Cult o f  the Virgin Mary, 
2nd edition. (London: Picador, 1990), pp. 220-1; Caroline Walker Bynum, Jesus as Mother: 
Studies in the Spirituality o f  the High Middle Ages (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 
1972), p. 255; Miri Rubin, Corpus Christi: the Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1991), p. 145.
blood accordingly. Where Rosader is made—as the past participle form 
implies—by Lodge’s Rosalind, Orlando co-fashions himself. Or rather, the 
present participle (-ando) suggests (since the self cannot fashion the self) that 
Orlando is fashioning itself (semantic ambiguity intended).
Rosalind faints, therefore, just as the Virgin Mary fainted at the crucifixion 
in many medieval presentations of that scene.12 The showing of the blood is 
equivalent to a presentation of the crucifixion in that it is a sign that Orlando died 
to himself (no matter if momentarily) and was reborn as non-self-bound process. 
He thus qualifies for marriage with Rosalind—the marriage of Rosalind and 
Orlando being a sacramental equivalent of the bodily union with God. Orthodox 
Renaissance theologians such as the Dominican Thomas de Vio (later Cardinal 
Cajetan) objected to the presentation of the fainting Mary because they feared it 
might be taken to indicate the Virgin’s lack of conscious participation in Christ’s 
divinity/resurrection.13 As You Like I f  s facultative analysis of the issue 
demonstrates that the matter is best regarded as concerning not the extent but the 
nature of the Virgin’s participation in Christ’s redemptive project. Nature does 
not know what outcome the sum of its rhetorical effects upon the human appetite 
will deliver until the moment of truth. A difference of (Catholic) opinion on the 
meaning of the Virgin Mary, therefore, is registered in As You Like I f  s departure 
from Rosalynde in having its heroine swoon:14 the future state of Shakespeare’s 
Rosalind was in the balance until the moment of her cognition of Orlando’s 
participation in Christ.
It is tempting to close on that rapturous note. However, I would like to 
acknowledge another area which I have not been able to explore in the space 
available but which has an obvious relevance to issues raised by the thesis. As 
observed in the Introduction, As You Like It as staged play is very much in step 
with the establishment position presented by Hooker in the Ecclesiastical Polity.
12 Amy Neff, “The Pain o f Compassio: Mary’s Labour at the Foot o f the Cross,” pp. 254-5, Art 
Bulletin 80 (1998), pp. 254-73; Rubin, Mother o f  God, p. 362; Sweeney, Snow in Arcadia, pp. 
148-9, 154; Robertson, Jr., Chaucer, pp. 214-5.
13 Rubin, Mother o f  God, p. 362.
14 For discussion o f  the comparable swoon in Tasso’s Aminta, see: Cody, Landscape, pp. 68-9.
However, when the comedy is considered as reading-text, it might be supposed 
that the situation alters. As with the figuration of Rosalind, one example will 
have to do duty here for the larger argument. When the comedy achieves social 
harmony, Jaques withdraws, being “not for dancing meazures” (5.4.191). This 
act of withdrawal can be read in the light of Hooker’s text. Hooker informed the 
discontented radical reformers of the 1580s and 1590s that, as dutiful members of 
a Christian commonwealth, they should accept the rulings of established 
authority if their doctrinal challenge to the Elizabethan Settlement was allowed a 
fair hearing. The only greater authority they could reasonably appeal to was not 
their subjective understanding of Scripture but a general council of Christendom 
or, failing that, a council of recognized delegates from the reformed churches.15 
Given these circumstances, the best course the reformers could follow would be 
to hone their arguments in private in order to render them as plausible as possible 
when presented in a legitimate public forum.16 (Hooker’s advice would also 
apply to Dyer’s case: instead of complaining in circulated verse, frustrated 
courtiers should nurse their grievances in private.)
At the end of As You Like It, Jaques de Boys, whom I have argued is a 
figure for the passive intellect, arrives in the forest without being summoned. 
Thus, he appears to participate in the settlement reached by the play’s resolution. 
Tellingly, though, he lacks a bride, which suggests that Shakespeare does not 
conceive of the intellectual faculty as having any crucial role to play in the 
communal performance of salvation. As mentioned, Jaques de Boys (read 
facultatively) returns from “schoole” as a consequence of Orlando converting his 
passions to grace and rousing the dormant will. With the appetite under control, 
and the will (Oliver) wedded to heaven (Celia), the (passive) intellect may now 
settle down to useful endeavours within the commonwealth.17 The melancholy 
Jaques, on the other hand, refuses to participate in the celebration of the new
15 Richard Hooker, “A Preface to Them That Seek (as They Term It,[)] the Reformation o f  the 
Laws and Orders Ecclesiastical in the Church o f  England,” p. 117, in Morris, ed. Ecclesiastical 
Polity, 1.77-146.
16 Hooker, “Preface,” pp. 120-1.
17 This point is informed by Elizabeth Hanson’s discussion o f Francis Bacon’s method for 
securing the results o f  empiricism from “every manifestation o f  the subject’s desire, or w ill”: 
Discovering the Subject in Renaissance England (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998), p. 140.
settlement. My question is: does the play present Jaques’ withdrawal in a positive 
or negative light? Should the intellect submit to merely a passive role within a 
Christian commonwealth? Another way of putting the question: is the notion of 
an “active” intellect an accident of culture (or a consequence of the fall) or is the 
distinction between active and passive intellects an ontological one? The 
simplest answer is that the play leaves the question open. However, does the 
play-as-staged-performance—or the play-as-read, for that matter—leave the 
question less open? Watching a performance of the play, one might (to speak 
stereotypically for heuristic purposes) be caught up in the dancing and festive 
joy, the promises of sensual gratification, and be inclined to regard Jaques as a 
self-righteous and mistaken killjoy. Reading the play in the study, the reflective 
reader might be more inclined to agree with Jaques that human beings are fools 
for allowing themselves to be seduced by transient pleasures.
The melancholy Jaques appears to take Hooker’s advice, retiring to a cave 
for further contemplation instead of venturing to criticize the new settlement 
which everyone else seems happy with. Thus, the play, as read, is arguably no 
less consistent with the Hookerian establishment position. Moreover, one must 
beware here of applying subjectivist logic instead of considering the matter 
facultatively. The active intellect will always—by definition—be “unhappy” with 
the status quo—how else could it be active unless it questioned the way things 
currently appear?18 Nonetheless, its activity is not independent of either the body 
or the community. Only when both the body and the community are well- 
regulated can the active intellect function in a non-polluting manner. This 
conclusion is consistent with aspects of Luther’s teaching. Luther’s view of 
marriage, for example, though entirely positive, was unromantic: one has 
physical needs and instead of suppressing them one should satisfy them in a 
manner consistent with civic order. This achieved, the intellect/s—passive and 
active—may be trusted to go about its/their work. The active intellectual faculty 
may be allowed to theorize in its cave/laboratory with the appetite properly 
satisfied and the will wedded to heaven.
18 Chadwick, ed. Confessions, XII.27 and p. 288.n.22.
One might read As You Like It, therefore, and find support there, say, for 
one’s eschatological hobby-horse. However, one should not then take this as a 
cue for issuing a public challenge to the religious establishment. Instead, one 
ought to attend a performance of the play in order to discern how consistent 
one’s reading is with the communal reception of the play.
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Appendix.
1. Arundel Harington Manuscript, fol. 106V-107.1
A complaint o f one forsaken o f his love.
1 He that his myrthe hath lost whose sorrowcomfort is dismayde, 
whose hope ys vayne, whose faythe ys scome whose trust ys all
betrayd,
2 Y f he have h-ld held them deere, & cannot cease to mone,
Come let him take his place by me, hee shall not rue alone.
3 But y f  the smallest sweet, be mixt wth all his sowre, [5] 
Y f in the day the moneth the yeere he feele one lightning howre.
4 then rest he wth him selfe he ys no mate for me,
whose feare ys fallen whose succor voyd, whose hurt his death
must be.
5 Yet not the wished deathe wch hathe noe playnt or lacke, 
which making free the better part, ys only natures wracke [10]
6 Oh noe that weare to well, my greefe ys o f the mynde, 
which allways yeeldes extreamest payns, but leaves the worst
behind.
7 As one that lives in shew, but inwardly doth dye,
whose knowledge ys a blody feeld whear all helpe slayne doth lye
8 Whose hart the awlter1S his spyrit to sacrifice, [15] 
vnto the powers whome to appease noe sorrows can suffise.
9 My fancies are lyke thomes on whiche I goe by nighte,
1 Text from Hughey, ed. Arundel Harington, 1.182-4.
Myne arguments are like an host whose force ys put to flyghte.
10 My sence my passions spye, my thought lyke mines olde,
o f famous Carthage, or the towne wch Synon bought and solde. [20]
11 Which still before myne eyes my mortall fall dothe laye,
Whome love and fortune once advaunct, & now have cast away.2
12 Oh thought, no thought but who woundes somtyme ye seat o f
Ioy,
somtyme the store o f rest, but now, the nourse o f all annoye.
13 1 sowed the soyle o f peace,my blisse was in the springe, [25] 
and day by day I eat the fruite that my lives tre did bringe
14 To nettles now my come my feelde ys turned to flynte 
whear sitting in the Cipres shade I reade this hiacinthe
15 The peace, the rest, the lyfe, that I enioyd o f yore tofore 
Came to the-”3'my lot that by the losse my smarte m ightbe the
more. [30]3
16 So to vnhappy me enne the best frames for the worst
Oh tyme, oh place, oh woordes, oh looks then deere but now
accurst
17 In was stands my delight, in ys and shall my woe,
Myne horror fastned in the yea, my hope hangde in the noe.
181 looke for noe releefe releefe would come to late, [35]
To late I fynde, I fynde to soone,we11 to well stood myne estate.
19 Behold suche is the end, what pleasure heere ys suer,
Ah nothinge ells but cares and playntes dothe to the world endure.
20 fforsaken first am I yea vutt vtterly forgotten,
and they that came not neere my faythe to my reward are gotten. [40]
Then love./
21 Then love wheare ys thie sawce that makes thie tormentes 
sweet
wheare ys the cawse that some have thowghte theare deathe for
the but meete.
22 The stately chast disdaine, the secret thankfulnesse.
“Line 22 is written over an erasure”: Hughey, ed. Arundel Harington, 11.202.
Hughey notes that “‘be’ is inserted in another ink”: Arundel Harington, 11.202.
The grace reserved the common light that shynes in worthinesse. 
Oh that yt weare not soe or I yt coulde excuse, [45]
[Oh] that the wrathe o f Ielowsye my iudgment might abvse.
[Tom page]
Oh frayle vnconstant vnconstant Kinde oh Sure in th trothe to no
man
[No w]omen Angells be, but loe, my Mrs ys a woman
Yet hate I but the fawlte and not the fawlty one
[Nor c]anne I ridd frome me the bonds in whiche I lye alone. [50]
26 Alone I lye whose lyke, in love was never yet.
The prince, the poore, the yownge, the ould, the fond, or full o f
wit.
27 Nor that I meane hence foorthe this straunge will to professe 
As one that could betray suche trothe d*o buyld on ficklenesse
28 But yt shall never fayle that my faythe bbare in hande [55] 
I have my word my word gave me bothe word and guift shall
stande.
29 Sithe then yt must be thus, and this ys all to yll,
I yeelde me captive to my curse my harde fate to fullfill.
30 The solitarye woodes my cyte shall becomme6
The darkest den shalbe my lodge in wch I reste or rome. [60]
31 O f heben blacke my boord, the wormes my feast shalbe. 
whearwth my carcase shalbe fed vntill they feed on me.
32 My bedwyne o f Niobe my bed o f Craggie rocke,
the serpents hisse myne harmonye the shreekinge owle my clocke.
33 Myne exercise nought ellse but raging agonyes, [65] 
My bookes o f spytefull fortunes foyles or dreary tragedyes.
34 My walke the pathe o f playnt my ppect into hell
Wheare wretched Sisiphe and his feeres in endless torment dwell.
35 And thoughe I seeme to vse the fayninge poetes style
To figure foorth my rufull flight my fall or my exile [70]
36 yet are my greefs not fayned whearin I sterue or pine.
Who feelethe moste shall fynde yt leaste y f  his compare w,h myne.
37 My songe y f  any aske whose greevous case ys suche
Die er thowe let his name be known his folly shews to muche.4 
38 But best yt is to hide and never come to lighte [75]
ffor one the earthe may none but I the accente sound aright./
ffln is./
2. Bodleian MS. Ashmole, 781, pp. 140-2.5
Hee that his mirth hath loste, whose comfort is dismaid,
Whose hope is vaine, whose faith is scomd, whose trust is all betraid;
If hee have held them deare, and cannot cease to moume,
Come, let him take his place by mee: he shall not rue alone.
But if the smallest sweete be mixt with all his sowre, [5]
If in the day, the moneth, the yeare, he finde one lightsome
howre,
Then rest hee by himself, he is noe mate for mee,
Whose feare is fallen, whose succor voyde, whose hurt his death
must be;
Yet not the wished death, that hath noe plainte nor lacke,
Which making free the better parte, is onely natures lacke; [10]
Oh noe, that were too well: my death is o f the mind,
Which always yeelds extreamest paines, yet keepes the most
behind:
4 The monogram “E.D.” appears in the left margin by this line: Hughey, ed. Arundel Harington, 
11.202 .
5 Text from Sargent, Dyer, p. 184-7, 205-7. Sargent uses ASH as copy-text but draws upon other 
versions for emendations. The text here is reconstructed from Sargent’s text and textual 
apparatus.
As one that lives in shewe, but inwardly doth dye,
Whose knowledge is a bloody field, wheare all help slaine doth lie;
Whose hart the Aulter is, whose spirit the sacrifize [15]
Vnto the Powers, whome to appease noe sorrowes can suffize:
My fancies are like thomes, on which I goe by night,
Mine arguments are like an hoste, that force hath put to flight:
whose sense whose thoughts whose passions like ruins old 
O f famous Carthage or the town that Sinon bought and sold, [20]
Which still before my face my mortall foe doth lay,
Whome love and fortune once advaunced and now hath cast
away.
0  thoughtes, noe thoughts, but woundes, sometimes the seate o f
Joy,
Sometymes the chaire o f quiet rest, but now o f all Annoy!
1 sewed the soyle o f peace, my blisse was in the springe, [25] 
And day by day I ate the fruits, that my Lives tree did bring.
To nettles no we my Come, my feild is tumd to flint,
Where, sitting in the Cipros shade, I reade the Hyacint.
The ioy, the rest, the life, that I enioyed o f yore,
Came to my lot, that by my losse, my smarte might smarte the
more. [30]
Thus to vnhappie man, the best frames to the worste,
O tyme, o place, o words, o looks deere then, but nowe accurst:
In was stood my delight, in is and shall my woe;
My horror hastned in the yea, my hope hangs in the noe.
I looke for noe delight, releefe will come too late, [35]
Too late I finde, I finde too well, too well stoode my estate.
Behold, suche is the end, and nothing such is sure:
Oh, nothing ells but plaints and cares, doth to the world enduer.
Forsaken first was I, then vtterly foregotten,
And he that came not to my faith, lo, my reward hath gotten. [40]
nowe love, where is thy laws, that make thy torments sweete: 
what is the cause, that some through thee have thought their
death but meete?
The stately chaste disdaine, the secret thanckfulness,
The grace reserved, the common light that shines in worthines?
O that it were not soe, or that I could excuse, [45]
O that the wrath o f Ielousie my Iudgment might abuse!
0  fraile vnconstant kind, and safe in trust to noe man!
Noe women angels are, and loe, my mystris is a woeman;
Yet had I but the falte, and not the faultie one,
Nor can I rid me o f the bands wherein I lye alone. [50]
Alone I lye, whose like by love was neuer yet,
Nor rich, nor poore, nor younge, nor old, nor fond, nor full o f
witt.
Hers still remaine must I, by wronge, by death, by shame:
1 cannot blot out o f my minde that love wrought in her name:
I cannot set at nought that I have held soe deare: [55]
I cannot make it seeme soe farre, that is indeed soe neare.
Not that I meane henceforth this strange will to professe:
I neuer will betray such trust and fall fickelnesse;
Nor shall it ever faile that my word have in hand:
I gave my worde, my worde gave me; both worde and guift shall
stand. [60]
Syth then it must be thus, and this is all to ill,
I yeelde me Captive to my curse, my harde fate to fulfill.
The sollitarie woodes my Cittie shall remaine:
The darkest den shalbe my lodge, whereto noe light shall come:
O f heban blacke my boorde, the wormes my meate shalbe, [65]
Wherewith my Carcasse shalbe fed, till they doe feede on mee:
My pillow the moulde, my bed the cragie rocke,
The serpents hysse my harmony, the scritchinge owle my clock:
Mine Exercise naught ells but raginge agonies,
My bookes o f spightfull fortunes foiles and drerye tragedies: [70]
My walkes the pathes o f plaint, my prospect into Hell,
With Sisiphus and all his pheres in endless paines to dwell.
And though I seeme to vse the Poets fained style,
To figure forth my wofull plight, my fall, and my Exile;
Yet is my greefe not faind, wherein I strive and pine: [75]
Whoe feeleth most, shall finde it least, comparing his with mine.
My song, if  anie aske whose greivous Case is such,
Dy er thou letst his name be knowne: his folly knowes to much,
But best were thee to hide, and neuer come to light,
For in the world can none but thee these accents sound aright. [80]
And soe an end, my Tale is tould: his life is but disdaind,
Whose sorrowes present painehim soe, his pleasures are full
faind.
3. Cambridge University Library, MS Dd.5.75, folios 25-5v.6
Bewayling his exile he singeth thus
He that his mirthe hathe lost, whose comfort is dismayd,
Whose hope is vayne, whose faith is skomd, whose trust is all
betrayed,
Y f he have held them dear and can not ceasse to moan,
Com let him take his place by me, he shall not rew alone.
But y f  the smallest sweete be mixt with all his sower, [5]
Y f in the day, the monethe, the year he feele one lightning hower,
Then rest he with himself, he is no mate for me,
Whose feare is fallen, whose succour voyd, whose helpe his death
must be.
Yet not the wished deathe which hath no playnt nor lacke,
Which making free the better part is only nature’s wracke; [10]
Oh noe! that were to well, my death is o f the mynd,
Which alwayes yeldes extremest pangues but keepes the worst
6 Text from May, Courtier Poets, pp. 290-4. May uses CUL as copy-text but draws upon other 
versions for emendations. The text here is reconstructed from May’s text and textual apparatus.
behind.
As one which lyves in show but inwardly doth die,
Whose knowlege is a bloudie field wher all help slayn dothe lie; 
Whose hart the alter is, whose spirit a sacrifice [15]
Unto the powers whom to appease no sorow may suffise.
My fancies are like thomes on which I goe by night,
Myn arguments are as an host whom force hath put to flight;
My sense my passions’ spie, my thoughtes like ruins old 
O f famous Carthage or the towne which Synon bought and sold,
[20]
Which still before myn eyes my mortall fall dothe lay,
Whom love and fortune once advanced but now have cast away.
Oh thoughtes, no thoughtes but woundes, somtyme the seates o f
joye,
Somtyme the store o f quiet rest but now o f all annoye.
I sowd the soile o f peace, my blisse was in the spring, [25]
And day by day I eat the fruict which my lyve’s tree doth bring.
To nettles now my Come, my feild is turned to flint,
Wher sitting in the Cypresse shade I read the hyacinthe.
The peace, the rest, the life which I enjoyed o f yore,
Cam to my lotte that by my losse my smart might sting the more. [30] 
So to unhappie men the best frames for the worst,
Oh tyme, ohe place, o wordes most dear, sweet then but now
accurst!
In (was) standes my delight, in (is) and (shall) my woe,
My horrour fastened in the (yea), my hope hanges in the (noe).
I looke for no relief, reliefe would com to late, [35]
To late I fynd, I fynd to well, somtyme stood my estate.
Behold suche is the end, what pleasure here is sure?
Ohe nothing els but care and playnt dothe to the world endure. 
Forsaken first am I, then utterlie forgotten,
And they that cam not to my faith to my reward have gotten. [40] 
Then love wher is the sawce that makes thie tormentes sweete?
What is the cause that many thinke ther death throughe the but
meete?
The statly chast disdayn, the secret thankfulness,
The grace reserved, the common light that shines in worthiness; 
Oh that yt wer not so, or I yt could excuse, [45]
Or that the wrathe o f Jelousie my judgement did abuse.
Oh frail, inconstaunt kynd, o safe in trust to no man,
No wemen aungels be and lo my maystres is a woman;
Yet hate I but the fault and not the faultie one,
Nor can I rid from me the bonds in which I lie alone. [50]
Alone I lie whose like in love was never yet,
The prince, the poore, the yong, the old, the fond or full o f witte. 
Here styll remayn must I, by death, by wrong, by shame,
I cannot blott out o f my brest what love wrought in her name;
I cannot sett at naught which I have held so dear, [55]
I cannot make yt seme so farre which is in deed so neere.
Not that I mean henceforth this straunge will to professe,
As one that could betray suche trothe to build on fickleness,
For yt shall never faile that my faithe bore in hand:
I gave my word, my word gave me, bothe word and gift shall
stand. [60]
Sithe then yt must be thus, and this is all to yll 
I yeld me captive to my curse my hard fate to fulfill.
The solitarie wood my citie shall becom,
The darkest denne shalbe my lodge wherin I rest or runne;
O f eben blacke my boord, the wormes my feat shallbe [65]
Wherwith my bodie shalbe fed till they doe feede on me.
My wyne o f Niobie, my bed a craggie rocke,
The serpent’s hisse my harmonie, the scriching owle my clocke. 
My exercise nought els but raging agonies,
My bookes o f spightfull fortune’s foiles and drery trajedies, [70] 
My walke the pathe o f playntes, my prospect into hell 
Wher Sisiphus, that wretched wight, in endlesse payn dothe dwell. 
And though I seeme to use the fayninge poets’ stile 
To figure forthe my ruthefull plight, my fall and my exile,
Yet is my greife not fained wherin I sterve and pyne, [75]
Who feeles his most shall fynd yt least y f  his compare with myne. 
My song, y f any aske whose greivous case is suche,
Die er thou lette his name be knowen, his folie shoes to muche; 
But best is the to hide and never com to light,
For on the earthe may none but I this accent sound aright. [80]
4. Stonyhurst MS A.v.27.7
D ye rs  p h a n cy  tu rn ed  to  a  S inners C om plain te
Hee that his myrth hath lost 
Whose comfort is to rue 
Whose hope is falne whose faith is eras’d 
Whose trust is founde untrue 
If he have helde them deere [5]
And cannot cease to mone 
Come lett him take his place by me 
He shall not rue alone 
But if  the smallest sweete 
Be mixt with all his sowre [10]
If in the day the moneth the yere 
He feele one lightninge houre 
Then rest he with himself 
He is no mate for me 
Whose tyme in teares whose race in ruth [15]
Whose life a death must be 
Yett not the wished deathe 
That feeles no plaint or lacke 
That makinge free the better parte
7 Text from Davidson & Sweeney, eds. Collected Poems, pp. 3 2 - 5 .
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Is onely natures wracke 
O no that were to well 
My death is o f the mynde 
That allwaies yeldes extremest pangues 
Yet threttens worse behind 
As one that lives in shewe 
And inwardly doth dye 
Whose knowledge is a bloodye feilde 
Where vertue slayne doth lye.
Whose hart the Alter is 
And hoast a god to move 
From whome my evell doth feare revenge 
His good doth promise love 
My phancies are like thomes 
In which I go by nighte 
My frighted witts are like an hoaste 
That force hath put to flighte 
My sence is passions spie 
My thoughtes like ruyns old 
Which shew how faire the building was 
While grace did it upholde.
And still before myne eyes 
My mortall fall doth laye 
Whom grace and vertue once advauncd 
Nowe Synne hath cast away
0  thoughtes no thoughtes but woundes 
Sometyme the seate o f joy
Sometime the store o f quiet rest 
But now o f all annoye.
1 sow’d the soyle o f peace
My blisse was in the springe 
And day by day the fruite I eate 
That Vertues tree did bringe 
To nettles nowe my Come
Where I a heavie harvest reape 
O f cares that never stynt 
The peace the rest the life 
That I enjoyd o f yore 
Were happy lott but by their losse 
My smarte doth stinge the more.
So to unhappye men 
The best frames to the worste 
O time o place where thus I fell 
Deere then but now accurste 
In was stands my delighte 
In is and shall my woe 
My horrour fastned in the yea 
My hope hangd in the no.
Unworthy o f reliefe 
That craved it to late 
Too late I finde I finde too well 
Too well stoode my estate 
Behould such is the ende 
That pleasure doth procure 
O f nothing els but care and plaint 
Can she the mynde assure 
Forsaken firste by grace 
By pleasure now forgotten 
Her payne I feele but graces wage 
Have others from me gotten.
Then grace where is the joye 
That makes thy torments sweete 
Where is the cause that many thought 
Their Deathes through the but meete 
Where thy disdayne o f synne 
Thy secreet sweete delite 
Thy sparkes o f blisse thy heavenly rayes
That shined erst so brighte 
O that they were not loste 
Or I coulde it excuse 
O that a dreame o f fayned losse 
My judgement did abuse
0  frayle inconstant fleshe 
Soone trapt in every gynn
Soone wrought thus to betray thy soule 
And plunge thy selfe in synne 
Yett hate I but the faulte 
And not the faltye one 
Ne can I rid from me the mate 
That forceth me to mone 
To moane a Synners Case 
Then which was never worse 
In prince or poore in yonge or old 
In bliss’d or full o f curse 
Yett gods must I remayne 
By death by wronge by shame
1 cannot blott out o f my harte
That grace wrote in his name 
I cannot sett at nought
Whome I have held so deare 
I cannot make him seeme afarre 
That is in dede so neere.
Not that I looke henceforthe 
For love that earst I founde 
Sith that I brake my plighted truth 
To build on fickle grounde 
Yet that shall never fayle 
Which my faith bare in hande 
I gave my vow my vow gave me 
Both vow and gift shall stande 
But since that I have synnd
And scourge none is to ill 
I yeld me captive to my curse 
My hard fate to fulfill.
The solitarye Woode 
My Citye shall become 
The darkest Denns shall be my lodge 
In which I rest or come.
A sandy plot my borde
The wormes my feast shall be 
Wherewith my carcas shall be fedd 
Untill they feede on mee 
My teares shall be my Wyne 
My bedd a craggy rocke 
My harmonye the serpents hysse 
The screeching oule my clocke 
My exercise remorse 
And dolefull sinners layes 
My booke remembrance o f my crymes 
And faltes o f former dayes 
My Walke the pathe o f playnte 
My prospect into hell 
Where Judas and his cursed crewe 
In endles paynes do dwell 
And though I seemed to use 
The feyning Poets stile 
To figure forth my carefull plight 
My fall and my exile 
Yet is my greife not faynd 
Wherein I sterve and pyne 
Who feeleth most shall thinke it lest 
If his Compare with myne.
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